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Regulatory Treatment of Non-Core Sources of Radioactivity for Advanced Reactor Designs

The recent resurgence in advance (non-light water) reactor development has been paralleled by the development of risk-informed performance-based (RIPB) licensing pathways. Specifically, the creation of the RIPB Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) approach and subsequent endorsement by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now provides advanced reactor vendors with a defined RIPB method to develop an affirmative safety case for licensing. In addition, the Technology Inclusive Content of Applications Project (TICAP) has published guidance on developing a license application based on the LMP approach. To support the utilization of risk information as part of advanced reactor design and licensing efforts, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) has developed a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard for advanced reactors. The standard, which was formerly approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 2021 and recently endorsed by the NRC in trial use Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.247, is an integral standard, covering from initiating events to offsite consequence. A major feature of the standard is that it permits the inclusion of any source of radioactivity material at the site within the plant PRA. Therefore, non-core sources of radioactivity, such as fuel storage, fuel processing, and purification systems, can be included within a single comprehensive plant PRA. For those advanced reactor vendors utilizing a RIPB licensing approach, there is an opportunity to include the non-core sources of radioactivity within the RIPB framework for licensing decision-making, such as the categorization of events, classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), and evaluation of the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID). For advanced reactor designs that contain multiple non-core sources of radioactivity, or for monolithic plant sites that include associated fuel facilities, this approach could potentially simplify licensing applications through the use of a single, uniform, and consistent decision-making framework across all radioactive sources at the site. In addition, a RIPB approach could provide additional insights regarding plant behavior, flexibility regarding licensing decision-making, and potentially allow the use of risk information as part of the plant oversight process. Risk-informing these aspects of advanced reactor licensing would also be consistent with the NRC’s risk policy statement. However, there is diverse regulation and guidance regarding the licensing of non-core sources of radioactivity and generally limited experience using RIPB approaches for the evaluation as part of licensing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Development, Testing and Validation of a Waste Assay System for the Measurement and Characterisation of Active Spent Fuel Element Debris From UK Magnox Reactors - 12533

This paper describes the development, testing and validation of a waste measurement instrument for characterising active remote handled radioactive waste arising from the operation of Magnox reactors in the United Kingdom. Following operation in UK Magnox gas cooled reactors and a subsequent period of cooling, parts of the magnesium-aluminium alloy cladding were removed from spent fuel and the uranium fuel rods with the remaining cladding were removed to Sellafield for treatment. The resultant Magnox based spent fuel element debris (FED), which constitutes active intermediate level waste (ILW) has been stored in concrete vaults at the reactor sites. As part of the decommissioning of the FED vaults the FED must be removed, measured and characterised and placed in intermediate storage containers. The present system was developed for use at the Trawsfynydd nuclear power station (NPS), which is in the decommissioning phase, but the approach is potentially applicable to FED characterisation at all of the Magnox reactors. The measurement system consists of a heavily shielded and collimated high purity Germanium (HPGe) detector with electromechanical cooling and a high count-rate preamplifier and digital multichannel pulse height analyser. The HPGe based detector system is controlled by a software code, which stores the measurement result and allows a comprehensive analysis of the measured FED data. Fuel element debris is removed from the vault and placed on a tray to a uniform depth of typically 10 cm for measurement. The tray is positioned approximately 1.2 meters above the detector which views the FED through a tungsten collimator with an inverted pyramid shape. At other Magnox sites the positions may be reversed with the shielded and collimated HPGe detector located above the tray on which the FED is measured. A comprehensive Monte Carlo modelling and analysis of the measurement process has been performed in order to optimise the measurement geometry and eliminate interferences from radioactive sources and FED in the immediate vicinity of the measurement position. The detector system has been calibrated and high activity radioactive sources of Cs-137, Co-60 and Na-22 have been used to validate the measurement process. The data acquisition and analysis software code has been tested and validated in keeping with the software quality assurance requirements of both ISO:9001-2008 - TICK-IT in the UK and NQA-1. The measurement and analysis system has been comprehensively tested with high activity sources, is flexible and may be applicable to a wide range of remote handled radioactive waste measurement applications. It is due to be installed at Trawsfynydd NPS later this year. This paper describes the Waste Tray Assay System (WTAS) that has been developed for the measurement of Magnox FED waste. The WTAS has been tested with a range of radioactive sources and its operation has been simulated with benchmarked MCNP Monte Carlo calculations. The measurement software has been validated as has the operation of the system for a range of strong radioactive sources. A system based on the design is due for installation and operation in 2012. The system has application to the measurement of Magnox Fuel Element Debris (FED) waste at other Magnox reactor sites. The major design objective of the WTAS that has been achieved is the ability of the assay system to determine the content of Cs-137, and in turn to enable the fissile burden to be assessed using a radionuclide fingerprint, in the presence of higher and highly variable quantities of Co-60, typically from nimonic springs. The approach can be used in other Magnox FED waste configurations where the detector is located above the FED waste sorting tray and where the collimation is fixed below the detector and at a distance above the tray. In this case, which has also been investigated, there are different shielding problems and mechanical support issues. The extensive use of MCNP Monte Carlo modelling to simulate the geometry of the sorting cell and the distribution of radioactive sources has helped to ensure that all of the detector shielding requirements are addressed and suitable Cs-137 and Co-60 discrimination can be achieved. The WTAS in its present form or in other configurations has relevance to the measurement of other active ILW and highly active RH waste. Examples include high activity RH LLW and RH TRU (Transuranic) waste as defined in the United States arising from both commercial nuclear and Department of Energy (DOE) operations. The analysis is able to analyse a range of radionuclides beyong those expected in the Magnox FED cases. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in the Slovak Republic - 12100

