Results for “Performance-Based” — Page 8

NASA NTRS2021

High-Density Automated Vertiport Concept of Operations

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) vision for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) includes Urban Air Mobility (UAM) – a concept involving vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, decentralized (or federated) traffic management, and new infrastructure to support urban, suburban, and rural flight operations. High-density performance-based routes or corridors enable prompt transportation of people and goods from node to node, where each node represents a vertiport, defined as an identifiable ground or elevated area used for the takeoff and landing of VTOL aircraft. In the presence of uncertainty surrounding aircraft turnaround time on the ground, vertiports are the critical end points in scheduling, sequencing, and spacing (SSS) of aircraft in dense metropolitan environments. This Concept of Operations (ConOps) includes vertiports of varying sizes, configurations, service offerings, and locations. UAM air vehicles include conventional rotorcraft, unmanned VTOL aircraft, and novel piloted VTOL aircraft. This ConOps focuses on operations at a high-density vertiport, supported by a Vertiport Automation System (VAS) with high-throughput operation capabilities under conditions defined as NASA’s Urban Air Mobility Maturity Level Four (UML-4).

UAM↗

NASA NTRS2021

High-Density Automated Vertiport Concept of Operations

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) vision for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) includes Urban Air Mobility (UAM) – a concept involving vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, decentralized (or federated) traffic management, and new infrastructure to support urban, suburban, and rural flight operations. High-density performance-based routes or corridors enable prompt transportation of people and goods from node to node, where each node represents a vertiport, defined as an identifiable ground or elevated area used for the takeoff and landing of VTOL aircraft. In the presence of uncertainty surrounding aircraft turnaround time on the ground, vertiports are the critical end points in scheduling, sequencing, and spacing (SSS) of aircraft in dense metropolitan environments. This Concept of Operations (ConOps) includes vertiports of varying sizes, configurations, service offerings, and locations. UAM air vehicles include conventional rotorcraft, unmanned VTOL aircraft, and novel piloted VTOL aircraft. This ConOps focuses on operations at a high-density vertiport, supported by a Vertiport Automation System (VAS) with high-throughput operation capabilities under conditions defined as NASA’s Urban Air Mobility Maturity Level Four (UML-4).

Urban Air Mobility↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evolution of NASA’s Nuclear Flight Safety Program to Meet Changing Needs

Over the past 4 years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.

NASA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

HUMAN FACTORS AND BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE EXPLORATION MEASURES: ASSESSING ASTRONAUT RISK

INTRODUCTION: The Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Exploration Measures (HFBP-EM) suite is a set of standardized measures to assess behavioral health and performance risk related to future exploration class missions, and to support reduction of the Human Research Program’s (HRP) Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Team, Sleep, and Human Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) risks. This presentation will provide an overview of the HFBP-EM program, describe its implementation across spaceflight analogs and the international space station (ISS), and discuss its applicability to audience members. TOPIC: HFBP-EM is a research program designed to develop a standard set of measures that can be used in space and space-analog research to characterize BMed, Team, Sleep, and HSIA risks. It is an ongoing research project that is used examine the validity and reliability of HFBP measures, as well as their shorter forms. It also serves as a test bed for HFBP measures being considered for the spaceflight standard measures. The suite of measures is used to test the efficacy of countermeasures. To date, HFBP-EM has been collected in Human Exploration Research Analogs campaigns 4 and 5, and the SIRIUS 19 mission in the Russian Ground Based Experiment Complex. A subset of the HFBP-EM suite was collected during spaceflight as part of HRP’s Standard Measures in Spaceflight Project. Data was collected from a total of 55 multinational astronaut and astronaut-like crewmembers (mean age: 39.5, SD = 7.6; 31% female; 91% with advanced degrees). Three broad categories of HFBP-EM measures and their relevance to HRP risks will be discussed: 1) surveys that assess team functioning (Teams risk) as well as mood and affect (Bmed risk), 2) performance-based tasks of cognitive functioning and operationally relevant performance (Bmed risk), and 3) physiological biomarkers of sleep (sleep risk) and heart rate (Bmed risk). We will provide an overview of the background of the HFBP-EM program, what the suite currently includes, and next steps in its future development. We will also discuss the application to aerospace practitioners and researchers. APPLICATION: Astronaut teams selected for future space exploration missions will face several challenges that pose significant yet still unknown risks to the behavioral health and performance of astronauts. The HFBP-EM suite provides a comprehensive assessment of behavioral health and performance in space analog and spaceflight settings. This suite can be applied to both operational and research settings to advance risk reduction research for long duration space exploration missions.

