SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Risk”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 145 records · Page 8

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer's Perspective

Risk management is a communications device that, when executed as an essential task, enables systems engineering to effectively balance risk across the project. Developing and baselining risks is an essential continuous task to ensure top project concerns both from bottom up and top down are being mitigated. Risk management provides the opportunity to avoid the consequence of the risk when mitigation steps start early enough. Just discussing risk with all the project flight elements during development, even if no risks are open, provides an excellent communication opportunity between systems engineering and those elements, ensuring concerns and worries have a platform for discussion. A well-managed risk identification process will identify concerns that are serious but not being clearly communicated, and it will enable mitigation of those potential problems before they cause a failure. Effective risk management requires considerable time and effort, but that effort will save time and money across the development. Risk management must be frequent enough to be useful and in depth enough to bring out emerging issues. It also requires a trusting relationship between the lead systems engineer and element and/or subsystem leads. The discussions need to be with the right number of individuals (typically a handful) and the right duration in time (typically an hour a month). Outside of these risk working groups, there is a formal management process to input, status, and disposition risks, and a monthly Risk Management Board meeting where key project stakeholders are informed. This paper provides good guidance on effective risk management from a systems engineering perspective and provides project lessons learned from the NASA spaceflight missions NICER, Landsat 9, LRO, and OSIRIS-REx to demonstrate the effectiveness of risk management.

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned With Risk Management: A Systems Engineer’s Perspective

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 1

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0. NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Uncertainty↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 2

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0 (January 2020). NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Risk Leadership↗

NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management: An Overview

Software risk management is important because it helps avoid disasters, rework, and overkill, but more importantly because it stimulates win-win situations. The objectives of software risk management are to identify, address, and eliminate software risk items before they become threats to success or major sources of rework. In general, good project managers are also good managers of risk. It makes good business sense for all software development projects to incorporate risk management as part of project management. The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to implement risk management. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This is an introductory tutorial to continuous risk management based on this course. The rational for continuous risk management and how it is incorporated into project management are discussed. The risk management structure of six functions is discussed in sufficient depth for managers to understand what is involved in risk management and how it is implemented. These functions include: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.

Rosenberg, Linda↗

NASA NTRS2004

Risk Management Implementation Tool

Continuous Risk Management (CM) is a software engineering practice with processes, methods, and tools for managing risk in a project. It provides a controlled environment for practical decision making, in order to assess continually what could go wrong, determine which risk are important to deal with, implement strategies to deal with those risk and assure the measure effectiveness of the implemented strategies. Continuous Risk Management provides many training workshops and courses to teach the staff how to implement risk management to their various experiments and projects. The steps of the CRM process are identification, analysis, planning, tracking, and control. These steps and the various methods and tools that go along with them, identification, and dealing with risk is clear-cut. The office that I worked in was the Risk Management Office (RMO). The RMO at NASA works hard to uphold NASA s mission of exploration and advancement of scientific knowledge and technology by defining and reducing program risk. The RMO is one of the divisions that fall under the Safety and Assurance Directorate (SAAD). I worked under Cynthia Calhoun, Flight Software Systems Engineer. My task was to develop a help screen for the Continuous Risk Management Implementation Tool (RMIT). The Risk Management Implementation Tool will be used by many NASA managers to identify, analyze, track, control, and communicate risks in their programs and projects. The RMIT will provide a means for NASA to continuously assess risks. The goals and purposes for this tool is to provide a simple means to manage risks, be used by program and project managers throughout NASA for managing risk, and to take an aggressive approach to advertise and advocate the use of RMIT at each NASA center.

