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NASA NTRS2010

Statistical Analysis of a Large Sample Size Pyroshock Test Data Set Including Post Flight Data Assessment

The Earth Observing System (EOS) Terra spacecraft was launched on an Atlas IIAS launch vehicle on its mission to observe planet Earth in late 1999. Prior to launch, the new design of the spacecraft's pyroshock separation system was characterized by a series of 13 separation ground tests. The analysis methods used to evaluate this unusually large amount of shock data will be discussed in this paper, with particular emphasis on population distributions and finding statistically significant families of data, leading to an overall shock separation interface level. The wealth of ground test data also allowed a derivation of a Mission Assurance level for the flight. All of the flight shock measurements were below the EOS Terra Mission Assurance level thus contributing to the overall success of the EOS Terra mission. The effectiveness of the statistical methodology for characterizing the shock interface level and for developing a flight Mission Assurance level from a large sample size of shock data is demonstrated in this paper.

Hughes, William O.↗
NASA NTRS2018

A New Approach to Mission Classification and Risk Management for NASA Space Flight Missions

The NASA risk classification system is meant to uide space mission development from formulation through completion of implementation. It is also meant to be the basis on which program and project managers develop and implement appropriate mission assurance and risk management strategies for the mission. In order to be useful, the risk classification system needs to provide consistent and reproducible classification results so that missions may be designed with the appropriate components, subsystems, and testing philosophy, all of which impacts mission schedule and cost. In a cost-constrained environment, a clear, robust, and reproducible approach to mission implementation becomes more critical than ever before. Once a project's risk classification level is established, the managers can define the appropriate management controls, systems engineering processes, mission assurance requirements, safety, and testing for that mission. The current NASA mission classification system will be reviewed before a new system is proposed.NASA manages space flight missions according to a four-tiered classification which assumes increasing levels of risk. We argue that risk does not change between classes. What changes are the means available to reduce risk. In performance-driven missions, the project will spend money in order to maintain performance without reducing margins. In cost-constrained missions, performance will be reduced in order to stay within budget or to maintain schedule: measurement requirements may be traded, design life may be reduced, or both. We then propose a new approach to the classification of NASA space flight missions, based on an assessment of how flexible the requirements, how exquisite the measurements, how long the lifetime, and how rigid the budget.Our proposed approach makes possible a clearer differentiation between classification levels and more effective guidance to program and project managers.

Bordi, Francesco↗
NASA NTRS2008

Ares Project Overview - Quality in Design

This presentation introduces the audience to the overall goals of the Ares Project, which include providing human access to low-Earth orbit, the Moon, and beyond. The presentation also provides an overview of with the vehicles that will execute those goals and progress made on the vehicles to date. The briefing will provide an introduction to Lean, Six Sigma, and Kaizen practices Ares will use to improve the overall effectiveness and quality of its efforts. Finally, the briefing includes a summary of Safety and Mission Assurance practices being implemented within[Ares to ensure safety and quality early in the design process. Integrating Safety and Mission Assurance in Design: This presentation describes how the Ares Projects are learning from the successes and failures of previous launch systems in order to maximize safety and reliability while maintaining fiscal responsibility. The Ares Projects are integrating Safer T and Mission Assurance into design activities and embracing independent assessments by Quality experts in thorough reviews of designs and processes. Incorporating Lean thinking into the design process, Ares is also streamlining existing processes and future manufacturing flows which will yield savings during production. Understanding the value of early involvement of Quality experts, the Ares Projects are leading launch vehicle development into the 21st century.

Cianciola, Chris↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA Armstrong (AFRC) Human Factors Program

Armstrong Flight Research Center is NASA’s premier flight research center. It is located on Edwards AFB in the high desert of California. The AFRC Safety and Mission Assurance Directorates Human Factors Program is one tool that enables Armstrong to be the national center of excellence for conducting leading edge aerospace flight research, airborne science, and airborne astronomy by providing responsive, effective, and adaptive Safety & Mission Assurance support. The AFRC Human Factors Specialist is also a member of the Agency Human Factors Task Force which provides and expands the understanding and impact of Human Factors across the Agency. The Program is managed by the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance at NASA Headquarters.

