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Habitability Assessments And Lessons-learned From 3-day And 11-day Enriched Oxygen Hypobaric Chamber Tests At NASA Johnson Space Center

INTRODUCTION: Decompression sickness (DCS) is a risk to the health and performance of astronauts and high-altitude aircrew. Tolerance to flammability, hypoxia, prebreathe duration, and DCS risk varies across different organizations, vehicles, suits, and destinations, necessitating a variety of DCS risk mitigation approaches. Existing models of altitude DCS risk are often insufficient to enable accurate risk-informed decisions during hardware development, mission planning, and flight operations. METHODS: NASA completed outfitting of a dedicated facility at Johnson Space Center to support testing of up to eight human subjects for multiple days in hypobaric and enriched oxygen atmospheres. The primary purpose of the testing capability is validation of DCS risk mitigation protocols for Artemis missions to the Moon; however, it will also support development and validation of a generalizable altitude DCS risk estimation tool. A 3-day and an 11-day prebreathe validation test were completed in 2022, each with 8 human subjects living at 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2, with 5 simulated EVAs performed on masks at 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi), 85% O2, 15% N2. Facility and organizational lessons-learned and process improvements were recorded during and following the tests, and subjective habitability ratings were recorded daily during the 11-day test. Hypoxia and DCS-related physiological and cognitive outcome measures were recorded during both tests and are reported in companion presentations. RESULTS & DISCUSSION: All subjects completed each of the tests. Primary habitability issues related to mask discomfort during simulated EVAs and poor sleep quality due to thin mattresses. Polybenzimidazole (PBI) clothing was worn by all subjects due to the increased fire risk and may be required for Artemis missions; clothing was found to be acceptable overall with the worst ratings being due to poor fit and inelasticity. Chamber O2 and CO2 sensor inconsistency was observed that did not result in test termination but required post-test follow-up. Forward plans include additional hypobaric testing and integration of existing and future physiological outcome data into an open-source Aerospace Estimation Tool for Hypobaric Exposure Risk (AETHER). NASA is also working to make the testing capability available to commercial companies.

Andrew Abercromby↗

Current Status of Radiopharmaceutical Therapy

In radiopharmaceutical therapy (RPT), a radionuclide is systemically or locally delivered with the goal of targeting and delivering radiation to cancer cells while minimizing radiation exposure to untargeted cells. Examples of current RPTs include thyroid ablation with the administration of {sup 131}I, treatment of liver cancer with {sup 90}Y microspheres, the treatment of bony metastases with {sup 223}Ra, and the treatment of neuroendocrine tumors with {sup 177}Lu-DOTATATE. New RPTs are being developed where radionuclides are incorporated into systemic targeted therapies. To assure that RPT is appropriately implemented, advances in targeting need to be matched with advances in quantitative imaging and dosimetry methods. Currently, radiopharmaceutical therapy is administered by intravenous or locoregional injection, and the treatment planning has typically been implemented like chemotherapy, where the activity administered is either fixed or based on a patient’s body weight or body surface area. RPT pharmacokinetics are measurable by quantitative imaging and are known to vary across patients, both in tumors and normal tissues. Therefore, fixed or weight-based activity prescriptions are not currently optimized to deliver a cytotoxic dose to targets while remaining within the tolerance dose of organs at risk. Methods that provide dose estimates to individual patients rather than to reference geometries are needed to assess and adjust the injected RPT dose. Accurate doses to targets and organs at risk will benefit the individual patients and decrease uncertainties in clinical trials. Imaging can be used to measure activity distribution in vivo, and this information can be used to determine patient-specific treatment plans where the dose to the targets and organs at risk can be calculated. The development and adoption of imaging-based dosimetry methods is particularly beneficial in early clinical trials. In this work we discuss dosimetric accuracy needs in modern radiation oncology, uncertainties in the dosimetry in RPT, and best approaches for imaging and dosimetry of internal radionuclide therapy.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Guidance, Navigation, and Control System Design in a Mass Reduction Exercise

Early Orion GN&C system designs optimized for robustness, simplicity, and utilization of commercially available components. During the System Definition Review (SDR), all subsystems on Orion were asked to re-optimize with component mass and steady state power as primary design metrics. The objective was to create a mass reserve in the Orion point of departure vehicle design prior to beginning the PDR analysis cycle. The Orion GN&C subsystem team transitioned from a philosophy of absolute 2 fault tolerance for crew safety and 1 fault tolerance for mission success to an approach of 1 fault tolerance for crew safety and risk based redundancy to meet probability allocations of loss of mission and loss of crew. This paper will discuss the analyses, rationale, and end results of this activity regarding Orion navigation sensor hardware, control effectors, and trajectory design.

