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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1985

Satellite voice broadcast. Volume 1: Executive summary

An Executive Summary of the Satellite Voice Broadcast System Study designs are synthesized for direct sound broadcast satellite systems for HF-, VHF-, and Ku-bands. Methods are developed and used to predict satellite weight, volume, and RF performance for the various concepts considered. Cost and schedule risk assessments are performed to predict time and cost required to implement selected concepts. Technology assessments and tradeoffs are made to identify critical enabling technologies that require development to bring technical risk to acceptable levels for full scale development.

Bachtell, E. E.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Satellite voice broadcast. Volume 2: System study

The Technical Volume of the Satellite Broadcast System Study is presented. Designs are synthesized for direct sound broadcast satellite systems for HF-, VHF-, L-, and Ku-bands. Methods are developed and used to predict satellite weight, volume, and RF performance for the various concepts considered. Cost and schedule risk assessments are performed to predict time and cost required to implement selected concepts. Technology assessments and tradeoffs are made to identify critical enabling technologies that require development to bring technical risk to acceptable levels for full scale development.

Bachtell, E. E.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) for the Space Transportation System (STS) systems study. Volume 1: Executive summary

The feasibility of replacing the Space Transportation System (STS) Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) with Liquid Rocket Boosters (LRBs) was studied. Feasibility required acceptable technical risk, program costs, and a program plan which supports STS requirements. Three major goals were identified to direct booster design and operation: increased STS safety and reliability; STS/LRB integration with minimum impact; and increased STS performance. Two booster engine designs were studied. The first engine design was a turbopump-fed engine with state-of-the-art design, and the second was a pressure-fed engine which might provide a lower cost alternative to the pump-fed concept. Both booster concepts were carried through to completion of conceptual design and all system impacts and program costs were identified. Applications for LRB use in the Advanced Launch System (ALS) program were studied using the pump-fed LRB baseline concept and variations on the baseline concept. Support for the Pressure-Fed Booster Test Bed (PFBTB) included test program planning and costs and technical support.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2000

NASA's Integrated Space Transportation Plan

Improvements in the safety, reliability and affordability of current and future space transportation systems must be achieved if NASA is to perform its mission and if the U.S. space industry is to reach its full commercial potential. In response to Presidential Policy in 1994, NASA, working with our industrial partners, initiated several efforts including the X-33, X-34, X-37 and Advanced Space Transportation programs with the goal of demonstrating the technologies that could enable these goals. We have learned that emerging technologies will enable the needed advancements but that more development along multiple, competing paths is needed. We have learned that developing requirements diligently and in partnership with industry will allow us to better converge with commercial capabilities. We have learned that commercial markets are not growing as fast as projected earlier, but there are still possibilities in the near-term to pursue alternate paths that can make access to space more robust. The goal of transitioning NASA's space transportation needs to commercial launch vehicles remains the key aim of our efforts and will require additional investment to reduce business and technical risks to acceptable levels.

Cook, Stephen A.↗
NASA NTRS1999

A Summary fo Solar Sail Technology Developments and Proposed Demonstration Missions

NASA's drive to reduce mission costs and accept the risk of incorporating innovative, high payoff technologies into it's missions while simultaneously undertaking ever more difficult missions has sparked a greatly renewed interest in solar sails. From virtually no technology or flight mission studies activity three years ago solar sails are now included in NOAA, NASA, DOD, DLR, ESA and ESTEC technology development programs and technology roadmaps. NASA programs include activities at Langley Research Center, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, and the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts; NOAA has received funding for a proposed solar sail mission; DLR is designing and fabricating a 20-m laboratory model sail, there are four demonstration missions under study at industry, NASA, DOD and Europe, two new text books on solar sailing were recently published and one new test book is planned. This paper summarizes these on-going developments in solar sails.