After splitting-up the Czechoslovak Federation in 1993, the system of management of institutional radioactive waste, where disused sources represent its significant part, had had to build from beginning, since all corresponding activities had remained in the Czech part of the Federation. The paper presents the development of legislative and institutional framework of the disused radioactive sealed source management, development of the national inventory and development of management practices. According the Governmental decision (1994), the management of disused sealed sources and institutional radioactive waste at whole was based on maximal utilization of facilities inside nuclear facilities, particularly in the NPP A1 (shut down in the past, currently under decommissioning). This approach has been recently changing by Governmental decision (2009) to construct 'non-nuclear facility' - central storage for remained disused sealed sources collected from the places of use, where they were stored in some cases for tens of years. The approaches to siting and construction of this storage facility will be presented, as well as the current approaches to solution of the disused radioactive sources final disposal. Environmental impact assessment process in regard to the given facility/activity is slowly drawing to a close. The final statement of the Ministry of Environment can be expected in January or February 2012, probably recommending option 1 as preferred [6]. According to the Slovak legislation, the final statement has a status of recommendation for ongoing processes leading to the siting license. Very recently, in December 2012, Government of the Slovak republic decided to postpone putting the facility into operation by the end of June, 2014. (author)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Miniaturized pulsed discharge ionization detector, non-radioactive ionization sources, and methods thereof

The present application relates to pulsed discharge ionization detectors (PDIDs) and non-radioactive ionization sources, including miniaturized forms thereof. In some examples, the PDID includes annular electrodes, where each electrode is disposed between annular insulators. Also provided herein are methods of making and using such PDIDs, such as for detecting one or more volatile organic compounds, as well as non-radioactive ionization sources.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Miniaturized pulsed discharge ionization detector, non-radioactive ionization sources, and methods thereof

The present application relates to pulsed discharge ionization detectors (PDIDs) and non-radioactive ionization sources, including miniaturized forms thereof. In some examples, the PDID includes annular electrodes, where each electrode is disposed between annular insulators. Also provided herein are methods of making and using such PDIDs, such as for detecting one or more volatile organic compounds, as well as non-radioactive ionization sources.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 13512

The future safe development of nuclear energy and progressive increasing use of sealed sources in medicine, research, industry and other fields in Egypt depends on the safe and secure management of disused radioactive sealed sources. In the past years have determined the necessity to formulate and apply the integrated management program for radioactive sealed sources to assure harmless and ecological rational management of disused sealed sources in Egypt. The waste management system in Egypt comprises operational and regulatory capabilities. Both of these activities are performed under legislations. The Hot Laboratories and Waste Management Center HLWMC, is considered as a centralized radioactive waste management facility in Egypt by law 7/2010. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Determination of attenuation coefficients of heavyweight concretes containing colemanite by using {sup 133}Ba radioactive isotope source - Paper 140

