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Space projects rely completely on people for development and implementation - but project-related risk list rarely include human factors as significant sources of risk. The paper notes mitigation techniques for risks associated with the human factors - readers are encouraged to come up with as many mitigation strategies as possible, and share them with each other.
Space Telerobotics research, performed under contract to the European Space Agency (ESA), concerning the execution of human factors experiments, and ultimately leading to the development of a telerobotics test bed, has been carried out since 1985 by a British Consortium consisting of British Aerospace, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and, more recently, the UK National Advanced Robotics Research Centre. The principal aim of the first study of the series was to derive preliminary requirements for a teleoperation servicing system, with reference to two mission model scenarios. The first scenario introduced the problem of communications time delays, and their likely effect on the ground-based operator in control of a manipulator system on board an unmanned servicing vehicle in Low Earth Orbit. In the second scenario, the operator was located on the NASA Orbiter aft flight deck, supervising the control of a prototype manipulator in the 'servicing' of an experimental payload in the cargo bay area. Human factors analyses centered on defining the requirements for the teleoperator workstation, such as identifying basic ergonomic requirements for workstation and panel layouts, defining teleoperation strategies, developing alphanumeric and graphic screen formats for the supervision or direct control of the manipulator, and the potential applications of expert system technology. The second study for ESA involved an experimental appraisal of some of the important issues highlighted in the first study, for which relevant human factors data did not exist. Of central importance during the second study was the issue of communications time delays and their effect on the manual control of a teleoperated manipulator from a ground-based command and control station.
Previewing human capabilities in a computer-aided engineering mode has assisted greatly in planning well-designed systems without the cost and time involved in mockups and engineering models. To date, the computer models have focused on such variables as field of view, accessibility and fit, and reach envelopes. Program outputs have matured from simple static pictures to animations viewable from any eyepoint. However, while kinematics models are available, there are few biomechanical models available for estimating strength and motion patterns. Those, such as Crew Chief, that are available are based on strength measurements taken in specific positions. Johnson Space Center is pursuing a biomechanical model which will use strength data collected on single joints at two or three velocities to attempt to predict compound motions of several joint simultaneously and the resulting force at the end effector. Two lines of research are coming together to produce this result. One is an attempt to use optimal control theory to predict joint motion in complex motions, and another is the development of graphical representation of human capabilities. The progress to date in this research is described.
The formal approach described herein computationally simulates the probable ranges of uncertainties for the human factor in probabilistic assessments of structural reliability. Human factors such as marital status, professional status, home life, job satisfaction, work load, and health are studied by using a multifactor interaction equation (MFIE) model to demonstrate the approach. Parametric studies in conjunction with judgment are used to select reasonable values for the participating factors (primitive variables). Subsequently performed probabilistic sensitivity studies assess the suitability of the MFIE as well as the validity of the whole approach. Results show that uncertainties range from 5 to 30 percent for the most optimistic case, assuming 100 percent for no error (perfect performance).
Even under optimal conditions, helicopter flight is a most demanding form of human-machine interaction, imposing continuous manual, visual, communications, and mental demands on pilots. It is made even more challenging by small margins for error created by the close proximity of terrain in NOE flight and missions flown at night and in low visibility. Although technology advances have satisfied some current and proposed requirements, hardware solutions alone are not sufficient to ensure acceptable system performance and pilot workload. However, human factors data needed to improve the design and use of helicopters lag behind advances in sensor, display, and control technology. Thus, it is difficult for designers to consider human capabilities and limitations when making design decisions. This results in costly accidents, design mistakes, unrealistic mission requirements, excessive training costs, and challenge human adaptability. NASA, in collaboration with DOD, industry, and academia, has initiated a program of research to develop scientific data bases and design principles to improve the pilot/vehicle interface, optimize training time and cost, and maintain pilot workload and system performance at an acceptable level. Work performed at Ames, and by other research laboratories, will be reviewed to summarize the most critical helicopter human factors problems and the results of research that has been performed to: (1) Quantify/model pilots use of visual cues for vehicle control; (2) Improve pilots' performance with helmet displays of thermal imagery and night vision goggles for situation awareness and vehicle control; (3) Model the processes by which pilots encode maps and compare them to the visual scene to develop perceptually and cognitively compatible electronic map formats; (4) Evaluate the use of spatially localized auditory displays for geographical orientation, target localization, radio frequency separation; (5) Develop and flight test control/display concepts; (6) Quantify, model, predict, and improve pilots, workload-management strategies; and (7) Design computer-game trainers to reduce training time and cost.
The NASA Docking System (NDS) is a 31.4961-inch (800 mm) diameter circular hatch for astronauts to pass through when docked to other pressurized elements in space or for entrance or egress on surface environments. The NDS is utilized on the Orion Spacecraft and has been implemented as the International Docking System Standard (IDSS). The EV74 Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Team at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) conducted human factors analyses with various hatch shapes and sizes to accommodate for all astronaut anthropometries and daily task comfort. It is believed that the hatch, approximately 32 inches, is too small, and a bigger hatch size would better accommodate most astronauts. In order to conduct human factors analyses, four participants were gathered based on anthropometry percentiles: 1st female, 5th female, 95th male, and 99th male.
