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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2009

Orbital Debris Quarterly News: No. 1 - Volume 13

Topics discussed include: new debris from a decommissioned satellite with a nuclear power source; debris from the destruction of the Fengyun-1C meteorological satellite; quantitative analysis of the European Space Agency's Automated Transfer Vehicle 'Jules Verne' reentry event; microsatellite impact tests; solar cycle 24 predictions and other long-term projections and geosynchronus (GEO) environment for the Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM2008). Abstracts from the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, examining satellite reentry risk assessments and statistical issues for uncontrolled reentry hazards, are also included.

Liou, J.-C.↗
NASA NTRS2018

An Investigation of Risk Management Approaches for NASA Piloted X-Plane Projects

NASA is resuming X-plane research. It plans to build a low-boom supersonic flight demonstrator (LBFD), an all-electric general aviation aircraft (X-57), and possibly an ultra-efficient subsonic transport (UEST) demonstrator. In an attempt to define what levels of risk are appropriate in piloted X-plane research, the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) evaluated numerous NASA, Department of Defense (DoD), and industry project management and risk assessment tools. Provided are the results of the evaluations of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5, 7120.8, and 8705.4; Langley Research Center (LaRC) Procedural Requirement (LPR) 7120.5; Dryden (Armstrong) Center Procedures S-002 and X-009; and Military Handbook 516C. Some of these were applied to the LBFD and X-57 aircraft. The impacts on risk of budgeting decisions and specialized flight conditions were also considered. None of the evaluated processes were found to be fully appropriate for governing experimental aircraft projects, but many useful elements were found in some of them.

X-59↗
NASA NTRS2001

Probabilistic Risk-Based Approach to Aeropropulsion System Assessment Developed

In an era of shrinking development budgets and resources, where there is also an emphasis on reducing the product development cycle, the role of system assessment, performed in the early stages of an engine development program, becomes very critical to the successful development of new aeropropulsion systems. A reliable system assessment not only helps to identify the best propulsion system concept among several candidates, it can also identify which technologies are worth pursuing. This is particularly important for advanced aeropropulsion technology development programs, which require an enormous amount of resources. In the current practice of deterministic, or point-design, approaches, the uncertainties of design variables are either unaccounted for or accounted for by safety factors. This could often result in an assessment with unknown and unquantifiable reliability. Consequently, it would fail to provide additional insight into the risks associated with the new technologies, which are often needed by decisionmakers to determine the feasibility and return-on-investment of a new aircraft engine.

Tong, Michael T.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations (BLEs) used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the coefficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for spacecraft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar surface assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Equation Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. This paper will expand on the hypervelocity impact (HVI) testing and ballistic limit equation (BLE) definition work that was partially presented at the 2nd International Orbital De-bris (IOC-II) Conference held in Sugar Land, TX in December 2023. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the co-efficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for space-craft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar sur-face assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environ-ment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Mar-shall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗
NASA NTRS2022

Unique Science from the Moon in the Artemis Era

Since the beginning of the space age, the Moon has been proposed as a platform for astronomy. The Moon provides unique capabilities for astrophysics observations. NASA’s Artemis plan to return humans to the Moon in the mid-2020s in a sustainable manner provides an opportunity to advance synergistic approaches between human and robotic exploration. This NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) workshop assesses the feasibility and value proposition of using the Moon as a location for performing unique science observations, leveraging Artemis-era infrastructure while evaluating risks and key engineering challenges.

