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DOE OSTI2024

Quantifying Investment Risk: Analysis of the Purchase Decision of a Nuclear Power Plant

Cost overruns are an ill-fated part of the deployment history of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States, and yet studies increasingly show the important role nuclear technologies must play in decarbonizing the U.S. economy. Paradoxically, then, a key piece of a coherent decarbonization strategy depends on attracting investor action to a purchase where historical cost overruns have been sizeable. To address this challenge, this study aims to develop a financial model that quantifies risk of cost overruns in the decision-making process for purchasing advanced reactor concepts. Using the concept of Value at Risk (VaR), the model is built to evaluate financial risk nuclear construction with the aim to identify risk mitigation strategies. The objective is to identify strategies to mitigate cost-risk challenges and to assess the potential reduction in investor risk exposure. The paper presents the initial development and preliminary verification of the financial risk analysis model. The development of this model involved a comprehensive approach to estimating financial risk over the operating life of NPP that stems from construction uncertainties. By utilizing net present value (NPV) with discounted cash flows, the model captures the complex interconnections of project costs, construction timelines, revenue, and uncertainties. Verification of the model involved testing historical data from previous reactor construction projects against the construction project of Vogtle 3 and 4. The results of this paper present the comparison of the preconstruction cost overrun prediction with the current cost estimates from a nearly complete Vogtle 3 and 4.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

NASA NTRS2014

Overview of the Contributing Factor Map and How it can Support your Research

The Contributing Factor Map (CFM) is a visual representation of a taxonomy of factors influencing human health and performance in space. This presentation will give an overview of its development and its structure. It will describe various uses of the CFM that can support researchers working within the Human Research Program (HRP) Architecture of Evidence-Risk-Gap-Task-Deliverable. For example, during the Risk phase, the CFM can be used as a "menu" to help formulate a qualitative model of the factors contributing to specific consequences of concern. It provides a reference set of factors from across the operational, vehicle design, and human domains that otherwise might not be considered if approaching a risk from a specific domain perspective. Using the CFM as a reference can increase awareness of potential cross-disciplinary collaborations for overall risk mitigation. The CFM can also be used as a framework for identifying gaps in knowledge about a risk. This identification can support the subsequent development of gaps and tasks comprising the research plan aimed at risk mitigation. Examples of these types of applications of the CFM will be discussed and information on the support available to researchers in using it will be provided.

Mindock, Jennifer A.↗

NASA NTRS2016

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Prototype Biology-Based Radiation Risk Module Project

Biological effects of space radiation and risk mitigation are strategic knowledge gaps for the Evolvable Mars Campaign. The current epidemiology-based NASA Space Cancer Risk (NSCR) model contains large uncertainties (HAT #6.5a) due to lack of information on the radiobiology of galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and lack of human data. The use of experimental models that most accurately replicate the response of human tissues is critical for precision in risk projections. Our proposed study will compare DNA damage, histological, and cell kinetic parameters after irradiation in normal 2D human cells versus 3D tissue models, and it will use a multi-scale computational model (CHASTE) to investigate various biological processes that may contribute to carcinogenesis, including radiation-induced cellular signaling pathways. This cross-disciplinary work, with biological validation of an evolvable mathematical computational model, will help reduce uncertainties within NSCR and aid risk mitigation for radiation-induced carcinogenesis.

Terrier, Douglas↗

NASA NTRS2019

A Discussion of the Need to Sustain Mission Ready TPS and for Continued Development of Innovative Entry System Technologies