Wright, Shayla L.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Communicating Risk to Program Managers

Program Managers (PM) can protect program resources and improve chances of success by anticipating, understanding and managing risks. Understanding the range of potential risks helps one to avoid or manage the risks. A PM must choose which risks to accept to reduce fire fighting, must meet the expectations of stakeholders consistently, and avoid falling into costly "black holes" that may open. A good risk management process provides the PM more confidence to seize opportunities save money, meet schedule, even improve relationships with people important to the program. Evidence of managing risk and sound internal controls can mean better support from superiors for the program by building a trust and reputation from being on top of issues. Risk managers have an obligation to provide the PM with the best information possible to allow the benefits to be realized (Small Business Consortium, 2004). The Institute for Chartered Accountants in England and Wales sees very important benefits for companies in providing better information about what they do to assess and manage key business risks. Such information will: a) provide practical forward-looking information; b) reduce the cost of capital; c) encourage better risk management; and d) improve accountability for stewardship, investor protection and the usefulness of financial reporting. We are particularly convinced that enhanced risk reporting will help listed companies obtain capital at the lowest possible cost (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England &Wales, June 2002). Risk managers can take a significant role in quantifying the success of their department and communicating those figures to executive (program) management levels while pushing for a broader risk management role. Overall, risk managers must show that risk management work matters in the most crucial place-the bottom line- as they prove risk management can be a profit center (Sullivan, 2004).

Shivers, C. Herbert↗

NASA NTRS2011

Risk Assessment Overview

Risk assessment is used in many industries to identify and manage risks. Initially developed for use on aeronautical and nuclear systems, risk assessment has been applied to transportation, chemical, computer, financial, and security systems among others. It is used to gain an understanding of the weaknesses or vulnerabilities in a system so modification can be made to increase operability, efficiency, and safety and to reduce failure and down-time. Risk assessment results are primary inputs to risk-informed decision making; where risk information including uncertainty is used along with other pertinent information to assist management in the decision-making process. Therefore, to be useful, a risk assessment must be directed at specific objectives. As the world embraces the globalization of trade and manufacturing, understanding the associated risk become important to decision making. Applying risk assessment techniques to a global system of development, manufacturing, and transportation can provide insight into how the system can fail, the likelihood of system failure and the consequences of system failure. The risk assessment can identify those elements that contribute most to risk and identify measures to prevent and mitigate failures, disruptions, and damaging outcomes. In addition, risk associated with public and environment impact can be identified. The risk insights gained can be applied to making decisions concerning suitable development and manufacturing locations, supply chains, and transportation strategies. While risk assessment has been mostly applied to mechanical and electrical systems, the concepts and techniques can be applied across other systems and activities. This paper provides a basic overview of the development of a risk assessment.

Prassinos, Peter G.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Addressing Human System Risks to Future Space Exploration

NASA is contemplating future human exploration missions to destinations beyond low Earth orbit, including the Moon, deep-space asteroids, and Mars. While we have learned much about protecting crew health and performance during orbital space flight over the past half-century, the challenges of these future missions far exceed those within our current experience base. To ensure success in these missions, we have developed a Human System Risk Board (HSRB) to identify, quantify, and develop mitigation plans for the extraordinary risks associated with each potential mission scenario. The HSRB comprises research, technology, and operations experts in medicine, physiology, psychology, human factors, radiation, toxicology, microbiology, pharmacology, and food sciences. Methods: Owing to the wide range of potential mission characteristics, we first identified the hazards to human health and performance common to all exploration missions: altered gravity, isolation/confinement, increased radiation, distance from Earth, and hostile/closed environment. Each hazard leads to a set of risks to crew health and/or performance. For example the radiation hazard leads to risks of acute radiation syndrome, central nervous system dysfunction, soft tissue degeneration, and carcinogenesis. Some of these risks (e.g., acute radiation syndrome) could affect crew health or performance during the mission, while others (e.g., carcinogenesis) would more likely affect the crewmember well after the mission ends. We next defined a set of design reference missions (DRM) that would span the range of exploration missions currently under consideration. In addition to standard (6-month) and long-duration (1-year) missions in low Earth orbit (LEO), these DRM include deep space sortie missions of 1 month duration, lunar orbital and landing missions of 1 year duration, deep space journey and asteroid landing missions of 1 year duration, and Mars orbital and landing missions of 3 years duration. We then assessed the likelihood and consequences of each risk against each DRM, using three levels of likelihood (Low: less than or equal to 0.1%; Medium: 0.1%–1.0%; High: greater than or equal to 1.0%) and four levels of consequence ranging from Very Low (temporary or insignificant) to High (death, loss of mission, or significant reduction to length or quality of life). Quantitative evidence from clinical, operational, and research sources were used whenever available. Qualitative evidence was used when quantitative evidence was unavailable. Expert opinion was used whenever insufficient evidence was available. Results: A set of 30 risks emerged that will require further mitigation efforts before being accepted by the Agency. The likelihood by consequence risk assessment process provided a means of prioritizing among the risks identified. For each of the high priority risks, a plan was developed to perform research, technology, or standards development thought necessary to provide suitable reduction of likelihood or consequence to allow agency acceptance. Conclusion: The HSRB process has successfully identified a complete set of risks to human space travelers on planned exploration missions based on the best evidence available today. Risk mitigation plans have been established for the highest priority risks. Each risk will be reassessed annually to track the progress of our risk mitigation efforts.