Garner, Charles↗
NASA NTRS2003

PEM-INST-001: Instructions for Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuit (PEM) Selection, Screening, and Qualification

Potential users of plastic encapsulated microcircuits (PEMs) need to be reminded that unlike the military system of producing robust high-reliability microcircuits that are designed to perform acceptably in a variety of harsh environments, PEMs are primarily designed for use in benign environments where equipment is easily accessed for repair or replacement. The methods of analysis applied to military products to demonstrate high reliability cannot always be applied to PEMs. This makes it difficult for users to characterize PEMs for two reasons: 1. Due to the major differences in design and construction, the standard test practices used to ensure that military devices are robust and have high reliability often cannot be applied to PEMs that have a smaller operating temperature range and are typically more frail and susceptible to moisture absorption. In contrast, high-reliability military microcircuits usually utilize large, robust, high-temperature packages that are hermetically sealed. 2. Unlike the military high-reliability system, users of PEMs have little visibility into commercial manufacturers proprietary design, materials, die traceability, and production processes and procedures. There is no central authority that monitors PEM commercial product for quality, and there are no controls in place that can be imposed across all commercial manufacturers to provide confidence to high-reliability users that a common acceptable level of quality exists for all PEMs manufacturers. Consequently, there is no guaranteed control over the type of reliability that is built into commercial product, and there is no guarantee that different lots from the same manufacturer are equally acceptable. And regarding application, there is no guarantee that commercial products intended for use in benign environments will provide acceptable performance and reliability in harsh space environments. The qualification and screening processes contained in this document are intended to detect poor-quality lots and screen out early random failures from use in space flight hardware. However, since it cannot be guaranteed that quality was designed and built into PEMs that are appropriate for space applications, users cannot screen in quality that may not exist. It must be understood that due to the variety of materials, processes, and technologies used to design and produce PEMs, this test process may not accelerate and detect all failure mechanisms. While the tests herein will increase user confidence that PEMs with otherwise unknown reliability can be used in space environments, such testing may not guarantee the same level of reliability offered by military microcircuits. PEMs should only be used where due to performance needs there are no alternatives in the military high-reliability market, and projects are willing to accept higher risk.

Teverovsky, Alexander↗
NASA NTRS1999

Preparing for Mars: the physiologic and medical challenges

As the twentieth century closes, retrospectives cite the Apollo moon missions as one of the important events of the past 100 years. A trip to Mars, however, would be even more challenging and significant. A round-trip Mars journey would require nearly three years away from Earth, a significant leap in complexity compared to the two week long Moon trips or the record-breaking fourteen-month flight on Mir. What would be the physiologic and medical challenges of a Mars flight? Two key areas of physiology present the greatest potential problems--calcium metabolism and radiation exposure. Data from Mir missions show that bone loss continues in space despite an aggressive countermeasure program. Average losses were 0.35% per month, but some load bearing areas lost >1% per month. A 1% loss rate, if it continued unabated for 30 months, could produce osteoporosis. Smaller losses could still increase fracture risk. Some bone loss can be well tolerated, particularly if the bone can be regained after the mission. But the effectiveness of post-flight rehabilitation to restore the density and quality of bone after spaceflight is not well known. Bone loss estimates are based on continuous weightlessness exposure, but this is not a requirement for a Mars trip. Most of the time on a Mars trip will be spent in the 1/3 Earth's gravity environment on Mars, and either intermittent or continuous artificial gravity can be provided for the transit between planets (although at an engineering cost). The dosing of the gravity exposure (e.g. the level and duration), however, has not been established. Radiation protection also requires a balance between engineering cost and human health. Excessive shielding could add billions of dollars to the cost of a mission. Trips in interplanetary space, however, expose the crew to heavy high-energy particles from cosmic rays (HZE particles), which have a high linear energy transfer. This high energy leads to significant biological damage (e.g. chromosomal aberrations, cancer induction). A recent report from the Committee on Space Biology and Medicine notes that only one systematic study of cancer induction from high-energy particles has been conducted (using the mouse Harderian gland). Predictions of cancer risk and acceptable radiation exposure in space are extrapolated from minimal data. Other areas of physiology also present problems, such as muscle loss, cardiovascular deconditioning, and vestibular adaptation. Despite all the issues, however, a focussed, aggressive research program that uses the resources of the International Space Station should pave the way for mankind's greatest adventure--a trip to Mars.

