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DOE OSTI2017

Security-informed safety: integrating security within the safety demonstration of a smart device - 157

Safety and security engineering have, over the years, developed their own regulations, standards, cultures, and practices. However, there's a growing realisation that security is closely connected to safety. Safety must be security-informed: if a safety-critical system isn't secure, it isn't safe. A safety demonstration is incomplete and unconvincing unless it considers security. In our work for government and industry, we have used the Claims, Arguments, Evidence (CAE) framework to analyse the impact of security on a safety justification or safety case and identified the significant changes needed to address security explicitly. This will impact the design and implementation process as well as the assurance and V and V approach. In this paper we discuss the impact of integrating security when developing a safety demonstration of a smart device. A smart device is an instrument, device or component that contains a microprocessor (and therefore contains both hardware and software) and is programmed to provide specialised capabilities, often measuring or controlling a process variable. Examples of smart devices include radiation monitors, relays, turbine governors, uninterruptible power supplies and heating ventilation, and air conditioning controllers. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Proposed Classifications of Remote Operations for Nuclear Reactors Based on Physical and Cybersecurity Considerations

The incorporation of remote operations into reactor operations is a topic of high interest among advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) vendors, with some considering it essential to the success of their business models. However, remote operations are a concept novel to the nuclear industry. While various technical aspects of remote operations have been explored, a significant gap remains in understanding the security implications of integrating remote operations into reactor designs, particularly concerning the security requirements for remote-operations facilities and infrastructure. This report aims to address this gap by first defining classes of remote operation based on the extent of remote access to reactor control systems and grounded in the existing regulatory framework with compatible terminology. Secondly, the report outlines the physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to remote-operations facilities and infrastructure at each defined class. These requirements are based on existing licensing frameworks provided by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52, as well as the upcoming A/SMR licensing framework in the proposed Part 53. The assessment focuses specifically on security regulations, such as 10 CFR Part 73, which includes provisions for both cybersecurity (§ 73.54) and physical security (§ 73.55). This report proposes five classes of remote reactor operations. Class 1 involves remote monitoring only, with no control over reactor systems. Class 2 allows for the remote issuance of allowlisted commands to the reactor facility. Class 3 extends control to non-safety-significant, non-safety-related, or not important to safety systems and equipment. Class 4 permits remote control of safety-significant systems. Finally, Class 5 allows remote control of safety-related systems. It is important to note that these classes were defined purely with functionality in mind, without considering the practicality or feasibility of implementation for each class under current or upcoming regulatory guidance. The intention behind this approach is to enable an assessment of which security requirements apply to each class, allowing readers to evaluate the implementation possibilities for their specific use cases. Following the definition of remote-operation classes, the report assesses the specific physical and cybersecurity requirements applicable to the remote-operations facility and infrastructure within each defined class. This includes defining the types and locations of operators that are possible at each class of operation and, based on operator type and location, as well as functionality within each class, outlining the physical and cybersecurity requirements. By detailing the security requirements by class, the report provides readers with the information needed to determine the type of security program they may need to implement for their desired concept of operation. The next contribution of this report was to assess the practicality of implementing each proposed class of remote operations based upon the security requirement assessment. In short, three of the five proposed remote-operation classes were found to possibly have a practical path forward to implementation under the U.S. regulatory framework. Class 1 remote operations are currently in use in the U.S. while Class 2 and 3 remote operations may be logistically possible to implement under the U.S. regulatory framework. The final two Classes, 4 and 5, would likely be logistically difficult, if not infeasible to implement within the current U.S. physical- and cybersecurity regulatory framework. Given the results of the feasibility assessment, an example architecture is proposed for both Class 2, remote allowlisted commands, and Class 3, remote control of non-safety systems as well as security implication assessments of each architecture. These example implementations are not meant to be prescriptive in terms of how Class 2 or Class 3 remote operations should be deployed; instead, they are intended to be informative to stakeholders on how Class 2 or Class 3 could potentially be applied in order to inform their system design. An example architecture for Class 1 remote monitoring was not provided as Class 1 in already in use in U.S. nuclear operations. Example architectures for Class 4 and Class 5 were not provided due to their assessment of being likely infeasible to implement. The final contribution is an assessment of the physical- and cybersecurity implications of introducing autonomous operations into an A/SMR. What was found was that the security implications can be separated into two cases. Autonomous operations supported by SSCs located only at the reactor site, and autonomous operations supported by SSCs outside of the reactor site. For the first case, the introduction of autonomous systems will likely not change the facility’s requirement to comply with existing cyber and physical security regulation

