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At least 145 records · Page 8

Hanford building 324 REC hot cell decommissioning approach - 15484

The 324 Building is a facility located at the Hanford Site and is undergoing decontamination and demolition (D and D) activities by Washington Closure Hanford (WCH). In October 1986, an in-cell leak of approximately 1.3 million curies occurred with a substantial fraction being lost into the subsurface soil beneath the floor of a large hot cell complex. Sampling under the hot cell floor revealed hot spots in the soil and cobble reading in excess of 10,000 R. In January of 2014, WCH contracted an AREVA lead team with Kurion as primary design agent to remove the B-Cell floor and highly contaminated underlying soils. The objective of this project is to remove the contaminated debris and soil and repackage them into the existing adjacent hot cells for final disposition as monoliths. The approach to this project uses an innovate combination of existing cell equipment, commercial equipment, and special tools to perform a series of completely remote operations. Also, a novel waste handling approach allows all the highly radioactive waste to remain within the existing cells. The remote handling approach to this project is to use customized off-the-shelf excavators which are mounted and operated remotely inside the cell. These can be moved and replaced remotely with a -Plug-and-Play- connection method. All the cables and utilities for the excavator and tools are managed through this cell connection with connections in a worker-accessible gallery space. The remote excavators are wall-mounted, which frees up the floor for the excavator work. The design also includes a transfer barrier which allows the B-Cell door to remain open during waste transfers while preventing spread of contamination between cells. The project balances the use of existing cell equipment such as cranes and shield doors, with the use of new remote equipment Existing equipment will be removed from the floor of the hot cell to adjacent cells. The concrete floor and stainless steel liner will then be remotely cut and removed, revealing the contaminated soil beneath the cell. The contaminated soil will be mixed with grout in the cell using the excavators and then placed in rigid bins. These bins will then be placed in the adjacent cells using existing overhead cranes. The waste containers allow optimal utilization of the limited adjacent hot cell space and improve the characteristics of the final waste monolith package. The system will use each bin once which significantly decreases the risk of contamination spread. The project includes a full-scale mockup facility in which all installation and operational activities will be tested and proven prior to hot cell construction activities. The mockup facility will also be used for operator training before actual hot work starts. This facility will remain available for use during operations with a full set of spares for redundancy and to support operations modeling during construction and remediation activities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 563: Septic Systems, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 563 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) as “Septic Systems” and consists of the following four Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 3 and 12 of the Nevada Test Site: · CAS 03-04-02, Area 3 Subdock Septic Tank · CAS 03-59-05, Area 3 Subdock Cesspool · CAS 12-59-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Septic Tanks · CAS 12-60-01, Drilling/Welding Shop Outfalls Closure activities were conducted from September to November 2009 in accordance with the FFACO (1996, as amended February 2008) and the Corrective Action Plan for CAU 563. The corrective action alternatives included No Further Action and Clean Closure.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Post-Closure Inspection Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada For Calendar Year 2025

This report includes visual inspection results, descriptions of maintenance and repair activities, and recommendations for CY 2025 for use restrictions (URs) at corrective action sites (CASs) located on the Nevada National Security Site and on the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) that are accessed through the NNSS Main Gate. This document is arranged by project activity (i.e., Industrial Sites, Soils, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA]); then by corrective action unit (CAU); and then by CAS. Post-closure UR inspections are performed on an annual basis, unless as noted in text. Post-closure UR inspections verify the condition of physical controls required by each UR, which may include the following activities: • Visual verification of the legibility of signs • Visual inspection of fencing, signs, monuments, and/or markers for indications of wear • Visual inspection of soil covers for indications of subsidence, erosion, or unauthorized use Deficiencies in UR requirements that were identified during CY 2024 inspections and not addressed in the CY 2024 report are addressed in this CY 2025 report.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Symmetry progression and band vs Mott character of CdPS 3 under pressure

