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Hypervelocity impact tests were conducted to simulate the damage that meteoroids will produce in the Shuttle Orbiter leading edge structural subsystem material. The nature and extent of the damage is reported and the probability of encountering meteoroids with sufficient energy to produce such damage is discussed.
Textile and clothing specifications for space activities are discussed, emphasizing a chronological and utilitarian role. New fabrication techniques led to the Mercury Space Suit, a constant-wear hybrid of the omni-environmental full pressure suit used by high-flying pilots of the 1950s. The Gemini program (1964-1966) provided the first specifically designed protective clothing assembly for both intra- and extravehicular operations. The G4C, used for EV (extravehicular) activities, protected the astronaut against solar radiation, heat loss, and meteoroid penetration. The clothing for the Apollo program (1968-1975) mirrored a greater concern for fire safety with Durette (a halogenated polyamide) and PBI (polybenzimadazole) widely used for intravehicular garments. With the advent of the Shuttle program, cabin pressure and composition were changed from 6 psi, 100% oxygen to 9-14 psi, 23.4% oxygen, 76.6% N2. As a result, 'off-the-shelf' materials were used without compromising fire safety. Reusability was stressed, as textile costs and durability were now important selection criteria noting that existing textile materials will probably be adequate for the next 20 years of space operations and research. A portable lunar survival shelter made of textiles is being developed; and a preliminary design for an EV 'tunnel suit system' (an access tunnel and homoform work station) is already in existence.
NASA's Meteoroid Environment Office (MEO) is charged with monitoring the meteoroid environment in near-Earth space for the protection of satellites and spacecraft. The MEO has recently established eight wide-field meteor cameras, four cameras each at two separate stations to calculate automated meteor fluxes in the millimeter size range. Each camera consists of a 17 mm focal length Schneider lens on a Watec 902H2 Ultimate CCD video camera, producing a 21.7 x 15.5 degree field of view. This configuration has a limiting meteor magnitude of about +5. One station is located at Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama and the other is 31.8 kilometers away at a school in Decatur, Alabama. Both single-station and double-station fluxes are calculated every morning using data from the previous night. The flux algorithms employed here differ from others currently in use in that they do not assume a single height for all meteors observed in the common camera volume. In the MEO system, the volume is broken up into a set of height intervals, with the collecting areas determined by the position of the active shower or sporadic source radiant. The flux per height interval is calculated and summed to obtain the total meteor flux. As the mass is also computed from the photometry, a mass flux can also be calculated. First, a weather algorithm indicates if sky conditions are clear enough to calculate fluxes, at which point a limiting magnitude algorithm is employed. The limiting magnitude algorithm performs a fit of stellar magnitudes versus camera intensities. The stellar limiting magnitude is derived from this and converted to a limiting meteor magnitude for the active shower or sporadic source. The fluxes are scaled to an average limiting magnitude throughout the night and zenithal hourly rate (ZHR's) are output daily along with flux values. In addition to this process, results will be presented as applied to the 2014 May Camelopardalid outburst, using data from several different optical systems, which looked at May Camelopardalids in different size ranges.
The purpose of this research is to provide Space Station Freedom protective structures design insight through the coupling of design/material requirements, hypervelocity impact phenomenology, meteoroid and space debris environment sensitivities, optimization techniques and operations research strategies, and mission scenarios. The goals of the research are: (1) to develop a Monte Carlo simulation tool which will provide top level insight for Space Station protective structures designers; (2) to develop advanced shielding concepts relevant to Space Station Freedom using unique multiple bumper approaches; and (3) to investigate projectile shape effects on protective structures design.
It is noted that the Shuttle Orbiter will be more subject to meteoroid impact than previous spacecraft, due to its greater surface area and longer cumulative time in space. The Orbiter structural material, RCC, a reinforced carbon-carbon laminate with a diffused silicon carbide coating, is evaluated in terms of its resistance to hypervelocity impact. It was found that the specimens (disks with a mass of 34 g and a thickness of 5.0 mm) were cratered only on the front surface when the impact energy was 3 J or less. At 3 J, a trace of the black carbon interior was exposed. The specimens were completely penetrated when the energy was 34 J or greater.
