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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2002

Lessons learned from Shuttle/Mir: psychosocial countermeasures

BACKGROUND: During future long-duration space missions, countermeasures need to be developed to deal with psychosocial issues that might impact negatively on crewmember performance and well-being. METHODS: In our recently completed NASA-funded study of 5 U.S. astronauts, 8 Russian cosmonauts, and 42 U.S. and 16 Russian mission control personnel who participated in the Shuttle/Mir program, we evaluated a number of important psychosocial issues such as group tension, cohesion, leadership role, and the displacement of negative emotions from crewmembers to people in mission control and from mission control personnel to management. RESULTS: Based on our findings, which are reviewed, a number of psychosocial countermeasures are suggested to help ameliorate the negative impact of potential psychosocial problems during future manned space missions. CONCLUSIONS: Crewmembers should be selected not only to rule out psychopathology but also to select-in for group compatibility and facility in a common language. Training should include briefings and team building related to a number of psychosocial issues and should involve both crewmembers and mission control personnel. During the mission, both experts on the ground and the crewmembers themselves should be alert to potential interpersonal problems, including the displacement of negative emotions from the crew to the ground. Supportive activities should consist of both individual and interpersonal strategies, including an awareness of changing leisure time needs. Finally, attention should be given to postmission readjustment and to supporting the families on Earth.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS1995

An Open Specification for Space Project Mission Operations Control Architectures

An 'open specification' for Space Project Mission Operations Control Architectures is under development in the Spacecraft Control Working Group of the American Institute for Aeronautics and Astro- nautics. This architecture identifies 5 basic elements incorporated in the design of similar operations systems: Data, System Management, Control Interface, Decision Support Engine, & Space Messaging Service.

spacecraft ground systems↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Humanity hopes to perform extravehicular activities (EVAs) on the surface of Mars; however, several technical and operational challenges must first be overcome. Foremost among these challenges is managing a significant communication latency between Earth and Mars. Current and historical paradigms of EVA operations have required near-real-time communication between the crewmember(s) and Earth-based mission control. Nextgeneration operational paradigms for supporting deep space exploration will necessitate a distributed decision authority system, including delayed Earth-based mission control, the onplanet extravehicular crewmember(s), and intermediate mission support from intravehicular (IV) crewmember(s) within real-time communication range. This latter group is of particular interest: they must provide operations support without the plentiful resources available to mission control on Earth. Thus, NASA is developing the Personalized EVA Informatics and Decision Support (PersEIDS) software platform. PersEIDS is designed to bolster operator situational awareness and offload operator workload by automatically tracking and projecting consumables usage over an EVA timeline, providing real-time probabilistic safety assessments and recommending alternative EVA timeline(s) when the active timeline is not expected to be completed under consumables limits. The PersEIDS concept of operations, use cases, and models will be presented. A limited version of PersEIDS was demonstrated during a three-day-long study where each day a roughly four-hour-long simulated Martian EVA was performed in virtual reality at the NASA Johnson Space Center. The first day was a control trial without PersEIDS support; the second and third days represented different levels of decision support provided by PersEIDS to the IV crewmember acting as mission control. With PersEIDS support, the IV crewmember was able to manage the mission to completion faster and with more remaining consumables; however, additional testing is required to understand confounding factors, e.g., training bias.

Mars↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

PersEIDS: A Biomedical Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Humanity hopes to perform extravehicular activities (EVAs) on the surface of Mars; however, several technical and operational challenges must first be overcome. Foremost among these challenges is managing a significant communication latency between Earth and Mars. Current and historical paradigms of EVA operations have required near-real-time communication between the crewmember(s) and Earth-based mission control. Nextgeneration operational paradigms for supporting deep space exploration will necessitate a distributed decision authority system, including delayed Earth-based mission control, the onplanet extravehicular crewmember(s), and intermediate mission support from intravehicular (IV) crewmember(s) within real-time communication range. This latter group is of particular interest: they must provide operations support without the plentiful resources available to mission control on Earth. Thus, NASA is developing the Personalized EVA Informatics and Decision Support (PersEIDS) software platform. PersEIDS is designed to bolster operator situational awareness and offload operator workload by automatically tracking and projecting consumables usage over an EVA timeline, providing real-time probabilistic safety assessments and recommending alternative EVA timeline(s) when the active timeline is not expected to be completed under consumables limits. The PersEIDS concept of operations, use cases, and models will be presented. A limited version of PersEIDS was demonstrated during a three-day-long study where each day a roughly four-hour-long simulated Martian EVA was performed in virtual reality at the NASA Johnson Space Center. The first day was a control trial without PersEIDS support; the second and third days represented different levels of decision support provided by PersEIDS to the IV crewmember acting as mission control. With PersEIDS support, the IV crewmember was able to manage the mission to completion faster and with more remaining consumables; however, additional testing is required to understand confounding factors, e.g., training bias.