Complex chalcogenides are renowned for their tunable electronic, magnetic, and optical properties under external stimuli. The MPX 3 family (M = Mn, Ni, Co, V; X = S, Se) is a platform for many exciting discoveries—especially under compression—although CdPS3 is thought to be different because the Cd center possesses a filled 4d shell, which precludes Mottness. Here, we combine synchrotron-based infrared absorbance and Raman scattering spectroscopies with diamond anvil cell techniques, complementary lattice dynamics calculations, and an analysis of the energy landscape to reveal a series of structural phase transitions in CdPS 3 . We find four distinct pressure-driven transitions, with low frequency modes detectable over the full 35 GPa range of our investigation. A group–subgroup analysis along with our first-principles calculations allows us to partially unravel the space group sequence. For instance, the first critical pressure is a monoclinic C2/m to trigonal $\overline{R}$3 transition at 10 GPa. Despite the softness and overall sensitivity to pressure, we do not locate an insulator-to-metal transition in this pressure range, indicating that the energy scale for gap closure is significantly higher than expected. We discuss these findings in terms of force-induced color change and Mott vs band character in this system.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Wireless Transmission of Monitoring Data out of an Underground Repository: Results of Field Demonstrations Performed at the HADES Underground Laboratory - 13589

As part of the European 7. framework project MoDeRn, Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group (NRG) performed experiments in order to demonstrate the feasibility of wireless data transmission through the subsurface over large distances by low frequency magnetic fields in the framework of the geological disposal of radioactive waste. The main objective of NRG's contribution is to characterize and optimize the energy use of this technique within the specific context of post-closure monitoring of a repository. For that, measurements have been performed in the HADES Underground Research Laboratory (URL) located at Mol, Belgium, at 225 m depth. The experimental set-up utilizes a loop antenna for the transmitter that has been matched to the existing infrastructure of the HADES. Between 2010 and 2012 NRG carried out several experiments at the HADES URL in order to test the technical set-up and to characterize the propagation behavior of the geological medium and the local background noise pattern. Transmission channels have been identified and data transmission has been demonstrated at several frequencies, with data rates up to 10 bit/s and bit error rates <1%. A mathematical model description that includes the most relevant characteristics of the transmitter, transmission path, and receiver has been developed and applied to analyze possible options to optimize the set-up. With respect to the energy-efficiency, results so far have shown that data transmission over larger distances through the subsurface is a feasible option. To support the conclusions on the energy need per bit of transmitted data, additional experiments are foreseen. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NDA Challenges during Cleanup of the Hanford 618-10 Burial Ground Trenches - 15542

The 618-10 Burial Ground on the Hanford Reservation was an early trench waste site used for the disposal of waste from the 300 Area at Hanford. Much of this waste consisted of residues from evaluations of failed fuel as well as various process and separations studies associated with the Department of Energy (DOE) mission which were performed in the 300 Area between March 1954 and September 1963. Much of this waste contained significant concentrations of fission products as well as Transuranic (TRU) radionuclides. Waste forms consist of drums and boxes which were disposed of in the trenches. Many of the drums are shielded containers, cemented sludge, or cemented debris. There are no identifying marks on the containers to correlate them to a specific waste stream. In addition there is some waste in the trenches which came from other locations outside of the 300 area. Cleanup of the 618-10 burial ground is covered under the Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) contract. Due to the proximity of the 618-10 site to the Columbia River, waste is being removed from the 618-10 site, stabilized, and disposed of into either the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) if the containers are determined to be LLW or transferred to the Hanford Central Waste Complex (CWC) if the containers are suspected to be TRU waste. In order to determine the correct disposal path Non Destructive Assay (NDA) must be performed on all of the containers excavated from the trenches. The NDA of these containers is performed using germanium gamma spectroscopy with an In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) and with a neutron slab counter. Due to the challenges associated with these difficult waste streams, matrices, and lack of information to associate these containers with a particular process, the NDA program has had to develop a more robust process to ensure the correct disposition of the waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Conceptual World Information Library (WIL) and Land Use Information System (LUIS) - 16181