S T Bell↗

NASA NTRS2020

Hardware Verification and Validation for a Navigation Sensor Software Model in Support of Flight Vehicle Performance Analysis

… or, “It’s in the details, how to make complicated software perform like complicated hardware.” In attempts to minimize development time and quickly build an operational vehicle, NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) has had to be intentional about integrated testing. Constraints on budget and schedule have required balance between testing needs and the desire for an integrated flight vehicle as soon as possible. To provide key insights early in design and analysis cycles, a large amount of effort has shifted into maturing and validating models at the component level with integrated testing as a means to validate their integration. In terms of SLS Navigation, this, and the model-based design approach have pushed explicit requirements for sensor models to be validated against flight hardware to high precision. This paper covers the approach taken to verify and validate the models for the two key navigation sensors on the SLS vehicle, the Redundant Inertial Navigation Sensor and the Rate Gyro Assembly. These models are used in performance evaluation, fault detection, and operations development extensively. Using a mix of data from hardware vendor documentation and testing reports, limited in-house testing, and integration activities, these models were able to be validated against flight hardware at multiple levels, from the internal software design to statistical behavior at the raw sensor and integrated box levels. The high level of insight into the hardware elements is instrumental to support flight certification activities and building confidence in SLS Navigation capability. Focused testing enabled additional insight and validation that proved invaluable and the resulting insights were used to focus and mature models. Additionally, of having validated performance-based hardware models enables a wide breadth of activities including detailed fault detection studies and integration into future vehicle frameworks, such as an upper stage and provide a valuable asset to continued SLS analysis and design.

Evan J Anzalone↗

NASA NTRS2020

Hardware Verification and Validation for a Navigation Sensor Software Model in Support of Flight Vehicle Performance Analysis

… or, “It’s in the details, how to make complicated software perform like complicated hardware.” In attempts to minimize development time and quickly build an operational vehicle, NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) has had to be intentional about integrated testing. Constraints on budget and schedule have required balance between testing needs and the desire for an integrated flight vehicle as soon as possible. To provide key insights early in design and analysis cycles, a large amount of effort has shifted into maturing and validating models at the component level with integrated testing as a means to validate their integration. In terms of SLS Navigation, this, and the model-based design approach have pushed explicit requirements for sensor models to be validated against flight hardware to high precision. This paper covers the approach taken to verify and validate the models for the two key navigation sensors on the SLS vehicle, the Redundant Inertial Navigation Sensor and the Rate Gyro Assembly. These models are used in performance evaluation, fault detection, and operations development extensively. Using a mix of data from hardware vendor documentation and testing reports, limited in-house testing, and integration activities, these models were able to be validated against flight hardware at multiple levels, from the internal software design to statistical behavior at the raw sensor and integrated box levels. The high level of insight into the hardware elements is instrumental to support flight certification activities and building confidence in SLS Navigation capability. Focused testing enabled additional insight and validation that proved invaluable and the resulting insights were used to focus and mature models. Additionally, of having validated performance-based hardware models enables a wide breadth of activities including detailed fault detection studies and integration into future vehicle frameworks, such as an upper stage and provide a valuable asset to continued SLS analysis and design.

Thomas Park↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Energy and Momentum in Mechanical Impact Testing

The ASTM G86 method is used to determine the ignition sensitivity of materials to mechanical impact in oxygen. It has long been known that different systems built to the standard produce different results. Given the current push towards direct comparison of numerical results from different systems rather than just material rankings, it is desirable to normalize the systems to some performance-based metric. Normalization is complicated by the fact that the energy and momentum of a particular impact scale differently with plummet mass and drop height, and therefore adjusting the mass and height to account for system differences would result in a different impact. The standard uses dent blocks to assess impacts. However, it was unknown if the differences in momentum could be identified during dent block impacts. To determine this, dent blocks were impacted with constant energy and different momentums, using instrumented and non-instrumented plummets. The dent blocks showed statistically significant differences in the penetration function when subjected to impacts with the same energy but different momentum. Further, the instrumented plummet showed drastic differences in the power delivery with different momentums. System configuration was also shown to have an effect on the response of the penetration function to different momentums.