Mars↗
NASA NTRS2005

The Earth Science Afternoon Constellation: Preparing for Autonomous but Coordinated Operations

This paper describes how the challenges of coordinating the autonomous operations of geographically dispersed mission control centers for several small and large satellites are being overcome. The Earth Science Afternoon Constellation, also referred to as the "A-Train", is an international grouping of five NASA satellites (two major NASA EOS missions and three NASA/Earth System Science Pathfinder missions) and one French satellite orbiting in close proximity. This grouping of satellites provides scientists with the opportunity to perform coincident observations using data from two or more instruments on various satellites with measurements taken at approximately the same time. Three of the six missions are currently on-orbit, with the two missions expected to join the constellation later this year and one mission in 2007. The operational challenges are daunting for several reasons. There are several Mission Control Centers (widely separated on two continents), operating autonomously under tight budget constraints. All of the Mission Control Centers have reasons to be concerned about safety while flying in close proximity to other satellites, but most Centers did not have the resources or the desire to address this concern alone - the interfaces are too numerous and anticipated operations too costly. Clearly, an efficient approach was needed. This paper describes the steps taken to make this Earth science constellation a reality. Agreements were forged to allow the Mission Control Centers to maintain their autonomy, while ensuring their satellite's safety. Each member mission in the constellation operates independently in accordance with its own mission requirements, but the member missions have agreed to coordinate their operations, i.e., orbital positions and control to ensure the safety of the entire constellation. A centralized system was developed at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center to collect, analyze, and distribute ephemeris data used by each of the mission teams to determine the positions of the satellites in the constellation. The system issues warnings regarding possible dangerous configurations, eliminating the need for redundant capabilities at each Mission Control Center. On-orbit contingency situations were identified and analyzed; agreements were reached in advance of contingency operations to ensure that coordination between the Mission Control Centers can be handled expeditiously and fairly. In this manner, recovery from anomalous situations can be more quickly realized, thereby increasing the science return and reducing costs. The process used to develop these contingency procedures and the systems used to facilitate the contingency resolution are described as well.

Case, Warren↗
NASA NTRS2001

Psychosocial issues in space: results from Shuttle/Mir

Important psychosocial issues involving tension, cohesion, leader support, and displacement of negative emotions were evaluated in a 4 1/2-year study involving five U.S. and four Russian Shuttle/Mir space missions. Weekly mood and group climate questionnaires were completed by five U.S. astronauts, eight Russian cosmonauts, and 42 U.S. and 16 Russian mission control subjects. There were few findings that supported our hypothesized changes in tension, cohesion, and leader support in crew and ground subjects using various time models, although crewmembers reported decreasing leader support in the 2nd half of the missions, and astronauts showed some evidence of a novelty effect in the first few weeks. There was no evidence suggesting a 3rd quarter effect among crewmembers on any of the 21 subscales evaluated. In contrast, there was strong evidence to support the hypothesized displacement of tension and negative emotions from crewmembers to mission control personnel and from mission control personnel to management. There were several significant differences in response between Americans vs. Russians, crewmembers vs. mission control personnel, and subjects in this study vs. people in comparable groups on Earth. Subject responses before, during, and after the missions were similar, and we did not find evidence for asthenia in space. Critical incidents that were reported generally dealt with events on-board the Mir and interpersonal conflicts, although most of the responses were from a relatively small number of subjects. Our findings have implications for future training and lead to a number of countermeasures.

short duration↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Decision Support System for Extravehicular Operations Under Significant Communication Latency

