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NASA NTRS2010

Fault Management Technology Maturation for NASA's Constellation Program

This slide presentation reviews the maturation of fault management technology in preparation for the Constellation Program. There is a review of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) and a discussion of a couple of incidents with the shuttle main engine and tanking that indicated the necessity for predictive maintenance. Included is a review of the planned Ares I-X Ground Diagnostic Prototype (GDP) and further information about detection and isolation of faults using Testability Engineering and Maintenance System (TEAMS). Another system that being readied for use that detects anomalies, the Inductive Monitoring System (IMS). The IMS automatically learns how the system behaves and alerts operations it the current behavior is anomalous. The comparison of STS-83 and STS-107 (i.e., the Columbia accident) is shown as an example of the anomaly detection capabilities.

Waterman, Robert D.↗

NASA NTRS2011

20 plus Years of Computational Fluid Dynamics for the Space Shuttle

This slide presentation reviews the use of computational fluid dynamics in performing analysis of the space shuttle with particular reference to the return to flight analysis and other shuttle problems. Slides show a comparison of pressure coefficient with the shuttle ascent configuration between the wind tunnel test and the computed values. the evolution of the grid system for the space shuttle launch vehicle (SSLv) from the early 80's to one in 2004, the grid configuration of the bipod ramp redesign from the original design to the current configuration, charts with the computations showing solid rocket booster surface pressures from wind tunnel data, calculated over two grid systems (i.e., the original 14 grid system, and the enhanced 113 grid system), and the computed flight orbiter wing loads are compared with strain gage data on STS-50 during flight. The loss of STS-107 initiated an unprecedented review of all external environments. The current SSLV grid system of 600+ grids, 1.8 Million surface points and 95+ million volume points is shown. The inflight entry analyses is shown, and the use of Overset CFD as a key part to many external tank redesign and debris assessments is discussed. The work that still remains to be accomplished for future shuttle flights is discussed.

Gomez, Reynaldo J., III↗

NASA NTRS2011

Cavity Heating Experiments Supporting Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation

The two-color thermographic phosphor method has been used to map the local heating augmentation of scaled idealized cavities at conditions simulating the windward surface of the Shuttle Orbiter Columbia during flight STS-107. Two experiments initiated in support of the Columbia Accident Investigation were conducted in the Langley 20-Inch Mach 6 Tunnel. Generally, the first test series evaluated open (length-to-depth less than 10) rectangular cavity geometries proposed as possible damage scenarios resulting from foam and ice impact during launch at several discrete locations on the vehicle windward surface, though some closed (length-to-depth greater than 13) geometries were briefly examined. The second test series was designed to parametrically evaluate heating augmentation in closed rectangular cavities. The tests were conducted under laminar cavity entry conditions over a range of local boundary layer edge-flow parameters typical of re-entry. Cavity design parameters were developed using laminar computational predictions, while the experimental boundary layer state conditions were inferred from the heating measurements. An analysis of the aeroheating caused by cavities allowed exclusion of non-breeching damage from the possible loss scenarios being considered during the investigation.

Everhart, Joel L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV): Flight Rationale for the Space Shuttle Program