The NASA Docking System (NDS) is a 31.5-inch (800-millimeter)-diameter circular hatch for astronauts to pass through when docked to other pressurized elements in space or for surface egress. The NDS is utilized on the Orion Spacecraft and has been implemented as the International Docking System Standard (IDSS). The EV74 Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Team at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) conducted human factors analyses with various hatch shapes and sizes to accommodate for all astronaut anthropometries, task comfort, and task safety. The 32-inch hatch is too small and a bigger hatch size would better accommodate most astronauts and prove to be safer for daily pass-throughs. To conduct human factors analyses, four participants were gathered based on anthropometry: 1st female, 5th female, 95th male, and 99th male.
The primary objective of this study is to determine which biomedical and human factors measurements must be made aboard a space station to assure adequate evaluation of the astronaut's health and performance during prolonged space flights. The study has employed, where possible, a medical and engineering systems analysis to define the pertinent life sciences and space station design parameters and their influence on a measurement program. The major areas requiring evaluation in meeting the study objectives include a definition of the space environment, man's response to the environment, selection of measurement and data management techniques, experimental program, space station design requirements, and a trade-off analysis with final recommendations. The space environment factors that are believed to have a significant effect on man were evaluated. This includes those factors characteristic of the space environment (e. g. weightlessness, radiation) as well as those created within the space station (e. g. toxic contaminants, capsule atmosphere). After establishing the general features of the environment, an appraisal was made of the anticipated response of the astronaut to each of these factors. For thoroughness, the major organ systems and functions of the body were delineated, and a determination was made of their anticipated response to each of the environmental categories. A judgment was then made on the medical significance or importance of each response, which enabled a determination of which physiological and psychological effects should be monitored. Concurrently, an extensive list of measurement techniques and methods of data management was evaluated for applicability to the space station program. The various space station configurations and design parameters were defined in terms of the biomedical and human factors requirements to provide the measurements program. Research design of experimental programs for various station configurations, mission durations, and crew sizes were prepared, and, finally, a trade-off analysis of the critical variables in the station planning was completed with recommendations to enhance the confidence in the measurement program.
A study has been made of pilot human factors related to stall/spin accidents of supersonic fighter aircraft. The military specifications for flight at high angles of attack are examined. Several pilot human factors problems related to stall/spin are discussed. These problems include (1) unsatisfactory nonvisual warning cues; (2) the inability of the pilot to quickly determine if the aircraft is spinning out of control, or to recognize the type of spin; (3) the inability of the pilot to decide on and implement the correct spin recovery technique; (4) the inability of the pilot to move, caused by high angular rotation; and (5) the tendency of pilots to wait too long in deciding to abandon the irrecoverable aircraft. Psycho-physiological phenomena influencing pilot's behavior in stall/spin situations include (1) channelization of sensory inputs, (2) limitations in precisely controlling several muscular inputs, (3) inaccurate judgment of elapsed time, and (4) disorientation of vestibulo-ocular inputs. Results are given of pilot responses to all these problems in the F14A, F16/AB, and F/A-18A aircraft. The use of departure spin resistance and automatic spin prevention systems incorporated on recent supersonic fighters are discussed. These systems should help to improve the stall/spin accident record with some compromise in maneuverability.
A study has been made of pilot human factors related to stall/spin accidents of supersonic fighter aircraft. The military specifications for flight at high angles of attack are examined. Several pilot human factors problems related to stall/spin are discussed. These problems include: (1) unsatisfactory nonvisual warning cues; (2) the inability of the pilot to quickly determine if the aircraft is spinning out of control, or to recognize the type of spin; (3) the inability of the pilot to decide on and implement the correct spin recovery technique; (4) the inability of the pilot to move, caused by high angular rotation; and (5) the tendency of pilots to wait too long in deciding to abandon the irrecoverable aircraft. Psycho-physiological phenomena influencin pilot's behavior in stall/spin situations include: (1) channelization of sensor inputs, (2) limitations in precisely controlling several muscular inputs, (3) inaccurate judgment of elapsed time, and (4) disorientation of vestibulo-ocular inputs. Results are given of pilot responses to all these problems in the F14A, F16/AB, and F/A-18A aircraft. The use of departure spin resistance and automatic spin prevention systems incorporated on recent supersonic fighters are discussed. These systems should help to improve the stall/spin accident record with some compromise in maneuverability.
It has been estimated that aviation accidents are typically preceded by numerous minor incidents arising from the same causal factors that ultimately produced the accident. Accident databases provide in-depth information on a relatively small number of occurrences, however incident databases have the potential to provide insights into the human factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) operations based on a larger volume of less-detailed reports. Currently, there is a lack of incident data dealing with the human factors of unmanned aircraft systems. An exploratory study is being conducted to examine the feasibility of collecting voluntary critical incident reports from RPAS pilots. Twenty-three experienced RPAS pilots volunteered to participate in focus groups in which they described critical incidents from their own experience. Participants were asked to recall (1) incidents that revealed a system flaw, or (2) highlighted a case where the human operator contributed to system resilience or mission success. A total of 90 incidents were reported. This presentation begins with an overview of RPAS human factors and then considers the emerging issues identified by pilot reports.