Within the next few decades, humanity hopes to perform extravehicular activities (EVAs) on the surface of Mars; however, several technical and operational challenges must first be overcome. Foremost among these challenges is managing a significant two-way communication latency between Earth and Mars. Current and historical paradigms of EVA operations have required near-real-time communication between the crewmember(s) performing an EVA and an Earth-based mission control. Next-generation operational paradigms for supporting deep space exploration will necessitate a distributed decision authority system, including delayed Earth-based mission control, the on-planet extravehicular crewmember(s), and intermediate mission support from intravehicular crewmember(s) within real-time communication range. This latter group is of particular interest: they must provide operations support without the plentiful resources available to mission control on Earth. For this purpose, NASA is developing the Personalized EVA Informatics and Decision Support (PersEIDS) software platform. PersEIDS is designed to bolster operator situational awareness and offload operator workload by automating the tracking and projection of consumables usage over an EVA timeline, providing real-time probabilistic safety assessments of an EVA timeline given consumables constraints, and recommending alternative EVA timeline(s) when the active timeline is not expected to be completed under consumables limits. The PersEIDS concept of operations, use cases, and models will be presented. A limited version of PersEIDS was demonstrated during a three-day-long study where each day a roughly four-hour-long simulated Martian EVA was performed in virtual reality at the NASA Johnson Space Center. The first day was a control trial without PersEIDS support; the second and third days represented different levels of decision support provided by PersEIDS to the intravehicular crewmember acting as mission control. With PersEIDS support, the IV crewmember was able to manage the mission to completion faster and with more remaining consumables; however, additional testing is required to understand confounding factors, e.g. training bias.

Mars↗
NASA NTRS2001

Human interactions during Shuttle/Mir space missions

To improve the interpersonal climate of crewmembers involved with long-duration space missions, it is important to understand the factors affecting their interactions with each other and with members of mission control. This paper will present findings from a recently completed NASA-funded study during the Shuttle/Mir program which evaluated in-group/out-group displacement of negative emotions; changes in tension, cohesion, and leader support over time; and cultural differences. In-flight data were collected from 5 astronauts, 8 cosmonauts, and 42 American and 16 Russian mission control personnel who signed informed consent. Subjects completed a weekly questionnaire that assessed their mood and perception of their work group's interpersonal climate using questions from well-known, standardized measures (Profile of Mood States, Group and Work Environment Scales) and a critical incident log. There was strong evidence for the displacement of tension and dysphoric emotions from crewmembers to mission control personnel and from mission control personnel to management. There was a perceived decrease in commander support during the 2nd half of the missions, and for American crewmembers a novelty effect was found on several subscales during the first few months on-orbit. There were a number of differences between American and Russian responses which suggested that the former were less happy with their interpersonal environment than the latter. Mission control personnel reported more tension and dysphoria than crewmembers, although both groups scored better than other work groups on Earth. Nearly all reported critical incidents came from ground subjects, with Americans and Russians showing important differences in response frequencies.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS2022

The Cooling Loop A Anomaly of 2013: A Case Study in Human-Systems Resilience

Throughout the history of human spaceflight, NASA has employed an operational paradigm of 24/7 dependence on experts in Mission Control Center (MCC). In addition to nominal flight control and mission operations, these 85+ experts per shift manage anomaly detection, diagnosis, and response, and support the crew in real-time in performing maintenance and repair, procedure execution, and other complex mission operations. Future long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs) beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) will not operate successfully using this same Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) where crew rely on ground controllers, have ready access to resupply, and have a fallback plan of evacuation. As distance from Earth increases and the communication delay grows, crews will need to respond independently and adequately to time-critical vehicle malfunctions. It will not always be sufficient or even possible to ‘safe the system’ and then wait upon ground intervention. A new and radically different HSIA is needed to accommodate the paradigm shift of deep-space travel. Historical International Space Station (ISS) data show that for a 30-day mission, the likelihood of a high-consequence vehicle anomaly of uncertain origin that requires rapid response is greater than 10%. The likelihood of such an event is 50% by the fourth month of the mission, and it grows exponentially with time. Our team has conducted in-depth investigations into these events and their corresponding anomaly resolution activities. Using MCC and Mission Evaluation Room (MER) anomaly resolution artifacts (including meeting summaries, caution and warning data, and ISS daily summaries), we created timelines detailing ground actions and in-orbit events for two significant anomalies. We then mapped these timelines onto Mars transit conditions, introducing a ground-crew communications time delay and shifting immediate response, time-critical task execution, and vehicle commanding to the crew. In detailing successful anomaly resolution in transit to Mars, the timelines highlight where effective resolution requires drastically evolved onboard capabilities. Though this research has yielded a rich data set based on ground response in past missions, there is still insufficient knowledge to assess the potential impact of inflight anomalies on a small autonomous crew on future LDEMs beyond LEO. To begin building an evidence base that will inform future HSIA standards and requirements, we are developing an approach to systematically capture crew anomaly response and procedure execution during early Artemis missions. Being the first human spaceflight beyond LEO since Apollo, early Artemis missions provide a rare and unique opportunity to serve as a testbed for Mars missions. Our work aims to capitalize on planned data collection to derive crew operational responses to anomalous events in real-time. Our team is also researching the level of simulation fidelity required for empirically validating proposed HSIA standards and evaluating HSIA implementations for LDEMs beyond LEO. This work will produce a trade space study of HSIA simulation objectives and fidelity requirements. Ultimately, these research efforts will assist in developing the standards and technologies needed to build a next-generation HSIA for LDEMs beyond LEO.