Crain, Timothy↗

Analysis of Launch Vehicle Liftoff Debris: Historical Perspective from Space Shuttle and Application to Artemis I

Human exploration-class launch vehicles are inherently prone to debris due to the extreme environments generated during pre-launch operations, liftoff, and flight. The use of cryogenic propellants often requires thermal protection system (TPS) coatings, typically foam, to maintain the propellant conditions in the tank and prevent an accumulation ice on the external surface of the vehicle. Some ice growth is to be expected at umbilical interfaces, vents, flanges, or brackets where it is difficult to apply TPS. This ice may come loose at any time due to wind on the launch pad, structural vibration and acoustics after rocket ignition, or aerodynamic forces during flight. This phenomena is especially apparent on vehicles with no TPS, such as the Saturn V rockets used in the Apollo Program, see Figure 1. During propellant tanking, the thermal contraction of the underlying substrate may generate cracks in the TPS (Figure 1). Chunks of TPS can release due to the expansion of ingested gas from cryopumping or from aerodynamic forces if the crack creates an offset surface. Most foams will also have a certain amount of “popcorning” where small pieces of foam will pop off during flight because of the differential between the static surface pressure and the pressure of the gas trapped in the foam cell structure. There are a number of other coating or closeout materials that may be shed from the vehicle and become debris. During pre-launch operations and liftoff, the vehicle may also be exposed to debris originating from the launch pad or ground support equipment. This debris is separate from foreign object debris, or FOD, which is not intended to be present and is strictly controlled through operations and maintenance procedures. In this case, debris is generated from hardware and materials that are necessary for launch and are subject to the intense vibration, acoustics, and direct plume impingement of the launch environment. Examples include ice from umbilicals, tape and tie wraps that protect cables, and rust or corrosion from the launch platform. While NASA has historically been aware of debris as a potential issue that could cause a failure resulting in loss of mission, loss of vehicle, or loss of crew, the likelihood and severity of that risk was not always well understood or given sufficient weight in program and flight decisions. After the Space Shuttle Columbia accident (STS-107), the investigation found that foam TPS debris shed from the external tank was the proximate cause of the damage to the orbiter wing. Six previous observations of debris released from the foam ramp that covered the bipod connecting the forward end of the orbiter to the external tank resulted in minor changes or were determined to be accepted flight risks. Two occurrences of bipod ramp foam loss were not identified until the STS-107 investigation. Despite the damage inflicted by these debris strikes, the Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board deemed the vehicle safe to fly. During the Return to Flight effort following the Columbia disaster, NASA Engineering developed a process for the assessment of debris transport, impact, and damage tolerance to support independent assessments of risk by NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Under this system, each element (vehicle or ground system) defines a catalog of all expected debris based on launch history, component testing, or analysis. Debris transport analysis (DTA) is conducted using the debris catalog characteristics and potential flow transport mechanisms (e.g., vehicle aerodynamics, gravity, wind, plume-driven). The predicted debris impact locations and velocities are provided to the hardware owners, who use available test data and analysis to determine whether each component can withstand the impacts. In cases where the element hardware may be severely damaged or fail, the options are to mitigate the debris source through some change in design or operation, or to work with S&MA to try to characterize the probability of the impact and damage for program risk acceptance. Because of the differences in debris characteristics and transport, the DTA has been divided between the Liftoff and Ascent regimes. The development and application of Liftoff DTA methodology from the Shuttle Program to the current Artemis Program is the subject of this paper. Liftoff DTA covers the time from the start of pre-launch operations at the launch pad, up until the vehicle clears the launch tower and there is no longer any interaction with ground systems. Debris transport during this period is broadly classified as either gravity, wind, and plume-entrained (GWPE) or plume driven (PD). GWPE debris is generally lower speed, travelling in a forward-to-aft direction. PD transport includes flow features from the rocket ignition transient, as well as plume impingement and recirculation that occur as the vehicle lifts off the launch platform. In these cases, the debris typically moves in an aft-to-forward direction at higher speeds. The applicable transport mechanisms must be considered for each piece of debris depending on the material, and release location and time. For example, rust or metallic debris from the tower could fall (GWPE) and impact the vehicle before landing on the launch platform deck where it could be also be transported by plume impingement (PD). However, falling ice (GWPE) from an umbilical is unlikely to survive impact with the vehicle or launch platform and be available for PD transport. Modeling of debris transport is accomplished using a set of DTA tools which simulate debris trajectories subject to a reference frame acceleration (i.e., gravity) and aerodynamic drag. Where the trajectory encounters a solid surface, the debris is allowed to rebound with a specified coefficient of restitution. The drag is calculated by interpolating the fluid state at each point in the debris trajectory from high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations of the launch vehicle and pad. The CFD data may either be static (steady state or time averaged), typically for GWPE transport, or dynamic (time-accurate) for PD flow features like the ignition transient. Examples of the CFD flow field solutions for the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket and launch pad are shown in Figure 2. Typical SLS debris trajectory predictions from DTA are illustrated in Figure 3. The final version of this paper will include a more detailed examination of the Liftoff DTA process developed during the Shuttle Program, and how it has been augmented and applied to the SLS rocket under the Artemis Program. Comparisons with debris observations from the Artemis I launch will demonstrate validation of the tools and methodology.