Flight proven entry system and TPS technologies are critical for the successful execution of in-situ science missions at Venus. Emerging new technologies point to new possibilities and offer innovative approaches to delivering small satellites for orbital science. Venus entry can be very demanding and there are only a few flight proven TPS, some developed by Industry and others by NASA, capable of meeting the mission needs. NASA developed TPS has predominately been transferred to Industry and it is assumed industry will maintain the fabrication capability. However, lack of mission needs may result in obsolence of TSP fabrication capability if there is no money and no motivation. Even within NASA, its' expertise could be diverted to higher priority objectives and thereby the readiness for particular material systems can be impacted or lost. Atrophy of capabilities can come about in other ways as well such as changes to raw materials. Even small manufacturing process changes can demand requalification and TRL may be degraded. Carbon-Phenolic is a text book example. After a long period of absence of US Venus missions, VEXG and the Science community is making the case for future missions. It is insufficient to assume the TSP technologies will be there in 5 or 10 years without active and continual planning and assessment. After Galileo, Carbon-Phenolic materials and fabrication skills were allowed to atrophy. Then when missions needed it, in early 2000, it was no longer possible to make the heritage Carbon-Phenolic. What do we need to do? The first step is to advocate for the establishment of TPS readiness assess-ment. The assessment will involve understanding threats and opportunities, and the development of risk mitigation strategies. VEXAG needs to advocate for such an active monitoring of the needed capabilities, assessment of emerging risks and development of risk mitigation strategies with implementation plans. Such an approach reduces the threat of material obsolence and helps maintain the availability of entry system and TPS technology capabilities, both old and new. Venus probes, landers, balloons and other variable altitude missions, and skimmer missions such as "Cu-pid's Arrow" as well as aerocapture missions to deliver small spacecraft require qualified entry systems and ablative TPS. VEXAG advocated for HEEET in 2013/2014 and the community is well versed with the need to sustain it. But, other TPS that need to be sustained may not be apparent to VEXAG community. The following figure summarizes the ablative TPS capabilities vs Venus mission needs for both primary heatshield and backshell.

Venkatapathy, Ethiraj↗

NASA NTRS2009

Human Research Program (HRP) Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Standing Review Panel (SRP)

The SRP believes strongly that regularly performed in-flight crew assessments are needed in order to identify a change in health status before a medical condition becomes clinically apparent. It is this early recognition in change that constitutes the foundation of the "occupational health model" expounded in the HRP Requirements Document as a key component of the HRP risk mitigation strategy that will enable its objective of "prevention and mitigation of human health and performance risks". A regular crew status examination of physiological and clinical performance is needed. This can be accomplished through instrumented monitoring of routine embedded tasks. The SRP recommends addition of a new gap to address this action under Category 3.0 Mitigate the Risk. This new gap is closely associated with Task 4.19 which addresses the lack of adequate biomedical monitoring capabilities for performing periodic clinical status evaluations and contingency medical monitoring. A corollary to these gaps is the critical emphasis on preventive medicine, not only during pre- and post-flight phases of a mission as is the current practice, but continued into the in-flight phases of exploration class missions.

Cintron, Nitza↗

NASA NTRS2008

Managing Large Scale Project Analysis Teams through a Web Accessible Database

Large scale space programs analyze thousands of requirements while mitigating safety, performance, schedule, and cost risks. These efforts involve a variety of roles with interdependent use cases and goals. For example, study managers and facilitators identify ground-rules and assumptions for a collection of studies required for a program or project milestone. Task leaders derive product requirements from the ground rules and assumptions and describe activities to produce needed analytical products. Disciplined specialists produce the specified products and load results into a file management system. Organizational and project managers provide the personnel and funds to conduct the tasks. Each role has responsibilities to establish information linkages and provide status reports to management. Projects conduct design and analysis cycles to refine designs to meet the requirements and implement risk mitigation plans. At the program level, integrated design and analysis cycles studies are conducted to eliminate every 'to-be-determined' and develop plans to mitigate every risk. At the agency level, strategic studies analyze different approaches to exploration architectures and campaigns. This paper describes a web-accessible database developed by NASA to coordinate and manage tasks at three organizational levels. Other topics in this paper cover integration technologies and techniques for process modeling and enterprise architectures.

O'Neil, Daniel A.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Top Human System Research and Technology Needs for Mars

