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DOE OSTI2025

Quantum Computing Strategy 2026

Quantum computing (QC) is a rapidly maturing technology with the potential for revolutionary impacts on stockpile stewardship science and national security. Recent developments in fault-tolerant architectures have compressed vendor roadmaps, and predictions of a production-ready quantum computer by the mid-2030s are becoming increasingly credible. This strategy provides a roadmap for integrating QC into the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program by investing in four strategic focus areas: 1. Develop Capabilities in Mission-Relevant Quantum Applications: ASC will prioritize developing quantum-ready applications in mission areas that have shown significant promise for quantum advantage, including simulations of materials in extreme environments, nuclear dynamics, solving linear and nonlinear partial differential equations, and uncertainty quantification. These applications directly support stockpile stewardship science and modernization objectives. 2. Conduct R&D in Algorithms, Software, and Hardware: Sustained research into quantum algorithms, robust software tools, and quantum hardware is essential. ASC will develop efficient quantum algorithms; invest in quantum compilers, debuggers, and performance tools; and explore specialized quantum hardware tailored to NNSA’s unique requirements. 3. Engage with Vendors and Partners: Early and active collaboration with commercial quantum hardware vendors and academic partners is critical. Through testbeds, co-design agreements, and quantum demonstration facilities, ASC will influence hardware design, gain early access to emerging technologies, and ensure that quantum platforms evolve to meet mission needs. 4. Build Knowledge, Experience, and Workforce: Expanding and upskilling the quantum-trained workforce is essential to long-term success. This includes hiring, internal training, university outreach, and postdoctoral support to ensure ASC maintains the expertise required to operate, program, and integrate quantum systems as they become available. While quantum computing will never replace classical computing, it has the potential to solve certain problems with speed and accuracy that would be unachievable using any conceivable classical high-performance computing (HPC) system. By investing strategically in QC, ASC will help propel the emergent QC industry, maintain U.S. technological leadership, ensure mission readiness, and position itself to rapidly adopt quantum technologies as they mature.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2026

Quantitative Evaluation of Potassium Iodide Implementation Strategies for Emergency Preparedness and Response

This study evaluates the effectiveness of potassium iodide (KI) distribution strategies in mitigating exposure to radioiodine during severe nuclear power plant accidents. This analysis quantitatively compares various KI distribution methods (pre-distributed versus stockpiles), including scenarios with and without KI administration. The results indicate that differences in distribution strategies impact the projected thyroid dose by at least an order of magnitude. The results also indicate that the timing of KI administration is critical, as expected. For scenarios involving delayed releases of significant quantities of radionuclides, evacuation is the most effective protection strategy regardless of KI distribution method. For scenarios involving rapid releases, retrieving KI from stockpiles can have a detrimental effect. Pre-distributed KI is potentially the most effective approach when used as a supplement to evacuation and sheltering. However, these model results are based on idealized conditions for KI distribution and administration; the actual benefits of KI prophylaxis are likely to be less than estimated in this report due to many variables. The results highlight the importance of considering the cost and rigor of different distribution programs and public compliance with emergency instructions. This report includes suggested research to explore KI distribution plans for advanced reactors.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS1997

Dryden Flight Research Center Chemical Pharmacy Program

The Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) Chemical Pharmacy "Crib" is a chemical sharing system which loans chemicals to users, rather than issuing them or having each individual organization or group purchasing the chemicals. This cooperative system of sharing chemicals eliminates multiple ownership of the same chemicals and also eliminates stockpiles. Chemical management duties are eliminated for each of the participating organizations. The chemical storage issues, hazards and responsibilities are eliminated. The system also ensures safe storage of chemicals and proper disposal practices. The purpose of this program is to reduce the total releases and transfers of toxic chemicals. The initial cost of the program to DFRC was $585,000. A savings of $69,000 per year has been estimated for the Center. This savings includes the reduced costs in purchasing, disposal and chemical inventory/storage responsibilities. DFRC has chemicals stored in 47 buildings and at 289 locations. When the program is fully implemented throughout the Center, there will be three chemical locations at this facility. The benefits of this program are the elimination of chemical management duties; elimination of the hazard associated with chemical storage; elimination of stockpiles; assurance of safe storage; assurance of proper disposal practices; assurance of a safer workplace; and more accurate emissions reports.