STS-90 Shuttle Project↗
NASA NTRS2007

Implementation of Leak Test Methods for the International Space Station (ISS) Elements, Systems and Components

The International Space Station (ISS has Qualification and Acceptance Environmental Test Requirements document, SSP 41172 that includes many environmental tests such as Thermal vacuum & Cycling, Depress/Repress, Sinusoidal, Random, and Acoustic Vibration, Pyro Shock, Acceleration, Humidity, Pressure, Electromatic Interference (EMI)/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMCO), etc. This document also includes (13) leak test methods for Pressure Integrity Verification of the ISS Elements, Systems, and Components. These leak test methods are well known, however, the test procedure for specific leak test method shall be written and implemented paying attention to the important procedural steps/details that, if omitted or deviated, could impact the quality of the final product and affect the crew safety. Such procedural steps/details for different methods include, but not limited to: - Sequence of testing, f or example, pressurization and submersion steps for Method I (Immersion); - Stabilization of the mass spectrometer leak detector outputs fo r Method II (vacuum Chamber or Bell jar); - Proper data processing an d taking a conservative approach while making predictions for on-orbit leakage rate for Method III(Pressure Change); - Proper Calibration o f the mass spectrometer leak detector for all the tracer gas (mostly Helium) Methods such as Method V (Detector Probe), Method VI (Hood), Method VII (Tracer Probe), Method VIII(Accumulation); - Usage of visibl ility aides for Method I (Immersion), Method IV (Chemical Indicator), Method XII (Foam/Liquid Application), and Method XIII (Hydrostatic/Visual Inspection); While some methods could be used for the total leaka ge (either internal-to-external or external-to-internal) rate requirement verification (Vacuum Chamber, Pressure Decay, Hood, Accumulation), other methods shall be used only as a pass/fail test for individual joints (e.g., welds, fittings, and plugs) or for troubleshooting purposes (Chemical Indicator, Detector Probe, Tracer Probe, Local Vacuum Chamber, Foam/Liquid Application, and Hydrostatic/Visual Inspection). Any isolation of SSP 41172 requirements have led to either retesting of hardware or accepting a risk associated with the potential system or component pressure integrity problem during flight.

Underwood, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2005

Probabilistic Reasoning for Plan Robustness

A planning system must reason about the uncertainty of continuous variables in order to accurately project the possible system state over time. A method is devised for directly reasoning about the uncertainty in continuous activity duration and resource usage for planning problems. By representing random variables as parametric distributions, computing projected system state can be simplified in some cases. Common approximation and novel methods are compared for over-constrained and lightly constrained domains. The system compares a few common approximation methods for an iterative repair planner. Results show improvements in robustness over the conventional non-probabilistic representation by reducing the number of constraint violations witnessed by execution. The improvement is more significant for larger problems and problems with higher resource subscription levels but diminishes as the system is allowed to accept higher risk levels.

autonomous planning↗
NASA NTRS2009

Occupant Protection during Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle Landings

The constellation program is evaluating current vehicle design capabilities for nominal water landings and contingency land landings of the Orion Crew Exploration vehicle. The Orion Landing Strategy tiger team was formed to lead the technical effort for which associated activities include the current vehicle design, susceptibility to roll control and tip over, reviewing methods for assessing occupant injury during ascent / aborts /landings, developing an alternate seat/attenuation design solution which improves occupant protection and operability, and testing the seat/attenuation system designs to ensure valid results. The EVA physiology, systems and Performance (EPSP) project is leading the effort under the authority of the Tiger Team Steering committee to develop, verify, validate and accredit biodynamics models using a variety of crash and injury databases including NASCAR, Indy Car and military aircraft. The validated biodynamics models will be used by the Constellation program to evaluate a variety of vehicle, seat and restraint designs in the context of multiple nominal and off-nominal landing scenarios. The models will be used in conjunction with Acceptable Injury Risk definitions to provide new occupant protection requirements for the Constellation Program.

