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At least 145 records · Page 8

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Overview and Policy Context of UF6 Cylinder Tracking Program

Thousands of cylinders containing uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) move around the world from conversion plants to enrichment plants to fuel fabrication plants, and their contents could be very useful to a country intent on diverting uranium for clandestine use. Each of these large cylinders can contain close to a significant quantity of natural uranium (48Y cylinder) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) (30B cylinder) defined as 75 kg {sup 235}U which can be further clandestinely enriched to produce 1.5 to 2 significant quantities of high enriched uranium (HEU) within weeks or months depending on the scale of the clandestine facility. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) kicked off a 5-year plan in April 2011 to investigate the concept of a unique identification system for UF{sub 6} cylinders and potentially to develop a cylinder tracking system that could be used by facility operators and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The goal is to design an integrated solution beneficial to both industry and inspectorates that would improve cylinder operations at the facilities and provide enhanced capabilities to deter and detect both diversion of low-enriched uranium and undeclared enriched uranium production. The 5-year plan consists of six separate incremental tasks: (1) define the problem and establish the requirements for a unique identification (UID) and monitoring system; (2) develop a concept of operations for the identification and monitoring system; (3) determine cylinder monitoring devices and technology; (4) develop a registry database to support proof-of-concept demonstration; (5) integrate that system for the demonstration; and (6) demonstrate proof-of-concept. Throughout NNSA's performance of the tasks outlined in this program, the multi-laboratory team emphasizes that extensive engagement with industry stakeholders, regulatory authorities and inspectorates is essential to its success.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Importance of Establishing and Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge during 21st Century Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities

During this century, the entire nuclear fuel cycle will expand and become increasingly more global, taxing both the resources and capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to maintain an effective Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) and its ability to provide timely detection of diversion. Uranium that currently is mined and milled in one country will be converted, enriched, and fabricated into fuel for reactors in an expanding set of new countries. This expansion will make it harder to guarantee that regional activities stay regional and that diversion detection is timely unless new and sustainable tools are developed to improve inspector effectiveness. To deal with this emerging reality, the IAEA must increase its use of unattended monitoring and employ new tools and methods that enhance CoK during all phases of the fuel cycle. This approach will help provide useful information to aid in detecting undeclared activities and create opportunities for timely and appropriate responses to events well before they enter phases of greater concern (e.g., enrichment). The systems that maintain CoK of safeguarded assets rely on containment and surveillance (C/S) technologies. The 21st century fuel cycle will require increased use of these technologies and systems, plus greater implementation of unattended systems that can securely collect data when inspectors are not present.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Process Monitoring for Nuclear Safeguards

Process Monitoring has long been used to evaluate industrial processes and operating conditions in nuclear and non-nuclear facilities. In nuclear applications there is a recognized need to demonstrate the safeguards benefits from using advanced process monitoring on spent fuel reprocessing technologies and associated facilities, as a complement to nuclear materials accounting. This can be accomplished by: defining credible diversion pathway scenarios as a sample problem; using advanced sensor and data analysis techniques to illustrate detection capabilities; and formulating 'event detection' methodologies as a means to quantify performance of the safeguards system. Over the past 30 years there have been rapid advances and improvement in the technology associated with monitoring and control of industrial processes. In the context of bulk handling facilities that process nuclear materials, modern technology can provide more timely information on the location and movement of nuclear material to help develop more effective safeguards. For international safeguards, inspection means verification of material balance data as reported by the operator through the State to the international inspectorate agency. This verification recognizes that the State may be in collusion with the operator to hide clandestine activities, potentially during abnormal process conditions with falsification of data to mask the removal. Records provided may show material is accounted for even though a removal occurred. Process monitoring can offer additional fidelity during a wide variety of operating conditions to help verify the declaration or identify possible diversions. The challenge is how to use modern technology for process monitoring and control in a proprietary operating environment subject to safeguards inspectorate or other regulatory oversight. Under the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a range of potential safeguards applications for process monitoring are under conceptual development and evaluation. This paper reports on a study of process monitoring for a sample problem involving spent fuel reprocessing with aqueous reprocessing technologies. This includes modeling the processes in the context of a nuclear material diversion scenario and measuring the associated process chemistry. A systems-centric model is applied using actual and simulated plant data, advanced sensors, anomaly detection methods, statistical analysis and data authentication methods, to help illustrate the benefits of process monitoring applications.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Technical Cross-Cutting Issues for the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Spent Fuel Nondestructive Assay Project