As it is well known, colemanite is a boron ore. Boron is one of the most important underground richness of Turkey. Boron is employed as a constituent material of neutron shielding because of its high absorption of thermal neutrons. Barite ore includes BaSO{sub 4}, which is a well photon radiation absorbent. The literature about radiation attenuation in heavy concretes (including boron and barite ores) is fairly abundant. Abdo and Abdo et al. theoretically calculated and determined cross section by using XCOM computer program for photon and neutron radiations shielding. Akkurt et al. measured radiation transmission of heavy concretes including normal and barite aggregates for different γ-ray energies and calculated linear attenuation coefficients. Bashter et al. studied heavy concretes including hematite-serpentine, ilmenite-limonite as control absorber in nuclear reactors γ-rays and neutron particles shielding. Bashter and Bashter et al. studied heavy concretes including hematite-serpentine, ilmenite-limonite, basalt-magnetite, ilmenite, basalt, steel and magnetite for only photon radiation shielding and calculated linear and mass attenuation coefficients from 10 keV to 1 GeV. Dealmeid et al. studied radiation transmission and angular distribution for 25 MV X-rays by using LINAC. Demir and Keles measured radiation transmission of concrete including boron waste for 59.54 and 80.99 keV γ-rays. Kaplan reported about many heavy concretes studies in his book. Kitis et al. studied heavy concretes including barite aggregates for cyclotron shielding. Mollah et al. determined concretes including ilmenite and magnetite aggregates for neutron shielding by using {sup 252}Cf radioactive source and BF{sub 3} neutron detector. Yarar and Bayuelken studied concretes including colemanite aggregates for neutron shielding. In this paper, we have measured radiation transmission of thirteen different heavy concretes produced by using barite, colemanite and normal aggregates for 276, 303, 356 and 383 keV γ-ray energies of {sup 133}Ba radioactive isotope by using CdTe semiconductor detector and calculated linear and mass attenuation coefficients. Results were compared to X-ray mass attenuation coefficient values of NIST. The attenuation of γ-ray photons is governed primarily by the atomic number and density of the concrete as a shielding material. Photon attenuation depends on pair production, photoelectric effect and Compton scattering. In this study, linear attenuation coefficients (μ) decrease with the increasing the photon energy for these concretes. Heavy elements there is a fairly sharp minimum in the absorption cross section at about this energy region. It is indicated that attenuation coefficient is useful parameter for radiation shielding. As known, the linear attenuation coefficients of the concretes used in this study at these γ-ray energies are not available in the literature by using CdTe semiconductor detectors. The data shows the effects of including boron-rich colemanite or barium-rich barite in addition to normal aggregate in the concrete mixtures. As would be expected, the barite is desirable for photon attenuation, while the colemanite is desirable for neutron attenuation. The concretes including barite and colemanite would be preferred as materials for building construction of radiation oncology departments, radiology departments, nuclear reactors and radiation research laboratories against photon and neutron particle radiations. But other aggregate properties of colemanite such as abrasion resistance and freeze-thaw durability are also found to be important for concrete but they cannot be quantified at this study. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

German Support Program for Retrieval and Safe Storage of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Ukraine - 13194

The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany supports the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) in enhancement of nuclear safety and radiation protection and strengthening of the physical protection. One of the main objectives of the agreement concluded by these parties in 2008 was the retrieval and safe interim storage of disused orphan high radioactive sealed sources in Ukraine. At present, the Ukrainian National Registry does not account all high active radiation sources but only for about 70 - 80 %. GRS in charge of BMU to execute the program since 2008 concluded subcontracts with the waste management and interim storage facilities RADON at different regions in Ukraine as well with the waste management and interim storage facility IZOTOP at Kiev. Below selected examples of removal of high active Co-60 and Cs-137 sources from irradiation facilities at research institutes are described. By end of 2012 removal and safe interim storage of 12.000 disused radioactive sealed sources with a total activity of more than 5,7.10{sup 14} Bq was achieved within the frame of this program. The German support program will be continued up to the end of 2013 with the aim to remove and safely store almost all disused radioactive sealed sources in Ukraine. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Regulatory Control of Sealed Sources in Germany including Regulations Regarding Spent and Disused Sources - 13176