NASA is working with industry and international partners to return humans to the moon and eventually enable a human Mars mission. Within NASA, several organizations work together to identify, prioritize, fund, execute, and operationalize the crew health and performance (CHP) research and technology development (R&D) necessary to enable these future missions. These organizations include flight programs as well as other organizations such as the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), Human Research Program, Space Technology Mission Directorate, and System Capability Leadership Teams, each of which existed for several years prior to the creation of the Moon-to-Mars (M2M) Program Office in 2023. A variety of constructs, vocabularies, and processes exist for the management of risks and strategic planning across these organizations. For example, M2M objectives, program risks, human system risks, human research gaps, capability gaps, and envisioned futures are all constructs currently used within NASA for identifying and prioritizing R&D needs. Alignment and evolution of these strategic planning constructs is ongoing and will allow for alignment and traceability between M2M objectives and R&D investments at a detailed level. While this reorganization is ongoing, and even after it is established, there is a recognized need among stakeholder organizations to identify and communicate the highest CHP R&D priorities in a unified and digestible way that synthesizes the considerations and perspectives of the CHP community across NASA. To achieve this, the HMTA facilitated a series of group discussions with representatives of NASA’s CHP community, which culminated in a product identifying the eight highest priority mission-enabling CHP capabilities for human missions to Mars, referred to as the “Top Human System Capability Needs for Mars”. The list includes Earth-Independent Human Operations; Mars Duration Food System; Mars Duration Effects on Human Physiology; Risks Mitigations for Vehicle Atmospheres; Computational Injury & Anthropometric Models; Exploration Exercise Countermeasures; Individual Variability in Responses to Spaceflight; and Sensorimotor Countermeasures. Existing strategic planning and risk management tools and processes were considered, as well as practicalities of technical, cost, and schedule feasibility associated with potential R&D risk mitigations and technology solutions. The product is not owned by any one organization and does not replace existing strategic or program planning processes; rather it aims to complement and inform them with a unified set of community generated priorities. It is anticipated that this list will be re-evaluated periodically based on R&D progress and the evolving M2M architecture.

Life Support↗

NASA NTRS2023

Concept of Operations for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Upper E Airspace

The National Airspace System undergoes continuous change including in the Upper Class E airspace involving increasingly complex operations and a widening diversity of vehicles. To secure a safe future system, the National Academies recommended an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that is extensible to Upper E. Current Air Traffic Management is not cost-effective to scale for future Upper E operations and diversity of vehicles so the Federal Aviation Administration developed an Upper E Traffic Management ConOps to safely integrate the diverse operations and vehicles having different performance characteristics and flight missions without disrupting current operations including space launch and reentry, suborbital flights, supersonic and hypersonic flights, slow moving or stationary unmanned balloons, and long endurance fixed wing vehicles that are slow, stationary, or high speed. IASMS integrates state-of-the-art predictive modeling with reactive and proactive analytics to detect hazards and mitigate risk precursors for Upper E operators. IASMS identifies emergent safety risks exposed by transformation of the NAS with new and increasingly complex operations. Safety intelligence will also expand the data available and offer insight to new approaches for implementing safety improvements to mitigate risk with more seamless “in-time” integration across the policy, risk management, safety assurance, and promotion pillars of SMS.

K Ellis↗

DOE OSTI2026

Current Best Practices on Wildfire Risk Reduction for Electric Transmission and Distribution Systems

This report provides a set of best practices in response to Section 4(d) of Executive Order 14308, Empowering Commonsense Wildfire Prevention and Response. The information contained herein is expected to be used in conjunction with other materials at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Wildfire Risk Mitigation Technical Conference (Docket No. AD25-16-000), with possible direction to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation to take action. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of existing and emerging best practices currently employed or planned by utilities for wildfire mitigation, demonstrating how these efforts align with the executive order’s emphasis on reducing electric utility–caused wildfires while also balancing cost-effectiveness. Additionally, while most practices in utility-developed wildfire mitigation plans focus on risk reduction through robustness and operational reliability, this report also discusses best practices for resilience. The best practices are adopted from publicly available utility wildfire mitigation plans from the United States and Canada, recent findings from wildfire risk reduction research, and industry engagement.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NASA NTRS2007

Learning from Past Experiences

Space flight is a risky business. This truism has been bandied about since the earliest days of the space program. When asked by the young daughter of a coworker, one of the Mercury astronauts likened launching into space to "riding a Roman candle" -- it was both exciting and dangerous. Even in these more technologically advanced days, the solid rocket boosters and external tanks of the space shuttle provide a no less exciting, or dangerous, ride into space. However much the phrase "risk mitigation" is bandied about within the U.S. space program, there is still the history of the Apollo 1 fire during a ground test at Cape Canaveral, Fla., the loss of the shuttle Challenger during liftoff, and the loss of the shuttle Columbia when returning to Earth to remind us that while we give lip-service to risk management, we have not learned to manage risk as well as we ought. Moreover, there are many more less dramatic, but equally critical, incidents that have occurred in association with the space program that also highlight our inability to accurately gauge and manage risk. Why do we seem caught in a senseless spiral in which we focus most on risk only after a tragedy? Why do we repeat serious mishaps and not learn from our mistakes? This paper reviews some possible explanations for our risk-taking behavior and provides examples of interest to the NASA centers, while also discussing inter center and intra-center opportunities for sharing information to mitigate risk.