Gernhardt, Michael L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Constellation Program: Lessons Learned: Executive Summary - Volume 1

This document (Volume I) provides an executive summary of the lessons learned from the Constellation Program. A companion Volume II provides more detailed analyses for those seeking further insight and information. In this volume, Section 1.0 introduces the approach in preparing and organizing the content to enable rapid assimilation of the lessons. Section 2.0 describes the contextual framework in which the Constellation Program was formulated and functioned that is necessary to understand most of the lessons. Context of a former program may seem irrelevant in the heady days of new program formulation. However, readers should take some time to understand the context. Many of the lessons would be different in a different context, so the reader should reflect on the similarities and differences in his or her current circumstances. Section 3.0 summarizes key findings developed from the significant lessons learned at the program level that appear in Section 4.0. Readers can use the key findings in Section 3.0 to peruse for particular topics, and will find more supporting detail and analyses in Section 4.0 in a topical format. Appendix A contains a white paper describing the Constellation Program formulation that may be of use to readers wanting more context or background information. The reader will no doubt recognize some very similar themes from previous lessons learned, blue-ribbon committee reviews, National Academy reviews, and advisory panel reviews for this and other large-scale human spaceflight programs; including Apollo, Space Shuttle, Shuttle/Mir, and the ISS. This could represent an inability to learn lessons from previous generations; however, it is more likely that similar challenges persist in the Agency structure and approach to program formulation, budget advocacy, and management. Perhaps the greatest value of these Constellation lessons learned can be found in viewing them in context with these previous efforts to guide and advise the Agency and its stakeholders.

Constellation Program↗
NASA NTRS2012

Benchmarking Evaluation Results for Prototype Extravehicular Activity Gloves

The Space Suit Assembly (SSA) Development Team at NASA Johnson Space Center has invested heavily in the advancement of rear-entry planetary exploration suit design but largely deferred development of extravehicular activity (EVA) glove designs, and accepted the risk of using the current flight gloves, Phase VI, for unique mission scenarios outside the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) Program realm of experience. However, as design reference missions mature, the risks of using heritage hardware have highlighted the need for developing robust new glove technologies. To address the technology gap, the NASA Game-Changing Technology group provided start-up funding for the High Performance EVA Glove (HPEG) Project in the spring of 2012. The overarching goal of the HPEG Project is to develop a robust glove design that increases human performance during EVA and creates pathway for future implementation of emergent technologies, with specific aims of increasing pressurized mobility to 60% of barehanded capability, increasing the durability by 100%, and decreasing the potential of gloves to cause injury during use. The HPEG Project focused initial efforts on identifying potential new technologies and benchmarking the performance of current state of the art gloves to identify trends in design and fit leading to establish standards and metrics against which emerging technologies can be assessed at both the component and assembly levels. The first of the benchmarking tests evaluated the quantitative mobility performance and subjective fit of four prototype gloves developed by Flagsuit LLC, Final Frontier Designs, LLC Dover, and David Clark Company as compared to the Phase VI. All of the companies were asked to design and fabricate gloves to the same set of NASA provided hand measurements (which corresponded to a single size of Phase Vi glove) and focus their efforts on improving mobility in the metacarpal phalangeal and carpometacarpal joints. Four test subjects representing the design ]to hand anthropometry completed range of motion, grip/pinch strength, dexterity, and fit evaluations for each glove design in both the unpressurized and pressurized conditions. This paper provides a comparison of the test results along with a detailed description of hardware and test methodologies used.