Davis, Bette↗

DOE OSTI2017

Trinity Supercomputer Now Fully Operational

Now one of the fastest supercomputers in the United States, the Trinity Supercomputer Phase II project was completed during the summer of 2017, and the computer became fully operational during an unclassified “open science” run. The computer has now transitioned to classified mode. The Trinity supercomputer is designed to provide increased computational capability for the NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise in support of increasing geometric and physics fidelities in nuclear weapons simulation codes, while maintaining expectations for total time to solution. The capabilities of Trinity are required for supporting the NNSA Stockpile Stewardship program’s certification and assessments to ensure that the nation’s nuclear stockpile is safe, secure and effective. With an expected operational lifetime through 2020, Trinity is an approximately 41.5 petaflop (41.5 million billion calculations per second, peak performance) supercomputer based on the Cray XC40 architecture. It consists of 19,420 compute nodes utilizing two processor architectures, Intel Xeon Haswell and Intel Xeon Phi Knights Landing. It is a water-cooled system with a power requirement of about 10 megawatts. The Trinity project is managed and operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories under the Alliance for Computing at Extreme Scale (ACES) partnership. The system is located at the Nicholas Metropolis Center for Modeling and Simulation at Los Alamos and covers approximately 5,200 square feet of floor space.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2019

National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Vision Strengthening our Nation through Nuclear Security

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s enduring mission is to protect our nation by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global nuclear threats, and providing our submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear propulsion. Although we have numerous strategic partners that enable, contribute to, and benefit from our efforts, no other organization, government or civilian, can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of the American people. In this area, we stand alone. This strategic vision pursues urgent change at a significant scale to develop creative approaches, make sustained investments, and be disciplined in our approach to develop a nuclear capability for our time and for the foreseeable future. It is incumbent on us to anticipate our future security challenges and ensure our country is ready to meet them. Not doing so would have far-reaching consequences. Failure to meet our vital mission objectives will erode confidence in the security that the United States strategic deterrent umbrella provides. In assessing the current mission environment in NNSA, we can count on one thing—change: The geopolitical environment for our deterrent is ever-changing Threats from rogue states and terrorists are evolving Our nuclear weapons and the infrastructure that supports them are aging Science and technology continue to move forward at an ever-increasing pace In this dynamic environment, it is not sufficient to remedy today’s situation and meet our current mission requirements. We must lean forward in the development, planning, and execution of programs that address our current challenges while developing the workforce, infrastructure, tools, and governance systems that will enable us to meet our deterrence, non-proliferation, and naval propulsion mission requirements for the next 50 years. We must embrace a next-generation enterprise that is flexible enough to respond to future challenges. With decades of stagnation following the end of the Cold War, we find ourselves in the unenviable position of implementing near-term fixes while using those lessons learned to better prepare for the future. Without sustained and predictable investments to restore and modernize our infrastructure, we will rapidly lose our ability to deliver on our promise of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, which will degrade our deterrent capability and render legacy weapon systems irrelevant to the defense of our nation. We must not and will not allow the next generation of our nuclear security enterprise to simply maintain the status quo. We have a storied past that guides us. For 75 years our enterprise has overcome every challenge, led the country in incredible scientific and engineering endeavors and discoveries, and successfully ensured constant vigilance in maintaining an effective deterrent, reducing global nuclear threats, and powering our nuclear navy. Now is the time for us to take decisive action in forging the enterprise of the future. As I have traveled to all of our labs, plants, and sites and met with people across our complex, I have been left with one overwhelming impression: the incredible workforce that makes up our nuclear security enterprise is up to all of the challenges we have before us. Together we can and will ensure that those in the future workforce have the resources and the responsive, agile infrastructure they need to maintain the systems of today and to design and field the systems of tomorrow.

