Results for “Safety” — Page 8

NASA NTRS2010

Proposal for Ground Safety Review Coordination at ISS Launch Sites

As the transportation of ISS payloads and cargo shifts from KSC to other launch sites, close coordination of ground safety review processes would be of benefit to all parties. The benefit would have the launch sites receiving consistent data that would require less effort to review while still meeting their needs. Until recently, ground safety focus for the ISS program has been almost exclusively for prelaunch processing at KSC/post-landing processing at KSC/DFRC Each launch site, used by the ISS Program, has a ground safety review process. Ground safety viewed as local prerogative. Up till now, ground processing has consisted of low risk/low hazard items; but this will not always be the case. Recent coordination issues associated with the ground safety review of ORU's to be processed at Tanegashima for HTV-2, illustrate that IP ground safety review processes are not well understood by the ISS community at large. Confusion for data providers (US only?). Lack of internal review process for data being submitted to launch sites can lead to inconsistent submittals. NCRs/HRs. Majority of IP ground safety requirements are based upon old KHB 1700.7 (now KNPR 8715.3, Chapter 20). Proposals include: Establish a ground safety working group as part of the MS&MAP. Search for efficiencies in requirements and data submittal processes. Document processes in NSTS 13830/SSP 30599. Each launch site report out its payload ground safety status at the F2F (Monthly's as required). Completions/due dates/NCRs/issues/changes. Establish internal processes for review of ground safety submittals.

Kirkpatrick, Paul D.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Flightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP) Model for Safety Technology Portfolio Assessment

NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) develops and advances methodologies and technologies to improve air transportation safety. The Safety Analysis and Integration Team (SAIT) conducts a safety technology portfolio assessment (PA) to analyze the program content, to examine the benefits and risks of products with respect to program goals, and to support programmatic decision making. The PA process includes systematic identification of current and future safety risks as well as tracking several quantitative and qualitative metrics to ensure the program goals are addressing prominent safety risks accurately and effectively. One of the metrics within the PA process involves using quantitative aviation safety models to gauge the impact of the safety products. This paper demonstrates the role of aviation safety modeling by providing model outputs and evaluating a sample of portfolio elements using the Flightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP) model. The model enables not only ranking of the quantitative relative risk reduction impact of all portfolio elements, but also highlighting the areas with high potential impact via sensitivity and gap analyses in support of the program office. Although the model outputs are preliminary and products are notional, the process shown in this paper is essential to a comprehensive PA of NASA's safety products in the current program and future programs/projects.

Ancel, Ersin↗

NASA NTRS2016

Addressing Uniqueness and Unison of Reliability and Safety for a Better Integration

Over time, it has been observed that Safety and Reliability have not been clearly differentiated, which leads to confusion, inefficiency, and, sometimes, counter-productive practices in executing each of these two disciplines. It is imperative to address this situation to help Reliability and Safety disciplines improve their effectiveness and efficiency. The paper poses an important question to address, "Safety and Reliability - Are they unique or unisonous?" To answer the question, the paper reviewed several most commonly used analyses from each of the disciplines, namely, FMEA, reliability allocation and prediction, reliability design involvement, system safety hazard analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment. The paper pointed out uniqueness and unison of Safety and Reliability in their respective roles, requirements, approaches, and tools, and presented some suggestions for enhancing and improving the individual disciplines, as well as promoting the integration of the two. The paper concludes that Safety and Reliability are unique, but compensating each other in many aspects, and need to be integrated. Particularly, the individual roles of Safety and Reliability need to be differentiated, that is, Safety is to ensure and assure the product meets safety requirements, goals, or desires, and Reliability is to ensure and assure maximum achievability of intended design functions. With the integration of Safety and Reliability, personnel can be shared, tools and analyses have to be integrated, and skill sets can be possessed by the same person with the purpose of providing the best value to a product development.