Kiriokos, Nick C.↗
NASA NTRS2020

NASA Quality Assurance in an MBSE world

Over the past decade or so, the emergence of Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) has demonstrated its desirability and value in terms of 1) being a single source of truth, 2) unambiguous definitions and relationships, and 3) after representation, the ability to explore/extract any sets of data on demand. While much work has been done in showing the value to the system engineering discipline in these areas, how does that value translate to the Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) world? This paper provides a vision of a very desirable future of NASA S&MA after it is fully integrated into the MBSE framework. We explore the impact and consequences of the MBSE Value items discussed above and how they impact the disciplines of quality assurance, reliability and maintainability, system safety, and software assurance. We provide insight into how the MBSE modeling tools can be used to define S&MA processes (ideally as a result of Use Case [1] elaboration of processes represented in MagicDraw®), produce S&MA products (ViewEditor output of various items), and represent S&MA disciplines (S&MA inside of MagicDraw). We also provide insight into the degree to which some elements can be directly integrated into a SysML® model and when, as often happens, an interface to some external source must be provided. The desirability of this future is part of the reason for the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance’s (OSMA) recent creation of a Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA) Program [2] and the MBMA annual workshops. We briefly summarize the efforts to date to generate S&MA Use Cases for eventual deployment into pilot and project efforts. Even simple use of the SysML modeling tools can be used to capture quality assurance tasks and integrate them with the systems engineering and produce products that are easy to use by quality practitioners that are unfamiliar with these methods. We anticipate finding opportunities to pilot and implement various Quality Assurance (QA) Use Cases in FY20. The MBMA Program is focused on implementation; the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer's Community of Practice, as well as the SmallSat communities, are very interested in the integration of S&MA. Finally, as projects move forward utilizing whatever efficiency increases they can find in a cost-constrained environment, the S&MA community cannot be caught unawares and needs to continue preparing for the ever-growing implementation of MBSE across NASA and our government and commercial partners.

Evans, John W↗
NASA NTRS2010

Development of NASA's Accident Precursor Analysis Process Through Application on the Space Shuttle Orbiter

Accident Precursor Analysis (APA) serves as the bridge between existing risk modeling activities, which are often based on historical or generic failure statistics, and system anomalies, which provide crucial information about the failure mechanisms that are actually operative in the system. APA docs more than simply track experience: it systematically evaluates experience, looking for under-appreciated risks that may warrant changes to design or operational practice. This paper presents the pilot application of the NASA APA process to Space Shuttle Orbiter systems. In this effort, the working sessions conducted at Johnson Space Center (JSC) piloted the APA process developed by Information Systems Laboratories (ISL) over the last two years under the auspices of NASA's Office of Safety & Mission Assurance, with the assistance of the Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Shuttle & Exploration Analysis Branch. This process is built around facilitated working sessions involving diverse system experts. One important aspect of this particular APA process is its focus on understanding the physical mechanism responsible for an operational anomaly, followed by evaluation of the risk significance of the observed anomaly as well as consideration of generalizations of the underlying mechanism to other contexts. Model completeness will probably always be an issue, but this process tries to leverage operating experience to the extent possible in order to address completeness issues before a catastrophe occurs.

Maggio, Gaspare↗
NASA NTRS2019

Method for Tracking and Communicating Aggregate Risk Through the Use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) Tools

Large, complex projects can identify a significant number and variety of risks, throughout the project life cycle. These risks are analyzed, mitigated, closed or accepted as independent uncertainties. Once closed or accepted, it is easy for projects to lose awareness of their impact. In reality, each of these risks contributes some amount to the overall risk posture of the project. The ability to track and effectively communicate this aggregate risk has represented a challenge to project management. There have been previous attempts to create a schema to communicate the aggregate effect of risks, without notable success. Most of these attempts have centered on some additive metric derived from the scoring of likelihood and consequence values. This, in and of itself, is a logical approach, but all too often the scores were then aggregated to a level where all context was lost. One weakness has been a lack of attempt to create linkages or logical groups of the risks upon which useful aggregation could then occur. The overall move to model-based (systems) engineering (MBSE) has opened up a vast frontier of opportunities to better integrate all project data. MBSE provides an underlying layer that links data items to each other. Objectives link to requirements, which then link to functions, functions to physical architecture items, and so on, as far down as projects want to model. While it started with a focus on modeling requirements based on things like use cases, efforts are now underway to integrate safety and mission assurance (S&MA) information and analyses, such as risks. This effort, called Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA), is yielding models that are more useful and are a more accurate representations of the systems. MBSE models, with this ability to link related items, provide a new means of tracking and communicating aggregate risks. In the proposed method, risks are added into the models as distinct items, having attributes that communicate a scoring derived from the likelihood and consequence values as charted on the standard NASA 5x5 risk matrix. Like earlier efforts, each box in the 5x5 has an associated scoring, which may include both a current score and potential post-mitigation/control score. The risk items are then linked to elements of the model, such as system objectives/goals, requirements, functions, or physical architecture items, with "Risk to" relationships. These risks will then be communicated by use of reports generated from the model, detailing all risks and/or hazards linked to model elements. These reports can include aggregate impacts, including a current scoring and potential future state scoring based on the planned mitigations and/or controls. These reports will show all risks, open, accepted, and closed, linked to project objectives or requirements. When run as part of an upcoming risk acceptance discussion, these reports will serve to remind the team of all previous risks that relate to the effected portion of the system. When included as part of periodic program or project reviews, risk reviews, and safety reviews, this method can improve the overall understanding of the system's true risk posture. This proposed method takes full advantage of the advances that modern modeling techniques provide, with a minimal investment of additional time. Utilizing the model environment also enables a near constant access to current state of aggregate risks.