Source record↗

DOE OSTI2019

The Effect of Glass Chemistry on Caesium Volatility in Iron Phosphate Glass Systems - 19344

The UK currently has a stockpile of 99,000 m{sup 3} of intermediate level waste (ILW), with this figure expected to rise to 191,000 m{sup 3} by 2125. Current immobilisation options include cementation and thermal treatment, with cementation being the preferred candidate due to the simplicity of processing. However, thermal processing such as vitrification could offer significant volume reductions, up to 75 % for some waste-streams. In comparison, cementation is generally associated with a volume increase, with a typical waste package seeing a volume increase of 200 - 400 %. For vitrification to be accepted as the preferred treatment option of ILW in the UK, the issue of volatility during the vitrification process must be addressed. Volatile components of ILW such as Cs-137 and Sr-90 account for almost 50 % of the current total radioactivity produced by the UK's ILW stockpile. Therefore, the efficient retention of these elements into the glass immobilisation medium must be considered. Various approaches can be employed when trying to increase volatile retention, however this project has focussed on the influence of glass chemistry on volatility. A series of iron phosphate glasses containing 5 mol % of B{sub 2}O{sub 3}, MnO and ZnO have been produced, where additives have been substituted in place of Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3} in a standard 40Fe{sub 2}O{sub 3}-60P{sub 2}O{sub 5} system. All glass samples were characterised using Raman spectroscopy, SEM-EDX, thermal analysis, XRD and XRF. The glasses were then doped with caesium carbonate and re-melted in the system described below. A simple off-gas system has been developed and commissioned to capture and characterise volatiles released from the glass during melting. The off-gas system has been refined several times, with the most recent design comprising of a sealed stainless steel system, connected to two gas washing bottles containing 150 ml of 50 % nitric acid. Nitrogen gas is passed through the system for the duration of the experiment at a flow rate of ∼ 0.9 L/min to ensure efficient carryover of the volatiles released from the glass melt into the solutions in the gas washing bottles. The total retention of the volatiles can be measuring by analysing the contents of the gas washing bottles using ICP-MS and XRF of the final glass product. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Reactivity in cement pastes bearing fine fraction concrete and glass from construction and demolition waste: Microstructural analysis of viability

Converting construction and demolition waste (CDW) into secondary raw materials is one of the priorities of environmental policy and circular economy strategy. This study analysed the variation in eco-efficient paste reactivity with OPC replacement ratio (5% to 10%) and hydration time (2 d, 28 d and 90 d). Three types of CDW were explored: two (calcareous and siliceous) consisting of fine (4 AH{sub 13} and C{sub 4}AcH{sub 11}, ettringite and portlandite, were the same as observed in OPC hydration. These findings attest to the scientific viability recycling such CDWs as mineral additions in eco-cement manufacture and consequently eliminating the need for stockpiling these materials at recycling/storage plants.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2016

Nevada National Security Site: Site-Directed Research and Development (SDRD) Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Report

This report presents results of multiple research projects, new and ongoing, funded under the Site-Directed Research and Development Program for the Nevada National Security Site during federal fiscal year 2015. The Site's legacy capabilities in remote sensing combined with new paradigms for emergency response and consequence management help drive the need to develop advanced aerial sensor platforms. Likewise, dynamic materials science is a critical area of scientific research for which basic physics issues are still unresolved. New methods of characterizing materials in extreme states are vitally needed, and these efforts are paving the way with new knowledge. Projects selected in FY 2015 for the Exploratory Research portfolio exhibit a strong balance of NNSS mission relevance. Geoscience, seismology, and techniques for detecting underground nuclear events are still essential focus areas. Many of the project reports in the second major section of this annual report are ongoing continuations in multi-year lifecycles. Diagnostic techniques for stockpile and nuclear security science figured prominently as well, with a few key efforts coming to fruition, such as phase transition detection. In other areas, modeling efforts toward better understanding plasma focus physics has also started to pay dividends for major program needs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2017

