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NASA NTRS1994

Reliability analysis in the Office of Safety, Environmental, and Mission Assurance (OSEMA)

The technical personnel in the SEMA office are working to provide the highest degree of value-added activities to their support of the NASA Langley Research Center mission. Management perceives that reliability analysis tools and an understanding of a comprehensive systems approach to reliability will be a foundation of this change process. Since the office is involved in a broad range of activities supporting space mission projects and operating activities (such as wind tunnels and facilities), it was not clear what reliability tools the office should be familiar with and how these tools could serve as a flexible knowledge base for organizational growth. Interviews and discussions with the office personnel (both technicians and engineers) revealed that job responsibilities ranged from incoming inspection to component or system analysis to safety and risk. It was apparent that a broad base in applied probability and reliability along with tools for practical application was required by the office. A series of ten class sessions with a duration of two hours each was organized and scheduled. Hand-out materials were developed and practical examples based on the type of work performed by the office personnel were included. Topics covered were: Reliability Systems - a broad system oriented approach to reliability; Probability Distributions - discrete and continuous distributions; Sampling and Confidence Intervals - random sampling and sampling plans; Data Analysis and Estimation - Model selection and parameter estimates; and Reliability Tools - block diagrams, fault trees, event trees, FMEA. In the future, this information will be used to review and assess existing equipment and processes from a reliability system perspective. An analysis of incoming materials sampling plans was also completed. This study looked at the issues associated with Mil Std 105 and changes for a zero defect acceptance sampling plan.

Kauffmann, Paul J.↗
NASA NTRS2002

The Mars Technology Program

Future Mars missions require new capabilities that currently are not available. The Mars Technology Program (MTP) is an integral part of the Mars Exploration Program (MEP). Its sole purpose is to assure that required technologies are developed in time to enable the baselined and future missions. The MTP is a NASA-wide technology development program managed by JPL. It is divided into a Focused Program and a Base Program. The Focused Program is tightly tied to the proposed Mars Program mission milestones. It involves time-critical deliverables that must be developed in time for infusion into the proposed Mars 2005, and, 2009 missions. In addition a technology demonstration mission by AFRL will test a LIDAR as part of a joint NASNAFRL experiment. This program bridges the gap between technology and projects by vertically integrating the technology work with pre-project development in a project-like environment with critical dates for technology infusion. A Base Technology Program attacks higher riskhigher payoff technologies not in the critical path of missions.

technology Mars exploration lander rover sample re↗
NASA NTRS2019

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History

In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures.

Green, Carrie↗
NASA NTRS2004

Evaluation of Open-Source Hard Real Time Software Packages

Reliable software is, at times, hard to find. No piece of software can be guaranteed to work in every situation that may arise during its use here at Glenn Research Center or in space. The job of the Software Assurance (SA) group in the Risk Management Office is to rigorously test the software in an effort to ensure it matches the contract specifications. In some cases the SA team also researches new alternatives for selected software packages. This testing and research is an integral part of the department of Safety and Mission Assurance. Real Time operation in reference to a computer system is a particular style of handing the timing and manner with which inputs and outputs are handled. A real time system executes these commands and appropriate processing within a defined timing constraint. Within this definition there are two other classifications of real time systems: hard and soft. A soft real time system is one in which if the particular timing constraints are not rigidly met there will be no critical results. On the other hand, a hard real time system is one in which if the timing constraints are not met the results could be catastrophic. An example of a soft real time system is a DVD decoder. If the particular piece of data from the input is not decoded and displayed to the screen at exactly the correct moment nothing critical will become of it, the user may not even notice it. However, a hard real time system is needed to control the timing of fuel injections or steering on the Space Shuttle; a delay of even a fraction of a second could be catastrophic in such a complex system. The current real time system employed by most NASA projects is Wind River's VxWorks operating system. This is a proprietary operating system that can be configured to work with many of NASA s needs and it provides very accurate and reliable hard real time performance. The down side is that since it is a proprietary operating system it is also costly to implement. The prospect of replacing this somewhat costly implementation is the focus of one of the SA group s current research projects. The explosion of open source software in the last ten years has led to the development of a multitude of software solutions which were once only produced by major corporations. The benefits of these open projects include faster release and bug patching cycles as well as inexpensive if not free software solutions. The main packages for hard real time solutions under Linux are Real Time Application Interface (RTAI) and two varieties of Real Time Linux (RTL), RTLFree and RTLPro. During my time here at NASA I have been testing various hard real time solutions operating as layers on the Linux Operating System. All testing is being run on an Intel SBC 2590 which is a common embedded hardware platform. The test plan was provided to me by the Software Assurance group at the start of my internship and my job has been to test the systems by developing and executing the test cases on the hardware. These tests are constructed so that the Software Assurance group can get hard test data for a comparison between the open source and proprietary implementations of hard real time solutions.