Effective regulatory control is essential to ensure the safe and secure use of radioactive material and the appropriate management of radioactive waste. To ensure a sustainable control of high radioactive sources, the European Commission published the Council Directive 2003/122/EURATOM on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources, which had to be transferred into national legislation by all member states of the European Union. Major requirement of the Directive is a system to ensure traceability of high-activity sealed sources from 'cradle to grave' as well as the provision to take back disused sources by the supplier or manufacturer. With the Act on high-activity sealed radioactive sources Germany implemented the requirements of the Directive 2003/122/EURATOM and established a national registry of high-activity sealed sources in 2006. Currently, about 27.000 high-activity sealed sources are recorded in this national registry. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Thermal Performance Analysis of a Geologic Borehole Repository

The Brazilian Nuclear Research Institute (IPEN) proposed a design for the disposal of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources (DSRS) based on the IAEA Borehole Disposal of Sealed Radioactive Sources (BOSS) design that would allow the entirety of Brazil’s inventory of DSRS to be disposed in a single borehole. The proposed IPEN design allows for 170 waste packages (WPs) containing DSRS (such as Co-60 and Cs-137) to be stacked on top of each other inside the borehole. The primary objective of this work was to evaluate the thermal performance of a conservative approach to the IPEN proposal with the equivalent of two WPs and two different inside configurations using Co-60 as the radioactive heat source. The current WP configuration (heterogeneous) for the IPEN proposal has 60% of the WP volume being occupied by a nuclear radioactive heat source and the remaining 40% as vacant space. The second configuration (homogeneous) considered for this project was a homogeneous case where 100% of the WP volume was occupied by a nuclear radioactive heat source. The computational models for the thermal analyses of the WP configurations with the Co-60 heat source considered three different cooling mechanisms (conduction, radiation, and convection) and the effect of mesh size on the results from the thermal analysis. The results of the analyses yielded maximum temperatures inside the WPs for both of the WP configurations and various mesh sizes. The heterogeneous WP considered the cooling mechanisms of conduction, convection, and radiation. The temperature results from the heterogeneous WP analysis suggest that the model is cooled predominantly by conduction with effect of radiation and natural convection on cooling being negligible. From the thermal analysis comparing the two WP configurations, the results suggest that either WP configuration could be used for the design. The mesh sensitivity results verify the meshes used, and results obtained from the thermal analyses were close to being independent of mesh size. The results from the computational case and analytically-calculated case for the homogeneous WP in benchmarking were almost identical, which indicates that the computational approach used here was successfully verified by the analytical solution.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Handling of Highly Radioactive Radiation Sources in a Hot Cell Using a Mechanically Driven Cell Crane - 13452

In 2010, Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik GmbH was awarded the contract for design and erection of a Hot Cell for handling and storage of highly radioactive radiation sources. This Hot Cell is part of a new hot cell laboratory, constructed for the NHZ (Neues Handhabungszentrum = New Handling Center) of the Nuclear Engineering Seibersdorf GmbH (NES). All incurring radioactive materials from Austria are collected in the NHZ, where they are safely conditioned and stored temporarily until their final storage. The main tasks of the NES include, apart from the collection, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste, also the reprocessing and the decontamination of facilities and laboratories originating from 45 years of research and development at the Seibersdorf site as well as the operation of the Hot Cell Laboratory [1]. The new Hot Cell Laboratory inside the NHZ consists of the following room areas: - One hot cell, placed in the center, for remote controlled, radiation protected handling of radioactive materials, including an integrated floor storage for the long-term temporary storage of highly radioactive radiation sources; - An anteroom for the loading and unloading of the hot cell; - One control room for the remote controlling of the hot cell equipment; - One floor storage, placed laterally to the hot cell, for burial, interim storage and removal of fissionable radioactive material in leak-proof packed units in 100 l drums. The specific design activity of the hot cell of 1.85 Pbq relating to 1-Me-Radiator including the integrated floor storage influences realization and design of the components used in the cell significantly. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Risk of theft and malicious use of radiation sources in transit