Huang, Zhaofeng↗

NASA NTRS2023

Information and Best Practices Related to NASA Nuclear Flight Safety for Space Flights Involving Space Nuclear Systems

The purpose of this handbook is to facilitate a repeatable and robust process that promotes clear and effective interfaces between activities and stakeholders focused on meeting nuclear flight safety requirements for missions utilizing space nuclear systems (SNS), within the context of NASA’s broader nuclear-related activities and interfaces. NPR 8715.26, Nuclear Flight Safety, requires that the NASA project manager “incorporate nuclear flight safety considerations starting with program or project formulation through the point at which the SNS or other radioactive material no longer has the potential to affect Earth’s biosphere.” NASA’s use of SNS inherently involves partnering with other stakeholders to conduct a range of related activities that interface with nuclear flight safety. From a categorical perspective these include: (i) meeting the authorities and licensing requirements for possession and use of nuclear material, as governed by other Federal authorities; (ii) conducting National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) activities for nuclear-enabled missions; (iii) meeting Federal nuclear launch authorization requirements; (iv) conducting radiological contingency planning activities, including those associated with international commitments; (v) performing risk communication and public outreach activities; and (vi) ensuring decommissioning and disposal strategies reflect National policies and interests. It is the intent of this handbook to promote an effective interface between nuclear flight safety and these interrelated categorical activities. In addition to activities undertaken with partnering agencies, there are individual nuclear-related activities and programs that have a nexus to nuclear flight safety, and these include: (i) applicable NASA Standing Review Boards; (ii) the US Department of Energy nuclear safety activities conducted in partnership with NASA under Memoranda of Understanding; (iii) the Department of Defense’s Range Safety activities; (iv) NASA’s general involvement in interagency and international dialogues regarding nuclear safety; (v) the NASA-administered Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Board; (vi) NASA’s program and project governance activities and nuclear-specific Technical Discipline Team activities under the Office of the Chief Engineer; and others. It is the intent of this handbook to promote effective leveraging of these additional interrelated organizational activities, as appropriate.

Donald Helton↗

NASA NTRS2015

Formal Foundations for Hierarchical Safety Cases

Safety cases are increasingly being required in many safety-critical domains to assure, using structured argumentation and evidence, that a system is acceptably safe. However, comprehensive system-wide safety arguments present appreciable challenges to develop, understand, evaluate, and manage, partly due to the volume of information that they aggregate, such as the results of hazard analysis, requirements analysis, testing, formal verification, and other engineering activities. Previously, we have proposed hierarchical safety cases, hicases, to aid the comprehension of safety case argument structures. In this paper, we build on a formal notion of safety case to formalise the use of hierarchy as a structuring technique, and show that hicases satisfy several desirable properties. Our aim is to provide a formal, theoretical foundation for safety cases. In particular, we believe that tools for high assurance systems should be granted similar assurance to the systems to which they are applied. To this end, we formally specify and prove the correctness of key operations for constructing and managing hicases, which gives the specification for implementing hicases in AdvoCATE, our toolset for safety case automation. We motivate and explain the theory with the help of a simple running example, extracted from a real safety case and developed using AdvoCATE.

Hierarchy↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Data-Driven Approach to Recognizing and Understanding Human Contributions to Aviation Safety

Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence, and are influenced by, how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on safety-producing behaviors, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non-representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human contributions to aviation safety represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making policy decisions about safety management and system design. Opportunities exist to leverage the vast amount of data that have already been collected, or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human contributions to safety in commercial aviation. This presentation will focus on those opportunities as well as the challenges associated with collecting and analyzing data on operators’ safety-producing behaviors.

Safety↗

NASA NTRS2013

Prospective Safety Analysis and the Complex Aviation System

Fatal accident rates in commercial passenger aviation are at historic lows yet have plateaued and are not showing evidence of further safety advances. Modern aircraft accidents reflect both historic causal factors and new unexpected "Black Swan" events. The ever-increasing complexity of the aviation system, along with its associated technology and organizational relationships, provides fertile ground for fresh problems. It is important to take a proactive approach to aviation safety by working to identify novel causation mechanisms for future aviation accidents before they happen. Progress has been made in using of historic data to identify the telltale signals preceding aviation accidents and incidents, using the large repositories of discrete and continuous data on aircraft and air traffic control performance and information reported by front-line personnel. Nevertheless, the aviation community is increasingly embracing predictive approaches to aviation safety. The "prospective workshop" early assessment tool described in this paper represents an approach toward this prospective mindset-one that attempts to identify the future vectors of aviation and asks the question: "What haven't we considered in our current safety assessments?" New causation mechanisms threatening aviation safety will arise in the future because new (or revised) systems and procedures will have to be used under future contextual conditions that have not been properly anticipated. Many simulation models exist for demonstrating the safety cases of new operational concepts and technologies. However the results from such models can only be as valid as the accuracy and completeness of assumptions made about the future context in which the new operational concepts and/or technologies will be immersed. Of course that future has not happened yet. What is needed is a reasonably high-confidence description of the future operational context, capturing critical contextual characteristics that modulate both the likelihood of occurrence of hazards, and the likelihood that those hazards will lead to negative safety events. Heuristics extracted from scenarios, questionnaires, and observed trends from scanning the aviation horizon may be helpful in capturing those future changes in a way conducive to safety assessment. What is also needed is a checklist of potential sources of emerging risk that arise from organizational features that are frequently overlooked. The ultimate goal is to develop a pragmatic, workable method for using descriptions of the future aviation context, to generate valid predictions of safety risks.

