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Details results from radiotracking a newly discovered reproducing population of desert bighorn sheep on the Nevada National Security Site including, movement patterns, disease prevalence, population estimates, and radiological analyses.
This revision was prepared to document changes to the data-collection activities. Specifically, the drilling and completion of the wells have been revised, and enhancements to the surface geophysics measurements have been included. Corrective action is needed because underground radioactive contamination exists in these areas resulting from historic underground nuclear testing. The PM CAUs are located in the northwestern portion of the Nevada National Security Site and comprise 82 corrective action sites. A total of 85 underground nuclear detonations took place within the area covered by the PM CAUs between 1965 and 1992 and resulted in the release of radionuclides in the subsurface in the vicinity of the test cavities.
This report details seismic ambient noise analysis to improve seismic velocity estimates of the southeastern Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). We compare two different methods for estimating surface wave dispersion curves from ambient noise cross-correlations: frequency time analysis (FTAN) and Aki’s cross-spectral method (XSpec). We find that XSpec performs better for our local-regional dataset and frequency content. Using phase velocity estimates from XSpec, we build a preliminary phase velocity dispersion dataset, which contains data for 1,054 station pairs and 8,905 discrete phase velocity measurements for periods between 0.5 and 13 s. This phase velocity dataset will be incorporated into an updated local-regional P and S wave velocity model of the southeastern NNSS in the future and is expected to improve upon shallow velocity estimates.
This is the seventh annual storm water report prepared in accordance with the modified National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit issued to the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) on April 1, 2014. This modified permit removed the authorization to augment flow in East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC) and thus removed the requirement to sample this effluent in conjunction with other major outfalls on EFPC. The general condition of the site continues to improve. The concentrations of Escherichia Coli (Es. coli) at the major outfalls and instream monitoring locations on EFPC are no longer elevated as they were in 2018. Follow-up samples indicated normal levels. Monitoring for this parameter will continue into 2020. The repair of Outfall 014 is nearing completion and will be sampled for storm water in 2020. This repair was expected to occur in 2019 but was delayed until 2020. There are several construction and demolition activities currently in progress at Y-12. These include the construction of the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), the Mercury Treatment Facility (MTF) on EFPC and the impending demolition of the Biology Complex. These projects will present challenges for the protection of storm water. Oversight of these activities will be a priority in 2020. Y-12 will continue to implement appropriate Best Management Practices and reduce outside material storage areas where possible.
This document describes gas permeability measurements made in June 2022 in P-Tunnel at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Four boreholes (AC-1, GI-5, GI-6, and HF-1) were tested with a dual packer system. The pressure versus flow rate data that were collected are analyzed using a numerical simulation method that captures compressible gas flow in partially saturated porous media using a close approximation to the geometry of the test setup. The first part of this document begins with data collection and a description of the packer assembly followed by details on data acquisition, measurement instrumentation, and equipment followed by a description of pre-test system verification. Next, the implementation of testing in the field is described, including how specific locations were chosen for testing. The second part of this document describes the numerical simulations used to back-out permeability from the pressure versus flow rate data. First, the numerical model is described, including assumptions. Next the details of the mesh that represents the experiment are described. A method for generating type curves in pressure versus flow rate space is presented and finally the data are mapped to permeability. We conclude with a discussion of the results.
This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 5.
METEX21 was an atmospheric tracer release experiment executed at the Department of Energy’s Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in the southwestern U.S to study terrain-induced wind and thermodynamic conditions that influence local-scale (<5-km) plume transport under varying atmospheric forcing conditions. Meteorological observations were collected using 10-m tall meteorological towers, 2-m tall tripods with 3-d sonic anemometers, a 3-m tall eddy covariance flux tower, Doppler profiling lidars, Doppler scanning lidars, weather-balloon launched radiosondes, and a tethered balloon equipped with wind, temperature, and aerosol sensors at heights up to 800 m. A smoke tracer was released along three transects in the horizontal and vertical directions and observed with video cameras, aerosol sensors and lidars (via aerosol backscatter). The observations showed evidence of large-scale/synoptic transience as well as local-scale upslope and downslope flows, along-axis valley flows, recirculation eddies on leeward slopes, and periods of strong shear and veer aloft. The release days were classified as either synoptically-driven or locally-driven, and a single case day is presented in detail for each. Synoptically-forced days show relatively narrow smoke plumes traveling down the valley from north to south (with the predominant wind direction), with little deviation in transport direction regardless of the elevation or ground locations of the smoke releases, except near the presence of leeside recirculation eddies. Locally-forced days exhibit a wider range of plume behavior due to the combination of thermally-induced valley and slope flows, which are often flowing in different cardinal directions, and wind shear found aloft at higher altitudes and elevations. We saw evidence of smoke lofting on top of the mesas due to strong upslope flows on these days. A major finding of this experiment was the effectiveness of scanning lidars to measure 2-dimensional plume transport out to a 2–3 km distance; much farther than could be visibly observed. METEX21 was the first of three planned tracer experiments at NNSS, and future experiments will incorporate multiple tracers to improve individual plume identification so that finer resolution flow details can be attained from these measurements, as well as deploy a larger suite of meteorological instrumentation, including more temperature profiling data.