Remote radioactive source applications require frequent transportation of sources from storage locations to remote sites. This introduces risk of theft of a source during the transportation process, with the level of risk proportional to the radioactivity of the source. To that end, theft of smaller sources, such as microcurie-level moisture density gauges, are of minor concern, but larger sources, such as those used for radiography and well logging, present more risk. Radiography sources include 192 Ir, 75 Se, or 60 Co radionuclides with radioactivity amounts at or exceeding IAEA Category 2. Well-logging sources, primarily 241 Am/Be, are used for their neutron-emission properties. 137 Cs is also used in well-logging at lower activities than in radiography but at levels that still present some risk. The vulnerability for malicious use of such sources to cause contamination and associated economic effects is dependent on the elemental chemical and physical properties, especially melting point and bulk modulus. Theft of radiography sources is somewhat common, well-logging sources less so. Theft of sources commonly occurs in concert with theft of the vehicle, with the source subsequently abandoned. There have been some instances where a source appears to have been specifically targeted. There are a variety of security measures and protocols, available and under development, to mitigate the risk of theft and assist in source recovery.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integrated treatment of detector arrays for source tracking.

Illicit radioactive sources can potentially appear in a wide range of public venues. One element in a plan for managing such sources involves searching for them in venues at risk and tracking them in real time when they are detected. A treatment of source tracking using multiple directional detectors in a probabilistic framework is given. The performance of a prototype directional detector based on these methods was characterized in the laboratory. Instances where the performance of a directional detector is not immune to the effects of shielding are identified.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Transitioning from Cobalt-60 to X-Ray or E-Beam for Medical Sterilization: Filling Data and Education Gaps

The Office of Radiological Security (ORS) within the U.S. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is charged to “work with government, law enforcement, and businesses across the globe to protect radioactive sources used for medical, research, and commercial purposes; remove and dispose of disused radioactive sources; and reduce the global reliance on high activity radioactive sources through the promotion of viable non-radioisotopic alternative technologies.” In this effort, the NNSA/ORS, along with the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D, has been working with government and private entities that utilize gamma-ray irradiators in areas that include blood irradiation, radiotherapy, biology research, well logging, and radiation processing to consider alternative technologies that do not depend upon radioactive materials. In the medical device industry, nearly 50% of products are sterilized with ethylene oxide, 40.5% with cobalt-60 gamma-rays, 4.5% with electron-beam (e-beam), and <1% with X-ray.(1,2) The cobalt-60 irradiation facilities use an estimated 150 MCi of isotope to sterilize approximately 200 million cubic feet of product annually.(3) Due to growing safety regulations governing cobalt-60 use, continued advancements in e-beam and X-ray accelerator technology, and the greater irradiation durations and costs for cobalt-60 irradiation compared to e-beam and X-ray, switching to these non-radionuclide modalities is increasingly economically competitive. However, this breakdown of 40.5% cobalt-60 and 5.5% accelerator for product sterilization illustrates the difficulty that market forces and industry players have had in overcoming barriers in transitioning to non-nuclide alternatives. Besides those associated with construction of new e-beam and X-ray facilities, significant financial and regulatory obstacles are also associated with the irradiation and comprehensive testing of product constituent polymers and elastomers. The standards associated with product material performance testing are the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) Technical Information Report 17 (TIR 17), and its referenced American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) polymer testing standards. In the study now underway, and the subject of this article, the NNSA/ORS provided R&D funding to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in partnership with university researchers, leading medical product manufacturers, accelerator manufacturers, and contract sterilizers. The resulting Team Nablo (in memory of Sam Nablo) includes individuals representing PNNL, Becton Dickinson (BD), Johnson & Johnson, Stryker, Texas A&M University (TAMU), Steri-Tek, Mevex, Ion Beam Applications (IBA), and Sterigenics. The goals of this study are to 1) Identify specific polymer and/or elastomer-based medical products that are currently sterilized with gamma-rays, and for which there are data gaps and would be of greatest industry impact, 2) Work with relevant ASTM subcommittees for guidance and for potential standard revision, 3) Work with an appropriate Food & Drug Administration (FDA) office for potential collaboration on a guidance document for device manufacturers, 4) Measure the physical effects that product materials exhibit when they are given sterilization-level radiation doses from cobalt-60, e-beam or X-ray, and determine whether these effects would preclude the use of e-beam or X-ray for sterilization, 5) Communicate the resulting scientific datasets and findings via industry conferences, peer-reviewed journals, and relevant trade magazines, and 6) Post the resulting datasets on a publicly accessible website, which can be built on in future years. The end objective is to identify technical barriers preventing the adoption of X-ray and e-beam technologies, and share the results to encourage X-ray and e-beam adoption where feasible.