Aitchison, Lindsay↗
NASA NTRS2012

Development of Human System Integration at NASA

Human Systems Integration seeks to design systems around the capabilities and limitations of the humans which use and interact with the system, ensuring greater efficiency of use, reduced error rates, and less rework in the design, manufacturing and operational deployment of hardware and software. One of the primary goals of HSI is to get the human factors practitioner involved early in the design process. In doing so, the aim is to reduce future budget costs and resources in redesign and training. By the preliminary design phase of a project nearly 80% of the total cost of the project is locked in. Potential design changes recommended by evaluations past this point will have little effect due to lack of funding or a huge cost in terms of resources to make changes. Three key concepts define an effective HSI program. First, systems are comprised of hardware, software, and the human, all of which operate within an environment. Too often, engineers and developers fail to consider the human capacity or requirements as part of the system. This leads to poor task allocation within the system. To promote ideal task allocation, it is critical that the human element be considered early in system development. Poor design, or designs that do not adequately consider the human component, could negatively affect physical or mental performance, as well as, social behavior. Second, successful HSI depends upon integration and collaboration of all the domains that represent acquisition efforts. Too often, these domains exist as independent disciplines due to the location of expertise within the service structure. Proper implementation of HSI through participation would help to integrate these domains and disciplines to leverage and apply their interdependencies to attain an optimal design. Via this process domain interests can be integrated to perform effective HSI through trade-offs and collaboration. This provides a common basis upon which to make knowledgeable decisions. Finally, HSI must be considered early in the requirements development phase of system design and acquisition. This will provide the best opportunity to maximize return on investment (ROI) and system performance. HSI requirements must be developed in conjunction with capability ]based requirements generation through functional. HSI requirements will drive HSI metrics and embed HSI issues within the system design. After a system is designed, implementation of HSI oversights can be very expensive. An HSI program should be included as an integral part of a total system approach to vehicle and habitat development. This would include, but not limited to, workstation design, D&C development, volumetric analysis, training, operations, and human -robotic interaction. HSI is a necessary process for Human Space Flight programs to meet the Agency Human ]System standards and thus mitigate human risks to acceptable levels. NASA has been involved in HSI planning, procedures development, process, and implementation for many years, and has been building several internal and publicly accessible products to facilitate HSI fs inclusion in the NASA Systems Engineering Lifecycle. Some of these products include: NASA STD 3001 Volumes 1 and 2, Human Integration Design Handbook, NASA HSI Implementation Plan, NASA HSI Implementation Plan Templates, NASA HSI Implementation Handbook, and a 2 ]hour short course on HSI delivered as part of the NASA Space and Life Sciences Directorate Academy. These products have been created leveraging industry best practices and lessons learned from other Federal Government agencies.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗
NASA NTRS2014

iPAS: AES Flight System Technology Maturation for Human Spaceflight

In order to realize the vision of expanding human presence in space, NASA will develop new technologies that can enable future crewed spacecraft to go far beyond Earth orbit. These technologies must be matured to the point that future project managers can accept the risk of incorporating them safely and effectively within integrated spacecraft systems, to satisfy very challenging mission requirements. The technologies must also be applied and managed within an operational context that includes both on-board crew and mission support on Earth. The Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Program is one part of the NASA strategy to identify and develop key capabilities for human spaceflight, and mature them for future use. To support this initiative, the Integrated Power Avionics and Software (iPAS) environment has been developed that allows engineers, crew, and flight operators to mature promising technologies into applicable capabilities, and to assess the value of these capabilities within a space mission context. This paper describes the development of the integration environment to support technology maturation and risk reduction, and offers examples of technology and mission demonstrations executed to date.