Debris↗

A decade of progress in understanding and managing legacy well integrity for geologic carbon storage

This study reviews a decade of research progress in legacy well integrity and risk management for geologic carbon storage (GCS) to commemorate the 20 th anniversary of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 2005 Special Report on Carbon Capture and Storage. In the past ten years, legacy well research has benefited from global efforts to constrain emissions from abandoned oil and gas wells, a continued focus on well materials performance in the presence of CO 2 -rich fluids, and practical experience gained through GCS implementation. Field measurements of abandoned well emissions show that leakage is not universal or catastrophic but forms a continuum of low-to-moderate fluxes that depend on isolation integrity and environmental attenuation. Materials research has constrained the conditions under which Portland cements exhibit self-sealing and non-sealing behaviors, and has identified the impact of geomechanical properties, non-uniform pathway apertures, multi-phase flow, and impurities in the CO 2 stream, on leakage pathways as important new areas for investigation. GCS projects at brownfield sites have inspired the creation of new workflows that integrate various tools and technologies to manage legacy well leakage risks. GCS implementation has also motivated a push towards scenario-based well modeling that directly informs permit applications. These advances inspire new research questions for the coming decade, particularly around the level of legacy well leakage risk that is environmentally acceptable and tolerable to stakeholders when sequestering millions of tonnes of CO 2 annually.

Carbon capture and storage↗

Validated Feasibility Study of Integrally Stiffened Metallic Fuselage Panels for Reducing Manufacturing Costs

The continual need to reduce airframe cost and the emergence of high speed machining and other manufacturing technologies has brought about a renewed interest in large-scale integral structures for aircraft applications. Applications have been inhibited, however, because of the need to demonstrate damage tolerance, and by cost and manufacturing risks associated with the size and complexity of the parts. The Integral Airframe Structures (IAS) Program identified a feasible integrally stiffened fuselage concept and evaluated performance and manufacturing cost compared to conventional designs. An integral skin/stiffener concept was produced both by plate hog-out and near-net extrusion. Alloys evaluated included 7050-T7451 plate, 7050-T74511 extrusion, 6013-T6511 extrusion, and 7475-T7351 plate. Mechanical properties, structural details, and joint performance were evaluated as well as repair, static compression, and two-bay crack residual strength panels. Crack turning behavior was characterized through panel tests and improved methods for predicting crack turning were developed. Manufacturing cost was evaluated using COSTRAN. A hybrid design, made from high-speed machined extruded frames that are mechanically fastened to high-speed machined plate skin/stringer panels, was identified as the most cost-effective manufacturing solution. Recurring labor and material costs of the hybrid design are up to 61 percent less than the current technology baseline.