NASA Engineering and Safety Center↗
NASA NTRS2004

Risk Management Implementation Tool

Continuous Risk Management (CM) is a software engineering practice with processes, methods, and tools for managing risk in a project. It provides a controlled environment for practical decision making, in order to assess continually what could go wrong, determine which risk are important to deal with, implement strategies to deal with those risk and assure the measure effectiveness of the implemented strategies. Continuous Risk Management provides many training workshops and courses to teach the staff how to implement risk management to their various experiments and projects. The steps of the CRM process are identification, analysis, planning, tracking, and control. These steps and the various methods and tools that go along with them, identification, and dealing with risk is clear-cut. The office that I worked in was the Risk Management Office (RMO). The RMO at NASA works hard to uphold NASA s mission of exploration and advancement of scientific knowledge and technology by defining and reducing program risk. The RMO is one of the divisions that fall under the Safety and Assurance Directorate (SAAD). I worked under Cynthia Calhoun, Flight Software Systems Engineer. My task was to develop a help screen for the Continuous Risk Management Implementation Tool (RMIT). The Risk Management Implementation Tool will be used by many NASA managers to identify, analyze, track, control, and communicate risks in their programs and projects. The RMIT will provide a means for NASA to continuously assess risks. The goals and purposes for this tool is to provide a simple means to manage risks, be used by program and project managers throughout NASA for managing risk, and to take an aggressive approach to advertise and advocate the use of RMIT at each NASA center.

Wright, Shayla L.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Three-Dimensional, Transgenic Cell Models to Quantify Space Genotoxic Effects

The space environment contains radiation and chemical agents known to be mutagenic and carcinogenic to humans. Additionally, microgravity is a complicating factor that may modify or synergize induced genotoxic effects. Most in vitro models fail to use human cells (making risk extrapolation to humans more difficult), overlook the dynamic effect of tissue intercellular interactions on genotoxic damage, and lack the sensitivity required to measure low-dose effects. Currently a need exists for a model test system that simulates cellular interactions present in tissue, and can be used to quantify genotoxic damage induced by low levels of radiation and chemicals, and extrapolate assessed risk to humans. A state-of-the-art, three-dimensional, multicellular tissue equivalent cell culture model will be presented. It consists of mammalian cells genetically engineered to contain multiple copies of defined target genes for genotoxic assessment,. NASA-designed bioreactors were used to coculture mammalian cells into spheroids, The cells used were human mammary epithelial cells (H184135) and Stratagene's (Austin, Texas) Big Blue(TM) Rat 2 lambda fibroblasts. The fibroblasts were genetically engineered to contain -a high-density target gene for mutagenesis (60 copies of lacl/LacZ per cell). Tissue equivalent spheroids were routinely produced by inoculation of 2 to 7 X 10(exp 5) fibroblasts with Cytodex 3 beads (150 micrometers in diameter). at a 20:1 cell:bead ratio, into 50-ml HARV bioreactors (Synthecon, Inc.). Fibroblasts were cultured for 5 days, an equivalent number of epithelial cells added, and the fibroblast/epithelial cell coculture continued for 21 days. Three-dimensional spheroids with diameters ranging from 400 to 600 micrometers were obtained. Histological and immunohistochemical Characterization revealed i) both cell types present in the spheroids, with fibroblasts located primarily in the center, surrounded by epithelial cells; ii) synthesis of extracellular matrix; and iii,, mitotic cells located throughout the spheroids. Spheroidal integrity and cell viability were retained for the 30-day test period after removal of spheroids from the bioreactor. Potential utility of this three-dimensional, transgenic model for genotoxicity was initially assessed by exposure of spheroids to 0-2 Gy neon at dose rates of 0.3 to 1.5 Gy/min (National Institute of Radiological Sciences, Chiba, Japan). Quantification of mutation at the lacl gene revealed a linear dose response for mutation induction. Limited sequencing analysis of mutant clones revealed higher frequencies of deletions and multiple base sequence changes with increasing dose. These results suggest that our three-dimensional, transgenic model is applicable to a wide variety of studies involving the quantification, identification, and characterization of genotoxicity incurred in space and on Earth. This model uniquely allows investigation of the interaction of relevant factors, namely cell-to-cell interactions and the mechanistic interaction of microgravity with radiation insults and DNA repair. Using this three-dimensional model will allow us to obtain dual genotoxic information (i.e., mutation rate plus chromosome aberration data) from the same system so that one endpoint can be used to reference the other, thereby increasing the fidelity of the data set. Moreover, the tissue-equivalent nature of the three-dimensional model provides high confidence for relevance of risk assessment, i.e., the establishment of quality factors directly applicable to the microgravity environment.