Othon, William L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

An Approach for Performance Assessments of Extravehicular Activity Gloves

The Space Suit Assembly (SSA) Development Team at NASA Johnson Space Center has invested heavily in the advancement of rear‐entry planetary exploration suit design but largely deferred development of extravehicular activity (EVA) glove designs, and accepted the risk of using the current flight gloves, Phase VI, for unique mission scenarios outside the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) Program realm of experience. However, as design reference missions mature, the risks of using heritage hardware have highlighted the need for developing robust new glove technologies. To address the technology gap, the NASA Game‐Changing Technology group provided start‐up funding for the High Performance EVA Glove (HPEG) Project in the spring of 2012. The overarching goal of the HPEG Project is to develop a robust glove design that increases human performance during EVA and creates pathway for future implementation of emergent technologies, with specific aims of increasing pressurized mobility to 60% of barehanded capability, increasing the durability by 100%, and decreasing the potential of gloves to cause injury during use. The HPEG Project focused initial efforts on identifying potential new technologies and benchmarking the performance of current state of the art gloves to identify trends in design and fit leading to establish standards and metrics against which emerging technologies can be assessed at both the component and assembly levels. The first of the benchmarking tests evaluated the quantitative mobility performance and subjective fit of two sets of prototype EVA gloves developed ILC Dover and David Clark Company as compared to the Phase VI. Both companies were asked to design and fabricate gloves to the same set of NASA provided hand measurements (which corresponded to a single size of Phase Vi glove) and focus their efforts on improving mobility in the metacarpal phalangeal and carpometacarpal joints. Four test subjects representing the design‐to hand anthropometry completed range of motion, grip/pinch strength, dexterity, and fit evaluations for each glove design in pressurized conditions, with and without thermal micrometeoroid garments (TMG) installed. This paper provides a detailed description of hardware and test methodologies used and lessons learned.

Aitchison, Lindsay↗
NASA NTRS2015

An Approach for Performance Based Glove Mobility Requirements

The Space Suit Assembly (SSA) Development Team at NASA Johnson Space Center has invested heavily in the advancement of rear‐entry planetary exploration suit design but largely deferred development of extravehicular activity (EVA) glove designs, and accepted the risk of using the current flight gloves, Phase VI, for exploration missions. However, as design reference missions mature, the risks of using heritage hardware have highlighted the need for developing robust new glove technologies. To address the technology gap, the NASA Space Technology Mission Directorate's Game‐Changing Development Program provided start‐up funding for the High Performance EVA Glove (HPEG) Element as part of the Next Generation Life Support (NGLS) Project in the fall of 2013. The overarching goal of the HPEG Element is to develop a robust glove design that increases human performance during EVA and creates pathway for implementation of emergent technologies, with specific aims of increasing pressurized mobility to 60% of barehanded capability, increasing the durability in on‐pristine environments, and decreasing the potential of gloves to cause injury during use. The HPEG Element focused initial efforts on developing quantifiable and repeatable methodologies for assessing glove performance with respect to mobility, injury potential, thermal conductivity, and abrasion resistance. The team used these methodologies to establish requirements against which emerging technologies and glove designs can be assessed at both the component and assembly levels. The mobility performance testing methodology was an early focus for the HPEG team as it stems from collaborations between the SSA Development team and the JSC Anthropometry and Biomechanics Facility (ABF) that began investigating new methods for suited mobility and fit early in the Constellation Program. The combined HPEG and ABF team used lessons learned from the previous efforts as well as additional reviews of methodologies in physical and occupational therapy arenas to develop a protocol that assesses gloved range of motion, strength, dexterity, tactility, and fit in comparative quantitative terms and also provides qualitative insight to direct hardware design iterations. The protocol was evaluated using five experienced test subjects wearing the EMU pressurized to 4.3psid with three different glove configurations. The results of the testing are presented to illustrate where the protocol is and is not valid for benchmark comparisons. The process for requirements development based upon the results is also presented along with suggested performance values for the High Performance EVA Gloves to be procured in fiscal year 2015.

Aitchison, Lindsay↗
NASA NTRS2015

Guidelines for CubeSat's Thermal Design

Thermal and Fluids Analysis Workshop 2015, Silver Spring, MD. NCTS 19104-15. What does it take to thermally designlow cost, low mass cubesats? What are the differences in the approach when you compare with large scale missions?What additional risk is acceptable? What is the approach to hardware? How is the testing campaign run? These aresome of the questions that will be addressed in this course, which is designed to equip the attendees to support thedevelopment of cubesats at their organization.

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