Topics covered include: Calibration Test Set for a Phase-Comparison Digital Tracker; Wireless Acoustic Measurement System; Spiral Orbit Tribometer; Arrays of Miniature Microphones for Aeroacoustic Testing; Predicting Rocket or Jet Noise in Real Time; Computational Workbench for Multibody Dynamics; High-Power, High-Efficiency Ka-Band Space Traveling-Wave Tube; Gratings and Random Reflectors for Near-Infrared PIN Diodes; Optically Transparent Split-Ring Antennas for 1 to 10 GHz; Ice-Penetrating Robot for Scientific Exploration; Power-Amplifier Module for 145 to 165 GHz; Aerial Videography From Locally Launched Rockets; SiC Multi-Chip Power Modules as Power-System Building Blocks; Automated Design of Restraint Layer of an Inflatable Vessel; TMS for Instantiating a Knowledge Base With Incomplete Data; Simulating Flights of Future Launch Vehicles and Spacecraft; Control Code for Bearingless Switched- Reluctance Motor; Machine Aided Indexing and the NASA Thesaurus; Arbitrating Control of Control and Display Units; Web-Based Software for Managing Research; Driver Code for Adaptive Optics; Ceramic Paste for Patching High-Temperature Insulation; Fabrication of Polyimide-Matrix/Carbon and Boron-Fiber Tape; Protective Skins for Aerogel Monoliths; Code Assesses Risks Posed by Meteoroids and Orbital Debris; Asymmetric Bulkheads for Cylindrical Pressure Vessels; Self-Regulating Water-Separator System for Fuel Cells; Self-Advancing Step-Tap Drills; Array of Bolometers for Submillimeter- Wavelength Operation; Delta-Doped CCDs as Detector Arrays in Mass Spectrometers; Arrays of Bundles of Carbon Nanotubes as Field Emitters; Staggering Inflation To Stabilize Attitude of a Solar Sail; and Bare Conductive Tether for Decelerating a Spacecraft.
Design practices to provide protection for International Space Station (ISS) crew and critical equipment from meteoroid and orbital debris (M/OD) Impacts have been developed. Damage modes and failure criteria are defined for each spacecraft system. Hypervolocity Impact -1 - and analyses are used to develop ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for each exposed spacecraft system. BLEs define Impact particle sizes that result in threshold failure of a particular spacecraft system as a function of Impact velocity, angles and particle density. The BUMPER computer code Is used to determine the probability of no penetration (PNP) that falls the spacecraft shielding based on NASA standard meteoroid/debris models, a spacecraft geometry model, and the BLEs. BUMPER results are used to verify spacecraft shielding requirements Low-weight, high-performance shielding alternatives have been developed at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF) to meet spacecraft protection requirements.
Protection of human life onboard the International Space Station (ISS) requires reinforced shielding of crewed modules to prevent penetration of micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD), while optimizing the necessary mass for that application. An efficient way to achieve that protection consists in combining metal plates with ceramic and Kevlar fabrics in critical areas, a configuration known as the “Stuffed Whipple Shield”. In robotic spacecraft, fuel tanks are particularly vulnerable to MMOD impacts due to their pressurized contents and thin walls. Risk assessment of the Plankton, Aerosol, Cloud, ocean Ecosystem (PACE) spacecraft using the Bumper3-Sat hypervelocity impact simulation tool demonstrated that the risk of propulsion tank damage due to MMOD particles coming from the ram direction (Launch Vehicle Adapter side) violated NASA requirements to limit the generation of orbital debris and threatened mission success. To mitigate the risk and achieve compliance, the basic configuration of the ISS Stuffed Whipple shield was scaled down and adapted to become a tank shield in the spacecraft ram direction. This paper will describe the adaptation of the ISS Stuffed Shield to a robotic spacecraft, while also comparing the effectiveness of the proposed shield design with more traditional single-wall and double-wall alternatives used in robotic spacecraft under similar conditions.
The Mars Sample Return Campaign must satisfy a Back Planetary Protection requirement that limits the risk of biological contamination of the Earth by Martian microbes. The Earth Re-turn Orbiter (ERO), being developed by the European Space Agency (ESA), will carry a Capture, Containment and Return System (CCRS), which is being developed by NASA to retrieve orbiting samples (OS) from Mars orbit, surround them with two containment layers to create a Contained OS (COS), and transfer the COS to the Earth Entry System (EES), which will be re-leased by ERO to carry the samples through entry, descent and landing at the Utah Test and Training Range. Micrometeoroid impact damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS) of the EES, which may occur at any time in the ERO mission, is recognized as a potential risk driver for loss of sample containment that needs to be rigorously assessed. A Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) will be implemented to limit that risk. The MMPS consists of a shield covering the TPS called the Micrometeoroid Garage (MMG) and a system of cameras to inspect the TPS. An extensive study was performed by the CCRS Project in collaboration with the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC)to assess the probability of damage to the MMG and TPS by meteoroids over the entire ERO mission. This included the computation of the meteoroid fluence on the MMG and directly on the TPS after EES separation, and assessment of damage to the MMG and TPS via hypervelocity impact tests, hydrocode simulations, and empirical damage prediction and ballistic limit equations (BLEs). The focus of this paper is the meteoroid fluence on the MMG.