Energy↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planetary Protection is Not a One Size Fits All Missions Approach: Enabling the Planetary Protection Programmatic and Engineering Process

Missions have a wide range of variables that change their management and engineering structure (e.g., competed vs directed missions, multiple NASA centers, international partnerships, increased commercial collaborations, etc.). Why would an identical planetary protection approach and structure for each mission make sense in this evolving landscape? Missions do not fit in a one-size-fits-all approach, likewise their planetary protection process should not be a one-size-fits-all approach. During the significant update to NPR 8715.24 and NASA-STD-8719.27 planetary protection policies, the programmatic execution and engineering implementation processes were changed to provide clarification, streamlining, and expansion to include alternative approaches. From a programmatic perspective, these changes include the flexibility in timing and combination of gate products in addition to providing varying levels of technical depth commensurate and appropriate with the mission categorization. From a technical perspective, these changes include the ability to A) leverage either a performance-based and/or a prescriptive-based approach, B) identify applicable international consensus standards for verification, and C) propose alternative methods that adhere to sound scientific and engineering consensus. This presentation will directly highlight the culture shift in planetary protection, areas of flexibility available to the technical community for mission program and engineering execution, and feature some of the specific mission scenarios that have already leveraged such processes.

Nick Benardini↗

NASA NTRS2024

Evolution of NASA’s Nuclear Flight Safety Program to Infuse Risk Leadership and Assurance Framework Concepts

In recent years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. To achieve this evolution, NASA is factoring in an objectives-driven and assurance case mindset to develop a risk-informed and performance-based program. NASA and others have successfully applied this mindset in other disciplines and contexts and it is being pursued here via broad cooperation within NASA and with external stakeholders. This paper will briefly describe how the NASA nuclear flight safety program is evolving to meet these changing needs.

Matthew J. Forsbacka↗

NASA NTRS2024

Energy and Momentum in Mechanical Impact Testing

The ASTM G86 method is used to determine the ignition sensitivity of materials to mechanical impact in oxygen. It has long been known that different systems built to the standard produce different results. Given the current push towards direct comparison of numerical results from different systems rather than just material rankings, it is desirable to normalize the systems to some performance-based metric. Normalization is complicated by the fact that the energy and momentum of a particular impact scale differently with plummet mass and drop height, and therefore adjusting the mass and height to account for system differences would result in a different impact. The standard uses dent blocks to assess impacts. However, it was unknown if the differences in momentum could be identified during dent block impacts. To determine this, dent blocks were impacted with constant energy and different momentums, using instrumented and non-instrumented plummets. The dent blocks showed statistically significant differences in the penetration function when subjected to impacts with the same energy but different momentum. Further, the instrumented plummet showed drastic differences in the power delivery with different momentums. System configuration was also shown to have an effect on the response of the penetration function to different momentums.

Energy↗

DOE OSTI2022

Modularity-at-scale for advanced reactors presentation

Modularity options have been limited for traditional nuclear energy deployment due to the conventional light water reactor (LWR) safety requirements, such as high pressure retaining heavy and robust containment structures. However, a relatively new regulatory approach called ‘Functional Containment’ has potential to allow less expensive and more flexible designs for non-LWRs. Functional containment provides flexibility in design and deployment based on risk-informed and performance-based criteria, so that reactors are not over-designed. Non-nuclear industry has successfully used modular design approaches in automotive, aerospace, chemical processing, building construction, and ship building. These industries have shown that modular construction reduces construction time by around 30% - 50% compared to the conventional stick-built approach. The nuclear industry can use similar approaches to reduce construction time and costs, balanced with safety requirements, using the functional containment approach. This paper discussing the background of modularity in nuclear energy, examples of less learned, modularity approaches in non-nuclear industries and the potential of cost and schedule savings through the emerging regulatory design flexibilities potentially enabling combination of modular deployment at different scales.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Novel Approaches and Technologies for Aging Management

As part of the application process for license renewal and subsequent license renewal, nuclear utilities must perform an evaluation to confirm that they have appropriately considered aging effects on plant structures, systems, components within the scope of the license renewal. This effort within the Light Water Reactor Sustainability program’s Risk-informed System Analysis pathway is focused on risk-informed and performance-based approaches for aging management of buried piping, specifically managing selective leaching degradation phenomena. Selective leaching is a commonly occurring aging and degradation mechanism in buried pipes at nuclear power plants. To better understand the extent of selective leaching and its effect on the health of buried components, the licensees currently rely on visual inspections and destructive examinations which require extraction of multiple buried components. This research explores technological solutions that may replace or supplement existing inefficient, costly, and labor-intensive methods used in aging management.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Systems and methods for global cyber-attack or fault detection model