Hulet, Michael W.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Dexterous Orbital Servicing System (DOSS)

The Dexterous Orbiter Servicing System (DOSS) is a dexterous robotic spaceflight system that is based on the manipulator designed as part of the Flight Telerobotics Servicer program for the Space Station Freedom and built during a 'technology capture' effort that was commissioned when the FTS was cancelled from the Space Station Freedom program. The FTS technology capture effort yielded one flight manipulator and the 1 g hydraulic simulator that had been designed as an integrated test tool and crew trainer. The DOSS concept was developed to satisfy needs of the telerobotics research community, the space shuttle, and the space station. As a flight testbed, DOSS would serve as a baseline reference for testing the performance of advanced telerobotics and intelligent robotics components. For shuttle, the DOSS, configured as a movable dexterous tool, would be used to provide operational flexibility for payload operations and contingency operations. As a risk mitigation flight demonstration, the DOSS would serve the International Space Station to characterize the end to end system performance of the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator performing assembly and maintenance tasks with actual ISSA orbital replacement units. Currently, the most likely entrance of the DOSS into spaceflight is a risk mitigation flight experiment for the International Space Station.

Price, Charles R.↗

NASA NTRS2008

The Integrated Medical Model: Statistical Forecasting of Risks to Crew Health and Mission Success

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) helps capture and use organizational knowledge across the space medicine, training, operations, engineering, and research domains. The IMM uses this domain knowledge in the context of a mission and crew profile to forecast crew health and mission success risks. The IMM is most helpful in comparing the risk of two or more mission profiles, not as a tool for predicting absolute risk. The process of building the IMM adheres to Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) techniques described in NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8705.5, and uses current evidence-based information to establish a defensible position for making decisions that help ensure crew health and mission success. The IMM quantitatively describes the following input parameters: 1) medical conditions and likelihood, 2) mission duration, 3) vehicle environment, 4) crew attributes (e.g. age, sex), 5) crew activities (e.g. EVA's, Lunar excursions), 6) diagnosis and treatment protocols (e.g. medical equipment, consumables pharmaceuticals), and 7) Crew Medical Officer (CMO) training effectiveness. It is worth reiterating that the IMM uses the data sets above as inputs. Many other risk management efforts stop at determining only likelihood. The IMM is unique in that it models not only likelihood, but risk mitigations, as well as subsequent clinical outcomes based on those mitigations. Once the mathematical relationships among the above parameters are established, the IMM uses a Monte Carlo simulation technique (a random sampling of the inputs as described by their statistical distribution) to determine the probable outcomes. Because the IMM is a stochastic model (i.e. the input parameters are represented by various statistical distributions depending on the data type), when the mission is simulated 10-50,000 times with a given set of medical capabilities (risk mitigations), a prediction of the most probable outcomes can be generated. For each mission, the IMM tracks which conditions occurred and decrements the pharmaceuticals and supplies required to diagnose and treat these medical conditions. If supplies are depleted, then the medical condition goes untreated, and crew and mission risk increase. The IMM currently models approximately 30 medical conditions. By the end of FY2008, the IMM will be modeling over 100 medical conditions, approximately 60 of which have been recorded to have occurred during short and long space missions.