The Mars Sample Return Campaign must satisfy a Back Planetary Protection requirement that limits the risk of biological contamination of the Earth by Martian microbes. The Earth Re-turn Orbiter (ERO), being developed by the European Space Agency (ESA), will carry a Capture, Containment and Return System (CCRS), which is being developed by NASA to retrieve orbiting samples (OS) from Mars orbit, surround them with two containment layers to create a Contained OS (COS), and transfer the COS to the Earth Entry System (EES), which will be re-leased by ERO to carry the samples through entry, descent and landing at the Utah Test and Training Range. Micrometeoroid impact damage to the Thermal Protection System (TPS) of the EES, which may occur at any time in the ERO mission, is recognized as a potential risk driver for loss of sample containment that needs to be rigorously assessed. A Micrometeoroid Protection System (MMPS) will be implemented to limit that risk. The MMPS consists of a shield covering the TPS called the Micrometeoroid Garage (MMG) and a system of cameras to inspect the TPS. An extensive study was performed by the CCRS Project in collaboration with the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC)to assess the probability of damage to the MMG and TPS by meteoroids over the entire ERO mission. This included the computation of the meteoroid fluence on the MMG and directly on the TPS after EES separation, and assessment of damage to the MMG and TPS via hypervelocity impact tests, hydrocode simulations, and empirical damage prediction and ballistic limit equations (BLEs). The focus of this paper is the meteoroid fluence on the MMG.
To enable a sustainable, permanent human lunar presence, NASA must provide a safe haven shelter to protect astronauts and equipment from radiation, thermal extremes, and micro-meteoroids (MM). Planning and development for a robust Safe Haven includes an examination of NASA activities in site preparation, excavation, regolith transfer, surface operations, autonomous monitoring and maintenance, advanced manufacturing, and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) for identifying the best approaches when implementing a safe haven shelter. These NASA activities were reviewed as a part of a trade study conducted at NASA Langley to assess technological needs and estimated technology readiness levels (TRL). This paper presents a thorough review of the role and level of autonomy in the establishment and sustainment operations of a Lunar Safe Haven.
To enable a sustainable, permanent human lunar presence, NASA must provide a safe haven shelter to protect astronauts and equipment from radiation, thermal extremes, and micro-meteoroids (MM). Planning and development for a robust Safe Haven includes an examination of NASA activities in site preparation, excavation, regolith transfer, surface operations, autonomous monitoring and maintenance, advanced manufacturing, and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) for identifying the best approaches when implementing a safe haven shelter. These NASA activities were reviewed as a part of a trade study conducted at NASA Langley to assess technological needs and estimated technology readiness levels (TRL). This paper presents a thorough review of the role and level of autonomy in the establishment and sustainment operations of a Lunar Safe Haven.
All spacecraft use some sort of thermal insulation in their design, which is usually placed on the spacecraft’s exterior. As such, it is highly susceptible to high-speed impacts by meteoroids and orbital debris. These high-speed impacts can damage the insulation to a point where the protection it offers is below acceptable limits. It is, therefore, important to be able to characterize expected TPS damage levels stemming from such high-speed impacts. In a recent paper, we presented the results of a study that sought to characterize the high-speed impact damage that would be sustained by two thermal protection materials that have recently gained attention for possible use in interplanetary missions. As part of the analyses performed, ballistic limit equations for these materials were developed using recent high-speed impact test data, and then assessed by comparing their predictions against test data. In this paper, we extend the applicability of the ballistic limit equation for one of those thermal materials beyond the testable regime using the results of series of Smooth Particle Hydrodynamics Code (SPHC) impact simulations at velocities in excess of 10 km/s. When the predictions of the updated and expanded BLE were compared against the results of the SPHC runs, the predictions were seen to be consistent with the data: non-perforation data points were typically below the BLE curves, while perforation data points were typically above them.