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2016

This Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) was prepared to satisfy DOE Order DOE O 231.1B, “Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.” Its purpose is to (1) report compliance status with environmental standards and requirements, (2) present results of environmental monitoring of radiological and nonradiological effluents, (3) report estimated radiological doses to the public from releases of radioactive material, (4) summarize environmental incidents of noncompliance and actions taken in response to them, (5) describe the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) Environmental Management System and characterize its performance, and (6) highlight significant environmental programs and efforts. This NNSSER summarizes data and compliance status for calendar year 2016 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and its two Nevada-based support facilities, the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF) and the Remote Sensing Laboratory–Nellis (RSL-Nellis). It also addresses environmental restoration (ER) projects conducted at the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). NNSA/NFO directs the management and operation of the NNSS and six sites across the nation. In addition to the NNSA itself, the six sites include two in Nevada (NLVF and RSL-Nellis) and four in other states (RSL-Andrews in Maryland, Livermore Operations in California, Los Alamos Operations in New Mexico, and Special Technologies Laboratory in California). Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories are the principal organizations that sponsor and implement the nuclear weapons programs at the NNSS. National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), is the current Management and Operating contractor accountable for the successful execution of work and ensuring that work is performed in compliance with environmental regulations. The six sites all provide support to enhance the NNSS as a location for its multiple missions. The three major NNSS missions include National Security/Defense, Environmental Management, and Nondefense. The major programs that support these missions are Stockpile Stewardship and Management, Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism, Nuclear Emergency Response, Strategic Partnership Projects, Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, Conservation and Renewable Energy, Other Research and Development, and Infrastructure. The major facilities that support the programs include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility, Dense Plasma Focus Facility, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC), Radiological/Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Exercise Site, the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC), and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2017

Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report Summary 2016

This document is a summary of the full 2016 Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report (NNSSER) prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/ NFO). This summary provides an abbreviated and more readable version of the full NNSSER. NNSA/NFO prepares the NNSSER to provide the public an understanding of the environmental monitoring and compliance activities that are conducted on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to protect the public and the environment from radiation hazards and from potential nonradiological impacts. It is a comprehensive report of environmental activities performed at the NNSS and offsite facilities over the previous calendar year. The NNSS is currently the nation’s unique site for ongoing national security–related missions and high-risk operations. The NNSS is located about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The approximately 1,360-square-mile site is one of the largest restricted access areas in the United States. It is surrounded by federal installations with strictly controlled access as well as by lands that are open to public entry. In 2016, National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), was the NNSS Management and Operations Contractor accountable for ensuring work was performed in compliance with environmental regulations. NNSS activities in 2016 continued to be diverse, with the primary goal to ensure that the existing U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons remains safe and reliable. Other activities included weapons of mass destruction first responder training; the controlled release of hazardous material at the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC); remediation of legacy contamination sites; characterization of waste destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, or the Idaho National Laboratory in Idaho Falls, Idaho; disposal of low-level and mixed low-level radioactive waste; and environmental research. Facilities and centers that support the National Security/Defense mission include the U1a Facility, Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF), Device Assembly Facility (DAF), National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) located in the DAF, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) Facility, Dense Plasma Focus (DPF) Facility located in the Los Alamos Technical Facility (LATF), and the Radiological/ Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex (RNCTEC). Facilities that support the Environmental Management mission include the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) and the Area 3 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS), which has been in cold standby since 2006.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

New Energy Infrastructure Outlook: Data as of December 31, 2024 [Slides]

This report provides a perspective on energy infrastructure under development in the continental U.S. as of the end of 2024, focusing on those making significant progress toward achieving commercial operation. Infrastructures covered in this report include power plants, electric transmission, natural gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas facilities. Additionally, this report includes a section on stockpiled volumes of coal, natural gas, and petroleum.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

DOE OSTI2019

Analysis of Cygnus Electrical Signals

The United States initiated the Subcritical Experiment (SCE) program to support a stockpile stewardship mission shortly after the 1992 moratorium on underground nuclear testing was established. Many SCE’s are conducted at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nevada. Cygnus is a high-energy radiation generating device (RGD) located and operated at the NNSS and is a primary diagnostic for the SCE program. The Cygnus Dual Beam Radiographic Facility consists of two identical radiographic sources, Cygnus 1 and Cygnus 2. From creation of the high power V-I drive to energy transport and X-ray conversion at the rod-pinch diode, the Cygnus machines utilize the following components: oil-filled Marx generator, water-filled pulse-forming line (PFL), water-filled coaxial transmission line (CTL), three-cell vacuum induction voltage adder (IVA), and rod-pinch diode. The diode pulse has the following electrical specifications: 2.25 MV, 60 kA, 60 ns. Each source has the following X-ray specifications: 1 mm diameter, 4 rad at 1 m, and 50 ns radiation pulse. SCEs are both single-event and high-value; therefore, a high level of performance in reliability and reproducibility are key issues of Cygnus. Prior to executing such a SCE, there are a formidable number of shots (e.g., each of the two Cygnus RGDs charging and discharging properly into the rod-pinch diode load) that must be executed to determine reliability and reproducibility of the Cygnus RGDs. For every shot on Cygnus, voltages and currents along the machine are recorded and analyzed. In this paper we summarize attributes of the voltage and current waveforms at different locations using distribution plots. These distribution plots are used to quantify the reliability and reproducibility for Cygnus. This analysis methodology will provide a standard to trouble shoot results of individual Cygnus shots, and also to monitor long term Cygnus performance. Accordingly, this type of extensive analysis will contribute to optimized Cygnus performance on SCEs.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2018