model based mission assurance↗
NASA NTRS2015

Risky Business

During my internship I worked on two major projects, recommending improvements for the Center's Risk Management Workshop and helping with the strategic planning efforts for Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). The risk management improvements is the key project I worked on this semester through my internship, while the strategic planning is the secondary assignment. S&MA Business Office covers both aspects in its delegation, getting both spans some of the work done in the office. A risk is a future event with a negative consequence that has some probability of occurring. Safety and Mission Assurance identifies, analyzes, plans, and tracks risk. The directorate offers the Center a Risk Management Workshop, and part of the ongoing efforts of S&MA is to make continuous improvements to the RM Workshop. By using the Project Management Institute's (PMI) Standard for Risk Management, I performed a gap analysis to make improvements for our materials. I benchmarked the PMI's Risk Management Standard, compared our Risk Management Workshop materials to PMI's standard, and identified any gaps in our material. My major findings were presented to the Business Office of S&MA for a decision on whether or not to incorporate the improvements. These suggestions were made by attending JSC working group meetings, Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) panel reviews and various risk review meetings. The improvements provide better understanding of risk management processes and enhanced risk tracking knowledge and skills. Risk management is an integral part of any engineering discipline, getting exposed to this section of engineering will greatly help shape my career in the future. Johnson Space Center is a world leader in risk management processes; learning risk management here gives me a huge advantage over my peers, as well as understanding decision making in the context of risk management will help me to be a well-rounded engineer. Strategic planning is an area I had not previously studied. Helping with the strategic planning efforts in S&MA has taught me how organizations think and function as a whole. S&MA is adopting a balanced scorecard approach to strategic planning. As part of this planning method strategic themes, objectives, and initiatives are formed. I attended strategic theme team workshops that formed the strategy map for the directorate and gave shape to the plan. Also during these workshops the objectives were discussed and built. Learning the process for strategic planning has helped me better understand how organizations and businesses function, which also helps me to be a more effective employee. Other assignments I had during my internship included completing the Safety and Mission Assurance Technical Excellent Program (STEP) Level 1, as well as doing a two week rotation through the Space Exploration division in S&MA, specifically working with a thermal protection systems (TPS) engineer. While working there, I learned about the Orion capsule and the SpaceX Dragon cargo capsule. I attended meetings to prepare the engineers for the upcoming Critical Design Reviews for both capsules and reviewed test data. Learning risk management, strategic planning, and working in the Space Exploration division has taught me about many aspects of S&MA. My internship at NASA has given me new experiences and taught me numerous subjects that I would have otherwise not learned. This opportunity has expanded my educational horizons and is helping me to become a more useful engineer and employee.

Yarbrough, Katherine↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Mission Operations Directorate Preparations for the COTS Visiting Vehicles

With the retirement of the Space Shuttle looming, a series of new spacecraft is under development to assist in providing for the growing logistical needs of the International Space Station (ISS). Two of these vehicles are being built under a NASA initiative known as the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program. These visiting vehicles ; Space X s Dragon and Orbital Science Corporation s Cygnus , are to be domestically produced in the United States and designed to add to the capabilities of the Russian Progress and Soyuz workhorses, the European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the Japanese H-2 Transfer Vehicle (HTV). Most of what is known about the COTS program has focused on the work of Orbital and SpaceX in designing, building, and testing their respective launch and cargo vehicles. However, there is also a team within the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at NASA s Johnson Space Center working with their operational counterparts in these companies to provide operational safety oversight and mission assurance via the development of operational scenarios and products needed for these missions. Ensuring that the operational aspect is addressed for the initial demonstration flights of these vehicles is the topic of this paper. Integrating Dragon and Cygnus into the ISS operational environment has posed a unique challenge to NASA and their partner companies. This is due in part to the short time span of the COTS program, as measured from initial contract award until first launch, as well as other factors that will be explored in the text. Operational scenarios and products developed for each COTS vehicle will be discussed based on the following categories: timelines, on-orbit checkout, ground documentation, crew procedures, software updates and training materials. Also addressed is an outline of the commonalities associated with the operations for each vehicle. It is the intent of the authors to provide their audience with a better understanding of the mission assurance that MOD brings to commercial ventures to the ISS