Mattei, Nicholas S.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Space technology research plans

Development of new technologies is the primary purpose of the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST). OAST's mission includes the following two goals: (1) to conduct research to provide fundamental understanding, develop advanced technology and promote technology transfer to assure U.S. preeminence in aeronautics and to enhance and/or enable future civil space missions: and (2) to provide unique facilities and technical expertise to support national aerospace needs. OAST includes both NASA Headquarters operations as well as programmatic and institutional management of the Ames Research Center, the Langley Research Center and the Lewis Research Center. In addition. a considerable portion of OAST's Space R&T Program is conducted through the flight and science program field centers of NASA. Within OAST, the Space Technology Directorate is responsible for the planning and implementation of the NASA Space Research and Technology Program. The Space Technology Directorate's mission is 'to assure that OAST shall provide technology for future civil space missions and provide a base of research and technology capabilities to serve all national space goals.' Accomplishing this mission entails the following objectives: y Identify, develop, validate and transfer technology to: (1) increase mission safety and reliability; (2) reduce flight program development and operations costs; (3) enhance mission performance; and (4) enable new missions. Provide the capability to: (1) advance technology in critical disciplines; and (2) respond to unanticipated mission needs. In-space experiments are an integral part of OAST's program and provides for experimental studies, development and support for in-space flight research and validation of advanced space technologies. Conducting technology experiments in space is a valuable and cost effective way to introduce advanced technologies into flight programs. These flight experiments support both the R&T base and the focussed programs within OAST.

Hook, W. Ray↗
NASA NTRS1989

NDE in aerospace - Requirements for science, sensors and sense

The complexity of modern nondestructive evaluation (NDE) arises from four main factors: quantitative measurement science, physical models for computational analysis, realistic interfacing with engineering decisions, and direct access to management priorities. Recent advances in the four factors of NDE are addressed. Physical models of acoustic propagation are presented that have led to the development of measurement technologies advancing the ability to assure that materials and structures will perform as designed. In addition, a brief discussion is given of current research for future mission needs such as smart structures that sense their own health. Such advances permit projects to integrate design for inspection into their plans, bringing NDE into engineering and management priorities. The measurement focus is on ultrasonics with generous case examples. Problem solutions highlighted include critical stress in fasteners, residual stress in steel, NDE laminography, and solid rocket motor NDE.

Heyman, Joseph S.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Advanced Technologies for Future Spacecraft Cockpits and Space-based Control Centers

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is embarking on a new era of Space Exploration, aimed at sending crewed spacecraft beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), in medium and long duration missions to the Lunar surface, Mars and beyond. The challenges of such missions are significant and will require new technologies and paradigms in vehicle design and mission operations. Current roles and responsibilities of spacecraft systems, crew and the flight control team, for example, may not be sustainable when real-time support is not assured due to distance-induced communication lags, radio blackouts, equipment failures, or other unexpected factors. Therefore, technologies and applications that enable greater Systems and Mission Management capabilities on-board the space-based system will be necessary to reduce the dependency on real-time critical Earth-based support. The focus of this paper is in such technologies that will be required to bring advance Systems and Mission Management capabilities to space-based environments where the crew will be required to manage both the systems performance and mission execution without dependence on the ground. We refer to this concept as autonomy. Environments that require high levels of autonomy include the cockpits of future spacecraft such as the Mars Exploration Vehicle, and space-based control centers such as a Lunar Base Command and Control Center. Furthermore, this paper will evaluate the requirements, available technology, and roadmap to enable full operational implementation of onboard System Health Management, Mission Planning/re-planning, Autonomous Task/Command Execution, and Human Computer Interface applications. The technology topics covered by the paper include enabling technology to perform Intelligent Caution and Warning, where the systems provides directly actionable data for human understanding and response to failures, task automation applications that automate nominal and Off-nominal task execution based on human input or integrated health state-derived conditions. Shifting from Systems to Mission Management functions, we discuss the role of automated planning applications (tactical planning) on-board, which receive data from the other cockpit automation systems and evaluate the mission plan against the dynamic systems and mission states and events, to provide the crew with capabilities that enable them to understand, change, and manage the timeline of their mission. Lastly, we discuss the role of advanced human interface technologies that organize and provide the system md mission information to the crew in ways that maximize their situational awareness and ability to provide oversight and control of aLl the automated data and functions.