human-systems integration architecture↗
NASA NTRS2017

Promoting Crew Autonomy: Current Advances and Novel Techniques

Since the dawn of the era of human space flight, mission control centers around the world have played an integral role in guiding space travelers toward mission success. In the International Space Station (ISS) program, astronauts and cosmonauts have the benefit of near constant access to the expertise and resources within mission control, as well as lifeboat capability to quickly return to Earth if something were to go wrong. As we move into an era of longer duration missions to more remote locations, rapid and ready access to mission control on earth will no longer be feasible. To prepare for such missions, long duration crews must be prepared to operate more autonomously, and the mission control paradigm that has been successfully employed for decades must be re-examined. The team at NASA's Payload Operations and Integration Center (POIC) in Huntsville, Alabama is playing an integral role in the development of concepts for a more autonomous long duration crew of the future via research on the ISS.

Harris, Samantha↗
NASA NTRS1990

Real-time data system: Incorporating new technology in mission critical environments

If the Space Station Freedom is to remain viable over its 30-year life span, it must be able to incorporate new information systems technologies. These technologies are necessary to enhance mission effectiveness and to enable new NASA missions, such as supporting the Lunar-Mars Initiative. Hi-definition television (HDTV), neural nets, model-based reasoning, advanced languages, CPU designs, and computer networking standards are areas which have been forecasted to make major strides in the next 30 years. A major challenge to NASA is to bring these technologies online without compromising mission safety. In past programs, NASA managers have been understandably reluctant to rely on new technologies for mission critical activities until they are proven in noncritical areas. NASA must develop strategies to allow inflight confidence building and migration of technologies into the trusted tool base. NASA has successfully met this challenge and developed a winning strategy in the Space Shuttle Mission Control Center. This facility, which is clearly among NASA's most critical, is based on 1970's mainframe architecture. Changes to the mainframe are very expensive due to the extensive testing required to prove that changes do not have unanticipated impact on critical processes. Systematic improvement efforts in this facility have been delayed due to this 'risk to change.' In the real-time data system (RTDS) we have introduced a network of engineering computer workstations which run in parallel to the mainframe system. These workstations are located next to flight controller operating positions in mission control and, in some cases, the display units are mounted in the traditional mainframe consoles. This system incorporates several major improvements over the mainframe consoles including automated fault detection by real-time expert systems and color graphic animated schematics of subsystems driven by real-time telemetry. The workstations have the capability of recording telemetry data and providing 'instant replay' for flight controllers. RTDS also provides unique graphics animated by real-time telemetry such as workstation emulation of the shuttle's flight instruments and displays of the remote manipulator system (RMS) position. These systems have been used successfully as prime operational tools since STS-26 and have supported seven shuttle missions.

Muratore, John F.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Evolution of Utilizing Manual Throttles to Avoid Excessively Low LH2 NPSP at the SSME Inlet

In the late 1970s, years before the Space Shuttle flew its maiden voyage, it was understood low liquid hydrogen (LH2) Net Positive Suction Pressure (NPSP) at the inlet to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) could have adverse effects on engine operation. A number of failures within both the External Tank (ET) and the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) could result in a low LH2 NPSP condition, which at extremely low levels can result in cavitation of SSME turbomachinery. Operational workarounds were developed to take advantage of the onboard crew s ability to manually throttle down the SSMEs (via the Pilot s Speedbrake/Throttle Controller), which alleviated the low LH2 NPSP condition. Manually throttling the SSME to a lower power level resulted in an increase in NPSP, mainly due to the reduction in frictional flow losses while at the lower throttle setting. Early in the Space Shuttle Program s history, the relevant Flight Rule for the Booster flight controllers in Mission Control did not distinguish between ET and Orbiter MPS failures and the same crew action was taken for both. However, after a review of all Booster operational techniques following the Challenger disaster in the late 1980s, it was determined manually throttling the SSME to a lower power was only effective for Orbiter MPS failures and the Flight Rule was updated to reflect this change. The Flight Rule and associated crew actions initially called for a single throttle step to minimum power level when a low threshold for NPSP was met. As engineers refined their understanding of the NPSP requirements for the SSME (through a robust testing program), the operational techniques evolved to take advantage of the additional capabilities. This paper will examine the evolution of the Flight rule and associated procedure and how increases in knowledge about the SSME and the Space Shuttle vehicle as a whole have helped shape their development. What once was a single throttle step when NPSP decreased to a certain threshold has now become three throttle steps, each occurring at a lower NPSP threshold. Additionally the procedure, which for early Space Shuttle missions required a Return-to-Launch-Site abort, now results in a nominal Main Engine Cut Off and no loss of mission objectives.