Pettit, R. G.↗

Requirements Flowdown for Prognostics and Health Management

Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) principles have considerable promise to change the game of lifecycle cost of engineering systems at high safety levels by providing a reliable estimate of future system states. This estimate is a key for planning and decision making in an operational setting. While technology solutions have made considerable advances, the tie-in into the systems engineering process is lagging behind, which delays fielding of PHM-enabled systems. The derivation of specifications from high level requirements for algorithm performance to ensure quality predictions is not well developed. From an engineering perspective some key parameters driving the requirements for prognostics performance include: (1) maximum allowable Probability of Failure (PoF) of the prognostic system to bound the risk of losing an asset, (2) tolerable limits on proactive maintenance to minimize missed opportunity of asset usage, (3) lead time to specify the amount of advanced warning needed for actionable decisions, and (4) required confidence to specify when prognosis is sufficiently good to be used. This paper takes a systems engineering view towards the requirements specification process and presents a method for the flowdown process. A case study based on an electric Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (e-UAV) scenario demonstrates how top level requirements for performance, cost, and safety flow down to the health management level and specify quantitative requirements for prognostic algorithm performance.

video acuity↗

Space Shuttle critical function audit

A large fault-tolerance model of the main propulsion system of the US space shuttle has been developed. This model is being used to identify single components and pairs of components that will cause loss of shuttle critical functions. In addition, this model is the basis for risk quantification of the shuttle. The process used to develop and analyze the model is digraph matrix analysis (DMA). The DMA modeling and analysis process is accessed via a graphics-based computer user interface. This interface provides coupled display of the integrated system schematics, the digraph models, the component database, and the results of the fault tolerance and risk analyses.

Sacks, Ivan J.↗

Electromagnetic Radiation Effects on MgO-Based Magnetic Tunnel Junctions: A Review

Magnetic tunnel junctions (MTJs) have been widely utilized in sensitive sensors, magnetic memory, and logic gates due to their tunneling magnetoresistance. Moreover, these MTJ devices have promising potential for renewable energy generation and storage. Compared with Si-based devices, MTJs are more tolerant to electromagnetic radiation. In this review, we summarize the functionalities of MgO-based MTJ devices under different electromagnetic irradiation environments, with a focus on gamma-ray radiation. We explore the effects of these radiation exposures on the MgO tunnel barriers, magnetic layers, and interfaces to understand the origin of their tolerance. This review enhances our knowledge of the radiation tolerance of MgO-based MTJs, improves the design of these MgO-based MTJ devices with better tolerances, and provides information to minimize the risks of irradiation under various irradiation environments. This review starts with an introduction to MTJs and irradiation backgrounds, followed by the fundamental properties of MTJ materials, such as the MgO barrier and magnetic layers. Then, we review and discuss the MTJ materials and devices’ radiation tolerances under different irradiation environments, including high-energy cosmic radiation, gamma-ray radiation, and lower-energy electromagnetic radiation (X-ray, UV–vis, infrared, microwave, and radiofrequency electromagnetic radiation). In conclusion, we summarize the radiation effects based on the published literature, which might benefit material design and protection.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