Over the past 50 years, various NASA communities have contributed significantly to maturing NASA s meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD)1 programs to their current state. As a result of these community efforts, and to NASA s credit, NASA s MMOD programs and models are now widely used and respected by the providers and users of both government and commercial satellites, nationally as well as internationally. Satellites have been redesigned to protect critical components from MMOD damage by moving critical components from exterior surfaces to deep inside a satellite s structure. Orbits are monitored and altered to minimize the risk of collision with tracked orbital debris. MMOD shielding added to the International Space Station (ISS) protects critical components and astronauts from potentially catastrophic damage that might result from smaller, untracked debris and meteoroid impacts. The space shuttle, as it orbited Earth, and whether docked to the ISS or not, was optimally oriented to protect its fragile thermal protection and thermal radiation systems from MMOD damage. In addition, astronauts inspected its thermal protection system for MMOD damage before the shuttle reentered Earth s atmosphere; Orion, NASA s capsule to carry astronauts to low Earth orbit, includes designs to mitigate the threat of MMOD damage and provide increased safety to the crew. When a handful of reasonable assumptions are used in NASA s MMOD models, scenarios are uncovered that conclude that the current orbital debris environment has already reached a "tipping point." That is, the amount of debris - in terms of the population of large debris objects, as well as overall mass of debris in orbit - currently in orbit has reached a threshold where it will continually collide with itself, further increasing the population of orbital debris. This increase will lead to corresponding increases in spacecraft failures, which will only create more feedback into the system, increasing the debris population growth rate. The increase thus far has been most rapid in low Earth orbit (LEO), with geosynchronous Earth orbits (GEOs) potentially suffering the same fate, but over a much longer time period. The exact timing and pace of this exponential growth are uncertain, but the serious implications of such a scenario require careful attention because of the strategic importance of U.S. space operations. The Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management and Budget contracted with the National Research Council for a study to perform three tasks: review NASA s MMOD programs and efforts, recommend in which of those NASA should increase or decrease its effort or change focus, and determine whether NASA should pursue work in any new MMOD areas. The official letter requesting the study and the full statement of task for the Committee for the Assessment of NASA s Orbital Debris Programs are in Appendixes A and B, respectively.
Meteoroid penetration damage to spacecraft system, showing particle mass density distribution as protection criterion
The paper outlines selected outputs from an ongoing Marshall Space Flight Center/US Army Corps of Engineers parametric study of the effects of meteoroid/space debris impacts on Space Station Freedom module wall protection structures. The advantages and limitations of HULL hydrocode computer simulation are discussed, and examples of meteoroid/ debris impacts on various wall structural designs are presented. Trends in the terminal effects of particle sizes, velocities, shapes, and impact angles upon structural design parameters (wall and bumper thickness and spacing) are summarized and depicted through selected simulation runs. Throughout the paper, proposed structural modifications to the baseline module protection structure will be examined which are capable of mitigating damage from particle impacts.
Spacecraft designers have always been concerned about the effects of meteoroid impacts on mission safety. The engineering solution to this problem has generally been to erect a bumper or shield placed outboard from the spacecraft wall to disrupt/deflect the incoming projectiles. Spacecraft designers have a number of tools at their disposal to aid in the design process. These include hypervelocity impact testing, analytic impact predictors, and hydrodynamic codes. Analytic impact predictors generally provide the best quick-look estimate of design tradeoffs. The most complete way to determine the characteristics of an analytic impact predictor is through optimization of the protective structures design problem formulated with the predictor of interest. Space Station Freedom protective structures design insight is provided through the coupling of design/material requirements, hypervelocity impact phenomenology, meteoroid and space debris environment sensitivities, optimization techniques and operations research strategies, and mission scenarios. Major results are presented.
The possibility and probability of natural transfer of viable microbes from Mars to Earth and Earth to Mars traveling in meteoroids during the first 0.5 Ga and the following 4 Ga are investigated, including: --radiation protection against the galactic cosmic ray nuclei and the solar rays, dose rates as a function of the meteorite's radial column mass (radius x density), combined with dose rates generated by natural radioactivity within the meteorite; and survival curves for some bacterial species using NASA's HZETRN transport code --other factors affecting microbe survival: vacuum; central meteorite temperatures at launch, orbiting, and arrival; pressure and acceleration at launch; spontaneous DNA decay; metal ion migration --mean sizes and numbers of unshocked meteorites ejected and percentage falling on Earth, using current semiempirical results --viable flight times for the microbe species Bacillus subtilis and Deinococcus radiodurans R1 --the approximate fraction of microbes (with properties like the two species studied) viably arriving on Earth out of those ejected from Mars during the period 4 Ga BP to the present time, and during the 700 Ma from 4.5 to 3.8 Ga. Similarly, from Earth to Mars. The conclusion is that if microbes existed or exist on Mars, viable transfer to Earth is not only possible but also highly probable, due to microbes' impressive resistance to the dangers of space transfer and to the dense traffic of billions of martian meteorites which have fallen on Earth since the dawn of our planetary system. Earth-to-Mars transfer is also possible but at a much lower frequency.