Henfling, Rick↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Evolution of Utilizing Manual Throttling to Avoid Excessively Low LH2 NPSP at the SSME Inlet

In the late 1970s, years before the Space Shuttle flew its maiden voyage, it was understood low liquid hydrogen (LH2) Net Positive Suction Pressure (NPSP) at the inlet to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) could have adverse effects on engine operation. A number of failures within both the External Tank (ET) and the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) could result in a low LH2 NPSP condition, which at extremely low levels can result in cavitation of SSME turbomachinery. Operational workarounds were developed to take advantage of the onboard crew s ability to manually throttle down the SSMEs (via the Pilot s Speedbrake/Throttle Controller), which alleviated the low LH2 NPSP condition. Manually throttling the SSME to a lower power level resulted in an increase in NPSP, mainly due to the reduction in frictional flow losses while at the lower throttle setting. Early in the Space Shuttle Program s history, the relevant Flight Rule for the Booster flight controller in Mission Control did not distinguish between ET and Orbiter MPS failures and the same crew action was taken for both. However, after a review of all Booster operational techniques following the Challenger disaster in the late 1980s, it was determined manually throttling the SSME to a lower power was only effective for Orbiter MPS failures and the Flight Rule was updated to reflect this change. The Flight Rule and associated crew actions initially called for a single throttle step to minimum power level when a low threshold for NPSP was met. As engineers refined their understanding of the NPSP requirements for the SSME (through a robust testing program), the operational techniques evolved to take advantage of the additional capabilities. This paper will examine the evolution of the Flight rule and associated procedure and how increases in knowledge about the SSME and the Space Shuttle vehicle as a whole have helped shape their development. What once was a single throttle step when NPSP decreased to a certain low threshold has now become three throttle steps, each occurring at a lower NPSP threshold. Additionally the procedure, which for early Space Shuttle missions required a Return-to-Launch-Site abort, now results in a nominal Main Engine Cut Off and no loss of mission objectives.

Henfling, Rick↗
NASA NTRS1991

Real Time Data System (RTDS)

Information is given in viewgraph form on the Real Time Data System (RTDS). Topics covered include applications to the Space Station Freedom, the Space Shuttle flight controllers, the Mission Control Center workstations, and the Remote Manipulator Systems (RMS). Also covered are the technology gap, pacing factors, and lessons learned during research.

Heindel, Troy A.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Passing the Baton: An Experimental Study of Shift Handover

Shift handovers occur in many safety-critical environments, including aviation maintenance, medicine, air traffic control, and mission control for space shuttle and space station operations. Shift handovers are associated with increased risk of communication failures and human error. In dynamic industries, errors and accidents occur disproportionately after shift handover. Typical shift handovers involve transferring information from an outgoing shift to an incoming shift via written logs, or in some cases, face-to-face briefings. The current study explores the possibility of improving written communication with the support modalities of audio and video recordings, as well as face-to-face briefings. Fifty participants participated in an experimental task which mimicked some of the critical challenges involved in transferring information between shifts in industrial settings. All three support modalities, face-to-face, video, and audio recordings, reduced task errors significantly over written communication alone. The support modality most preferred by participants was face-to-face communication; the least preferred was written communication alone.

Parke, Bonny↗
NASA NTRS2005

Using Simulation for Launch Team Training and Evaluation

This document describes some of the histor y and uses of simulation systems and processes for the training and evaluation of Launch Processing, Mission Control, and Mission Management teams. It documents some of the types of simulations that are used at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) today and that could be utilized (and possibly enhanced) for future launch vehicles. This article is intended to provide an initial baseline for further research into simulation for launch team training in the near future.

Peaden, Cary J.↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Final Count Down: A Review of Three Decades of Flight Controller Training Methods for Space Shuttle Mission Operations

Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. As the space shuttle program ends in 2011, a review of how training for STS-1 was conducted compared to STS-134 will show multiple changes in training of shuttle flight controller over a thirty year period. This paper will additionally give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams have been trained certified over the life span of the space shuttle. The training methods for developing flight controllers have evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The reader will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, the paper will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors.

Dittemore, Gary D.↗