Damage Tolerance Testing of a NASA TransHab Derivative Woven Inflatable Module

Current options for Lunar habitat architecture include inflatable habitats and airlocks. Inflatable structures can have mass and volume advantages over conventional structures. Inflatable structures are perceived to carry additional risk because they are at a lower Technical Readiness Level (TRL) than conventional metallic structures. One of the risks associated with inflatable structures is understanding the tolerance to component damage and the resulting behavior of the system after the damage is introduced. The Damage Tolerance Test (DTT) is designed to study the structural integrity of an expandable structure during and subsequent to induced damage. The TransHab Project developed an experimental inflatable module developed at Johnson Space Center in the 1990's. The TransHab design was originally envisioned for use in Mars Transits but was also studied as a potential habitat for the International Space Station (ISS). The design of the TransHab module was based on a woven design using an Aramid fabric. Testing of this design demonstrated a high level of predictability and repeatability and good correlation with analytical predictions of stresses and deflections. Based on JSC's experience with the design and analysis of woven inflatable structures, the Damage Tolerance Test article was designed and fabricated using a woven design. The Damage Tolerance Test Article consists of a load bearing restraint layer, a bladder or gas barrier, and a structural metallic core. The test article restraint layer is fabricated from one inch wide Kevlar webbing that is woven in a basket weave pattern. Underneath the structural restraint layer is the bladder or gas barrier. For this test the bladder was required to maintain pressure for testing only and was not representative of a flight design. The bladder and structural restraint layer attach to the structural core of the module at steel bulkheads at each end. The two bulkheads are separated by a 10 foot center tube which provides the structural support for the module when in a non-inflated state as well as resists a portion of the axial load when pressurized. The longitudinal members of the structural restraint layer are attached to the bulkheads using a series of clevises that are bolted to the bulkheads. Strain gages are placed on the clevises that can measure change in load when the structural restraint is inflated. The test module is 88 inches in diameter and 120 inches in height. The objectives of the DTT are to (1) verify the structural integrity of the assembled and pressurized structure when a section of the structural restraint layer is cut by a foreign object, and (2) verify the load distribution of the structural restraint layer during pressurization, before and after the structural restraint layer is severed. For this test, a longitudinal structural restraint strap will be severed using a linear shape charge. The linear shape charge was designed specifically for this application to cut only a single longitudinal strap, while not damaging the bladder. An array of strain gages were located at the bulkhead mounted clevises where the longitudinal restraint layer straps are attached. The DTT article was inflated to 45 psig, 25% of the ultimate design pressure, and one of the one-inch wide longitudinal structural members was severed. Strain gage measurements of loading in an array of longitudinal straps were taken throughout pressurization of the module to 45 psig, before firing of the linear shape charge, and after firing of the shape charge and separation of the strap. During testing not only were the original objectives met but better than expected results occurred. This paper will discuss space inflatable structures, damage tolerance analysis, test results, and applicability to the Lunar architecture.

Edgecombe, John↗

Total Power Factor Smart Contract with Cyber Grid Guard Using Distributed Ledger Technology for Electrical Utility Grid with Customer-Owned Wind Farm

In modern electrical grids, the numbers of customer-owned distributed energy resources (DERs) have increased, and consequently, so have the numbers of points of common coupling (PCC) between the electrical grid and customer-owned DERs. The disruptive operation of and out-of-tolerance outputs from DERs, especially owned DERs, present a risk to power system operations. A common protective measure is to use relays located at the PCC to isolate poorly behaving or out-of-tolerance DERs from the grid. Ensuring the integrity of the data from these relays at the PCC is vital, and blockchain technology could enhance the security of modern electrical grids by providing an accurate means to translate operational constraints into actions/commands for relays. This study demonstrates an advanced power system application solution using distributed ledger technology (DLT) with smart contracts to manage the relay operation at the PCC. The smart contract defines the allowable total power factor (TPF) of the DER output, and the terms of the smart contract are implemented using DLT with a Cyber Grid Guard (CGG) system for a customer-owned DER (wind farm). This article presents flowcharts for the TPF smart contract implemented by the CGG using DLT. The test scenarios were implemented using a real-time simulator containing a CGG system and relay in-the-loop. The data collected from the CGG system were used to execute the TPF smart contract. The desired TPF limits on the grid-side were between +0.9 and +1.0, and the operation of the breakers in the electrical grid and DER sides was controlled by the relay consistent with the provisions of the smart contract. The events from the real-time simulator, CGG, and relay showed a successful implementation of the TPF smart contract with CGG using DLT, proving the efficacy of this approach in general for implementing electrical grid applications for utilities with connections to customer-owned DERs.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Damage Tolerance Testing of a NASA TransHab Derivative Woven Inflatable Module