Ever since there has been spent fuel (SF), researchers have made nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements of that fuel to learn about its content. In general these measurements have focused on the simplest signatures (passive photon and total neutron emission) and the analysis has often focused on diversion detection and on determining properties such as burnup (BU) and cooling time (CT). Because of shortcomings in current analysis methods, inspectorates and policy makers are interested in improving the state-of-the-art in SF NDA. For this reason the U.S. Department of Energy, through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), targeted the determination of elemental Pu mass in SF as a technical goal. As part of this research effort, 14 nondestructive assay techniques were studied . This wide range of techniques was selected to allow flexibility for the various needs of the safeguards inspectorates and to prepare for the likely integration of one or more techniques having complementary features. In the course of researching this broad range of NDA techniques, several cross-cutting issues were. This paper will describe some common issues and insights. In particular we will describe the following: (1) the role of neutron absorbers with emphasis on how these absorbers vary in SF as a function of initial enrichment, BU and CT; (2) the need to partition the measured signal among different isotopic sources; and (3) the importance of the “first generation” concept which indicates the spatial location from which the signal originates as well as the isotopic origins.

Next Generation Safeguards Initiative↗

Prototype Radiation Detector Positioning System For The Automated Nondestructive Assay Of Uf6 Cylinders

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders taken to be representative of the facility’s entire cylinder inventory. These measurements are time-consuming, expensive, and assay only a small fraction of the total cylinder volume. An automated nondestructive assay system capable of providing enrichment measurements over the full volume of the cylinder could improve upon current verification practices in terms of efficiency and assay accuracy. This paper describes an approach denoted the Integrated Cylinder Verification Station (ICVS) that supports 100% cylinder verification, provides volume-averaged cylinder enrichment assay, and reduces inspector manpower needs. To allow field measurements to be collected to validate data collection algorithms, a prototype radiation detector positioning system was constructed. The system was designed to accurately position an array of radiation detectors along the length of a cylinder to measure UF6 enrichment. A number of alternative radiation shields for the detectors were included with the system. A collimated gamma-ray spectrometer module that allows translation of the detectors in the surrounding shielding to adjust the field of view, and a collimating plug in the end to further reduce the low-energy field of view, were also developed. Proof-of-principle measurements of neutron and high-energy gamma-ray signatures, using moderated neutron detectors and large-volume spectrometers in a fixed-geometry, portal-like configuration, supported an early assessment of the viability of the concept. The system has been used successfully on two testing campaigns at an AREVA fuel fabrication plant to scan over 30 product cylinders. This paper will describe the overall design of the detector positioning system and provide an overview of the Integrated Cylinder Verification Station (ICVS) approach.