Garcia-Galan, Carlos↗
NASA NTRS2011

GSFC Supplier Surveillance

Topics covered include: Develop Program/Project Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans The work activities performed by the developer and/or his suppliers are subject to evaluation and audit by government-designated representatives. CSO supports project by selecting on-site supplier representative s by one of several methods: (1) a Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) person via a Letter Of Delegation (LOD), (2) an independent assurance contractor (IAC) via a contract Audits, Assessments, and Assurance (A3) Contract Code 300 Mission Assurance Support Contract (MASC)

Kelly, Michael P.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Writing Good Risk Statements and Critical Thinking in Risk

The term risk is used ubiquitously in the space community, but more often than not it is used in a counterproductive way. Furthermore, risks are often written to convey some type of concern, but the risk statements are often more emotional in nature than technically substantive. In this talk, we will provide a rigorous view and definition of risk, along with some structured guidelines for writing risk statements centered on critical thinking, which will combine to provide effective risk management tools when dealing with complex space systems.

risk↗
NASA NTRS2019

Health Management and Prognostics for Electric Aircraft Powertrain

W and c Any air borne vehicle needs incorporating safety as key parameter of measure, and inclusion of autonomy raises the critical need for safety under autonomous operations. Management of faults and component degradation is key as complexity in autonomous operations grow over the period of time. Therefore, in addition to basic operational requirements, an autonomous electric vehicle should be able to make accurate estimates of its current system health and take the correct decisions to complete its mission successfully. Real-time safety and state-awareness tools are therefore essential for the vehicle to be able to reach its destination in a safe and successful manner. The need for safety assurance and health management capabilities is particularly relevant for aircraft electric propulsion systems, which are relatively new and with limited historical to learn. They are critical systems requiring high power density along with reliability, resilience, efficient management of weight, and operational costs. A model- based fault diagnosis and prognostics approach of complex critical systems can successfully accomplish the safety and state awareness goal for such electric propulsion systems, enabling autonomous decision making capability for safe and efficient operation. To identify critical components in the system a Qualitative Bayesian approach using FMECA is implemented. This requires the assessment of some quantities representing the state of the electric unmanned aerial systems (e-UAS), as well as look-ahead forecasts of such states during the entire flight, presented in form of safety metrics (SM). In-service data and performance data gathered from degraded components sup- ports diagnostic and prognostic methods for these systems, but this data can be difficult to obtain as weight and packaging restrictions reduce redundancy and instrumentation on-board the vehicle. Therefore, an model-based framework should be capable or operating with limited data. In addition to data scarcity, the variability of such complex critical systems re- quires the model-based framework to reason in the presence of uncertainty, such as sensor noise, and modeling imperfections. Quantification of errors and uncertainties in the measured states and quantities is therefore a fundamental step for a precise estimation of such SMs; un-modeled uncertainty may result in erroneous state assessment and un- reliable predictions of future states of e-UAVs. Typical, centralized model-based schemes suffer from inherent disadvantages such as computational complexity, single point of failure, and scalability issues, and therefore may fail in such a complex scenario. This paper presents a methodology for developing a system level diagnostics and prognostics approach using a Qualitative Bayesian FMECA approach along with a formal uncertainty management framework for an e-UAS. In this work we demonstrate the efficacy of the framework to predict effects of sub-system level degradation on vehicle operation incorporating uncertainty management to predict future behavior under different operating conditions.

Kulkarni, Chetan↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Testing a Run-Time Assurance Framework Coupled with Integrated Risk Mitigation Capabilities for Autonomous Urban UAS Flights

The In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) Concept of Operations (ConOps) envisions new capabilities to monitor, assess, and mitigate flight safety risks. Systems will be tailored to mission type, vehicle/equipage type, operational environment, and safety risk tolerance. Within an IASMS framework, several capabilities may be implemented spanning three operational phases (pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight/off-line); and consisting of lower level functions and information services which may reside onboard the aircraft, on third-party server(s), and/or on ground/operator station(s). Each capability will be designed to produce and disseminate safety-relevant information; perform detection, diagnosis, and prediction of unsafe situations; and/or execute mitigation actions when hazardous events warrant such changes. This paper focuses on recent testing of airborne capabilities that demonstrate inflight aspects of the overarching concept for autonomous unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations in urban environments. A flight test architecture is described that applies run-time assurance principles (e.g., executes independent of the unassured autopilot), real-time risk assessment, and a technique to execute contingencies if necessary either automatically or via pilot intervention. Several tests using small UAS were conducted to verify the assured in-flight risk mitigation capability. The paper draws significantly from a larger NASA technical report and recent prior conference papers, providing additional details. Data is analyzed for two representative flights to illustrate the performance for various sequential and simultaneous hazards used during testing. During each automated flight, several hazards are encountered at various points along the flight path. At each point, the hazard is mitigated by the system, with the vehicle then continuing to subsequent points. The paper concludes with lessons-learned regarding relevant aspects of the overarching IASMS concept and how it may be updated and further advanced in the future.