An industrial asset may have monitoring nodes that generate current monitoring node values representing a current operation of the industrial asset. An abnormality detection computer may detect when a monitoring node is currently being attacked or experiencing a fault based on a current feature vector, calculated in accordance with current monitoring node values, and a detection model that includes a decision boundary. A model updater (e.g., a continuous learning model updater) may determine an update time-frame (e.g., short-term, mid-term, long-term, etc.) associated with the system based on trigger occurrence detection (e.g., associated with a time-based trigger, a performance-based trigger, an event-based trigger, etc.). The model updater may then update the detection model in accordance with the determined update time-frame (and, in some embodiments, continuous learning).

Xu, Rui↗

DOE OSTI2022

APPLICATION OF OBJECTIVES-DRIVEN ASSURANCE CASES TO SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IN AN EVOLVING ACQUISITION MODEL

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Application of Objectives-Driven Assurance Cases to System Development in an Evolving Acquisition Model

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

MODULARITY-AT-SCALE FOR COST COMPETITIVE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Modularity options have been limited for traditional nuclear energy deployment due to the conventional light water reactor (LWR) safety requirements, such as high pressure retaining heavy and robust containment structures. However, a relatively new regulatory approach called ‘Functional Containment’ has potential to allow less expensive and more flexible designs for non LWRs. Functional containment provides flexibility in design and deployment based on risk informed and performance-based criteria, so that reactors are not over-designed. Non-nuclear industry has successfully used modular design approaches in automotive, aerospace, chemical processing, building construction, and ship building. These industries have shown that modular construction reduces construction time by around 30% - 50% compared to the conventional stick built approach. The nuclear industry can use similar approaches to reduce construction time and costs, balanced with safety requirements, using the functional containment approach. This paper discussing the background of modularity in nuclear energy, examples of less learned, modularity approaches in non-nuclear industries and the potential of cost and schedule savings through the emerging regulatory design flexibilities potentially enabling combination of modular deployment at different scales.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2025

Advancing Multi-Hazard Risk and Safety Considerations for Aging Nuclear Facilities

While probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear facilities is expected to include internal and external hazards for a risk-informed and performance-based design, the current state of practice treats each hazard independently. However, such an independent treatment of hazards may not account for the correlations between different hazards and their response of and damage to the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in a plant resulting in underestimating the overall risk. This project proposes to advance the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities to more adequately evaluate concurrent hazards and contribute to an increased safety of nuclear plants. A framework for multi-hazard PRA will be developed by identifying concurrent hazard events (both internal and external) and event sequences that include interdependencies through the response of SSCs. An example application of the multi-hazard PRA framework will be demonstrated by considering a generic pressurized water reactor (PWR) subjected to seismic and internal flooding hazards. Computational models for the response of components will be developed to generated multi-hazard fragility surfaces under seismic and flooding loads. A PRA model consisting of event and fault trees will also be developed to quantify the multi-hazard risk profile and compare it with the independent hazard risk profile. Overall, by advancing the multi-hazard PRA of nuclear facilities, this project enhances nuclear safety and reduces costs by mitigating unforeseen consequences caused by correlations between concurrent hazards.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

ECAR-6440 Rev 2 MARVEL Hazard Evaluation

This hazard evaluation supports the Microreactor Applications Research, Validation, and Evaluation (MARVEL) Project’s design effort and the development of the preliminary documented safety analysis (PDSA) (addendum to safety analysis report [SAR]-420, “Transient Reactor Test [TREAT] Facility FSAR”) (SAR-420-ADD-1). The hazard evaluation process for the MARVEL project for compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 830, “Nuclear Safety Management,” follows a process similar to the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) as outlined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)-18-04, “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Guidance for Non-Light Water Reactor Licensing Basis Development,” and supporting documents. The LMP process is adapted to fit Department of Energy (DOE) reactor regulatory requirements as applicable and appropriate using a graded approach based on the MARVEL microreactor design. This approach provides reasonable assurance of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 830 for protection of the public, workers, and environment.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