Gonda, S. R.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Exploration Medical System Trade Study Tools Overview

ExMC is creating an ecosystem of tools to enable well-informed medical system trade studies. The suite of tools address important system implementation aspects of the space medical capabilities trade space and are being built using knowledge from the medical community regarding the unique aspects of space flight. Two integrating models, a systems engineering model and a medical risk analysis model, tie the tools together to produce an integrated assessment of the medical system and its ability to achieve medical system target requirements. This presentation will provide an overview of the various tools that are a part of the tool ecosystem. Initially, the presentation's focus will address the tools that supply the foundational information to the ecosystem. Specifically, the talk will describe how information that describes how medicine will be practiced is captured and categorized for efficient utilization in the tool suite. For example, the talk will include capturing what conditions will be planned for in-mission treatment, planned medical activities (e.g., periodic physical exam), required medical capabilities (e.g., provide imaging), and options to implement the capabilities (e.g., an ultrasound device). Database storage and configuration management will also be discussed. The presentation will include an overview of how these information tools will be tied to parameters in a Systems Modeling Language (SysML) model, allowing traceability to system behavioral, structural, and requirements content. The discussion will also describe an HRP-led enhanced risk assessment model developed to provide quantitative insight into each capability's contribution to mission success. Key outputs from these various tools, to be shared with the space medical and exploration mission development communities, will be assessments of medical system implementation option satisfaction of requirements and per-capability contributions toward achieving requirements.

Mindock, J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Error Localization Examples: Looking for a Needle in a Hay-stack

Finite element models (FEM) are routinely developed and used during fabrication of high dollar-value hardware. NASA as part of the pre-flight certification of launch vehicles routinely conducts vibration and static tests to calibrate models used for flight-risk assessments. As part of the calibration process, certain areas in the model are modified, using engineering judgment and sensitivity analysis, to match the test results. Unfortunately, tools to identify problem areas in the FEM using test data directly are scarce. Over the years, Error Localization Algorithms (ELA) have been proposed with very limited success. Recently, the Analytical Dynamics Model Improvement (ADMI) algorithm, which computes closed-form mass and stiffness corrections to match the test data exactly, have been shown to be effective for error localization. The paper will present several FEM example problems where ELA is used with simulated test data to determine FEM problem areas. For each example, the correct answer is shown along with ELA results. It is shown that the ELA process is able to identify general problem areas in the FEM, which are consistent with known model perturbations. However, in most cases the ELA identified area of improvement is larger than the true answer. Nonetheless, with proper optimization tools, calibration results using the ELA identified areas provide excellent results.

error localization↗
NASA NTRS2007

The Road to Mach 10: A History of the X-43A Hypersonic Flight Test Program at NASA Dryden...Toward the Future

In terms of technology, the X-43A/Hyper-X represented a singular milestone. After nearly a half century of high hopes, studies, wind tunnel tests, proposals, and canceled projects, a scramjet-powered vehicle had flown. The performance of the engine qualified the scramjet design tools and scaling laws. In turn, the theoretical calculations and ground testing could be used to design more advanced engine concepts. Just as important, both the scramjet and vehicle systems had successfully operated in the variable temperatures and densities of the atmosphere. The X-43A systems were able to maintain the exact flight conditions necessary for the scramjet to operate properly. Control deflections to correct the engine-induced moments were close to pre-flight predictions. When the unexpected occurred, such as when the vehicle pitched up during the cowl opening on the second flight, the control system was sufficiently designed to correct the situation. The airframe and wing structure, the thermal protection material, and the internal conditions of the X-43A performed largely as predicted. The HXLV thermal anomaly during the ascent on the third flight and "the Mach 8 unpleasantness" during the descent indicated that the HXLV and X-43A were not as resilient to aerodynamic heating as expected. The X-43A 's airframe drag and lift both were slightly higher than predicted, but still within preflight uncertainty predictions. The stability and control were as predicted, as was the boundary layer transition. The biggest aerodynamic worry before the flight was the separation of the HXLV and the X- 43A. After all was said and done, this went exactly as predicted, proving that non-symmetrical/high-dynamic pressure stage separations could be performed. This in turn meant that two-stage-to-orbit vehicles employing this technology were feasible. The Hyper-X program also served as a training ground for a new generation of scramjet and hypersonic researchers. This included both NASA and contractor personnel, providing them with experience in ground testing and component development; vehicle design, construction, integration, system checkout, and, ultimately, flight testing and data analysis. Additionally, researchers learned the practical details of running a project within finite budget and time limits, about the ambiguousness of risk assessment, and about the need to spend a significant amount of time and effort dealing with engineering problems, such as those with the FAS, that have nothing to do with the project's research goals. Finally, all those who worked on the X-43A project now know what it is like to spend years transforming an idea into a functional vehicle, only for it to be lost in a matter of seconds. And then to go through years of work to correct the problems, to face the possibility that still more might exist, and finally to savor the triumph of two successful flights. For those who will work on the hypersonic projects that emerge in coming years, these experiences may prove to be the most valuable of all.

