Emerging Scientific Research Opportunities in Nuclear Security
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International Radiological Assistance Program Training for Emergency Response course in Rabat, Morocco Feb 19-23, 2018 for DOE/NNSA/NA-81.
From the beginning of the Manhattan Project in the early 1940s, the women of what would become Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) worked in technical positions alongside their male counterparts, played a key role as computers, and worked in administrative jobs as secretaries, phone operators, bookkeepers, and on behalf of the U.S. Army in the Women’s Army Corps. Throughout the history of the Laboratory, women experts at LANL helped establish and lead important national and international security programs, with careers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Over time, the women of Los Alamos have come together under various Employee Resource Groups, such as the Atomic Women, to help the next generation succeed in their technical fields. The Laboratory’s commitment to diversity and inclusion continues to this day, with current Laboratory Director Thom Mason leading LANL as the first national laboratory to join the Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy.
A conference devoted to Reducing the Risks from Radioactive and Nuclear Materials presupposes that such risks exist. Few would disagree, but what are they? While debate on the nature and severity of risks associated with nuclear energy will always remain, it is easy to define a set of risks that are almost universally acknowledged. These include: (1) Nuclear warfare between states; (2) Continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials to states and non-state actors; (3) Terrorists or non-state actor acquisition or use nuclear weapons or nuclear materials; (4) Terrorists or non-state actors attack on a nuclear facility; and (5) Loss or diversion of nuclear weapons or materials by a state to unauthorized uses. These are listed in no particular order of likelihood or potential consequence. They are also very broadly stated, each one could be broken down into a more detailed set of discrete risks or threats. The fact that there is a strong consensus on the existence of these risks is evidence that we remain in an era of nuclear insecurity. This becomes even clearer when we note that most major trends influencing the probability of these risks continue to run in a negative direction.
The Department of Defense Science Board has stated that the United States is "not prepared to defend againsr cyber-attacks and that the military could lose "trust in the information and ability to control U.S. systems and forces [including nuclear forces]." One potential weak spot in cyber-security is storing encryption keys in computer memory. This paper explores the use of hardware devices (so-called Physical Unclonable Functions, or PUFs) to generate, in the nuclear weapon itself, unique encryption keys each time they are needed. Not only do we find that this has the potential to mitigate a number of cyberthreats, but such hardware has the potential to greatly diminish the total uncertainty associated with radiation-based warhead authentication procedures; a procedure many analysts feel will be key to future arms control regimes. After outline the use of PUFs in nuclear command, control, and communications--and indicating some of the areas that still require further research--we discuss their application to arms control and warhead authentication
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Oral presentation at the !AEA International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, Nov 13-17, 2017, Vienna, Austria.
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No abstract prepared.
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In this article, we propose the conceptual design, with supporting beam dynamics results, of a normal conducting, separated-sector cyclotron with a strong-focusing field gradient designed to accelerate light ions with a charge-to-mass ratio of 1/2 up to 15–20 MeV/u. The design can support a host of applications for therapy, radiobiology, material science, and instrumentation development. The light-ion species, which can include a mixed ion beam, can be dynamically chosen to provide a range of characteristic signals appropriate for specific material identification such as special nuclear materials. A conservative baseline concept is presented which has been optimized for radioisotope production of alpha emitters and theranostic radiopharmaceuticals. The modular design is also demonstrated to be scalable in gross physical parameters by a factor of 2–3, thereby reducing the size, weight, and power requirements (SWaP) and enabling near-term security applications.
There is growing interest in high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for use in advanced nuclear reactors as a high-energy fuel source. The primary objectives of this report are to identify the security risks that directly result from HALEU and to identify the gaps and challenges it presents from a theft and sabotage perspective. This study focuses on HALEU security risks for the front end of the fuel cycle and includes a review of the supply chain, fuel fabrication, and transport for terrestrial reactors.
Industry has a unique opportunity and critical role to play in strengthening governmental efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear, radiological, and dual-use materials and technologies that could be used in a nuclear or radiological weapon. Governmental regulations and policies are in effect at both the national and international levels to inhibit access to such materials and technologies by illegitimate end-users. However, the discovery of an illegal nuclear network, spearheaded by Pakistani scientist A Q Khan, increased international concern about what more could be done to prevent proliferation. Industry is well-poised and has a strong incentive to take a more proactive role to complement existing governmental efforts. Companies can be a tremendous help in ensuring that illicit diversions do not occur by increasing their oversight over the supply chain.
Abstract not provided.
Abstract Not Provided