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency initiative on the Preservation of Records, Knowledge and Memory is addressing the topic of communicating with future generations on the location, specific contents, and potential risks associated with deep geologic nuclear waste repositories. At the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in the United States, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has committed, prior to the facility closure, to develop a Passive Institutional Controls (PICs) program designed to last as long as practicable. A portion of this PICs program includes development of records packages, selection of data storage materials and methods, and a determination of records retention/storage locations. The approved plan for record retention at WIPP includes the storage of information including hard copies of data, figures and maps in multiple libraries and archive record centers. With this in mind, it is easy to envision reams of various paper documents in a robust physical archive record center similar to one of the museums in Washington D.C., or DOE's Legacy Management facility in Morgantown, West Virginia. While some portion of records for nuclear waste burial sites should be maintained in this fashion for near-term retrieval purposes, it is widely accepted that this is not an efficient way to communicate with future generations even 1,000 years from now. Transmitting large detailed volumes of information to the future should be captured in an electronic format; maintained on computers, translated by computers, and perhaps updated by artificial intelligence as machine and human languages change over the centuries. In addition to a physical records development and storage process for transmittal to future generations, a web-based electronic database system should be developed. A World Electronic Library (WEL) database could be funded from various nations and perhaps sanctioned by the United Nations and/or the IAEA. This WEL could contain information regarding several different subjects with the intent of being a one-stop-information-shop for future generations. This database would require updates and maintenance for as long as there is a recipient. One subset of the WEL would be a spatial database containing all the information available to any set of GPS coordinates, anywhere within the world. This Land Use Information System (LUIS) database would contain information on past and present land use, natural resources, known geology, hydrology and atmospheric conditions, potential warnings, and other pertinent information. The LUIS database is where specific electronic information, a subset of all the records data gathered for a nuclear waste repository, could reside. For not only would LUIS provide the information on a nuclear waste repository when specific GPS coordinates were entered; but a search from the LUIS on 'Nuclear Waste Repositories' could bring up information, including data on location of repositories, radionuclides, operations, D and D, maps, and regulations, plus many other details for locations throughout the world. This tool could be used by future generations for a number of land use or resource exploration decisions. So what can we do now? We can agree to the types of information that should be captured into an electronic database for nuclear waste repositories. We can agree to the levels of detail, the file names and the formats, for ease of combining information sets in the future. Perhaps we can agree to a central electronic data storage site, or sites, where this information will reside for import into a centralized electronic record system, if one is ever developed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Improved Benchmarking of Cohesive Elements in Abaqus Standard for Predicting Disbond and Delamination in Composite Structures

