Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Lessons”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1996

From Aeronautics to Space: Lessons in Human Automation

Civilian air flight continues on a growth curve, as more and more people utilize air travel to meet business and personal travel needs: This consumer-driven demand has resulted in the adoption of new methods to increase air system capacity and to make the air transportation system increasingly more efficient. As a consequence, civilian aviation, as an industry, has assumed a leading role in the use of automated systems, and, by implication, in the understanding of how human openers interact with these systems. Aeronautical automation systems serve a variety of roles. These include controlling aircraft and aiding, advising and monitoring numerous functions in the aircraft/airspace system. Experiences in the use of human/automation systems gathered from aviation are, in many cases, generalizable to other industries having similar requirements for human and non-human intelligent system interaction. However, the human/automation lessons learned from aviation have special relevance to the space application, where many of the same operational demands prevail. The application of aeronautical lessons of human-automated interaction to spaceflight is the subject of this paper. The discussion will address: the progress that has been made through aeronautically-based research and experience in understanding human/automation interaction, ways that this understanding can be applied to the needs of space, and the limits of our present understanding of human/automations systems. Suggestions will be offered related to human-automation research generally, and to the particular needs of the space endeavor.

Connors, Mary M.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Report from the School of Experience: Lessons-Learned on NASA's EOS/ICESat Mission

Abstract-NASA s Earth Observing System EOS) Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite (ICESat) mission was one of the first missions under Goddard Space Flight Center s (then-) new Rapid Spacecraft Development Office. This paper explores the lessons-learned under the ICESat successful implementation and launch, focusing on four areas: Procurement., Management, Technical, and Launch and Early Operations. Each of these areas is explored in a practical perspective of communication, the viewpoint of the players, and the interactions among the organizations. Conclusions and lessons-learned are summarized in the final section.

Anselm, William↗
NASA NTRS2003

Native Peoples-Native Homelands Climate Change Workshop: Lessons Learned

The Native Peoples-Native Homelands Climate Change Workshop was held on October 28 through November 01,1998, as part of a series of workshops being held around the U.S. to improve the understanding of the potential consequences of climate variability and change for the Nation. This workshop was specifically designed by Native Peoples to examine the impacts of climate change and extreme weather variability on Native Peoples and Native Homelands from an indigenous cultural and spiritual perspective and to develop recommendations as well as identify potential response actions. The workshop brought together interested Native Peoples, representatives of Tribal governments, traditional elders, Tribal leaders, natural resource managers, Tribal College faculty and students, and climate scientists fiom government agencies and universities. It is clear that Tribal colleges and universities play a unique and critical role in the success of these emerging partnerships for decision-making in addition to the important education function for both Native and non-Native communities such as serving as a culturally-appropriate vehicle for access, analysis, control, and protection of indigenous cultural and intellectual property. During the discussions between scientists and policy-makers from both Native and non-Native communities, a number of important lessons emerged which are key to building more effective partnerships between Native and non-Native communities for collaboration and decision-making for a more sustainable future. This talk summarizes the key issues, recommendations, and lessons learned during this workshop.

Maynard, Nancy G.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Development of X-33/X-34 Aerothermodynamic Data Bases: Lessons Learned and Future Enhancements

A synoptic of programmatic and technical lessons learned in the development of aerothermodynamic data bases for the X-33 and X-34 programs is presented in general terms and from the perspective of the NASA Langley Research Center Aerothermodynamics Branch. The format used is that of the aerothermodynamic chain, the links of which are personnel, facilities, models/test articles, instrumentation, test techniques, and computational fluid dynamics (CFD). Because the aerodynamic data bases upon which the X-33 and X-34 vehicles will fly are almost exclusively from wind tunnel testing, as opposed to CFD, the primary focus of the lessons learned is on ground-based testing.