Each Orbiter Vehicle (Space Shuttle Program) contains up to 24 Kevlar49/Epoxy Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) for storage of pressurized gases. In the wake of the Columbia accident and the ensuing Return To Flight (RTF) activities, Orbiter engineers reexamined COPV flight certification. The original COPV design calculations were updated to include recently declassified Kevlar COPV test data from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and to incorporate changes in how the Space Shuttle was operated as opposed to orinigially envisioned. 2005 estimates for the probability of a catastrophic failure over the life of the program (from STS-1 through STS-107) were one-in-five. To address this unacceptable risk, the Orbiter Project Office (OPO) initiated a comprehensive investigation to understand and mitigate this risk. First, the team considered and eventually deemed unfeasible procuring and replacing all existing flight COPVs. OPO replaced the two vessels with the highest risk with existing flight spare units. Second, OPO instituted operational improvements in ground procedures to signficiantly reduce risk, without adversely affecting Shuttle capability. Third, OPO developed a comprehensive model to quantify the likelihood of occurrance. A fully-instrumented burst test (recording a lower burst pressure than expected) on a flight-certified vessel provided critical understanding of the behavior of Orbiter COPVs. A more accurate model was based on a newly-compiled comprehensive database of Kevlar data from LLNL and elsewhere. Considering hardware changes, operational improvements and reliability model refinements, the mean reliability was determined to be 0.998 for the remainder of the Shuttle Program (from 2007, for STS- 118 thru STS-135). Since limited hardware resources precluded full model validation through multiple tests, additional model confidence was sought through the first-ever Accelerated Stress Rupture Test (ASRT) of a flown flight article. A Bayesian statistical approach was developed to interpret possible test results. Since the lifetime observed in the ASRT exceeded initial estimates by one to two orders of magnitude, the Space Shuttle Program deemed there was significant conservatism in the model and accepted continued operation with existing flight hardware. Given the variability in tank-to-tank original prooftest response, a non-destructive evaluation (NDE) technique utilizing Raman Spectroscopy was developed to directly measure COPV residual stress state. Preliminary results showed that patterns of low fiber elastic strains over the outside vessel surface, together with measured permanent volume growth during proof, could be directly correlated to increased fiber stress ratios on the inside fibers adjacent to the liner, and thus reduced reliability.

Kezirian, Michael T.↗

NASA NTRS2011

External Tank Program - Legacy of Success

The largest single element of Space Shuttle is the External Tank (ET), which serves as the structural backbone of the vehicle during ascent and provides liquid propellants to the Orbiter s three Main Engines. The ET absorbs most of the seven million pounds of thrust exerted by the Solid Rocket Boosters and Main Engines. The design evolved through several block changes, reducing weight each time. Because the tank flies to orbital velocity with the Space Shuttle Orbiter, minimization of weight is mandatory, to maximize payload performance. The initial configuration, the standard weight tank, weighed 76,000 pounds and was an aluminum 2219 structure. The light weight tank weighed 66,000 pounds and flew 86 missions. The super light weight tank weighed 58,500 pounds and was primarily an aluminum-lithium structure. The final configuration and low weight enabled system level performance sufficient for assembly of the International Space Station in a high inclination orbit, vital for international cooperation. Another significant challenge was the minimization of ice formation on the cryogenic tanks. This was essential due to the system configuration and the choice of ceramic thermal protection system materials on the Orbiter. Ice would have been a major debris hazard. Spray on foam insulation materials served multiple functions including thermal insulation, conditioning of cryogenic propellants, and thermal protection for the tank structure during ascent and entry. The tank is large, and unique manufacturing facilities, tooling, and handling, and transportation operations were developed. Weld processes and tooling evolved with the design as it matured through several block changes. Non Destructive Evaluation methods were used to assure integrity of welds and thermal protection system materials. The aluminum-lithium alloy was used near the end of the program and weld processes and weld repair techniques had to be refined. Development and implementation of friction stir welding was a substantial technology development incorporated during the Program. Automated thermal protection system application processes were developed for the majority of the tank surface. Material obsolescence was an issue throughout the multi-decade program. Process controls were implemented to assure cleanliness in the production environment, to control contaminants, and to preclude corrosion. Each tank was accepted via rigorous inspections, including non-destructive evaluation techniques, proof testing, and all systems testing. In the post STS-107 era, the project focused on ascent debris risk reduction. This was accomplished via stringent process controls, post flight assessment using substantially improved imagery, and selective redesigns. These efforts were supported with a number of test programs to simulate combined environments. The debris risk was reduced by two orders of magnitude. During this time a major natural disaster was overcome when hurricane Katrina damaged the manufacturing facility. Numerous lessons from these efforts, the manufacturing and material processing issues, the key design features, and evolution of the design will be discussed.