assay↗

Advancements of the Hybrid Method UF6 Container Inspection System

Safeguards inspectors currently visit uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are performed with handheld high-resolution detectors on a limited number of cylinders taken to be representative of the plant’s cylinder inventory. These enrichment assay methods interrogate only a small fraction of the total cylinder volume, and are time-consuming and expensive to execute. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing an automated UF6 cylinder verification station concept based on the combined collection of traditional enrichment-meter data (186 keV photons from 235U) and non-traditional, neutron-induced, high-energy gamma-ray signatures (3-8 MeV) with an array of collimated, medium-resolution scintillators. Previous work at PNNL (2010) demonstrated proof-of-principle that this hybrid method yields accurate, full-volume assay of the cylinder enrichment, reduces systematic errors when compared to several other enrichment assay methods, and provides simplified instrumentation and algorithms suitable for long-term, unattended operations. This system aims to increase the number of inspected cylinders at higher accuracy and with lower cost than when compared to inspectors with hand-held instruments. Several measurement campaigns of 30B cylinder populations and a refined MCNP model will be reported. The MCNP model consists of per-gram basis vectors for the different uranium isotopes and several fill geometries, enabling fast generation of any UF6 enrichment level and multiple configurations. The refined model was used to optimize collimator design and detector configuration for the hybrid method. In addition, a new field prototype based on model results was utilized in a set of field measurements.

Mace, Emily K.↗

Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Technology Solutions Case Study: Combustion Safety for Appliances Using Indoor Air

This case study describes how to assess and carry out the combustion safety procedures for appliances and heating equipment that uses indoor air for combustion in low-rise residential buildings. Only appliances installed in the living space, or in an area freely communicating with the living space, vented alone or in tandem with another appliance are considered here. This document is for inspectors, auditors, and technicians working in homes where energy upgrades are being conducted whether or not air infiltration control is included in the package of measures being applied. In the indoor combustion air case, guidelines summarized here are based on language provided in several of the codes to establish minimum requirements for the space using simplified prescriptive measures. In addition, building performance testing procedures are provided by testing agencies. The codes in combination with the test procedures offer comprehensive combustion safety coverage to address safety concerns, allowing inexperienced residential energy retrofit inspectors to effectively address combustion safety issues and allow energy retrofits to proceed.

Building America↗

Field trial of the enhanced data authentication system (EDAS)

The Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS) is means to securely branch information from an existing measurement system or data stream to a secondary observer. In an international nuclear safeguards context, the EDAS connects to operator instrumentation, and provides a cryptographically secure copy of the information for a safeguards inspectorate. However, this novel capability could be a valuable complement to inspector-owned safeguards instrumentation, offering context that is valuable for anomaly resolution and contingency.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Automated commissioning and inspection for PV systems

An electric system includes a local power controller and solar panel system that includes a plurality of solar modules on one or more branch circuits. A method for commissioning the electric system includes an installer using a commissioning device to send and receive information from a remote system and the local power controller performing an automatic self-test of the electric system. The results of the self-test may be packaged with photographs and measurements of the electric system and sent to a remote system where an inspector can inspect the electric system remotely. After receiving approval by the inspector, the local power controller may automatically activate each branch circuit of the electric system and thus enabling the electric system to generate electricity.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Design Considerations for the Field Use of International Nuclear Safeguards Technology

The process of developing and deploying safeguards technology should be carried out in such a way that it supports the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) international safeguards verification mission, while also being efficient in terms of both cost and time. This process, however, may be hindered by a general lack of nuclear facility operating experience among the scientists or engineers designing safeguards technology, or the inability to interact with the IAEA inspector end user. As a result, equipment designers may have difficulty understanding inspector needs and the limitations of using safeguards technology in the field, often leading to inefficiencies (in the form of increased cost and time spent) in the safeguards technology design process. Here, to mitigate this knowledge gap, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, has developed design considerations that should be incorporated into safeguards technologies, focusing on non-destructive assay equipment. Timelines for integration of these considerations into the design process are also discussed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integrating extended reality with inspection systems

An extended reality (“XR”) inspection system for inspecting a target is provided. The XR inspection system includes an inspection system and an XR device. The inspection system includes an inspection main unit and an inspection probe. The inspection main unit collects inspection data from the inspection probe, receives commands input by an inspector using the XR device, performs functions associated with the commands, and sends display data to the XR device. The XR device provides an augmented reality display and sensors. The XR device displays display data received from the inspection main unit, receives commands via the sensors from the inspector, and sends the commands to the inspection main unit.