Traditional approaches for aircraft certification require the assumption of an initial flaw condition, either represented as barely visible impact damage (BVID) or through inclusion of a Teflon insert to serve as surrogate damage. Based on the initial composite damage state, the structure must be shown to demonstrate structural durability and damage tolerance (DaDT) according to the following criteria: a. Damage displays no detrimental growth under cyclic loading b. The structure is able to sustain design limit load (DLL) Currently, the only available manner for validating structural performance is through test. Since damage can occur over a wide variety of areas within a structure, this approach has proven to be increasingly expensive and time consuming for composite airframes and acreage structure within the design-test-certification building block. A further complicating factor is the requirement to accurately capture the most critical damage morphologies as a starting condition. To understand the severity of the damage, it is either required to experimentally determine the most critical areas at tremendous expense or rely on legacy data of similar structural testing, which limits design space expansion. A preferred solution is to use advanced analysis to provide improved understanding of load margins for critical locations based on a wide variety of potential starting damage conditions. The standard industry approach for DaDT certification adheres to the use of the traditional virtual crack closure technique (VCCT) method. VCCT is generally a preferred method because it conforms to the current certification principles of damage from a known flaw, and when used correctly, can be effective at predicting delamination propagation under static and cyclic loading. The VCCT method requires the inclusion of an initial flaw in the finite element (FE) model requiring a-priori knowledge of the flaw location. This in turn requires a plethora of analysis cases to be examined to cover a reasonable span of potential damage states. Additionally, the VCCT approach requires node-to-node connectivity rendering it incompatible with the best practices and approaches for using continuum damage mechanics (CDM) based progressive damage and failure analysis (PDFA) tools within a typical FE solver. Alternatives to VCCT have emerged in the form of cohesive elements which utilize the cohesive zone model (CZM). Unlike VCCT which models linear elastic fracture mechanics, cohesive elements couples continuum and fracture based responses through the use of bilinear traction separation laws. These laws are defined based on a penalty stiffness, a cohesive strength, and a strain energy release rate. The approach can be mesh regularized with native cohesive elements within many FE solvers such as Abaqus and LS-DYNA. In Phase I of the NASA Advanced Composites Consortium (ACC) post-buckled stiffened panel with BVID, Strength and Life [1], the performance of cohesive elements were benchmarked in comparison to VCCT and LEFM solutions and showed good agreement using Abaqus explicit [2]. To realize savings on current and future programs, it is still necessary to close technical gaps related to the use of cohesive elements with Abaqus Standard. Within a program environment, standard finite element analysis is the preferred analytical capability for quasi-static loading as it eliminates uncertainty due to oscillatory behavior commonly seen with explicit analysis. This oscillatory behavior creates difficulties in writing margins of safety based on the analysis. The use of negative tangent stiffness material models complicates convergence which typically requires the use of numerical controls such as viscous damping to overcome. To date, there has not been a comprehensive study on how to establish best practices for cohesive element convergence for predictive capability within the Abaqus implicit solver. In pursuit of these goals, under the NASA ACC program, several numerical benchmark problems were proposed including pure mode I (double cantilevered beam – DCB), pure mode II (end notch flexure – ENF), and symmetric/unsymmetric evolving mixed mode (single leg bend – SLB). This paper focuses on the use of cohesive elements to model the delamination through the use of CZM. Specifically, finite element models for the DCB, ENF, symmetric SLB, and unsymmetric SLB, are developed and various solution controls for convergence are studied to develop a best practice. Once the best practice has been developed, the predictive capability of the objective CZM model is used to analyze the hat pull-off strength of a standard hat stiffened configuration under various loading conditions.

Abaqus↗

Formation of 2- and 1-methyl-1,4-dihydronaphthalene isomers via the crossed beam reactions of phenyl radicals (C 6 H 5 ) with isoprene (CH 2 C(CH 3 )CHCH 2 ) and 1,3-pentadiene (CH 2 CHCHCHCH 3 )

Crossed molecular beam reactions were exploited to elucidate the chemical dynamics of the reactions of phenyl radicals with isoprene and with 1,3-pentadiene at a collision energy of 55 ± 4 kJ mol -1 . Both reactions were found to proceed via indirect scattering dynamics and involve the formation of a van-der-Waals complex in the entrance channel. The latter isomerized via the addition of the phenyl radical to the terminal C1/C4 carbon atoms through submerged barriers forming resonantly stabilized free radicals C 11 H 13 , which then underwent cis–trans isomerization followed by ring closure. The resulting bicyclic intermediates fragmented via unimolecular decomposition though the atomic hydrogen loss via tight exit transition states located 30 kJ mol -1 above the separated reactants in overall exoergic reactions forming 2- and 1-methyl-1,4-dihydronaphthalene isomers. The hydrogen atoms are emitted almost perpendicularly to the plane of the decomposing complex and almost parallel to the total angular momentum vector (‘sideways scattering’) which is in strong analogy to the phenyl–1,3-butadiene system studied earlier. RRKM calculations confirm that 2- and 1-methyl-1,4-dihydronaphthalene are the dominating reaction products formed at levels of 97% and 80% in the reactions of the phenyl radical with isoprene and 1,3-pentadiene, respectively. This barrier-less formation of methyl-substituted, hydrogenated PAH molecules further supports our understanding of the formation of aromatic molecules in extreme environments holding temperatures as low as 10 K.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Active Measurement of Plasma Parameters in Over-Dense MFE Reactor Plasma Using High Frequency Beat-Wave Resonantly Generated Thermal Bernstein Waves