This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Transuranic (TRU) Waste Processing Center Mixed Low Level Waste (MLLW), FWORCHMLLW103, Revision 13 [TWPC 2021]), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The TRU Waste Processing Center MLLW waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.
Pahute Mesa (PM) in southern Nevada was one of the four principal underground nuclear testing areas at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), known as the “Nevada Test Site” until 2010 (Figure 1). Eighty-two underground nuclear tests were conducted at PM in northwestern corner of NNSS (USDOE, 2015). The PM area of underground nuclear testing is located near the center of the Pahute Mesa and Oasis Valley (PM-OV) groundwater basin, which discharges to the southwest near Oasis Valley (OV) north of Beatty, Nevada (Fenelon et al. 2016; Jackson et al., 2020). Most of the PM tests were located at depths near or below the regional water table and, therefore, present potential sources of groundwater contamination from release of test-related radionuclides.
This closure report (CR) has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. The corrective action for the RM/SM CAU is closure in place with long-term monitoring and institutional controls; and involves a balance of modeling, monitoring, and institutional controls.
This closure report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 578: Miscellaneous Inactive Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. The purpose of this CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 578 based on the implementation of the corrective actions listed in Table ES-1.
The Y-12 SIRP Quadrant 1, Quadrant 2, and Vehicle Barrier project involves the following summary elements. The perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS) is an existing system at the Y-12 National Security Complex, which is a government-owned facility located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and managed by Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) for the Department of Energy (DOE). National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) is the engineering design agent and construction manager (CM) for the Y-12 SIRP effort. The Quadrants 1 and 2 portion of the project involves the replacement of the PIDAS, and the vehicle barrier portion of the project involves the installation of a continuous passive vehicle barrier alongside the inner PIDAS fence.
Slides for a presentation concerning the levels of radionuclides present near the Nevada National Security Site to be given to the UNLV Health Physics seminar class on 2/16/2023.
This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).
LANL is a non-profit Federally Funded Research & Development Center (FFRDC). LANL’s Integrated Weapons Experiments (J) Division addresses national security challenges by executing largescale, integrated, focused experiments, and tests of engineered devices and systems. J-NV plans, fields, and executes dynamic high explosive experiments at NNSS. This includes sub-critical experiments involving special nuclear material, as well as small- and largescale non-nuclear experiments. J-NV generates, analyzes, and disseminates unique, high-quality data.
Report provides disposal volume data for waste disposal operations at the Nevada National Security Site during the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2020.
This assessment uses screening-level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program mixing-cell model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer-code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). It is highly unlikely the test scenarios evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health based on comparisons of calculated dose and concentration against regulatory standards and risk-based screening levels. Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of possible radionuclide releases are far below federal radiation protection standards. Conservative estimates of potential contaminant concentrations in groundwater are less than federal drinking water standards or screening levels. Predicted radionuclide concentrations in surface soils are below risk-based screening levels, except for Ge-68 (material Ga-68) for the worker. The Ge-68 soil concentration can be made less than the worker PRG, if the number of annual tests using Ga-68 is reduced from 12 to 6. However, the sum of ratios still exceeds one because of the high K-40 ratio. If the EF of the worker (number of days the worker is in the contaminated testing area) is reduced from 225 days/yr (default value for full time worker) to 112 days/yr, the Ge-68 ratio is less than one and the sum of ratios is less than one. Actual radiation doses and groundwater and surface-soil concentrations are likely to be much less than those calculated because of the conservative assumptions and parameters employed in the modeling. For example, atmospheric-transport calculations assume the entire inventory of each material type is readily released to the atmosphere and no plume deposition, depletion, or radioactive decay occurs during transport. The calculations also assume the same meteorological conditions (e.g., wind velocity, wind direction, stability class) that produce the maximum 95th percentile concentration (i.e., concentration representing the 95th percentile of a distribution of concentrations derived from 3 years of hourly meteorological data) at each receptor location are the same for all 12 tests during the year, and each receptor is assumed to be present during all 12 tests. The surface-soil assessment assumes the entire inventory of each test is deposited in the top 5 cm of soil. No atmospheric dispersal is assumed, and the radionuclides are subject only to leaching and radioactive decay. The groundwater-pathway modeling is conservative in that it is one-dimensional in the unsaturated zone (no lateral spreading/dilution) and assumes the entire inventory of contaminants infiltrates into the ground at the same location for every test. This is especially conservative for particulate radionuclides because they would have to dissolve or corrode first and some would be dispersed into the atmosphere. The groundwater receptor is also assumed to consume water directly from a hypothetical well positioned in the location of maximum concentration. In addition, conservative degradation rates were used, and volatilization was not considered for the nonradradioactive chemicals modeled. And finally, the calculations assume all 12 tests will be performed at the same place at both locations, and all 11 radioactive material types will be used for each test. This is conservative because it is anticipated that no more than two material types will be used per test.
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