population activity↗
NASA NTRS2004

NASA's Meteoroid Environment Office

The Meteoroid Environment Office (MEO) has recently been formed within the Engineering Directorate at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center. With agency-wide responsibility for defining the meteoroid environments for spacecraft engineering operations purposes, the MEO will distribute a state-of-the-art sporadic meteoroid model as well as meteor shower forecasts for spacecraft operators. To improve these models and forecasts, the MEO will manage an observation and research program. Office responsibilities, products, and plans will be discussed in this paper. The MEO is sponsored by the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance at NASA Headquarters.

Suggs, Robert M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Taking the Risk Out of Risk Assessment

The ability to understand risks and have the right strategies in place when risky events occur is essential in the workplace. More and more organizations are being confronted with concerns over how to measure their risks or what kind of risks they can take when certain events transpire that could have a negative impact. NASA is one organization that faces these challenges on a daily basis, as effective risk management is critical to the success of its missions especially the Space Shuttle missions. On July 29, 1996, former NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin charged NASA s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance with developing a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) tool to support decisions on the funding of Space Shuttle upgrades. When issuing the directive, Goldin said, "Since I came to NASA [in 1992], we've spent billions of dollars on Shuttle upgrades without knowing how much they improve safety. I want a tool to help base upgrade decisions on risk." Work on the PRA tool began immediately. The resulting prototype, the Quantitative Risk Assessment System (QRAS) Version 1.0, was jointly developed by NASA s Marshall Space Flight Center, its Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and researchers at the University of Maryland. QRAS software automatically expands the reliability logic models of systems to evaluate the probability of highly detrimental outcomes occurring in complex systems that are subject to potential accident scenarios. Even in its earliest forms, QRAS was used to begin PRA modeling of the Space Shuttle. In parallel, the development of QRAS continued, with the goal of making it a world-class tool, one that was especially suited to NASA s unique needs. From the beginning, an important conceptual goal in the development of QRAS was for it to help bridge the gap between the professional risk analyst and the design engineer. In the past, only the professional risk analyst could perform, modify, use, and perhaps even adequately understand PRA. NASA wanted to change this by developing a PRA tool that would be friendlier, more understandable, and more useful to the broader engineering community. This concept ultimately led to the look, feel, and functionality that QRAS has today.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2016

Systems Engineering and Management Applications of ISO 9001:2015 for Government

The manufacturing segment of the business world is busy assessing the impact of ISO 9001:2015, and updating their management systems to meet the required compliance date. What does the new revision mean for government agencies that deliver large engineering projects rather than mass production? In fact, the standard, especially the new revision, can be used quite readily for government agencies, or applied to specific projects, once it is understood in terms of the similarities with systems engineering and project management. From there it can be extrapolated to "mission realization" systems, and a Quality Management System (QMS) is a logical result that can bring order to processes and systems that likely already exist in some fashion. ISO 9001:2015 is less product-oriented than previous versions. It can be more broadly applied to public organizations as well as private; and to services (missions) as well as products. The emphasis on risk management in the revised standard provides the needed balance for weighing decisions with respect to cost, schedule, technical, safety, and regulatory compliance; so if this is not part of agency governance already, this is a good place to start, especially for large engineering projects. The Systems Engineering standard used for this analysis is from NASA's NPR 7123.1 NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements; however, those who are more familiar with ISO/IEC 26702 Systems Engineering-application and management of the systems engineering process, or SAE/EIA 632 Processes for Engineering a System will also recognize the similarities. In reality, the QMS outlined by ISO 9001 reinforces the systems engineering processes, and serves to ensure that they are adequately implemented, although most of the ISO 9001 literature emphasizes the production and process aspects of the standard. Rather than beginning with ISO 9001and getting lost in the vocabulary, it is useful to begin with the systems engineering lifecycle. Identification of stakeholder expectations, identifying solutions, creating specific product or service designs, production of the product or service, delivery to the public, and the associated management, planning, and control processes, are a familiar place to begin thinking of the overall system of identifying, designing, and competing a project or mission. Lining up this lifecycle with the ISO requirements (see Figure 1) illustrates how a quality management system is concerned with the same processes, and provides a governance and assurance function. If implemented properly, there are cost savings resulting from less rework, repair, reprocessing, failures, misplaced documents, and similar types of deficiencies1. Starting with an organization's systems engineering processes allows the organization to use their own terminology for a QMS plan, and tailor the plan to their own project or organization, so that it is more easily developed, understood, and implemented.