Miller, C. G.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Learning Lessons from the X-37 Project

The X-37 was planned as an automated vehicle capable of flight-testing new aerospace technologies in combined environments that are beyond the capability of existing ground or flight platforms. Flight demonstration with the X-37 architecture and configuration in relevant environments was planned to reduce the risk of developing launch vehicle technologies for sustainable, affordable exploration and other aerospace applications. Current plans are for the X-37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle (ALTV) to be atmospheric tested in 2005 from Scaled Composite's White Knight carrier aircraft at up to 40,000 feet over California's Mojave Spaceport, with and turnaround maintenance performed. The fight Operations Control Center will conduct the mission, using a streamlined operations concept. Taxi-tow and captive-carry tests will be conducted prior to the atmospheric-test series. Sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) with NASA participation, technical objectives are to: (1) mature Computed Air Data System/Remote Pressure Sensor technology, (2) manage energy during Terminal Area Energy Management/Heading Alignment Cone maneuvers, and (3) validate the aerodatabase. The X-37 Project began in 1999 under a cooperative agreement as an element of NASA's Future X Program and transitioned to a NASA Research Announcement under the Space Launch Initiative. In mid-2004, NASA transferred ownership to DARPA, with its heritage of performing high-risk, high-payoff research and development. NASA contributes technical expertise, including risk analysis and system integration. The Boeing Company is the prime contractor, with nationwide suppliers. This recent partnership exemplifies the synergy attainable when NASA Centers, other Government agencies, and industry work together toward a common goal - contributing to the knowledge base for U.S. exploration and other aerospace endeavors. The X-37 team represents a range of space transportation disciplines - from engineering to management. Some members have been with the project since its inception. All have gained priceless experience during the design, manufacturing, and testing of the ALTV, as well as through developing advanced orbital flight technologies, such as state-of-the-art Thermal Protection Systems and hot structures. Throughout this process, the X-37 Project team captures lessons that are directly applicable to other such efforts. The upcoming ALTV flights offer another dimension of data and first-hand experience that will prove invaluable to those designing new generations of reusable spacecraft. And ongoing technology developments will expand the aerospace knowledge base. Delivering prototype hardware is always a risky proposition. During the course of the X-37 effort, the team has experienced many challenging opportunities, delivering significant accomplishments and learning numerous lessons in the process. The ability to manage the risk landscape is key to overcoming obstacles, especially technical hurdles that are encountered in progressing hardware from design to flight. The approach to managing risk under this partnership is evolving but, in general, the team allocates resources to reduce the likelihood of severe-consequence risks, thus maximizing mission success and ensuring that the X-37 Project delivers value to its stakeholders. As the team sharpens its focus on operations, it continues to contribute knowledge to those who would undertake high-risk, high-payoff research and development and provides valuable experience to implement the exploration vision.

Turner, Susan↗
NASA NTRS2005

Learning Lessons from the X-37 Project

The X-37 was planned as an automated vehicle capable of flight-testing new aerospace technologies in combined environments that are beyond the capability of existing ground or flight platforms. Flight demonstration with the X-37 architecture and configuration in relevant environments was planned to reduce the risk of developing launch vehicle technologies for sustainable, affordable exploration and other aerospace applications. Current plans are for the X-37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle (ALTV) to be atmospheric tested in 2005 from Scaled Composite s White Knight carrier aircraft at up to 40,000 feet over California's Mojave Spaceport, with landing and turnaround maintenance performed. The Flight Operations Control Center will conduct the mission, using a streamlined operations concept. Taxi-tow and captive-carry tests will be conducted prior to the atmospheric-test series. Sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) with NASA participation, technical objectives are to: (1) mature Computed Air Data System/Remote Pressure Sensor technology, (2) manage energy during Terminal Area Energy Management/Heading Alignment Cone maneuvers, and (3) validate the aerodatabase. The X-37 Project began in 1999 under a cooperative agreement as an element of NASA's Future X Program and transitioned to a NASA Research Announcement under the Space Launch Initiative. In mid-2004, NASA transferred ownership to DARPA, with its heritage of performing high-risk, high-payoff research and development (R&D). NASA contributes technical expertise, including risk analysis and system integration. The Boeing Company is the prime contractor, with nationwide suppliers. This partnership exemplifies the synergy attainable when NASA Centers, other Government agencies, and industry work together toward a common goal - contributing to the knowledge base for U.S. exploration and other aerospace endeavors. The X-37 team represents a range of space transportation disciplines - from engineering to management. Some members have been with the project since its inception. All have gained priceless experience during the design, manufacturing, and testing of the ALTV, as well as through developing advanced orbital flight technologies, such as state-of-the-art Thermal Protection Systems and hot structures. Throughout this process, the X-37 Project team captures lessons that are directly applicable to other such efforts. The upcoming ALTV flights offer another dimension of data and first-hand experience that will prove invaluable to those designing new generations of reusable spacecraft. And ongoing technology developments will expand the aerospace knowledge base. Delivering prototype hardware is always a risky proposition. During the course of this effort, the X-37 team has experienced many challenging opportunities, delivering significant accomplishments and learning numerous lessons in the process. The ability to manage the risk landscape is key to overcoming obstacles, especially technical hurdles that are encountered in progressing hardware from design to flight. The approach to managing risk under this partnership is evolving but, in general, the team allocates resources to reduce the likelihood of severe-consequence risks, thus maximizing mission success and ensuring that the X-37 Project delivers value to its stakeholders. As the team sharpens its focus on operations, it continues to contribute knowledge to those who would undertake high-risk, high-payoff R&D and provides valuable experience to implement the Vision for Space Exploration.