Fitts, M. A.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRS2018

Potential Advantages of Conducting Short Duration Visits to the Martian Surface

Recent NASA concepts for human missions to Mars, including the Evolvable Mars Campaign and Design Reference Architecture 5.0, have focused on the conduct of missions with long duration stays on the Martian surface. The decision to focus on long duration missions (typically to a single site) is driven by a desire to increase the perceived sustainability of the human Mars campaign, predicated on the assumption that sustainability is best achieved by maximizing the level of activity on the surface, providing for continuous growth in operations, and promoting pioneering of Mars. However, executing a series of long duration missions to a single site is not the only option for human exploration of Mars that has been proposed. Other architectures have been evaluated that focus on missions with short duration surface stays, with each mission visiting a separate site on the surface. This type of architecture is less efficient in that elements are not typically reused from one mission to the next but requires a far less complex surface architecture. There are potentially valid arguments to be made that a short duration, multiple site approach could result in different types of advantages when compared to the long duration, single site approach to Mars exploration, particularly for initial human missions to Mars. These arguments revolve around four areas: Achieved Value, Risk Mitigation, Developmental Affordability, and Operational Affordability & Flexibility. The question of Achieved Value relates to the prioritization of goals for Martian exploration. As discussed, goals related to pioneering and expanding human presence are often referenced as justifications for the long duration approach. However, there are other competing goals, including science and exploration. While there is not a clear consensus among planetary scientists, many have argued that the value of being able to visit multiple sites could outweigh the value of continually visiting a single site. Risk Mitigation is a major concern for initial human missions to Mars. There are a number of hazards related to operating on the Martian surface that are not well characterized. It may be desirable to conduct a series of short duration missions to better understand the nature of these risks prior to committing to a long duration mission. Developmental Affordability relates to the ability of NASA and its partners to develop and deploy the proposed architecture. Any human missions to Mars will be among the most complex endeavors ever undertaken. The capabilities that must be developed to enable any human Mars missions are extremely challenging. The total design, development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) budget required to develop just the essential capabilities alone will be substantial. If additional surface capabilities are required to support long duration surface stays, the development effort could be unaffordable. Operational Affordability & Flexibility relates to the continued costs to execute the Mars campaign. Long duration missions, even with some amount of in-situ resource utilization, require a significant level of resupply for every mission. This requires additional launches and in-space transportation assets, increasing the operational complexity and total operational cost. This paper will explore each of the four potential advantages of short duration missions in detail. The authors will present comparisons between proposed long duration and short duration architectures through an evaluation of relevant performance, cost, and risk metrics.

Stromgren, Chel↗

NASA NTRS2012

Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) Element Management Plan: Human Research Program

NASA s Human Research Program (HRP) is an applied research and technology program within the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) that addresses human health and performance risk mitigation strategies in support of exploration missions. The HRP research and technology development is focused on the highest priority risks to crew health and safety with the goal of ensuring mission success and maintaining long-term crew health. Crew health and performance standards, defined by the NASA Chief Health and Medical Officer (CHMO), set the acceptable risk level for exploration missions. The HRP conducts research to inform these standards as well as provide deliverables, such as countermeasures, that ensure standards can be met to maximize human performance and mission success. The Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) Element was formed as part of the HRP to develop a scientifically-based, integrated approach to understanding and mitigating the health risks associated with human spaceflight. These health risks have been organized into four research portfolios that group similar or related risks. A fifth portfolio exists for managing technology developments and infrastructure projects. The HHC Element portfolios consist of: a) Vision and Cardiovascular; b) Exercise and Performance; c) Multisystem; d) Bone; and e) Technology and Infrastructure. The HHC identifies gaps associated with the health risks and plans human physiology research that will result in knowledge required to more fully understand risks and will result in validated countermeasures to mitigate risks.

Norsk, Peter↗

NASA NTRS2005

REIMR: A Process for Utilizing Propulsion-Oriented 'Lessons-Learned' to Mitigate Development Risk

This paper is a summary overview of a study conducted a t the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) during the initial phases of the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program to evaluate a large number of technical problems associated with the design, development, test, evaluation and operation of several major liquid propellant rocket engine systems (i.e., SSME, Fastrac, J-2, F-1). The results of this study was the identification of the "Fundamental Root Causes" that enabled the technical problems to manifest, and practices that can be implemented to prevent them from recurring in future engine development efforts. This paper will discus the Fundamental Root Causes, cite some examples of how the technical problems arose from them, and provide a discussion of how they can be mitigated or avoided.

Ballard, Richard O.↗

NASA NTRS2006

REIMR - A Process for Utilizing Liquid Rocket Propulsion-Oriented 'Lessons Learned' to Mitigate Development Risk in Nuclear Thermal Propulsion

This paper is a summary overview of a study conducted at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (NASA MSFC) during the initial phases of the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program to evaluate a large number of technical problems associated with the design, development, test, evaluation and operation of several major liquid propellant rocket engine systems (i.e., SSME, Fastrac, J-2, F-1). One of the primary results of this study was the identification of the Fundamental Root Causes that enabled the technical problems to manifest, and practices that can be implemented to prevent them from recurring in future propulsion system development efforts, such as that which is currently envisioned in the field of nuclear thermal propulsion (NTF). This paper will discuss the Fundamental Root Causes, cite some examples of how the technical problems arose from them, and provide a discussion of how they can be mitigated or avoided in the development of an NTP system

Ballard, RIchard O.↗