Current options for Lunar habitat architecture include inflatable habitats and airlocks. Inflatable structures can have mass and volume advantages over conventional structures. However, inflatable structures carry different inherent risks and are at a lower Technical Readiness Level (TRL) than more conventional metallic structures. One of the risks associated with inflatable structures is in understanding the tolerance to induced damage. The Damage Tolerance Test (DTT) is designed to study the structural integrity of an expandable structure. TransHab (Figure 1) was an experimental inflatable module developed at the NASA/Johnson Space Center in the 1990 s. The TransHab design was originally envisioned for use in Mars Transits but was also studied as a potential habitat for the International Space Station (ISS). The design of the TransHab module was based on a woven design using an Aramid fabric. Testing of this design demonstrated a high level of predictability and repeatability with analytical predictions of stresses and deflections. Based on JSC s experience with the design and analysis of woven inflatable structures, the Damage Tolerance Test article was designed and fabricated using a woven design. The DTT article was inflated to 45 psig, representing 25% of the ultimate burst pressure, and one of the one-inch wide longitudinal structural members was severed by initiating a Linear Shaped Charge (LSC). Strain gage measurements, at the interface between the expandable elements (straps) and the nonexpandable metallic elements for pre-selected longitudinal straps, were taken throughout pressurization of the module and strap separation. Strain gage measurements show no change in longitudinal strap loading at the bulkhead interface after strap separation indicating loads in the restraint layer were re-distributed local to the damaged area due to the effects of friction under high internal pressure loading. The test completed all primary objectives with better than expected results. This paper will discuss space inflatable structures, damage tolerance analysis, test results, and applicability to the Lunar architecture.

Edgecombe, John↗

Preparing for Mars: the physiologic and medical challenges

As the twentieth century closes, retrospectives cite the Apollo moon missions as one of the important events of the past 100 years. A trip to Mars, however, would be even more challenging and significant. A round-trip Mars journey would require nearly three years away from Earth, a significant leap in complexity compared to the two week long Moon trips or the record-breaking fourteen-month flight on Mir. What would be the physiologic and medical challenges of a Mars flight? Two key areas of physiology present the greatest potential problems--calcium metabolism and radiation exposure. Data from Mir missions show that bone loss continues in space despite an aggressive countermeasure program. Average losses were 0.35% per month, but some load bearing areas lost >1% per month. A 1% loss rate, if it continued unabated for 30 months, could produce osteoporosis. Smaller losses could still increase fracture risk. Some bone loss can be well tolerated, particularly if the bone can be regained after the mission. But the effectiveness of post-flight rehabilitation to restore the density and quality of bone after spaceflight is not well known. Bone loss estimates are based on continuous weightlessness exposure, but this is not a requirement for a Mars trip. Most of the time on a Mars trip will be spent in the 1/3 Earth's gravity environment on Mars, and either intermittent or continuous artificial gravity can be provided for the transit between planets (although at an engineering cost). The dosing of the gravity exposure (e.g. the level and duration), however, has not been established. Radiation protection also requires a balance between engineering cost and human health. Excessive shielding could add billions of dollars to the cost of a mission. Trips in interplanetary space, however, expose the crew to heavy high-energy particles from cosmic rays (HZE particles), which have a high linear energy transfer. This high energy leads to significant biological damage (e.g. chromosomal aberrations, cancer induction). A recent report from the Committee on Space Biology and Medicine notes that only one systematic study of cancer induction from high-energy particles has been conducted (using the mouse Harderian gland). Predictions of cancer risk and acceptable radiation exposure in space are extrapolated from minimal data. Other areas of physiology also present problems, such as muscle loss, cardiovascular deconditioning, and vestibular adaptation. Despite all the issues, however, a focussed, aggressive research program that uses the resources of the International Space Station should pave the way for mankind's greatest adventure--a trip to Mars.

STS-90 Shuttle Project↗

ByzSec — A Multi-layered Byzantine Resilient Architecture for Bulk Power System Protective Relays