sterilization, alternate technologies, gamma, X-ra↗

Solution-grown crystals for neutron radiation detectors, and methods of solution growth

A method according to one embodiment includes growing an organic crystal from solution, the organic crystal exhibiting a signal response signature for neutrons from a radioactive source. A system according to one embodiment includes an organic crystal having physical characteristics of formation from solution, the organic crystal exhibiting a signal response signature for neutrons from a radioactive source; and a photodetector for detecting the signal response of the organic crystal. A method according to another embodiment includes growing an organic crystal from solution, the organic crystal being large enough to exhibit a detectable signal response signature for neutrons from a radioactive source. An organic crystal according to another embodiment includes an organic crystal having physical characteristics of formation from solution, the organic crystal exhibiting a signal response signature for neutrons from a radioactive source, wherein the organic crystal has a length of greater than about 1 mm in one dimension.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Microfocus x-ray imaging of traceable pointlike {sup 22}Na sources for quality control

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to propose a microfocus x-ray imaging technique for observing the internal structure of small radioactive sources and evaluating geometrical errors quantitatively, and to apply this technique to traceable pointlike {sup 22}Na sources, which were designed for positron emission tomography calibration, for the purpose of quality control of the pointlike sources. Methods: A microfocus x-ray imaging system with a focus size of 0.001 mm was used to obtain projection x-ray images and x-ray CT images of five pointlike source samples, which were manufactured during 2009-2012. The obtained projection and tomographic images were used to observe the internal structure and evaluate geometrical errors quantitatively. Monte Carlo simulation was used to evaluate the effect of possible geometrical errors on the intensity and uniformity of 0.511 MeV annihilation photon pairs emitted from the sources. Results: Geometrical errors were evaluated with sufficient precision using projection x-ray images. CT images were used for observing the internal structure intuitively. As a result, four of the five examined samples were within the tolerance to maintain the total uncertainty below {+-}0.5%, given the source radioactivity; however, one sample was found to be defective. Conclusions: This quality control procedure is crucial and offers an important basis for using the pointlike {sup 22}Na source as a basic calibration tool. The microfocus x-ray imaging approach is a promising technique for visual and quantitative evaluation of the internal geometry of small radioactive sources.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Design and validation of a fission-product source for radioactive beams

A neutron-generator-based source of fission products (nuCARIBU) is being developed to replace the existing source at Argonne National Laboratory. Neutrons generated by reaction are thermalized in a compact polyethylene [(moderator and impinge on a thin 235 U foil to produce fission products. Experiments have been conducted to verify the nuCARIBU concept and simulation results using a 4 MeV, 0.16 µ⁢A proton beam from the ATLAS accelerator irradiating a LiF neutron production target and two different simplified versions of the nuCARIBU (C 2 ⁢H 4 ) n moderator with thicknesses of 3.81 cm and 1.91 cm separating it from the enriched 235 U fission foil. Here, the emitted γ-ray peaks of 1383.93 keV ( 92 Sr), 358.0 keV ( 104 Tc), 565.992 keV ( 134 Te), and 258.411 keV ( 138 Xe) obtained from fission products are used to determine the neutron-induced fission rates in the fission foil. The measured fission rates are in good agreement with those simulated using the PHITS Monte Carlo code with user-defined neutron production cross sections based on well-known cross section data. These experimental results, consistent with the simulations, show that the current 252 Cf source (CARIBU) can be replaced by the neutron induced fission source (nuCARIBU).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