Turner, Susan↗
NASA NTRS2006

Lessons Learned From the Development, Operation, and Review of Mechanical Systems on the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and Payloads

The Mechanical Design and Analysis Branch at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) is responsible for the technical oversight of over 30 mechanical systems flying on the Space Shuttle Orbiter and the International Space Station (ISS). The branch also has the responsibility for reviewing all mechanical systems on all Space Shuttle and International Space Station payloads, as part of the payload safety review process, through the Mechanical Systems Working Group (MSWG). These responsibilities give the branch unique insight into a large number of mechanical systems, and problems encountered during their design, testing, and operation. This paper contains narrative descriptions of lessons learned from some of the major problems worked on by the branch during the last two years. The problems are grouped into common categories and lessons learned are stated.

Dinsel, Alison↗
NASA NTRS2006

Heritage Adoption Lessons Learned: Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism

Within JPL, there is a technology thrust need to develop a larger Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism (CDLM) for future missions. The approach taken was to adopt and scale the CDLM design as used on the Galaxy Evolution Explorer (GALEX) project. The three separate mechanisms that comprise the CDLM will be discussed in this paper in addition to a focus on heritage adoption lessons learned and specific examples. These lessons learned will be valuable to any project considering the use of heritage designs.

Wincentsen, James↗
NASA NTRS2003

GPS lessons learned

Global geodesy has improved dramatically over the past decade starting with the GPS for IERS and Geodynamics demonstration campaign in 1991 (GIG 91). At the time it took over a week of CPU time to process a network solution based on 21 global receivers and orbit overlaps were in the 40 cm range. Today it is possible to process a network solution based on 80 global receivers in less then one day of CPU time and orbit overlaps are in the 4 cm range. Special methods are under development for efficient processing of increasingly large regional networks which may contain hundreds or thousands of GPS receivers. Along the way there have been many lessons learned about GPS satellites, receivers, monuments, antennas, radomes, analysis, reference frames, error sources, and interpretation. A wide range of scientific disciplines have been impacted including studies of plate motion, post-glacial rebound, seasonal loading, deformation in plate boundary zones, coseismic displacements due to major earthquakes, postseiemic relaxation, and interseismic strain accumulation related to assessment of seismic hazards. Lessons learned will be presented in the context of new dense networks such as the Plate Boundary Observation (PBO).

GPS satellites↗
NASA NTRS2006

Lessons Learned from Daily Uplink Operations during the Deep Impact Mission

The daily preparation of uplink products (commands and files) for Deep Impact was as problematic as the final encounter images were spectacular. The operations team was faced with many challenges during the six-month mission to comet Tempel One of the biggest difficulties was that the Deep Impact Flyby and Impactor vehicles necessitated a high volume of uplink products while also utilizing a new uplink file transfer capability. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Multi-Mission Ground Systems and Services (MGSS) Mission Planning and Sequence Team (MPST) had the responsibility of preparing the uplink products for use on the two spacecraft. These responsibilities included processing nearly 15,000 flight products, modeling the states of the spacecraft during all activities for subsystem review, and ensuring that the proper commands and files were uplinked to the spacecraft. To guarantee this transpired and the health and safety of the two spacecraft were not jeopardized several new ground scripts and procedures were developed while the Deep Impact Flyby and Impactor spacecraft were en route to their encounter with Tempel-1. These scripts underwent several adaptations throughout the entire mission up until three days before the separation of the Flyby and Impactor vehicles. The problems presented by Deep Impact's daily operations and the development of scripts and procedures to ease those challenges resulted in several valuable lessons learned. These lessons are now being integrated into the design of current and future MGSS missions at JPL.

uplink↗
NASA NTRS2007

Lessons Learned JSC Micro-Wireless Instrumentation Systems on Space Shuttle and International Space Station CANEUS 2006

A viewgraph presentation on lessons learned from NASA Johnson Space Center's micro-wireless instrumentation is shown. The topics include: 1) Background, Rationale and Vision; 2) NASA JSC/Structural Engineering Approach & History; 3) Orbiter Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System; 4) WLEIDS Confidence and Micro-WIS Lessons Learned; and 5) Current Projects and Recommendations.