UC Davis was funded to explore the combination of beat-wave excitation and laser scattering to make completely non-invasive determination of local plasma conditions. This involves the use of two high frequency mm-wave sources of differing frequencies (the pump waves) to excite plasma waves at the difference of the frequencies, which is known as the beat frequency. The difference frequency or the frequency of the beat wave is chosen so that we produce plasma waves whose fluctuating electron density is a sensitive function of plasma parameters at the location where the source waves overlap. This fluctuation can be detected from outside the plasma, by measuring the deflection of a probe beam directed at the overlap region between the two pump waves (i.e., collective scattering). This work is an extension of mm-wave frequencies of a 10 GHz beat-wave experiment conducted on the DDT toroidal device (see Fig. 1) in a magnetized plasma where the excited Langmuir wave is replaced by the magnetized upper hybrid wave. Here, two high power (> 1 kW) ~94 GHz pump sources will be employed to match the upper hybrid resonance. The primary envisioned experiment is to drive the electron Bernstein wave (EBW) in the interior of a magnetized plasma. The EBW is a hot-plasma electrostatic wave, which cannot propagate in vacuum. Roots of the EBW dispersion relation occur at frequencies slightly higher than harmonics of the electron cyclotron frequency. Use of the EBW has particular advantages for measuring plasma magnetic field in plasmas with relatively high density and low magnetic field, as is the case in spherical tokamaks. This is the “over dense” condition of future efficient high beta magnetic confinement fusion reactors such as the spherical tokamak (STs). The overarching goal of the proposed project is to demonstrate beat wave EBW excitation in low density and temperature parameters that are directly scalable to over-dense spherical tokamaks such as NSTX or MAST, where measurement of magnetic field by electron cyclotron emission (ECE) is experimentally complex, and requires models of plasma profiles in order to interpret results. In such experiments, availability of point measurements of magnetic field strength provided by a beat-wave diagnostic would serve as a powerful independent check on the ECE results, serving to validate the assumed profiles and wave-propagation models used. The first step was to assemble/modify the target chamber in which the beat-wave plasma experiments will take place. Here, the target chamber of the CTIX compact-toroid (spheromak) injector was chosen. At the time that the proposal was submitted, the aim was to conduct the experiments in the CTIX experimental facilities located at the Livermore campus of UC Davis using microwave/mm-wave equipment brought from the main campus., However, by the time DoE funds for this project were awarded, the CTIX experimental facilities located at the Livermore campus of UC Davis were in the process of being shut down due to the closure of the Livermore campus by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Consequently, the equipment needed for this project was crated up and shipped from Livermore to Davis as part of the laboratory shutdown after space on campus was secured and College of Engineering approval secured. Once it arrived in Davis on December 20, 2018, work on the project began in earnest with the initial efforts directed toward developing a new plasma target source. Because of the shutdown of the CTIX facility, the scope of the project thus had to be reduced due to the abbreviated amount of time allocated to the project once the shutdown/move had been completed. Chamber modifications have been completed, including the fabrication and installation of a 38 GHz interferometer, as described in Sec. 3. The thermionic plasma source has been tested and characterized. The magnetic field required for the EBW experiments will be generated by permanent magnets mounted on plates positioned above and below the chamber. Magnetic simulations have been performed, and show that a 3-ring magnet arrangement on each plate, with a plate separation of 50 cm, is required to achieve the ~100 G uniform magnetic field in the interaction region that we feel is necessary to ensure good EBW coupling. We proved unable to successfully revive either of Prof. Luhmann’s two high power (≥20 kW) 94 GHz millimeter-wave sources after their extended time in storage and decided to postpone further efforts and concentrate on slightly lower power sources. Consequently, we were successful in reviving a ~2 kW extended klystron amplifier (EIK), which together with a ~2 kW extended interaction oscillator (EIO) will provide the two pump sources required for the project. Safe operation of the EIO requires extensive modifications to one of Prof. Luhmann’s pulse modulators - these modulator modifications are ongoing, which has unfortunately delayed the planned beat-wave experiments. Details of this work are provided in Sec. 3. Even though project funding has now ended, we still plan to proceed to complete the EIO pulse modulator modifications, install the two ~94 GHz pump wave sources on the target chamber, and conduct unmagnetized tests of the beat-wave concept which involve coupling to unmagnetized electron plasma waves rather than magnetized EBWs. Should these experiments prove successful, we plan to submit a follow-up proposal for additional funding which would allow us to undertake the magnetized EBW experiments.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗

Deep Geologic Nuclear Waste Disposal - No New Taxes - 12469

To some, the perceived inability of the United States to dispose of high-level nuclear waste justifies a moratorium on expansion of nuclear power in this country. Instead, it is more an example of how science yields to social pressure, even on a subject as technical as nuclear waste. Most of the problems, however, stem from confusion on the part of the public and their elected officials, not from a lack of scientific knowledge. We know where to put nuclear waste, how to put it there, how much it will cost, and how well it will work. And it's all about the geology. The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future has drafted a number of recommendations addressing nuclear energy and waste issues (BRC 2011) and three recommendations, in particular, have set the stage for a new strategy to dispose of high-level nuclear waste and to manage spent nuclear fuel in the United States: 1) interim storage for spent nuclear fuel, 2) resumption of the site selection process for a second repository, and 3) a quasi-government entity to execute the program and take control of the Nuclear Waste Fund in order to do so. The first two recommendations allow removal and storage of spent fuel from reactor sites to be used in the future, and allows permanent disposal of actual waste, while the third controls cost and administration. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NPWA 1982) provides the second repository different waste criteria, retrievability, and schedule, so massive salt returns as the candidate formation of choice. The cost (in 2007 dollars) of disposing of 83,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) high-level waste (HLW) is about $ 83 billion (b) in volcanic tuff, $ 29 b in massive salt, and $ 77 b in crystalline rock. Only in salt is the annual revenue stream from the Nuclear Waste Fund more than sufficient to accomplish this program without additional taxes or rate hikes. The cost is determined primarily by the suitability of the geologic formation, i.e., how well it performs on its own for millions of years with little engineering assistance from humans. It is critical that the states most affected by this issue (WA, SC, ID, TN, NM and perhaps others) develop an independent multi-state agreement in order for a successful program to move forward. Federal approval would follow. Unknown to most, the United States has a successful operating deep permanent geologic nuclear repository for high and low activity waste, called the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Its success results from several factors, including an optimal geologic and physio-graphic setting, a strong scientific basis, early regional community support, frequent interactions among stakeholders at all stages of the process, long-term commitment from the upper management of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) over several administrations, strong New Mexico State involvement and oversight, and constant environmental monitoring from before nuclear waste was first emplaced in the WIPP underground (in 1999) to the present. WIPP is located in the massive bedded salts of the Salado Formation, whose geological, physical, chemical, redox, thermal, and creep-closure properties make it an ideal formation for long-term disposal, long-term in this case being greater than 200 million years. These properties also mean minimal engineering requirements as the rock does most of the work of isolating the waste. WIPP has been operating for twelve years, and as of this writing, has disposed of over 80,000 m{sup 3} of nuclear weapons waste, called transuranic or TRU waste (>100 nCurie/g but <23 Curie/1000 cm{sup 3}) including some high activity waste from reprocessing of spent fuel from old weapons reactors. All nuclear waste of any type from any source can be disposed in this formation better, safer and cheaper than in any other geologic formation. At the same time, it is critical that we complete the Yucca Mountain license application review so as not to undermine the credibility of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the scientific community. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Overview of the CERES Radiation and Validation Experiment (CRAVE)

The Clouds and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES) experiment is one of the highest priority scientific satellite instruments developed for NASA’s Earth Observing System. The CERES Radiation and Validation Experiment (CRAVE) provides continuous world-class surface longwave and shortwave radiation measurements and validation of CERES and other satellite products. CRAVE consists of three sites (two active and one legacy). The legacy site was the CERES Ocean Validation Experiment, or COVE, located at Chesapeake Light Station (36.90 N, 75.71 W), 25 km off the coast of southeastern Virginia, USA. COVE was active from 2000-2016 but was deactivated due to structural concerns. The deactivation of COVE interrupted a rare long-term ocean/water scene dataset in the Baseline Surface Radiation Network (BSRN), the gold standard for surface radiation measurements. Shortly after the closure of COVE, Granite Island (46.72 N, 87.41 W), a new water site, was discovered and has been active since the summer of 2018. Granite Island is privately owned, located in Lake Superior, approximately 20 km north of Marquette, Michigan, USA, and 10 km to the nearest land point. The other CRAVE site is in Hampton, Virginia, USA, at Nasa Langley Research Center (37.10 N, 76.38 W), a land scene, and has been operating since December 2014. We will describe CRAVE and its importance, the uniqueness of each site and site logistics, participating networks and measurements made for radiometric, aerosol, meteorological and water skin temperature analysis. CRAVE measurements detecting smoke originating from Canadian wildfires with aerosol optical depths well over 2 and first results from a shortwave calibration round robin experiment will also be presented.