Pilet, Jeffery C.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Software Programs Derive Measurements from Photographs

Even under the most unfortunate circumstances, NASA continues on a path of innovation. After the Space Shuttle Columbia reentered the atmosphere on February 1, 2003, it experienced a catastrophic failure, and the entire crew and vehicle were lost. For the two weeks prior to the accident, Columbia STS-107 was on a mission to perform physical, life, and space sciences research in the unique environment of microgravity. Following the accident, the remaining shuttles - Endeavor, Atlantis, and Discovery - were grounded, and an intense investigation ensued. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board spent nearly 7 months examining the cause of the accident and determining what would ensure a safe return to flight. To this end, investigators performed an extensive review down five analytic paths: aerodynamic, thermodynamic, sensor data timeline, debris reconstruction, and imaging. As part of the evaluation of all the available imagery from Columbia's ascent, orbit, and entry, investigators needed a new method for analyzing still video images to determine the size of the material that fell from Columbia, as well as the distance that the material traveled. John Lane, a scientist at Kennedy Space Center, devised a software program to calculate the unknown dimension of the material in the images, and soon after the investigation was complete, continued to enhance the technology. Eventually, the program that assisted in the Columbia investigation became available for licensing.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2011

External Tank - The Structure Backbone

The External Tank forms the structural backbone of the Space Shuttle in the launch configuration. Because the tank flies to orbital velocity with the Space Shuttle Orbiter, minimization of weight is mandatory, to maximize payload performance. Choice of lightweight materials both for structure and thermal conditioning was necessary. The tank is large, and unique manufacturing facilities, tooling, handling, and transportation operations were required. Weld processes and tooling evolved with the design as it matured through several block changes, to reduce weight. Non Destructive Evaluation methods were used to assure integrity of welds and thermal protection system materials. The aluminum-lithium alloy was used near the end of the program and weld processes and weld repair techniques had to be refined. Development and implementation of friction stir welding was a substantial technology development incorporated during the Program. Automated thermal protection system application processes were developed for the majority of the tank surface. Material obsolescence was an issue throughout the 40 year program. The final configuration and tank weight enabled international space station assembly in a high inclination orbit allowing international cooperation with the Russian Federal Space Agency. Numerous process controls were implemented to assure product quality, and innovative proof testing was accomplished prior to delivery. Process controls were implemented to assure cleanliness in the production environment, to control contaminants, and to preclude corrosion. Each tank was accepted via rigorous inspections, including non-destructive evaluation techniques, proof testing, and all systems testing. In the post STS-107 era, the project focused on ascent debris risk reduction. This was accomplished via stringent process controls, post flight assessment using substantially improved imagery, and selective redesigns. These efforts were supported with a number of test programs to simulate combined environments. Processing improvements included development and use of low spray guns for foam application, additional human factors considerations for production, use of high fidelity mockups during hardware processing with video review, improved tank access, extensive use of non destructive evaluation, and producibility enhancements. Design improvements included redesigned bipod fittings, a bellows heater, a feedline camera active during ascent flight, removal of the protuberance airload ramps, redesigned ice frost ramps, and titanium brackets replaced aluminum brackets on the liquid oxygen feedline. Post flight assessment improved due to significant addition of imagery assets, greatly improving situational awareness. The debris risk was reduced by two orders of magnitude. During this time a major natural disaster was overcome when Katrina damaged the manufacturing facility. Numerous lessons from these efforts are documented within the paper.