Paloski, W. H.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Risk Assessment Considerations for Underground Hydrogen Storage in Depleted Gas Reservoirs

Underground hydrogen storage (UHS) in depleted reservoirs presents a promising solution for large-scale energy storage as hydrogen demand grows. As the UHS industry emerges, robust risk assessments are critical to ensuring safe operation of the storage facilities and minimizing the risk of accidents. This work explores risk assessment protocols for underground natural gas storage (UGS) in depleted reservoirs and identifies key considerations for repurposing these facilities for UHS. By examining the differences in physical and chemical properties between hydrogen and natural gas, this work highlights new and modified hazards that merits a reevaluation of traditional natural gas risk assessment practices. This investigation synthesizes insights from previous literature reviews and interviews with UGS industry experts and operators to identify key areas for adapting risk assessment methodologies for hydrogen. The insights gleaned from expert interviews indicate that existing risk assessment standards are non-prescriptive, leading to diverse company-specific risk assessment methodologies requiring substantial additions to become practical. Due to a lack of concrete risk assessment requirements, experience, and relevant data, this uncertainty is expected to be magnified considerably when considering hydrogen. This study identifies several areas for potential modification of existing risk assessment practices that could be considered by those developing standards or performing risk assessments for UHS. Specifically, risk assessments may be improved by including risks unique to hydrogen in existing standards, changing the magnitude of different risk factors in existing risk assessment protocols, and improving methods of data collection and communication across the industry to address large areas of uncertainty.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2025

Quantitative Risk Assessment for Fuel Cell Electric Bus Hydrogen Storage and Refueling Facility