Bryan Fabbri↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 574: Neptune, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities required for closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 574, Neptune. CAU 574 is included in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996 [as amended March 2010]) and consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 12-23-10, U12c.03 Crater (Neptune); (2) CAS 12-45-01, U12e.05 Crater (Blanca). This plan provides the methodology for the field activities that will be performed to gather the necessary information for closure of the two CASs. There is sufficient information and process knowledge regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 574 using the SAFER process. Based on historical documentation, personnel interviews, site process knowledge, site visits, photographs, field screening, analytical results, the results of the data quality objective (DQO) process (Section 3.0), and an evaluation of corrective action alternatives (Appendix B), closure in place with administrative controls is the expected closure strategy for CAU 574. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation to verify and support the expected closure strategy and provide a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. This will be presented in a Closure Report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Streamlined Approach for (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 566: E-MAD Compound, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 566, EMAD Compound, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit 566 comprises the following corrective action site (CAS) located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site: • 25-99-20, EMAD Compound This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing CAS 25-99-20. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 566 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action. It is anticipated that the results of the field investigation and implementation of a corrective action of clean closure will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. If it is determined that complete clean closure cannot be accomplished during the SAFER, then a hold point will have been reached and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine whether the remaining contamination will be closed under the alternative corrective action of closure in place. This will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval. The data quality objective (DQO) strategy for CAU 566 was developed at a meeting on April 30, 2009, by representatives of NDEP and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for CAU 566. The following text summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 566: • Perform site preparation activities (e.g., utilities clearances, radiological surveys). • Collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., stained soil) to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information. • Collect samples of materials to determine whether potential source material (PSM) is present that may cause the future release of a COC to environmental media. • If no COCs or PSMs are present at a CAS, establish no further action as the corrective action. • If COCs exist, collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., clean soil adjacent to contaminated soil) and submit for laboratory analyses to define the extent of COC contamination. • If a COC or PSM is present at a CAS, either: - Establish clean closure as the corrective action. The material to be remediated will be removed, disposed of as waste, and verification samples will be collected from remaining soil, or - Establish closure in place as the corrective action and implement the appropriate use restrictions. • Confirm the selected closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Section 106 Evaluation of Building CP-1, Area 6, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