The DISTINCTIVE University Consortium: Theme 2: PuO{sub 2} and Fuel Residues - 18132

The safe and secure management of Pu is a matter of serious international concern, with ∼250 t of separated Pu currently stockpiled worldwide. Nearly 50% of this material is in long-term storage in the UK whilst the British government develops its options for final treatment and disposition. Options for this are: (i) reuse as a fuel in modern reactors (e.g. as MOX fuel or within a fast reactor) prior to disposal; (ii) prompt immobilisation for disposal as soon as is practicable; or, (iii) continued long term storage (prior to disposition). The focus of the work presented here is options (ii) and (iii). The R and D needs of both are now pressing: in option (iii) due to it being the current default; in option (ii) because of a comparative lack of R and D on Pu conditioning and packaging due to policy uncertainty as to whether it would be disposed of in a Geologic Disposal Facility (GDF). Addressing these needs is complicated by Pu's high radioactivity, decay heat and radiotoxicity, nuclear safeguard requirements and, for some UK Pu contaminated materials targeted for disposal, poor inventory. Thus, there is also a critical requirement for underpinning research on characterisation methods for Pu bearing materials. In response to these needs, the DISTINCTIVE Consortium (Decommissioning, Immobilisation and Storage Solutions for Nuclear Waste Inventories, a multi-disciplinary collaboration of 11 universities and 3 key industry partners from across the UK's civil nuclear sector) has been seeking to: - Understand how the structure and properties of PuO{sub 2} change with time in the presence of H{sub 2}O. - Understand the roles these processes play in gaseous product evolution from PuO{sub 2} in storage. - Understand radiation-induced amorphization and dissolution kinetics of Pu waste forms. - Develop novel, fast neutron based radiometric methods for the quantification, isotopic composition assessment and remote imaging of Pu-bearing materials. This paper describes recent progress made towards achieving these objectives. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

The DISTINCTIVE University Consortium: Transforming High Activity Materials Research in the UK - 18212

The DISTINCTIVE consortium (Decommissioning, Immobilisation and Storage Solutions for Nuclear Waste Inventories) is a partnership of 11 research universities, working to decommission and clean up the legacy of civil nuclear energy generation, sponsored by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). An important component of the research programme is to develop the skills and facilities to address key research questions, requiring the use of highly radioactive materials. Here we highlight the outcomes of four research projects in which access to state of the art research facilities for working with radioactive materials, supported by international partnerships, has advanced research in plutonium storage and immobilisation, and the disposal of spent nuclear fuels. First, we have developed a viable formulation and process for immobilisation of the UK plutonium stockpile, including commissioning of a radiological hot isostatic press and validation studies using plutonium-239. Second, we have further underpinned the interim storage of PuO{sub 2}, through understanding of water and chlorine sorption / desorption, pertinent to the historic practice of containment within, and degradation of PVC bags. Third, we have developed a novel methodology to investigate the in situ radiolysis induced dissolution of actinide oxide thin films, using synchrotron radiation, to underpin the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Fourth we monitored in situ the oxidation and self-ignition mechanism of uranium carbide, a legacy fuel from the Dounreay Prototype Fast Reactor that is waiting for oxidation treatment prior to permanent storage and/or disposal. Through this programme of research, the DISTINCTIVE consortium is rebuilding the UK capability for research with transuranic materials, which, hitherto, was eroded over decades of disinvestment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Integrated Methodology for the Impact Assessment of an Uranium Mill Contaminated Site - 19031