Shull, Sarah A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Comet Astrobiology Exploration Sample Return (CAESAR) Mission

The Comet Astrobiology Exploration Sample Return (CAESAR) mission will acquire and return to Earth for laboratory analysis a minimum of 80 grams of surface material from the nucleus of comet 67P/Chur-yumov-Gerasimenko (67P). CAESAR will characterize the surface region sampled, preserve the collected sample in a pristine state, and return evolved volatiles by capturing them in a separate gas reservoir. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center provides project management, systems engineering, safety and mission assurance, contamination control, mission operations, and many other important functions. Northrop Grumman Space Systems will build the spacecraft, based on Dawn mission heritage, which like CAESAR, uses solar electric propulsion. CAESAR was selected by for Phase A study in the New Frontiers 4 Competition and will be proposed to New Frontiers 5.Collection of a sample from the surface of comet 67P is facilitated by a set of cameras that together provide images to support sample site selection, perform optical navigation, and document the sample before, during, and after col-lection. The sample is collected at the end of an arm during a 5-second touch-and-go (TAG) maneuver with the Sample Acquisition System (SAS)designed by Honeybee Robotics for the surface properties of comet 67P observed by the Rosetta mission. After sample collection, and while the sample is still cold (< -80°C), the TAG Arm inserts the sample container into the Sample Containment System (SCS) mounted inside the Sample Return Capsule (SRC). The SCS is sealed, preventing the sample from escaping into space. The sample is slowly warmed inside the SCS to enable sublimation of volatiles, which are collected in the Gas Containment System (GCS), a passively cooled gas reservoir. Separating the volatiles from the solid sample protects the solid sample from alteration. Once all sublimated H2O is transferred to the GCS, the GCS is sealed to capture the volatile sit contains, and the SCS is vented to space to maintain the solid sample under vacuum. The SCS vent is closed before Earth entry to prevent atmospheric contamination. Detailed laboratory analyses of the sample from 67P will trace the history of volatile reservoirs, delineate the chemical pathways that led from simple interstellar species to complex molecules, constrain the evolution of the comet, and evaluate the role of comets in delivering water and prebiotic organics to the early Earth. CAESAR will achieve these goals by carrying out coordinated sample analyses that will link macroscopic properties of the comet with microscale mineralogy, chemistry, and isotopic studies of volatiles and solids. Most of the sample (≥75%) will be set aside for analyses by generations of scientists using continually advancing tools and methods, yielding an enduring scientific treasure that only sample return can provide. This presentation will review development conducted during NF4 Phase A and discuss the NF5 mission concept.

A G Hayes↗
NASA NTRS2004

Managing Risk to Ensure a Successful Cassini/Huygens Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI)

I. Design: a) S/C designed to be largely single fault tolerant; b) Operate in flight demonstrated envelope, with margin; and c) Strict compliance with requirements & flight rules. II. Test: a) Baseline, fault & stress testing using flight system testbeds (H/W & S/W); b) In-flight checkout & demos to remove first time events. III. Failure Analysis: a) Critical event driven fault tree analysis; b) Risk mitigation & development of contingencies. IV) Residual Risks: a) Accepted pre-launch waivers to Single Point Failures; b) Unavoidable risks (e.g. natural disaster). V) Mission Assurance: a) Strict process for characterization of variances (ISAs, PFRs & Waivers; b) Full time Mission Assurance Manager reports to Program Manager: 1) Independent assessment of compliance with institutional standards; 2) Oversight & risk assessment of ISAs, PFRs & Waivers etc.; and 3) Risk Management Process facilitator.

risk managment↗
NASA NTRS2023

CST: A Tool for Optimizing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Static-Code Analysis Tools