Keene, Lionel↗

Cosmic Ray Muon Radiography of Spent Fuel in Dry Storage Casks

In the absence of a permanent repository or reprocessing facilities, highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel bundles are typically placed in long-term storage in above ground casks. These dry storage casks are heavily shielded to prevent the escape of radiation from the contents to the environment. Casks under international safeguards are monitored to detect diversion of spent fuel. The heavy shielding of the cask walls also precludes inspection of cask contents with typical radiographic probes. When international safeguards inspectors need to verify cask contents (which may be necessary to recover from a loss of continuity of knowledge), the casks must be moved back into a cooling pool to be safely opened and visually inspected. This time-consuming procedure is invasive and potentially dangerous. A non-destructive radiographic method to verify a cask's contents in situ would therefore be a useful safeguards tool. Highly energetic cosmic ray muons are an alternative tomographic probe. Since muons are colorless leptons, they do not participate in strong interactions with nucleons, and their large mass suppresses radiative energy loss while passing through materials. These properties allow muons to penetrate dense shielding that defeats more typical probes like photons and neutrons. Measurements of the scattering of muons that pass through objects provide information on the object's internal structure. This summary describes the first measurements using cosmic ray muons to inspect the contents of a partially loaded dry storage cask. We show that partial defects in the cask loading can be identified with this technique. This data shows that cosmic ray muons are an effective radiographic probe of dry storage casks. This technique may be useful for international safeguards inspectors wishing to verify a cask's contents without opening it. The analysis techniques described here allow the column of missing fuel bundles to be determined, but not the row. Recording data from several positions around the cask would allow ambiguities in x-y position to be resolved. Alternatively, a detector could be designed such that it surrounds the cask and provides a full image of the casks interior. Improved measurements and the design of optimized cask imaging instruments are being explored. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

WIPP Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System (SSCVS) Quality Assurance Program - 20237

Construction and major equipment fabrication are underway for a new ventilation exhaust system at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The new system will provide continuous HEPA filtration of the exhaust from the WIPP underground while meeting the ventilation demands for expanded waste emplacement and mining operations over the next 40 years. The SSCVS project has proceeded with the awarding of CD-3A for Long Lead Procurements followed by CD-2/3 approval for the construction of the facilities. The SSCVS project team made the decision to increase the quality oversight throughout the complete project per the Project Quality Assurance Plan (PQAP) such that it can ensure the final products meet applicable NQA-1 requirements and general quality requirements, and that the project will proceed to operations without significant delays due to post installation quality concerns. The PQAP was established prior to approval of the project at the CD-2/3 milestone. The SSCVS project has 2 major long lead procurements which commenced with the awarding of CD-3A. These procurements include the HEPA filter housing assemblies and the Exhaust Fans. There are 22 HEPA filter assemblies for the SSCVS, which are designated Safety Significant for pressure boundary confinement, per the approved PDSA. The exhaust fans also have Safety Significant components to maintain the pressure confinement boundary. NWP made the decision to install resident Quality Inspectors at the fabrication facilities to ensure the documentation for each fabricated unit meets all the QA requirements as defined in the respective contract documents. For the construction of the SSCVS Salt Reduction Building (SRB) and New Filter Building (NFB), dedicated, on-site quality inspectors have been utilized to ensure that all work being performed will comply with quality requirements and the Special Inspections as defined in IBC-2015. At each stage of inspection, hold points are placed into the work packages to ensure NWP QA personnel are present to inspect and verify the installations are in accordance with the design specifications, codes and standards. With this level of oversight, NWP anticipates that the level of quality related issues, as seen on multiple other DOE complex site projects, will be avoided and that the commissioning, start-up and hot operations will progress in a timely fashion, as all documentation will be in place and approved prior to initiation of these activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Spent Fuel Verification Using a Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device