Shepherd, Christena C.↗
NASA NTRS2017

A Framework for Reliability and Safety Analysis of Complex Space Missions

Long duration and complex mission scenarios are characteristics of NASA's human exploration of Mars, and will provide unprecedented challenges. Systems reliability and safety will become increasingly demanding and management of uncertainty will be increasingly important. NASA's current pioneering strategy recognizes and relies upon assurance of crew and asset safety. In this regard, flexibility to develop and innovate in the emergence of new design environments and methodologies, encompassing modeling of complex systems, is essential to meet the challenges.

Safety Analysis↗
NASA NTRS2015

Resource Prospector (RP): A Cost-Effective Lunar Resource Pathfinder

Resource Prospector (RP) is an in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) technology demonstration mission under study by the NASA Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorates (HEOMD). This clever mission is currently planned to launch in 2020 and will demonstrate extraction of oxygen, water and other volatiles, as well measure mineralogical content such as silicon and light metals, like aluminum and titanium, from lunar regolith. Expanding human presence beyond low-Earth orbit to asteroids and Mars will require the maximum possible use of local materials, so-called in-situ resources, and the moon presents a unique destination to conduct robotic investigations that advance ISRU capabilities, as well as providing significant exploration and science value. This mission is equally important; however, for how it executes as a risk-tolerant, cost-effective mission. RP follows on the path-finding approaches of the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) mission. The LCROSS mission confirmed the presence of water-ice on the moon, but also established a new lightweight-approach to project and mission execution which was considerably cheaper and faster than traditional NASA missions. RP has been designated as a Class D mission, just as LCROSS. This mission classification is the most risk-tolerant class of mission within the NASA risk framework and as such, is given more latitude to accept higher-levels of residual risk. The intention is that by saving monies normally spent attempting to assure a single missions success, more missions can be funded. A well-designed portfolio can accept occasional mission failure, as it still gets more done for the same investment of resources. This classification enables tailoring the NASA Policy Requirements (NPRs) to lighter-weight approaches to mission management and execution. RP is also studying both international and commercial partnerships as a means to maximize return on the investment. International partnerships provide both capabilities synergies and cost-sharing opportunities, while the evolving new space commercial options are revealing new approaches to acquiring cost-effective services, including the benefits of bundling services. Even the world of launch vehicles is changing, offering much less expensive access to space, especially if NASA is able to be flexible in how it approaches mission assurance. Finally, leveraging investments being made elsewhere within a program portfolio, can enable cost-savings by enabling two applications with one investment. RP will be the next pathfinder mission to both enable exploration capabilities for future missions, and continue to evolve cost-effective approaches for NASA.

Lunar↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What You Need to Know about Planetary Protection Categorization for Your Mission

Planetary protection mission categorization helps to define the risk posture for requirements definition and implementation practices on space flight projects with planetary protection considerations. NASA has recently updated it’s planetary protection policy (NPR 8715.24), and with the update comes a major change in how the planetary protection categorization process is performed for NASA missions. Previously, projects would request the NASA Planetary Protection Officer (PPO) provide a categorization letter documenting the planetary protection category assigned to the proposed mission. Under the new policy the project manager (PM) proposes the planetary protection category for their mission. Depending on the level of the category, the PPO either concurs or recommends concurrence to the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) before forwarding to the Mission Directorate Associate Administrator (MDAA) for final approval prior to the system requirements review (SRR). But what topics must be considered for categorization? This presentation will provide key considerations for planetary protection mission categorization including the target solar system body to be explored, the trajectory to get to the target body, and the operations to be performed at the target body. Additional unique scenarios such as secondary and auxiliary payloads, encountering other solar system bodies on the way to the target body, and sample return missions will also be discussed to share lessons learned from missions that have been through the new categorization process.

Elaine Seasly↗