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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1991

On the role of exchange of power and information signals in control and stability of the human-robot interaction

A human's ability to perform physical tasks is limited, not only by his intelligence, but by his physical strength. If, in an appropriate environment, a machine's mechanical power is closely integrated with a human arm's mechanical power under the control of the human intellect, the resulting system will be superior to a loosely integrated combination of a human and a fully automated robot. Therefore, we must develop a fundamental solution to the problem of 'extending' human mechanical power. The work presented here defines 'extenders' as a class of robot manipulators worn by humans to increase human mechanical strength, while the wearer's intellect remains the central control system for manipulating the extender. The human, in physical contact with the extender, exchanges power and information signals with the extender. The aim is to determine the fundamental building blocks of an intelligent controller, a controller which allows interaction between humans and a broad class of computer-controlled machines via simultaneous exchange of both power and information signals. The prevalent trend in automation has been to physically separate the human from the machine so the human must always send information signals via an intermediary device (e.g., joystick, pushbutton, light switch). Extenders, however are perfect examples of self-powered machines that are built and controlled for the optimal exchange of power and information signals with humans. The human wearing the extender is in physical contact with the machine, so power transfer is unavoidable and information signals from the human help to control the machine. Commands are transferred to the extender via the contact forces and the EMG signals between the wearer and the extender. The extender augments human motor ability without accepting any explicit commands: it accepts the EMG signals and the contact force between the person's arm and the extender, and the extender 'translates' them into a desired position. In this unique configuration, mechanical power transfer between the human and the extender occurs because the human is pushing against the extender. The extender transfers to the human's hand, in feedback fashion, a scaled-down version of the actual external load which the extender is manipulating. This natural feedback force on the human's hand allows him to 'feel' a modified version of the external forces on the extender. The information signals from the human (e.g., EMG signals) to the computer reflect human cognitive ability, and the power transfer between the human and the machine (e.g., physical interaction) reflects human physical ability. Thus the information transfer to the machine augments cognitive ability, and the power transfer augments motor ability. These two actions are coupled through the human cognitive/motor dynamic behavior. The goal is to derive the control rules for a class of computer-controlled machines that augment human physical and cognitive abilities in certain manipulative tasks.

Kazerooni, H.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS1997

Wings: A New Paradigm in Human-Centered Design

Many aircraft accidents/incidents investigations cite crew error as a causal factor (Boeing Commercial Airplane Group 1996). Human factors experts suggest that crew error has many underlying causes and should be the start of an accident investigation and not the end. One of those causes, the flight deck design, is correctable. If a flight deck design does not accommodate the human's unique abilities and deficits, crew error may simply be the manifestation of this mismatch. Pilots repeatedly report that they are "behind the aircraft" , i.e., they do not know what the automated aircraft is doing or how the aircraft is doing it until after the fact. Billings (1991) promotes the concept of "human-centered automation"; calling on designers to allocate appropriate control and information to the human. However, there is much ambiguity regarding what it mean's to be human-centered. What often are labeled as "human-centered designs" are actually designs where a human factors expert has been involved in the design process or designs where tests have shown that humans can operate them. While such designs may be excellent, they do not represent designs that are systematically produced according to some set of prescribed methods and procedures. This paper describes a design concept, called Wings, that offers a clearer definition for human-centered design. This new design concept is radically different from current design processes in that the design begins with the human and uses the human body as a metaphor for designing the aircraft. This is not because the human is the most important part of the aircraft (certainly the aircraft would be useless without lift and thrust), but because he is the least understood, the least programmable, and one of the more critical elements. The Wings design concept has three properties: a reversal in the design process, from aerodynamics-, structures-, and propulsion-centered to truly human-centered; a design metaphor that guides function allocation and control and display design; and a deliberate distinction between two fundamental functions of design, to complement and to interpret human performance. The complementary function extends the human's capabilities beyond his or her current limitations - this includes sensing, computation, memory, physical force, and human decision making styles and skills. The interpretive (or hermeneutic, Hollnagel 1991) function translates information, functionality, and commands between the human and the aircraft. The Wings design concept allows the human to remain aware of the aircraft through natural interpretation. It also affords great improvements in system performance by maximizing the human's natural abilities and complementing the human's skills in a natural way. This paper will discuss the Wings design concept by describing the reversal in the traditional design process, the function allocation strategy of Wings, and the functions of complementing and interpreting the human.

Schutte, Paul C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Human Integration Design Processes (HIDP)

The purpose of the Human Integration Design Processes (HIDP) document is to provide human-systems integration design processes, including methodologies and best practices that NASA has used to meet human systems and human rating requirements for developing crewed spacecraft. HIDP content is framed around human-centered design methodologies and processes in support of human-system integration requirements and human rating. NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human-System Standard, is a two-volume set of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Agency-level standards established by the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer, directed at minimizing health and performance risks for flight crews in human space flight programs. Volume 1 of NASA-STD-3001, Crew Health, sets standards for fitness for duty, space flight permissible exposure limits, permissible outcome limits, levels of medical care, medical diagnosis, intervention, treatment and care, and countermeasures. Volume 2 of NASASTD- 3001, Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health, focuses on human physical and cognitive capabilities and limitations and defines standards for spacecraft (including orbiters, habitats, and suits), internal environments, facilities, payloads, and related equipment, hardware, and software with which the crew interfaces during space operations. The NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems, specifies the Agency's human-rating processes, procedures, and requirements. The HIDP was written to share NASA's knowledge of processes directed toward achieving human certification of a spacecraft through implementation of human-systems integration requirements. Although the HIDP speaks directly to implementation of NASA-STD-3001 and NPR 8705.2B requirements, the human-centered design, evaluation, and design processes described in this document can be applied to any set of human-systems requirements and are independent of reference missions. The HIDP is a reference document that is intended to be used during the development of crewed space systems and operations to guide human-systems development process activities.

Boyer, Jennifer↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