Peebles, Curtis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Defining A Modelling Language to Support Functional Hazard Assessment

Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) is a key early-stage engineering process that supports the incorporation of safety in design by identifying the high-level functional hazards the system may encounter. While many FHA-like methodologies have been proposed in the design engineering literature, many of these methodologies have had difficulty becoming accepted industry practice. Industry standards, on the other hand, either provide too little recommendation on how to represent the function of the system to perform FHA, or rely on existing design artefacts which insufficiently support the goals of the process. This paper presents some of the problems with current modeling languages (both proposed and used) for FHA which limit the scope, expressiveness, flexibility, and precision of the analysis. It then outlines desirable principles an FHA-supporting analysis language should embody, and introduces the Functional Reasoning Design Language (FRDL), a formal modeling language for describing the functional elements of a system and their interactions, which aims to satisfy these principles. To demonstrate the use of this language, the modeling and hazard analysis of a disaster response drone is presented. While this case study is limited in scope, it highlights how FRDL can represent system function while reducing the ambiguity present in typical FHA-supporting functional modeling languages

Hazard Assessment↗
NASA NTRS1989

Dynamic systems-engineering process - The application of concurrent engineering

A system engineering methodology is described which enables users, particulary NASA and DOD, to accommodate changing needs; incorporate emerging technologies; identify, quantify, and manage system risks; manage evolving functional requirements; track the changing environment; and reduce system life-cycle costs. The approach is a concurrent, dynamic one which starts by constructing a performance model defining the required system functions and the interrelationships. A detailed probabilistic risk assessment of the system elements and their interrelationships is performed, and quantitative analysis of the reliability and maintainability of an engineering system allows its different technical and process failure modes to be identified and their probabilities to be computed. Decision makers can choose technical solutions that maximize an objective function and minimize the probability of failure under resource constraints.

Wiskerchen, Michael J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Identification and Classification of Common Risks in Space Science Missions

Due to the highly constrained schedules and budgets that NASA missions must contend with, the identification and management of cost, schedule and risks in the earliest stages of the lifecycle is critical. At the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) it is the concurrent engineering teams that first address these items in a systematic manner. Foremost of these concurrent engineering teams is Team X. Started in 1995, Team X has carried out over 1000 studies, dramatically reducing the time and cost involved, and has been the model for other concurrent engineering teams both within NASA and throughout the larger aerospace community. The ability to do integrated risk identification and assessment was first introduced into Team X in 2001. Since that time the mission risks identified in each study have been kept in a database. In this paper we will describe how the Team X risk process is evolving highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches. The paper will especially focus on the identification and classification of common risks that have arisen during Team X studies of space based science missions.

Risk Identification↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Systems Engineering and Safety Culture: Aerospace Project Design and Implementation Challenges

Using Systems Engineering principles and the NASA Glenn Safety procedures and protocols, a rigorous method was developed to ensure safe testing and operation of a small, commercial off the shelf turbofan engine at the Aero-Acoustic Propulsion Laboratory (AAPL). The DGEN380 is a small, ~500-lbf thrust class, high-bypass, geared- turbofan engine with a separate flow nozzle. It is a modular, compact, lightweight turbofan with Full-Authority Digital Engine Control. It’s general characteristics make it an ideal candidate for utilization as a testbed for engine aero-acoustic technology maturation in a relevant performance environment. The DGEN380 is the core component of the DGEN Aero-propulsion Research Turbofan (DART) mobile test rig. The full presentation will describe the risk assessment and mitigation process applied to the DART by the project team. The identification and analysis of failure modes led to the development of risk mitigation plans, which include administrative, engineering, and physical controls for the safe operation of the DART test rig at the AAPL facility.