The Human Factors involvement in developing COMPAQ QuickSolve, an electronic problem-solving and information system for Compaq's line of networked printers, is described. Empowering customers with expert system technology so they could solve advanced networked printer problems on their own was a major goal in designing this system. This process would minimize customer down-time, reduce the number of phone calls to the Compaq Customer Support Center, improve customer satisfaction, and, most importantly, differentiate Compaq printers in the marketplace by providing the best, and most technologically advanced, customer support. This represents a re-engineering of Compaq's customer support strategy and implementation. In its first generation system, SMART, the objective was to provide expert knowledge to Compaq's help desk operation to more quickly and correctly answer customer questions and problems. QuickSolve is a second generation system in that customer support is put directly in the hands of the consumers. As a result, the design of QuickSolve presented a number of challenging issues. Because the produce would be used by a diverse and heterogeneous set of users, a significant amount of human factors research and analysis was required while designing and implementing the system. Research that shaped the organization and design of the expert system component as well.
The objectives of the Aeronautics Human Factors Research and Technology program are to provide the technology base and capability to design effective crew-cockpit systems and to advance solutions to human problems affecting air transport and rotorcraft effectiveness and safety. Advanced automation technologies, information display capabilities under computer control, and concern for the effects of human error in flight operations are elements which drive the directions of the program. Thus, the program has four thrusts: flight management, human engineering methods, rotorcraft, and subsonic transports.
There are two general strategies that may be employed for 'doing human factors research with nonhuman animals'. First, one may use the methods of traditional human factors investigations to examine the nonhuman animal-to-machine interface. Alternatively, one might use performance by nonhuman animals as a surrogate for or model of performance by a human operator. Each of these approaches is illustrated with data in the present review. Chronic ambient noise was found to have a significant but inconsequential effect on computer-task performance by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Additional data supported the generality of findings such as these to humans, showing that rhesus monkeys are appropriate models of human psychomotor performance. It is argued that ultimately the interface between comparative psychology and technology will depend on the coordinated use of both strategies of investigation.
The rapid advance of cockpit automation in the last decade has outstripped the ability of the human factors profession to understand the changes in human functions required. High technology cockpits require less physical (observable) workload, but are highly demanding of cognitive functions such as planning, alternative selection, and monitoring. Furthermore, automation creates opportunity for new and more serious forms of human error, and many pilots are concerned about the possibility of complacency affecting their performance. On the positive side, the equipment works as advertized with high reliability, offering highly efficient, computer-based flight. These findings from the cockpit studies probably apply equally to other industries, such as nuclear power production, other modes of transportation, medicine, and manufacturing, all of which traditionally have looked to aviation for technological leadership. The challenge to the human factors profession is to aid designers, operators, and training departments in exploiting the positive side of automation, while seeking solutions to the negative side. Viewgraphs are given.
This slide presentation reviews the history, and development of NASA-STD-3001, NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health, and the related Human Integration Design Handbook. Currently being developed from NASA-STD-3000, this project standard currently in review will be available in two volumes, (i.e., Volume 1 -- VCrew Health and Volume 2 -- Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health) and the handbook will be both available as a pdf file and as a interactive website.
The control stations of many unmanned systems have been characterized by inadequate human-system interfaces. Some of the interface problems may have been prevented had an existing regulation or cockpit design principle been applied. In other cases, the design problems may indicate a lack of suitable guidance material. The human factors of unmanned operations will be reviewed, and a NASA program to develop human-factor guidelines for control stations will be described. To be effective, guidelines must be relevant to a wide range of systems, must not be overly prescriptive, and must not impose premature standardization on evolving technologies. Several types of guidelines are described. These relate to required capabilities, information requirements, properties of the human machine interface, and general cognitive engineering principles.
In this presentation, we discuss the human factors research challenges from introducing greater levels of automation in a future air transportation concept called Urban Air Mobility (UAM). UAM is an air transportation concept that aims to provide air transportation services to the daily commuter, as well as emergency response and package delivery. The principal innovation over current day large air transport system is the greater distribution of important safety functions to automated and human agents; these functions include air traffic management, traditionally an air traffic controller responsibility. A central aspect of UAM is the development of an automated air traffic manager, whose primary responsibility is to approve airspace access for vehicle operators. Vehicle operator roles may include onboard and remote pilots, as well as a human manager who will supervise an entire fleet. Alternatively, both fleet manager and vehicle operators can be merged into a single role – a feasible option if UAM aircraft are autonomous. In lieu of tower controllers, vertiport managers, with the assistance of automation, will manage arrival and departure schedules between vertiports, as well as supervise surface operations. Our approach here will be to introduce use cases currently being developed by NASA, and then provide preliminary definitions for each of the roles introduced above and how coordination between them can be configured to support the operations within the use cases described. Subsequently, we review the tools and interfaces being developed to support the various roles. To conclude, we present current human factors work related to defining the roles above and suggest future work to advance the UAM concept.