This work describes the development of mathematical models for radionuclides distribution and transport in the environment. The applicability of the models involves an integrated approach to assess the quantitative dispersion of the radionuclides in different environmental compartments when released from uranium tailings or from other low-activity mining wastes storages. For every compartment the important pathways of contamination and the radionuclides of major concern are identified and selected, based on their chemical, physical, radiological and toxic properties. Each compartment represents an environmental media: air, soil, water, vegetation and biota. Depending on the characteristics of the sources different types of possible releases are evaluated using phenomenological models. Models of environmental release, dispersion, transport and fate within each environmental compartment, as well as models of transfer between them, are applied to a specific site. The model outputs are the radionuclides activities for each one of the environmental compartments, where relevant exposure end-points are previously identified. The methodology was applied to a specific Uranium Mill Site, referred here as the 'Mill'. The site comprises approximately 3.2 km and includes two inactive mills, former ore stockpiles areas, a partially reclaimed tailings pond disposal area and a current tailings pond disposal area. The Mill site began operations in the late 1950's extracting uranium ore by alkaline leaching. Later on, a new facility using acid leaching for extracting uranium begun to operate in 1980. The mill operated first continuously and after intermittently until its closure, in March 2006. The data required for the model input was acquired from different sources: direct measurements from this particular site and available from multiple site investigation reports (in particular, environmental data for groundwater, soil, surface water, sediments and biota); other, were selected from published data. For the unknown data, assumptions were made. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Opportunities to Implement Solutions to Achieve Remedial Action Objectives in Consideration of Stakeholder Interests - 20365

A case study in the implementation of a soils excavation and removal project conducted at a Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Maywood Superfund Site (FMSS) vicinity property; an active commercial business, in a densely populated area, with significant operational, technical and, logistical constraints that were expected to limit areas that could be remediated. The United States Army Corps of Engineers-led (USACE) team successfully navigated complex overlapping stakeholder interests to achieve a more efficient and complete removal of contaminated soils and debris while minimizing unnecessary excess costs to the Government. This paper centers on FUSRAP activities at the FMSS vicinity property located at 149-151 Maywood Avenue, Maywood, Bergen County, New Jersey. For most of its FUSRAP history, this ∼109,000 square meter (27-acre) property housed a now-demolished ∼26,000 square meter (6.5-acre) warehouse operated by Sears Logistics Services, a unit of the Sears Roebuck Company (Figure 2). Sears ended its property lease and vacated the warehouse in December 2016. Given that long history and for the purposes of this paper, the property will be referred to as the 'Sears property' or simply 'the property.' The Sears property is approximately 109,000 square meters (27-acres) and is currently zoned for commercial use. The property is bound to the north and northwest by 100 West Hunter Avenue (the Stepan Company), to the northeast by 205 Maywood Avenue, to the east by Maywood Avenue, to the south by 23 West Howcroft Road, and to the west by businesses on NJ Route 17 and the NJ Route 17 roadway. Until December 2016, the property housed a warehouse and distribution center operated by Sears Logistical Services. On-site structures were demolished by the property owner in 2017. The warehouse covered the north section of the property along the Stepan Company property line. A railroad spur from the adjacent property now known as the Maywood Interim Storage Site (MISS) ended at the northeast corner of the warehouse. Wetlands were located east of the warehouse; the rest of the property was covered with paved parking lots and grassed areas. During remediation at the property, opportunities frequently arose where the project team was able to coordinate effectively with stakeholders to sequence remediation activities to facilitate removal of otherwise inaccessible soils and identify opportunities for materials reuse when supported by residual radiological and chemical levels. Some specific opportunities include: - remediating individual truck loading dock bays to maintain tenant operations; - working along a busy highway and in a utility corridor containing a 30-inch high pressure gas main; - remediating Lodi Brook and associated wetlands requiring bypass pumping and other diversionary structures to maintain local community stormwater drainage; - protecting during remediation and supporting access to facilitate tenant/owner maintenance of critical fire protection and water supply system service lines buried in contaminated soils and necessary for safe warehouse operations; and - coordinating with stakeholders to ensure non-radiological contaminants of concern for the site (unaffiliated with FUSRAP) were addressed by the responsible party in a manner that maximized benefit to all parties while supporting an efficient overall site remediation program. Once the property was vacant and the warehouse structure and radiologically non-impacted above-grade structures were demolished, the project identified an opportunity to significantly reduce the volume of waste associated with the foundation of the former warehouse, a foundation suspected of being partially constructed in radiologically contaminated soils. The project developed and implemented supplemental radiological verification survey and sampling strategies based on radiological cross-contamination risk potential with process flow-charts and screening-level based decision points; a program that classified saw-cut sections of concrete based on observed residual surface radioactivity conditions using a combination of gamma sensitive sodium-iodide scans and beta sensitive Geiger-Muller direct measurements. The proposed approach was reviewed with stakeholders with feedback, including consideration of applicable State of New Jersey Site Remediation Program criteria and guidance before implementation. Once classified, additional sampling was performed at frequencies driven by screening. The sampling methods, stockpile sampling frequencies, criteria and, approach to data evaluation were developed in consideration of existing site cleanup standards, regional background ranges, State of New Jersey radiological remediation program guidance, and specific stakeholder input With the property remediation and survey efforts nearly completed, it is relevant to examine retrospectively the objectives, assumptions and limitations in the remedial design (i.e., what was planned) versus what was able to be accomplished through effective teaming. Benefits to other environmental remediation site programs include better understanding of how to work effectively with stakeholders to achieve win-win outcomes, and approaches to site remediation, waste minimization and materials reuse that were successful in their overall outcomes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