Studor, George↗
NASA NTRS2008

Lessons Learned From Atomic Oxygen Interaction With Spacecraft Materials in Low Earth Orbit

There have been five Materials International Space Station Experiment (MISSE) passive experiment carriers (PECs) (MISSE 1-5) to date that have been launched, exposed in space on the exterior of International Space Station (ISS) and then returned to Earth for analysis. An additional four MISSE PECs (MISSE 6A, 6B, 7A, and 7B) are in various stages of completion. The PECs are two-sided suitcase to size sample carriers that are intended to provide information on the effects of the low Earth orbital environment on a wide variety of materials and components. As a result of post retrieval analyses of the retrieved MISSE 2 experiments and numerous prior space experiments, there have been valuable lessons learned and needs identified that are worthy of being documented so that planning, design, and analysis of future space environment experiments can benefit from the experience in order to maximize the knowledge gained. Some of the lessons learned involve the techniques, concepts, and issues associated with measuring atomic oxygen erosion yields. These are presented along with several issues to be considered when designing experiments, such as the uncertainty in mission duration, scattering and contamination effects on results, and the accuracy of measuring atomic oxygen erosion.

Banks, Bruce A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Orbit Determination During Spacecraft Emergencies with Sparse Tracking Data - THEMIS and TDRS-3 Lessons Learned

This paper provides an overview of the lessons learned from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center s (GSFC) Flight Dynamics Facility s (FDF) support of the Time History of Events and Macroscale Interactions during Substorms (THEMIS) spacecraft emergency in February 2007, and the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-3 (TDRS-3) spacecraft emergency in March 2006. A successful and timely recovery from both of these spacecraft emergencies depended on accurate knowledge of the orbit. Unfortunately, the combination of each spacecraft emergency with very little tracking data contributed to difficulties in estimating and predicting the orbit and delayed recovery efforts in both cases. In both the THEMIS and TDRS-3 spacecraft emergencies, numerous factors contributed to problems with obtaining nominal tracking data measurements. This paper details the various causative factors and challenges. This paper further enumerates lessons learned from FDF s recovery efforts involving the THEMIS and TDRS-3 spacecraft emergencies and scant tracking data, as well as recommendations for improvements and corrective actions. In addition, this paper describes the broad range of resources and complex navigation methods employed within the FDF for supporting critical navigation activities during all mission phases, including launch, early orbit, and on-orbit operations.

Morinelli, Patrick J.↗
NASA NTRS2009

A History of Space Toxicology Mishaps: Lessons Learned and Risk Management

After several decades of human spaceflight, the community of space-faring nations has accumulated a diverse and sometimes harrowing history of toxicological events that have plagued human space endeavors almost from the very beginning. Lessons have been learned in ground-based test beds and others were discovered the hard way - when human lives were at stake in space. From such lessons one can build a risk-management framework for toxicological events to minimize the probability of a harmful exposure, while recognizing that we cannot foresee all events. Space toxicologists have learned that relatively harmless compounds can be converted by air revitalization systems into compounds that cause serious harm to the crew. Our toxic risk management strategy now includes an assessment of the fate of any compound that might be released into the atmosphere. Propellants are highly toxic compounds, yet we have not always been able to thoroughly isolate the crew from exposure to these toxicants. Leakage of fluids from systems has resulted in hazardous conditions at times, and the behavior of such compounds inside a spacecraft has taught us how to manage potentially harmful escapes should they occur. Potential combustion events are an ever-present threat to the wellbeing of the crew. Such events have been sufficiently common that we have learned that one cannot judge the health threat of a given fire by the magnitude of the event. Management of such risks demands monitoring of combustion products. In the category of unpredictable toxic events, if one assumes that fires are predictable, we can place experience with toxic microbial metabolites, upsets during repair operations, and discharges from filters that have accumulated a substantial load of pollutants in their absorption beds. Management of such events requires a broad-spectrum, real-time analytical capability to discern the identity and concentrations of pollutants if they enter the atmosphere. Adverse events are an integral part of any human activity, and the spacefaring community must learn as much as possible from mistakes and near misses.