It is necessary to understand the safety implications and risk mitigation options for fuel cell electric bus fleet deployment, especially for related facilities responsible for operations such as production, storage, compression, and dispensing of hydrogen for use by the buses. In this report, we present a quantitative risk assessment for a potential fuel cell electric bus fleet that was motivated by efforts to improve resilience at the Portland International Airport but can be applicable to a range of hydrogen case studies and use cases. We estimated risk for a facility that produces, stores, compresses, and dispenses hydrogen for the fleet of buses, with a focus on individual risk to people in terms of annual frequency of fatality. We considered the frequency of hydrogen leaks that could result in harmful physical outcomes like jet fires or explosions, and the consequences of those outcomes for people. We created customized fault trees to calculate the frequencies of different sizes of leaks and event sequence diagrams to calculate ignition probabilities for the various leak sizes. We also leveraged the HyRAM+ toolkit to use these inputs to calculate overall risk for the facility, which we separated into one section responsible for producing, storing, and compressing hydrogen, and one section responsible for dispensing the hydrogen to the buses. We found that the dispensing area seemed to have a higher risk than the production/storage/compression area of the facility, largely because of the inclusion of a component with a high leak frequency (the heat exchanger used to cool the hydrogen before entering the vehicle, to prevent overheating and expansion of hydrogen in the onboard tank). For the example production and refueling facility we evaluated and the data we used for the analysis, the leak frequency had a larger impact on the risk differences between the two sections on the facility, compared to the physical outcome consequence, which was slightly different due to the varying fuel conditions, but not substantially different. Actions can be taken to prevent these hazards (e.g., lowering leak frequencies in system components) or to mitigate the consequences if they do occur (e.g., installing barriers to protect people if ignition events occur). The choice of which actions to take depends not only on safety considerations but also on space, time, staffing, feasibility, and financial constraints. Therefore, the quantitative risk assessment approach can help understand relative risk contributions from different components, leak sizes, consequences, and human actions, to prioritize risk reduction strategies and balance these parameters. The outcomes of this report may be useful for a variety of stakeholders working in the hydrogen, transportation, vehicle, and aviation sector, including those responsible for aspects like facility design, operations, and regulations. There is not a single value of risk that determines whether a hypothetical system is “safe” or not. The insights about risk mitigations may be leveraged, and the quantitative risk assessment approach can be applied to other case studies to understand risk priorities and contributions specific to different FCEB and hydrogen facility uses.

08 HYDROGEN↗

NASA NTRS2009

Microbial Risk Assessment

Historically, microbiological spaceflight requirements have been established in a subjective manner based upon expert opinion of both environmental and clinical monitoring results and the incidence of disease. The limited amount of data, especially from long-duration missions, has created very conservative requirements based primarily on the concentration of microorganisms. Periodic reevaluations of new data from later missions have allowed some relaxation of these stringent requirements. However, the requirements remain very conservative and subjective in nature, and the risk of crew illness due to infectious microorganisms is not well defined. The use of modeling techniques for microbial risk has been applied in the food and potable water industries and has exceptional potential for spaceflight applications. From a productivity standpoint, this type of modeling can (1) decrease unnecessary costs and resource usage and (2) prevent inadequate or inappropriate data for health assessment. In addition, a quantitative model has several advantages for risk management and communication. By identifying the variable components of the model and the knowledge associated with each component, this type of modeling can: (1) Systematically identify and close knowledge gaps, (2) Systematically identify acceptable and unacceptable risks, (3) Improve communication with stakeholders as to the reasons for resource use, and (4) Facilitate external scientific approval of the NASA requirements. The modeling of microbial risk involves the evaluation of several key factors including hazard identification, crew exposure assessment, dose-response assessment, and risk characterization. Many of these factors are similar to conditions found on Earth; however, the spaceflight environment is very specialized as the inhabitants live in a small, semi-closed environment that is often dependent on regenerative life support systems. To further complicate modeling efforts, microbial dose-response characteristics may be affected by a potentially dysfunctional crew immune system during a mission. In addition, microbial virulence has been shown to change under certain conditions during spaceflight, further complicating dose-response characterization. An initial study of the applicability of microbial risk assessment techniques was performed using Crew Health Care System (CHeCS) operational data from the International Space Station potable water systems. The risk of infection from potable water was selected as the flight systems and microbial ecology are well defined. This initial study confirmed the feasibility of using microbial risk assessment modeling for spaceflight systems. While no immediate threat was detected, the study identified several medically significant microorganisms that could pose a health risk if uncontrolled. The study also identified several specific knowledge gaps in making a risk assessment and noted that filling these knowledge gaps is essential as the risk estimates may change by orders of magnitude depending on the answers. The current phase of the microbial risk assessment studies focuses on the dose-response relationship of specific infectious agents, focusing on Salmonella enterica Typhimurium, Pseudomonas spp., and Escherichia coli, as their evaluation will provide a better baseline for determining the overall hazard characterization. The organisms were chosen as they either have been isolated on spacecraft or have an identified route of infection during a mission. The characterization will utilize dose-response models selected either from the peer-reviewed literature and/or by using statistical approaches. Development of these modeling and risk assessment techniques will help to optimize flight requirements and to protect the safety, health, and performance of the crew.