Welzyn, Kenneth↗

NASA NTRS2012

An Analysis of Shuttle Crew Scheduling Violations

From the early years of the Space Shuttle program, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Shuttle crews have had a timeline of activities to guide them through their time on-orbit. Planners used scheduling constraints to build timelines that ensured the health and safety of the crews. If a constraint could not be met it resulted in a violation. Other agencies of the federal government also have scheduling constraints to ensure the safety of personnel and the public. This project examined the history of Space Shuttle scheduling constraints, constraints from Federal agencies and branches of the military and how these constraints may be used as a guide for future NASA and private spacecraft. This was conducted by reviewing rules and violations with regard to human aerospace scheduling constraints, environmental, political, social and technological factors, operating environment and relevant human factors. This study includes a statistical analysis of Shuttle Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) related violations to determine if these were a significant producer of constraint violations. It was hypothesized that the number of SCSC violations caused by EVA activities were a significant contributor to the total number of violations for Shuttle/ISS missions. Data was taken from NASA data archives at the Johnson Space Center from Space Shuttle/ISS missions prior to the STS-107 accident. The results of the analysis rejected the null hypothesis and found that EVA violations were a significant contributor to the total number of violations. This analysis could help NASA and commercial space companies understand the main source of constraint violations and allow them to create constraint rules that ensure the safe operation of future human private and exploration missions. Additional studies could be performed to evaluate other variables that could have influenced the scheduling violations that were analyzed.

Bristol, Douglas↗

NASA NTRS2024

BLAYER User Guide

Estimation of boundary layer edge or thickness is an essential aspect of utilizing high fidelity aerothermodynamic flow solutions. For viscous flow over a flat plate, the boundary layer thickness is usually defined as the distance from the wall at which the flow velocity (zero at the wall) has increased through some profile to 99% or 99.5% of the free stream velocity. In real gas flows over aerospace vehicles, a total enthalpy profile is employed for edge calculations. The importance of knowing boundary layer thickness and its relation to possible transition from laminar to turbulent flow is illustrated by Space Shuttle mission STS-114, when the appearance of tile gap filler protrusions on the nose was deemed serious enough that a crew member was called upon to exit the vehicle and remove the potential threat prior to its descent from orbit. The BLAYER utility used as part of post-processing Orion/MPCV flow solutions is a generalization of the earlier BLAYER_RESULTS utility developed following the STS-107 Columbia accident. BLAYER handles a variable number of gas species (not just 5), allows for more than one temperature and for optional extra flow quantities, and omits optional handling of Orbiter tile datasets.

momentum thicknes↗

NASA NTRS2026

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned: Columbia Launch and Recovery

On February 25, 2026, this NASA Talk was held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring this talk to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talk. Retired NASA Columbia Vehicle Manager Scott Thurston presented this talk. Mr. Thurston brings a wealth of knowledge from his mission experience. This talk was timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team. This record includes an mp4 video presentation with a run time of 36 min. 20 sec.; in color; with sound.

NASA Talks↗

NASA NTRS2026

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned

On February 25, 2026, two NASA Talks were held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery, Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes & Key Takeaways). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring these talks to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talks. NASA Mishap Program Specialist David Erickson and retired NASA Columbia Vehicle Manager Scott Thurston presented these talks. Mr. Erickson supports NASA mishap investigations and assists with the development of NASA's new Columbia Learning Center at KSC. Mr. Thurston brought a wealth of knowledge from his mission experience. These talks were timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team.

Space Shuttle Columbia↗

NASA NTRS2026

NASA Talks: Space Shuttle Columbia - Lessons Learned: Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes and Key Takeaways

On February 25, 2026, this NASA Talk was held regarding the Space Shuttle Columbia (Columbia Launch & Recovery, Columbia Reconstruction, Investigation, Causes & Key Takeaways). Crew & Thermal System Division (EC) partnered with Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Engineering Directorate (EA) to bring these talks to Johnson Space Center (JSC) centering on what led up to and transpired after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Some recovered debris was on exhibit during the talks. NASA Mishap Program Specialist David Erickson presented this talk. Mr. Erickson supports NASA mishap investigations and assists with the development of NASA's new Columbia Learning Center at KSC. This talk was timely and a solemn reminder of the critical importance of diligence, safety, and excellence in our work. EA Director Julie Kramer White welcomed the 400+ center-wide in-person audience, and EC Division Chief Rubik Sheth introduced the speakers. This event was held in the JSC Teague Auditorium, recorded, and executed by the EC in-house STAR Productions team. This record includes an mp4 video with a run time of 32 min. 31 sec.; in color; with sound.

NASA Talks↗