In-situ Synthesis of PuCl 3 and Corresponding Raman and Density Functional Theory Vibrational Modes

The experimental and calculated Raman spectrum of PuCl 3 has been reported for the first time. PuCl 3 is a primary species found in plutonium metal refinement, specifically in pyrochemical salt processes including multicycle direct oxide reduction, metal chlorination, and electrorefining. As such, Raman signatures of PuCl 3 could serve as potential forensic indicators of material process history. A novel technique for synthesizing PuCl 3 from the in situ chlorination of plutonium metal with HCl was developed to establish these signatures. Cerium metal surrogates were utilized to ensure optimization of the plutonium experiments and to minimize personnel exposure, and all experiments were carried out in a Raman reaction chamber designed for air-tight, high vacuum environments. In situ Raman spectroscopy was employed in conjunction with density functional theory (DFT) to investigate the vibrational modes of PuCl 3 . Associated mixed oxy and hydroxyl phases are also reported. The combined Raman and DFT results have eliminated inconsistencies in Raman mode assignments for the MX 3 family of metal chlorides having P6 3 /m symmetry, and IR modes derived from the DFT calculations are additionally presented. The data observed in this study are of potential interest to nuclear forensic analyses, nuclear sample aging, nuclear energy, plutonium processing, and stockpile stewardship.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2021

Prospects for Surrogate Neutron Capture Measurements with Radioactive Ion Beams and GODDESS

Neutron capture reactions are responsible for the synthesis of almost all of the elements heavier than iron through the slow s-process, that proceeds close to the line of stability, and the rapid r-process, with very neutron-rich waiting points. Uncertainties in (n,γ) rates in neutron rich nuclei, especially near closed neu- tron shells, can have significant impact [1] on the predictions of final abundances for different astrophysical scenarios for the r process. Understanding (n,γ) rates on neutron-rich fission fragments is also important for nuclear forensics and stockpile stewardship science. Ratkiewicz et al. [2 and references therein] has recently demonstrated that the (d,pγ) reaction is a valid surrogate for (n,γ), where the formation of the compound nucleus from the breakup of the deuteron has been calculated in a reaction model and the subsequent measured gamma-decay probabilities are reproduced with standard level density and strength functions in a Bayesian approach. In parallel to the surrogate validation efforts, we have demonstrated that the (d,pγ) reaction can be measured in inverse kinematics with Gammasphere ORRUBA: Dual Detectors for Experimental Structure Studies (GODDESS) [3] where the Gammasphere array of Compton-suppressed HPGe detectors is coupled to the Oak Ridge Rutgers University Barrel Array of position-sensitive silicon strip detectors. During the commissioning campaign we measured the (d,pγ) reaction with 134 Xe and 95 Mo beams, the latter to demonstrate the surrogate method in inverse kinematics. The present talk will present preliminary results from this campaign including γ-decay probabilities and prospects for surrogate (n,γ) measurements with 143 Ba fission-fragment beams.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