Ott, C. M.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Uncertainties in Estimates of the Risks of Late Effects from Space Radiation

The health risks faced by astronauts from space radiation include cancer, cataracts, hereditary effects, and non-cancer morbidity and mortality risks related to the diseases of the old age. Methods used to project risks in low-Earth orbit are of questionable merit for exploration missions because of the limited radiobiology data and knowledge of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) heavy ions, which causes estimates of the risk of late effects to be highly uncertain. Risk projections involve a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. Within the linear-additivity model, we use Monte-Carlo sampling from subjective uncertainty distributions in each factor to obtain a Maximum Likelihood estimate of the overall uncertainty in risk projections. The resulting methodology is applied to several human space exploration mission scenarios including ISS, lunar station, deep space outpost, and Mar's missions of duration of 360, 660, and 1000 days. The major results are the quantification of the uncertainties in current risk estimates, the identification of factors that dominate risk projection uncertainties, and the development of a method to quantify candidate approaches to reduce uncertainties or mitigate risks. The large uncertainties in GCR risk projections lead to probability distributions of risk that mask any potential risk reduction using the "optimization" of shielding materials or configurations. In contrast, the design of shielding optimization approaches for solar particle events and trapped protons can be made at this time, and promising technologies can be shown to have merit using our approach. The methods used also make it possible to express risk management objectives in terms of quantitative objective's, i.e., the number of days in space without exceeding a given risk level within well defined confidence limits.

Cucinotta, F. A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Sensitivity Analysis of Median Lifetime on Radiation Risks Estimates for Cancer and Circulatory Disease amongst Never-Smokers

Radiation risks are estimated in a competing risk formalism where age or time after exposure estimates of increased risks for cancer and circulatory diseases are folded with a probability to survive to a given age. The survival function, also called the life-table, changes with calendar year, gender, smoking status and other demographic variables. An outstanding problem in risk estimation is the method of risk transfer between exposed populations and a second population where risks are to be estimated. Approaches used to transfer risks are based on: 1) Multiplicative risk transfer models -proportional to background disease rates. 2) Additive risk transfer model -risks independent of background rates. In addition, a Mixture model is often considered where the multiplicative and additive transfer assumptions are given weighted contributions. We studied the influence of the survival probability on the risk of exposure induced cancer and circulatory disease morbidity and mortality in the Multiplicative transfer model and the Mixture model. Risks for never-smokers (NS) compared to the average U.S. population are estimated to be reduced between 30% and 60% dependent on model assumptions. Lung cancer is the major contributor to the reduction for NS, with additional contributions from circulatory diseases and cancers of the stomach, liver, bladder, oral cavity, esophagus, colon, a portion of the solid cancer remainder, and leukemia. Greater improvements in risk estimates for NS s are possible, and would be dependent on improved understanding of risk transfer models, and elucidating the role of space radiation on the various stages of disease formation (e.g. initiation, promotion, and progression).

Chappell, Lori J.↗

NASA NTRS2013

NASA's Risk Management System

Phased‐approach for implementation of risk management is necessary. Risk management system will be simple, accessible and promote communication of information to all relevant stakeholders for optimal resource allocation and risk mitigation. Risk management should be used by all team members to manage risks - not just risk office personnel. Each group/department is assigned Risk Integrators who are facilitators for effective risk management. Risks will be managed at the lowest‐level feasible, elevate only those risks that require coordination or management from above. Risk informed decision making should be introduced to all levels of management.  Provide necessary checks and balances to insure that risks are caught/identified and dealt with in a timely manner. Many supporting tools, processes & training must be deployed for effective risk management implementation. Process improvement must be included in the risk processes.