prospection↗

NASA NTRS2013

2013 NASA Range Safety Annual Report

Welcome to the 2013 edition of the NASA Range Safety Annual Report. Funded by NASA Headquarters, this report provides an Agency overview for current and potential range users. This report contains articles which cover a variety of subject areas, summaries of various activities performed during the past year, links to past reports, and information on several projects that may have a profound impact on the way business will be conducted in the future. Specific topics discussed in the 2013 NASA Range Safety Annual Report include a program overview and 2013 highlights, Range Safety Training, Independent Assessments, support to Program Operations at all ranges conducting NASA launch/flight operations, a continuing overview of emerging range safety-related technologies, and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range Safety responsibilities. Every effort has been made to include the most current information available. We recommend this report be used only for guidance and that the validity and accuracy of all articles be verified for updates. As is the case each year, we had a wide variety of contributors to this report from across our NASA Centers and the national range safety community at large, and I wish to thank them all. On a sad note, we lost one of our close colleagues, Dr. Jim Simpson, due to his sudden passing in December. His work advancing the envelope of autonomous flight safety systems software/hardware development leaves a lasting impression on our community. Such systems are being flight tested today and may one day be considered routine in the range safety business. The NASA family has lost a pioneer in our field, and he will surely be missed. In conclusion, it has been a very busy and productive year, and I look forward to working with all of you in NASA Centers/Programs/Projects and with the national Range Safety community in making Flight/Space activities as safe as they can be in the upcoming year.

Center Status↗

NASA NTRS2017

Qualitative Future Safety Risk Identification an Update

The purpose of this report is to document the results of a high-level qualitative study that was conducted to identify future aviation safety risks and to assess the potential impacts to the National Airspace System (NAS) of NASA Aviation Safety research on these risks. Multiple external sources (for example, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Flight Safety Foundation, the National Research Council, and the Joint Planning and Development Office) were used to develop a compilation of future safety issues risks, also referred to as future tall poles. The primary criterion used to identify the most critical future safety risk issues was that the issue must be cited in several of these sources as a safety area of concern. The tall poles in future safety risk, in no particular order of importance, are as follows: Runway Safety, Loss of Control In Flight, Icing Ice Detection, Loss of Separation, Near Midair Collision Human Fatigue, Increasing Complexity and Reliance on Automation, Vulnerability Discovery, Data Sharing and Dissemination, and Enhanced Survivability in the Event of an Accident.

future aviation safety risk↗

NASA NTRS2021

Architectural Modeling and Analysis for Safety Engineering

Model-based development tools are increasingly being used for system-level development of safety-critical systems. Architectural and behavioral models provide important information that can be leveraged to improve the system safety analysis process. Model-based design artifacts produced in early stage development activities can be used to perform system safety analysis, reducing costs and providing accurate results throughout the system life-cycle. In this report we describe an extension to the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) that supports modeling of system behavior under failure conditions. This Safety Annex enables the independent modeling of component failures and allows safety engineers to weave various types of fault behavior into the nominal system model. The accompanying tool support uses model checking to propagate errors from their source to their effect on safety properties without the need to add separate propagation specifications. The tool also captures all minimal set of fault combinations that can cause violation of the safety properties, that can be compared to qualitative and quantitative objectives as part of the safety assessment process. We describe the Safety Annex, illustrate its use with a representative example, and discuss and demonstrate the tool support enabling an analyst to investigate the system behavior under failure conditions.