Static Code Analysis (SCA) is a vital component of NASA IV&V’s mission assurance for safety-critical software as it reduces the likelihood of software-induced hazards impacting mission success. Static Code Analysis achieves this by identifying hazards that may not have been otherwise detectable by typical code reviews or other testing. Using SCA tools, however, can be intimidating due to steep learning curves, especially considering tool performance and defect coverage varies greatly. Because of this variation amongst SCA tools, understanding which tools support certain defects and which do not, as well as understanding how to run an analysis based on steps that are unique to each tool, can be difficult to both new and experienced analysts alike. To mitigate this, the SCAWG or the IV&V Static Code Analysis Working Group, created the SCA Checker Taxonomy and Starting Point Profiles. The Checker Selection Tool (CST) incorporates these two SCAWG products into an interactive tool which allows the user to: select organized categories of defects they would like the SCA tools to discover, select default checkers depending on their mission type (e.g. flight), and configure multiple SCA tools at once. C/C++, Java, and Python defect checkers from four common SCA tools were utilized in this iteration of the CST. This iteration also includes the addition of training, SCA tool specific help, and taxonomy guide links, into its design to help users new to Static Code Analysis learn how to perform SCA more efficiently. The CST has been subject to beta testing by experienced static code analysts from the SCAWG to ensure a usable and accurate final product. The implications of the CST in the mission assurance of NASA safety-critical software are profound, as the CST can help identify and reduce false positives and false negatives, fundamentally improving overall SCA efficiency and accuracy.

static code analysis↗
NASA NTRS2010

We're Here to Help You

Air Force lore tells us that the two biggest lies you will ever hear on the tarmac are when the Inspector General steps off the plane and says to the Wing Commander, "We're here to help you," and the Wing Commander replies, "We're glad to see you." Not too surprisingly, a similar relationship is often perceived between a project manager and the mission assurance representative (especially for operations). This perception intensifies as budgets shrink and missions shorten, after all, where is the value added? That is the question we will examine for three small, short projects: Phoenix, WISE, and Grail (which is yet to launch). All have limited resources to devote to "niceties" and a very short mission to reap the benefits for their operations. We will examine how mission operations assurance evolved for each project, what worked well, what could have been improved, and how these lessons can be applied to ensure mission operations assurance is a value added function for Grail and future small missions.

Topex↗
NASA NTRS2024

Orbital Debris and the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office

This submission includes 11 presentations prepared by NASA for the Trilateral Safety & Mission Assurance (SMA) Conference from June 24-26th at the ESA Centre for Earth Observation. These presentations encompass various safety & mission assurance topics focused on the conference themes of lunar exploration, space sustainability, new commercial partners & challenges, digital engineering, and the assurance of new technologies. These presentations will be shared amongst an international community of SMA practitioners & leadership to promote mutual dialogue on initiatives & challenges of SMA in an evolving spaceflight field.

OSIRIS↗
NASA NTRS2020

Application of Risk Informed Decision Making to Highly Reliable Three Dimensionally Woven Thermal Protection System for Mars Sample Return

The NASA Risk Informed Decision Making process is used to assess a trade space of three dimensionally woven thermal protection systems for application to the Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle. Candidate architectures are assessed based on mission assurance, technical development, cost, and schedule risk. Assessment methodology differed between the architectures, utilizing a four-point quantitative scale for mission assurance and technical development and highly tailored PERT techniques for cost and schedule. Risk results are presented, in addition to a review of RIDM effectiveness for this application.

Needels, J.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Application of Risk Informed Decision Making to a Highly Reliable Three-Dimensionally Woven Thermal Protection System for Mars Sample Return

The NASA Risk Informed Decision Making process is used to assess a trade space of three dimensionally woven thermal protection systems for application to the Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle. Candidate architectures are assessed based on mission assurance, technical development, cost, and schedule risk. Assessment methodology differed between the architectures, utilizing a four-point quantitative scale for mission assurance and technical development and highly tailored PERT techniques for cost and schedule. Risk results are presented, in addition to a review of RIDM effectiveness for this application.

Needels, J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Planetary Protection Program Overview and Update

NASA has an integrated planetary protection strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guide-lines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. The Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance, which in-cludes NASA’s Oÿce of Planetary Protection, depends on these activities to support NASA’s missions in the assurance of crew safety and mission success while protecting the public and planetary environment from harmful contamination. This report will detail the overall planetary protection policy development perspective to sup-port NASA’s upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include crewed Mars and sam-ple return missions. NASA continues to evolve its strategies, policies, and standards. NASA’s support in the COSPAR workshop series on Refining Planetary Protection Requirements for Crewed Missions to Mars have resulted in a NASA interim directive and paved the way for the development of NASA planetary protection roadmaps. These Agency level roadmaps address technology development and testing required to fill knowledge gaps for developing responsive policy guidelines and quantitative technical standards. In addition to workshops and tech-nology management strategies, NASA is also leveraging the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection to serve as a source of advice on planetary protection measures. Finally, the report will include how the Oÿce of Safety and Mission Assurance is incorporating planetary protection into existing and new multi-agency partnerships.

Frank Groen↗