Perera, Jeevan S.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Evidence Report: Risk of Cardiovascular Disease and Other Degenerative Tissue Effects from Radiation Exposure

Occupational radiation exposure from the space environment may result in non-cancer or non-CNS degenerative tissue diseases, such as cardiovascular disease, cataracts, and respiratory or digestive diseases. However, the magnitude of influence and mechanisms of action of radiation leading to these diseases are not well characterized. Radiation and synergistic effects of radiation cause DNA damage, persistent oxidative stress, chronic inflammation, and accelerated tissue aging and degeneration, which may lead to acute or chronic disease of susceptible organ tissues. In particular, cardiovascular pathologies such as atherosclerosis are of major concern following gamma-ray exposure. This provides evidence for possible degenerative tissue effects following exposures to ionizing radiation in the form of the GCR or SPEs expected during long-duration spaceflight. However, the existence of low dose thresholds and dose-rate and radiation quality effects, as well as mechanisms and major risk pathways, are not well-characterized. Degenerative disease risks are difficult to assess because multiple factors, including radiation, are believed to play a role in the etiology of the diseases. As additional evidence is pointing to lower, space-relevant thresholds for these degenerative effects, particularly for cardiovascular disease, additional research with cell and animal studies is required to quantify the magnitude of this risk, understand mechanisms, and determine if additional protection strategies are required.The NASA PEL (Permissive Exposure Limit)s for cataract and cardiovascular risks are based on existing human epidemiology data. Although animal and clinical astronaut data show a significant increase in cataracts following exposure and a reassessment of atomic bomb (A-bomb) data suggests an increase in cardiovascular disease from radiation exposure, additional research is required to fully understand and quantify these adverse outcomes at lower doses (less than 0.5 gray (SI unit for ionizing radiation dosage, i.e. one joule of radiation energy per one kilogram of matter)) to facilitate risk prediction. This risk has considerable uncertainty associated with it, and no acceptable model for projecting degenerative tissue risk is currently available. In particular, risk factors such as obesity, alcohol, and tobacco use can act as confounding factors that contribute to the large uncertainties. The PELs could be violated under certain scenarios, including following a large SPE (solar proton event) or long-term GCR (galactic cosmic ray) exposure. Specifically, for a Mars mission, the accumulated dose is sufficiently high that epidemiology data and preliminary risk estimates suggest a significant risk for cardiovascular disease. Ongoing research in this area is intended to provide the evidence base for accurate risk quantification to determine criticality for extended duration missions. Data specific to the space radiation environment must be compiled to quantify the magnitude of this risk to decrease the uncertainty in current PELs and to determine if additional protection strategies are required. New research results could lead to estimates of cumulative radiation risk from CNS and degenerative tissue diseases that, when combined with the cancer risk, may have major negative impacts on mission design, costs, schedule, and crew selection. The current report amends an earlier report (Human Research Program Requirements Document, HRP-47052, Rev. C, dated Jan 2009) in order to provide an update of evidence since 2009.

Patel, Zarana↗

NASA NTRS2022

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, and Psychosocial Adaptions within a Team

The Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team (the Team Risk) is primarily performance-focused, with a secondary emphasis on behavioral health outcomes resulting from team performance and interpersonal interactions. Monitoring tools, measures, and countermeasures are aimed at enhancing team processes and team composition configurations to optimize team performance and functioning. Long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs) will include major challenges that could affect team performance, including social isolation, physical confinement, a small and diverse crew, communication delays between crew and ground, limited or no crew rotation or evacuation options, limited or no resupply, and a high-consequence environment. Each of these conditions will affect the crew’s coordination, cooperation, psychological well-being, and performance. Although the International Space Station (ISS) remains important for studies that require spaceflight testing and validation, the current conditions on the ISS do not adequately mimic the exploration environment that is required for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) teams research, and thus access to terrestrial or ground-based analogs of LDEM conditions is paramount. The emphasis on analogs for research is reflected in this updated evidence review of the Team Risk, and includes data from studies conducted at isolated, confined, extreme (ICE) environments (e.g., Antarctic stations), and from several mission simulation analogs such as the Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) (HERA Experiment Information Package, 2014), also known as isolated, confined, controlled (ICC) environments. These studies have characterized many team factors regarding LDEMs, and the Team Risk has now matured from risk characterization to focusing more on countermeasure development. Because spaceflight evidence for team-level research is lacking, no reliable data is available to quantify the impact of team-level variables on individual and team-level outcomes during spaceflight missions. Until recently, no systematic attempt had been undertaken to measure the performance effects of team cohesion, team composition, team training, or team-related psychosocial adaptation during spaceflight. The Team Risk is a relatively young research area for NASA, with substantial growth only since the 2000s, and with limited access to spaceflight performance data. As a result, spaceflight evidence is lacking to identify specifically what team composition, level of training, amount of cohesion, or quality of psychosocial adaptation is necessary to reduce the risk of performance errors in space. However, astronaut journals and interviews and reports from spaceflight subject matter experts (SMEs) provide testimonies that team performance during spaceflight is important for mission success and to maintain crew health. Team spaceflight data is now being collected as part of the Spaceflight Standard Measures task (Clement, 2021)—a set of core measurements related to many human spaceflight risks that are collected from astronauts before, during, and after long-duration missions. The team-related standard measures focus on team cohesion, team performance, group living, team climate, and team processes. Collection of standard measures data is ongoing and published data is not yet available. Finally, although spaceflight evidence is lacking, evidence gleaned from ground studies and spaceflight analog studies will help close the gaps outlined in the Team Risk. Ground-based studies provide quantitative evidence for team functioning in ICE environments. Academic research on teams has produced dozens of meta-analyses that can be used to understand the general relationships among team inputs (e.g., team member characteristics and skills, job context), team processes, and emergent states (e.g., coordination, communication, cooperation, cohesion, trust, shared cognition), and team outcomes (e.g., effectiveness, errors, adaptation). Teams are complex, incorporating individual characteristics of team members, but also existing at a level that is greater than the sum of its parts. Therefore, the Team Risk must be integrated with other individual-focused NASA Human Research Program (HRP) risks, including Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Sleep, and Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), and emerging research indicates more integration may needed between the Team Risk and the physiologically oriented risks. Much of this integration occurs through the Human Systems Risk Board (HSRB). A lack of team functioning may be a stressor in some circumstances, but the team often acts as a countermeasure. For example, support for team leaders and teammates can facilitate individual functioning and encourage psychological and physically healthy behaviors and attitudes. However, more research is needed regarding teams during LDEMs and the remaining gaps in the research are described in the current report.

Lauren Blackwell Landon↗

DOE OSTI2024

Marine Energy Technology Development Risk Management Framework

Over the past decades, the global marine energy industry has suffered a number of serious technological and commercial setbacks. To help reduce the risks of industry failures and advance the development of new technologies, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) developed a Marine Energy Risk Management Framework in 2015, with this revision published in 2024. This risk management framework shall be utilized on all DOE Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) projects that require system testing in the open water. By addressing uncertainties, the Marine Energy Risk Management Framework increases the likelihood of successful development of marine energy converter technology. It covers projects of any technology readiness level technology performance level (TPL) and all risk types (e.g. technological risk, regulatory risk, commercial risk) over the development cycle. This risk framework is not a substitute for other risk management procedures that may be required for marine operations, such as installations at sea, hoisting and rigging, safe diver operations, and other safety requirements. This risk framework is intended to meet DOE's risk management expectations for marine energy technology research and development efforts from WPTO. It also provides an overview of other relevant risk management tools and documentation.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