FTA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model-Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

NASA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

System Safety Analysis of Complex NASA Systems with Model Based Engineering

The emergence of model-based engineering is transforming design and analysis methodologies [5]. A recognized benefit of model-based engineering is the existence of a “single source of truth” about the system that becomes the authoritative source of data and information for designers, analysts, and developers. This promotes consistency and efficiency as the design emerges and can be used to further optimize the design. Integrating System Safety Engineers to the “single source of truth” will ensure that the outputs of their assessments and analyses are relevant to the design as it evolves. Use of an integrated system model enables near immediate evaluation of a design change as well as development of operational processes for risk assessment and communication. Such models can enable efficient and timely analysis of system hazards (e.g., hazard fault tree analysis and procedure simulations) and produce complete, accurate, and more consistent products (e.g., hazard reports and safety requirement evaluations). Therefore, an agency-sponsored team at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) recently completed a System Safety Study of modeling and testing capabilities as part of a Model-Based Safety and Mission Assurance Initiative (MBSMAI). Using an existing model developed for reliability analyses [1], GSFC modeling and system safety experts performed system safety analysis/modeling and produced safety products. The team evaluated model-based feasibility to support System Safety Engineering, developed safety analysis modeling processes, and identified tool capability advancement/development needs. These study results indicate model-based engineering is valid and useable for System

Model Based Engineering↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.

safety expertise↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.

safety expertise↗

NASA NTRS1991

An interagency space nuclear propulsion safety policy for SEI - Issues and discussion

An interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of Safety Functional Requirements. In addition, the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety topics include reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, safeguards, risk/reliability, operational safety, ground testing, and other considerations. In this paper the emphasis is placed on the safety policy and the issues and considerations that are addressed by the NSPWG recommendations.

Marshall, A. C.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Nuclear safety

Topics dealing with nuclear safety are addressed which include the following: general safety requirements; safety design requirements; terrestrial safety; SP-100 Flight System key safety requirements; potential mission accidents and hazards; key safety features; ground operations; launch operations; flight operations; disposal; safety concerns; licensing; the nuclear engine for rocket vehicle application (NERVA) design philosophy; the NERVA flight safety program; and the NERVA safety plan.

Buden, D.↗

NASA NTRS1992

NSPWG-recommended safety requirements and guidelines for SEI nuclear propulsion

An interagency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG) was chartered to recommend nuclear safety policy, requirements, and guidelines for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) nuclear propulsion program to facilitate the implementation of mission planning and conceptual design studies. The NSPWG developed a top-level policy to provide the guiding principles for the development and implementation of the nuclear propulsion safety program and the development of safety functional requirements. In addition, the NSPWG reviewed safety issues for nuclear propulsion and recommended top-level safety requirements and guidelines to address these issues. Safety requirements were developed for reactor start-up, inadvertent criticality, radiological release and exposure, disposal, entry, and safeguards. Guidelines were recommended for risk/reliability, operational safety, flight trajectory and mission abort, space debris and meteoroids, and ground test safety. In this paper the specific requirements and guidelines will be discussed.

Marshall, Albert C.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This Annual Report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) presents results of activities during calendar year 2001. The year was marked by significant achievements in the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs and encouraging accomplishments by the Aerospace Technology Enterprise. Unfortunately, there were also disquieting mishaps with the X-43, a LearJet, and a wind tunnel. Each mishap was analyzed in an orderly process to ascertain causes and derive lessons learned. Both these accomplishments and the responses to the mishaps led the Panel to conclude that safety and risk management is currently being well served within NASA. NASA's operations evidence high levels of safety consciousness and sincere efforts to place safety foremost. Nevertheless, the Panel's safety concerns have never been greater. This dichotomy has arisen because the focus of most NASA programs has been directed toward program survival rather than effective life cycle planning. Last year's Annual Report focused on the need for NASA to adopt a realistically long planning horizon for the aging Space Shuttle so that safety would not erode. NASA's response to the report concurred with this finding. Nevertheless, there has been a greater emphasis on current operations to the apparent detriment of long-term planning. Budget cutbacks and shifts in priorities have severely limited the resources available to the Space Shuttle and ISS for application to risk-reduction and life-extension efforts. As a result, funds originally intended for long-term safety-related activities have been used for operations. Thus, while safety continues to be well served at present, the basis for future safety has eroded. Section II of this report develops this theme in more detail and presents several important, overarching findings and recommendations that apply to many if not all of NASA's programs. Section III of the report presents other significant findings, recommendations and supporting material applicable to specific program areas. Appendix A presents a list of Panel members. Appendix B contains the reaction of the ASAP to NASA's response to the calendar year 2000 findings and recommendations. In accordance with a practice started last year, this Appendix includes brief narratives as well as classifications of the responses as 'open,' 'closed,' or 'continuing.' Appendix C details the Panel's activities during the reporting period.

Source record↗