James, John T.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Turning Operational Lessons Learned into Design Reality

The capabilities and limitations of a particular system design are well known by the people who operate it. Operational workarounds, operational notes and lessons learned are traditional methods for dealing with and documenting design shortcomings. The beginning of each new program brings the hope that hard-learned lessons will be incorporated into the next new system. But often operations personnel find their well-intentioned efforts frustrated by an inability to have their inputs considered by design personnel who have strictly-scoped requirements that are coupled with ambitious cost and schedule targets. There is a way for operational inputs to make it into the design, but the solution involves a combination of organizational culture and technical data. Any organization that utilizes this approach can realize significant benefits over the life cycle of their project.

Brady, David A.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Inflatable Habitat Health Monitoring: Implementation, Lessons Learned, and Application to Lunar or Martian Habitat Health Monitoring

NASA's exploration mission is to send humans to the Moon and Mars, in which the purpose is to learn how to live and work safely in those harsh environments. A critical aspect of living in an extreme environment is habitation, and within that habitation element there are key systems which monitor the habitation environment to provide a safe and comfortable living and working space for humans. Expandable habitats are one of the options currently being considered due to their potential mass and volume efficiencies. This paper discusses a joint project between the National Science Foundation (NSF), ILC Dover, and NASA in which an expandable habitat was deployed in the extreme environment of Antarctica to better understand the performance and operations over a one-year period. This project was conducted through the Innovative Partnership Program (IPP) where the NSF provided the location at McMurdo Station in Antarctica and support at the location, ILC Dover provided the inflatable habitat, and NASA provided the instrumentation and data system for monitoring the habitat. The outcome of this project provided lessons learned in the implementation of an inflatable habitat and the systems that support that habitat. These lessons learned will be used to improve current habitation capabilities and systems to meet the objectives of exploration missions to the moon and Mars.

Rojdev, Kristina↗
NASA NTRS2009

Evaluating Failures and Near Misses in Human Spaceflight History for Lessons for Future Human Spaceflight

There have been a number of studies done in the past drawn on lessons learned with regard to human loss-of-life events. Generally, the systemic causes and proximate causes for fatal events have both been examined in considerable detail. However, an examination of near-fatal accidents and failures that narrowly missed being fatal could be equally useful, not only in detecting causes, both proximate and systemic, but also for determining what factors averted disaster, what design decisions and/or operator actions prevented catastrophe. Additionally, review of risk factors for upcoming or future programs will often look at trending statistics, generally focusing on failure/success statistics. Unfortunately, doing so can give a skewed or misleading view of past reliability or a reliability that cannot be presumed to apply to a new program. One reason for this might be that failure/success criteria aren't the same across programs, but also that apparent success can hide systemic faults that, under other circumstances, can be fatal to a program with different parameters. A program with a number of near misses can look more reliable than a consistently healthy program with a single out-of-family failure and provide very misleading data if it is not examined in detail. This is particularly true for a manned space program where failure/success includes more than making a particular orbit. Augmenting reliability evaluations with this near miss data can provide insight and expand on the limitations of a strictly pass/fail evaluation. Even more importantly, a thorough understanding of these near miss events can identify conditions that prevented fatalities. Those conditions may be key to a programs reliability, but, without insight to the repercussions if such conditions were not in place, their importance may not be readily clear. As programs mature and political and fiscal responsibilities come to the fore, often there is considerable incentive to eliminate unnecessary conservatism, design margin, redundancy, operational support, testing, training, or safety oversight. An evaluation that demonstrates how these features and capabilities averted disaster can ensure processes that saved lives or missions are not discarded without appropriate review and understanding. Close examination of accidents that almost were can also highlight differences in design from one program to another, either justifying reliability comparisons or negating them. It can also provide considerable insight into how those saving factors were developed and implemented so that similar methods can be used to ensure appropriate life-saving and mission saving factors can be developed, even for a dissimilar space program. The lessons are appropriate for seasoned manned space programs and agencies, but crucial for untried agencies and organizations that are interested in sending man into space. The large body of publicly available near miss and accident data available provide invaluable insight into programmatic, technical, and even political issues that can be addressed before they impact safety. In this paper, we examine a number of these near misses and accidents and steps a program, agency, or potential spacefaring company might take to improve their chances of success and avoid mission or safety disasters using this data.

Barr, Stephanie↗