Systems Engineering, Aeronautics, safety↗
NASA NTRS1994

Panel to review EOSDIS plans

Formed in Jan. 1992, the Panel to Review EOSDIS Plans was charged with advising NASA on its plans for developing the Earth Observing System (EOS) Data and Information System (EOSDIS). Specifically, the panel was asked to do the following: assess the validity of the engineering and technical underpinnings of the EOSDIS; assess its potential value to scientific users; suggest how technical risk can be minimized; and assess whether current plans are sufficiently resilient to be adaptable to changing technology and requirements such as budget environments, data volumes, new users, and new databases. The panel completed an interim report (Addendum A) and transmitted it to NASA and other interested parties in the government on 9 Apr. 1992. Because of a delay in NASA's plans to select the contractor for EOSDIS, the panel was not able to complete its review of the program according to the original government request. With the issuance of a letter report (Addendum B) on 28 Sep. 1992, the panel became inactive until such time as NASA could release the details of the contractor's proposed architecture, schedule, and costs for developing EOSDIS. In early 1993, NASA awarded the contract for the EOSDIS Core System (ECS). On 20 Apr. 1993, NASA asked the panel to reconvene to do the following: ( 1) complete its review of NASA's approach to the EOSDIS architecture and implementation; (2) appraise NASA's responses to the panel's previous recommendations; and (3) review the planning for EOSDIS in the context of NASA's role in the Global Change Data and Information System (GCDIS) implementation plan. To respond to the NASA charge, the panel met three times in 1993 including sessions with NASA officials and the EOSDIS contractor. In addition, several of the panel members visited individual Distributed Active Archive Centers (DAAC's) to obtain additional views of EOSDIS. The panel has now obtained substantial information on the EOSDIS budget, contractor work program, and current baseline architecture that was not previously available, due to procurement restrictions. This report presents the panel's findings and recommendations based on this additional information.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2009

Constellation Program (CxP) Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Project Integrated Landing System

Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Chief Engineer requested a risk comparison of the Integrated Landing System design developed by NASA and the design developed by Contractor- referred to as the LM 604 baseline. Based on the results of this risk comparison, the CEV Chief engineer requested that the NESC evaluate identified risks and develop strategies for their reduction or mitigation. The assessment progressed in two phases. A brief Phase I analysis was performed by the Water versus Land-Landing Team to compare the CEV Integrated Landing System proposed by the Contractor against the NASA TS-LRS001 baseline with respect to risk. A phase II effort examined the areas of critical importance to the overall landing risk, evaluating risk to the crew and to the CEV Crew Module (CM) during a nominal land-landing. The findings of the assessment are contained in this report.

Baker, John D.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Advanced Booster Composite Case/Polybenzimidazole Nitrile Butadiene Rubber Insulation Development

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was requested to examine processing sensitivities (e.g., cure temperature control/variance, debonds, density variations) of polybenzimidazole nitrile butadiene rubber (PBI-NBR) insulation, case fiber, and resin systems and to evaluate nondestructive evaluation (NDE) and damage tolerance methods/models required to support human-rated composite motor cases. The proposed use of composite motor cases in Blocks IA and II was expected to increase performance capability through optimizing operating pressure and increasing propellant mass fraction. This assessment was to support the evaluation of risk reduction for large booster component development/fabrication, NDE of low mass-to-strength ratio material structures, and solid booster propellant formulation as requested in the Space Launch System NASA Research Announcement for Advanced Booster Engineering Demonstration and/or Risk Reduction. Composite case materials and high-energy propellants represent an enabling capability in the Agency's ability to provide affordable, high-performing advanced booster concepts. The NESC team was requested to provide an assessment of co- and multiple-cure processing of composite case and PBI-NBR insulation materials and evaluation of high-energy propellant formulations.

Gentz, Steve↗