A portable digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD-e) was developed to verify light water reactor fuel cooled as long as 40 years with a burnup of 10,000 MWd/t U. This measurement regime is beyond the capability of the improved Cerenkov viewing Device (ICVD) used by the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors for spent fuel verification. The DCVD-e has verified spent fuel with a very low burnup of 1,200 MWd/t U cooled for 36 years and we expect to verify this assembly cooled past 60 years. This exceeds the target requirement. The verification method requires no fuel movement and no water contact. It is possible for one inspector to perform a fuel pond verification. Future studies include instrument characterization to allow the detection of partial defects. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

In-Born Radio Frequency Identification Devices for Safeguards Use at Gas-Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

Global expansion of nuclear power has made the need for improved safeguards measures at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) imperative. One technology under consideration for safeguards applications is Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs). RFIDs have the potential to increase IAEA inspector"s efficiency and effectiveness either by reducing the number of inspection visits necessary or by reducing inspection effort at those visits. This study assesses the use of RFIDs as an integral component of the "Option 4" safeguards approach developed by Bruce Moran, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for a model GCEP [1]. A previous analysis of RFIDs was conducted by Jae Jo, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), which evaluated the effectiveness of an RFID tag applied by the facility operator [2]. This paper presents a similar evaluation carried out in the framework of Jo’s paper, but it is predicated on the assumption that the RFID tag is applied by the manufacturer at the birth of the cylinder, rather than by the operator. Relevant diversion scenarios are examined to determine if RFIDs increase the effectiveness and/ or efficiency of safeguards in these scenarios. Conclusions on the benefits offered to inspectors by using in-born RFID tagging are presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Results of Inspections of Operation of the ORNL Mock Feed/Withdrawal System

Remote monitoring of process activities is one tool under consideration by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to handle increasing demands for conducting verification inspections at safeguarded facilities. The ability for the IAEA to continuously monitor feed and withdrawal (F&W) station operations (e.g., load cells and other process attributes) would provide independent verification of normal plant operations, supply data that would make safeguards more effective and efficient, and enable information-driven inspections. Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) have assembled a mock UF6 F&W system using water in lieu of UF6 to test the feasibility of advanced process monitoring systems and concepts (such as remote monitoring) for safeguards. One use of the F&W mockup involves exploring how a safeguards inspector would interact with the data and use it to perform onsite inspections more effectively, so the researchers divided staff into two groups: operators and inspectors. This paper will discuss this process and the promising results of the inspections that have been performed at the mock facility to verify operator declarations and detect material diversion. This paper also will present the intuitive and user-friendly graphic interface researchers used to analyze the information. Although the data gathered previously came from a computer local to the F&W system, future work will include remote transmission and analysis of the data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ENHANCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING THROUGH AN IMPROVED AIR MONITORING TECHNIQUE

Environmental sampling (ES) is a key component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguarding approaches throughout the world. Performance of ES (e.g. air, water, vegetation, sediments, soil and biota) supports the IAEAs mission of drawing conclusions concerning the absence of undeclared nuclear material or nuclear activities in a State and has been available since the introduction of safeguards strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors (1992-1997). A recent step-change improvement in the gathering and analysis of air samples at uranium/plutonium bulk handling facilities is an important addition to the international nuclear safeguards inspector's toolkit. Utilizing commonly used equipment throughout the IAEA network of analytical laboratories for particle analysis, researchers are developing the next generation of ES equipment for air grab and constant samples. Isotopic analysis of collected particles from an Aerosol Contaminant Extractor (ACE) silicon substrate has been performed with excellent results in determining attribute and isotopic composition of chemical elements present in an actual test-bed sample. The new collection equipment will allow IAEA nuclear safeguards inspectors to develop enhanced safeguarding approaches for complicated facilities. This paper will explore the use of air monitoring to establish a baseline environmental signature of a particular facility that could be used for comparison of consistencies in declared operations. The implementation of air monitoring will be contrasted against the use of smear ES when used during unannounced inspections, design information verification, limited frequency unannounced access, and complementary access visits at bulk handling facilities. Technical aspects of the air monitoring device and the analysis of its environmental samples will demonstrate the essential parameters required for successful application of the system.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