Reliability, selectivity, and sensitivity are the fundamental attributes of any protection system, acting as the main drivers in the selection of schemes, and equipment. In high-voltage systems, microprocessor-based relays represent the industry’s preferred solution, providing engineers with a vast array of benefits. However, they remain vulnerable to cybersecurity events that may compromise their functionality. To help mitigate against potential cybersecurity risks, this paper presents a fault-tolerant, Byzantine Resilient (BR) architecture that significantly increases the cybersecurity attributes of a protection system while minimizing the amount of performance impacts and integration overheads introduced. The solution relies on an array of independent relays that utilize robust consensus methods (based on Spire [1], [2]) to ensure correct system behavior is achieved even when a relay has been compromised. Furthermore, the solution has been complemented with a custom-built Situational Awareness engine that can be used to detect and identify potential threats. The implemented solution has been developed in consultation with three hardware vendors and has been tested to comply with the performance requirements of a 345kV differential protection scheme (87T). The results indicate that the proposed architecture is a comprehensive solution that: supports the strict correctness and performance requirements of the bulk power grid while providing a cost-effective alternative that offers a seamless, long-term solution.

byzantine security, Fault Tolerant Application Sof↗

NASA Battery Working Group - 2007-2008: Battery Task Summary Report

This presentation provides a summary of the 2007-2008 NASA Battery Working Group efforts completed in support of the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC). The effort covered a series of pro-active tasks that address the following: Binding Procurements -- guidelines related to requirements for the battery system that should be considered at the time of contract award Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries -- issues/strategies for effective storage and impact of long-term storage on performance and life Generic Guidelines for Lithium-ion Safety, Handling and Qualification -- Standardized approaches developed and risk assessments (1) Lithium-ion Performance Assessment -- survey of manufacturers and capabilities to meet mission needs. Guidelines document generated (2) Conditions Required for using Pouch Cells in Aerospace Missions -- focus on corrosion, thermal excursions and long-term performance issues. Document defining requirements to maintain performance and life (3) High Voltage Risk Assessment -- focus on safety and abuse tolerance of battery module assemblies. Recommendations of features required for safe implementation (4) Procedure for Determination of Safe Charge Rates -- evaluation of various cell chemistries and recommendation of safe operating regimes for specific cell designs

Manzo, Michelle↗

NASA System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Workshop Report

On March 9-11, 2022, NASA’s System-Wide Safety Wildland Firefighting Operations Workshop engaged the broader wildland firefighting management ecosystem in a safety-oriented discussion via a virtual platform. This enabled a better understanding of how NASA and community expertise can be leveraged in the safe development of current and future firefighting systems and operations. The goals of the workshop were to: (1) identify and prioritize the top safety-oriented risks, gaps in capabilities, and emerging technologies to enhance wildland firefighting for both near-term and far-term concepts, with a specific focus on aviation operations and (2) engage the stakeholder community in defining emergent safety-oriented scope, roles, responsibilities, and procedures for agents undergoing increasingly complex wildland firefighting operations in information-rich, but uncertain environments. Workshop participants were solicited from wildland firefighting stakeholders across government, industry, and academia. All levels of government were engaged, as NASA sought attendees from federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies. Industry participants from traditional wildland firefighting domains such as data visualization and equipment manufacturers were invited, and corporate attendees from novel application domains such as aerial robotics and autonomous systems were present as well. The top three findings were as follows: (1) Enhancing situation awareness is a safety priority, especially in the use of aerial assets; (2) Timely access to information along with data fusion and integrated displays will enhance safety-critical decision-making both inside and outside aviation contexts; and (3) Tailorable standards and common operating pictures in the field will enhance inter-agency cooperation in the wildland firefighting lifecycle and enable the optimal use of limited resources such as aerial assets. The workshop helped inform NASA of the relevant safety-related wildland firefighting concerns and aided the broader ecosystem in understanding the potential safety-oriented role NASA might play in this community. Increased engagement with crucial governmental stakeholders (e.g., U.S. Forest Service, CAL FIRE, etc.) along with industry partners in cutting- edge information -centric domains is a fundamental next step. Additionally, the workshop findings will help define the first of a series of operationally challenging demonstrations, held in concert with strategic ecosystem partners, known as the Safety Demonstrator Series for NASA’s System-Wide Safety project. The first demonstration is set in the wildland firefighting application domain and will: (1) examine high risk operational scenarios to reduce their overall risk via services, functions or capabilities that act as risk mitigators (or transfer that risk to automated systems better able to tolerate it) and (2) explore novel tools and technologies that will enhance safety margins by enabling non-traditional or neoteric operational paradigms.

wildland firefighting↗