On December 17, 2015, the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) vacated Building CP-1 (Building 06-CP-1) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. Starting in 1951, nearly all nuclear tests during the Cold War were controlled from this building on the facility, known as the Nevada Test Site for most of its years of operation. The test site was renamed the NNSS in 2010. CP-1 was the command and control center where decisions about NNSS activities were sought and made; where authorization for movements about the areas forward (north) of Mercury base camp were coordinated, granted or declined, and monitored; and where problems and emergencies in the forward areas were communicated and relayed to the appropriate agencies for solution. Some of the testing duties for the Control Point included the timing and firing of nuclear tests, air operations, security, communications, weather monitoring, and radiation safety. During tests, communications were maintained through various channels to receive and pass instructions or information to the numerous testing operations, to Washington, D.C., the national laboratories, and overhead aircraft monitoring the tests. At one time, the Security Control Center, a Class A Weather Station, and the Radiation Safety Headquarters were located in CP-1, which also contained a cafeteria, a dining area, and bunk rooms. This survey was prompted by recognition that closure of the building in place creates a situation where CP-1 is vulnerable to decay in its present and unused condition. Activities at CP-1 have been reduced gradually over time since the end of nuclear testing in 1992. The Area of Potential Effects (APE) was determined by NNSA/NFO to be a two-acre area historically considered the space directly associated with CP-1 and available to CP-1 personnel for use. The APE is bounded on the south by an unnamed main paved road into the guarded Control Point area, on the west by the edge of the parking lot for adjacent Building CP-9, on the east by the edge of the bladed cut-and-fill terrace for CP-1, and on the north by a barbed wire security fence (Figure 2). All of this lot is either bladed or covered with asphalt. Contained within the lot are eight Accessary Resources (AR) which are much more closely aligned with CP-1 than with adjacent buildings. AR are defined by the Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) (2013) as “…related but subordinate to the principal building. Accessory resources would not exist were it not for the principal resource.” The Visual APE was determined by NNSA/NFO to be the same as the APE used for intensive survey because no exterior modifications to the resource are anticipated. The APE is located in Section 34 T11S R53E MDBM (projected) within the NNSS base called the Control Point in Area 6. It is on the 1986 Yucca Lake USGS 7.5 min. series topographic quadrangle. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) surveyed the APE with the assistance of National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), resulting in recordation and evaluation of CP-1 (SHPO Resource Number B14490) and eight accessory resources (AR1-AR8). This recording of CP-1 was done in three sessions. Copies of the building form and report are on file at Nevada Cultural Resources Information System (NVCRIS), DRI, and with the NNSA/NFO, Las Vegas, Nevada. Control Point refers to the support facilities of which Building CP-1, with its 126 rooms, is the most important part (Campbell et al. 1983:165). CP-1 refers to the entire building but it also is the designation for the first phase of construction, i.e. the original building. There were three major subsequent phases of additions to the building. The first two were called CP-1A (the east wing) and CP-1B (the west wing with the new War Room). A final phase filled in the hyphen between CP-1 and CP-1B with a Field Office. For convenience this last phase is called CP-1C in this report. Hence, CP-1 can refer either the entire building or to the first phase of the building exclusive of additions. The context makes clear which of the two meanings is intended in the various sections of this report. There were also two minor expansions consisting of a small battery room and a shelter for an emergency exit.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Post-Closure Inspection Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada For Calendar Year 2024

This report includes visual inspection results, descriptions of maintenance and repair activities, and recommendations for calendar year 2024 for use restrictions at corrective action sites located on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and on the Nevada Test and Training Range that are accessed through the NNSS Main Gate.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A quantitative acoustic emission study on fracture processes in ceramics based on wavelet packet decomposition

We base a quantitative acoustic emission (AE) study on fracture processes in alumina ceramics on wavelet packet decomposition and AE source location. According to the frequency characteristics, as well as energy and ringdown counts of AE, the fracture process is divided into four stages: crack closure, nucleation, development, and critical failure. Each of the AE signals is decomposed by a 2-level wavelet package decomposition into four different (from-low-to-high) frequency bands (AA{sub 2}, AD{sub 2}, DA{sub 2}, and DD{sub 2}). The energy eigenvalues P{sub 0}, P{sub 1}, P{sub 2}, and P{sub 3} corresponding to these four frequency bands are calculated. By analyzing changes in P{sub 0} and P{sub 3} in the four stages, we determine the inverse relationship between AE frequency and the crack source size during ceramic fracture. AE signals with regard to crack nucleation can be expressed when P{sub 0} is less than 5 and P{sub 3} more than 60; whereas AE signals with regard to dangerous crack propagation can be expressed when more than 92% of P{sub 0} is greater than 4, and more than 95% of P{sub 3} is less than 45. Geiger location algorithm is used to locate AE sources and cracks in the sample. The results of this location algorithm are consistent with the positions of fractures in the sample when observed under a scanning electronic microscope; thus the locations of fractures located with Geiger's method can reflect the fracture process. The stage division by location results is in a good agreement with the division based on AE frequency characteristics. We find that both wavelet package decomposition and Geiger's AE source locations are suitable for the identification of the evolutionary process of cracks in alumina ceramics.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