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Neutronics Code Benchmark for Fluoride-Salt-Cooled Reactors

The fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactor (FHR) is an advanced reactor design that aims to improve on the efficiency, cost, safety and non-proliferation security of nuclear energy, while exploiting existing technologies to minimize the design and licensing burden. FHRs share many design features with the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR), namely using the same fuel form: a bed of graphite spheres, each with thousands of small coated fuel particles (TRISO) dispersed throughout it. However, rather than using a gas as a coolant, the FHR uses a molten salt which changes the behavior of the system; in particular, from a neutronics perspective, the coolant is no longer effectively transparent to neutrons, but rather contributes both to neutron moderation and absorption. It is difficult to perform exploratory reactor physics experiments for new reactor concepts, as the regulation and cost surrounding a fuel experiment is often highly restrictive and prohibitive. As such, researchers and design engineers must rely heavily on simulation capability to develop a working knowledge for how the reactor physics of a pre-prototypical reactor might behave. It is then essential to have confidence that simulation codes provide credible results. As there are no instances of FHRs deployed to date, nor are there any experimental data available on neutron behavior of pebble fuel immersed in salt, the first step is to perform a code-to-code verification of idealized scenarios that capture the physics involved with an FHR system. This summary describes the development of a code-to-code benchmark for FHR with the purpose of code verification and presents preliminary results. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Stochastic analog neutron transport with TRIPOLI-4 and FREYA: Bayesian uncertainty quantification for neutron multiplicity counting

From nuclear safeguards to homeland security applications, the need for the better modeling of nuclear interactions has grown over the past decades. Current Monte Carlo radiation transport codes compute average quantities with great accuracy and performance; however, performance and averaging come at the price of limited interaction-by-interaction modeling. These codes often lack the capability of modeling interactions exactly: for a given collision, energy is not conserved, energies of emitted particles are uncorrelated, and multiplicities of prompt fission neutrons and photons are uncorrelated. Many modern applications require more exclusive quantities than averages, such as the fluctuations in certain observables (e.g., the neutron multiplicity) and correlations between neutrons and photons. In an effort to meet this need, the radiation transport Monte Carlo code TRIPOLI-4® was modified to provide a specific mode that models nuclear interactions in a full analog way, replicating as much as possible the underlying physical process. Furthermore, the computational model FREYA (Fission Reaction Event Yield Algorithm) was coupled with TRIPOLI-4 to model complete fission events. As a result, FREYA automatically includes fluctuations as well as correlations resulting from conservation of energy and momentum.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Big Hole Drilling Support for Nuclear Testing, 1985-1992: An Architectural Survey of the Area 1 Subdock, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) planned to demolish two buildings at the Area 1 Subdock at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet environmental management mission requirements. A review was conducted under Title 54 United States Code (USC) § 306101 (commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. As a result, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was developed to mitigate the effects of the building demolitions. Stipulation III.B of the MOA requires an architectural survey of the Area 1 Subdock. Prior to this survey, the Subdock had not been systematically recorded. Therefore, an area of approximately 33 hectares (81 acres) was surveyed for historic properties by Desert Research Institute personnel. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the potential Area 1 Subdock Historic District (SHPO Resource No. D377), including the identification of its contributing components. This district is recommended as eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A and C. It contains 14 primary resources which include individual buildings, structures, storage yards, and infrastructure. Of these resources, all except one are recommended as elements that contribute to the district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1985 through 1992. Four of the resources (B18847, B18848, S2772, S2773) are recommended as individually eligible for the NRHP.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods

The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Risk informed cyber security for nuclear power plants - 342

Nuclear power plants are increasingly adding digital components for plant operation, safety, and security. These digital components fill a gap with legacy equipment where replacement components no longer exist. They also benefit operation of the plant by increasing efficiency in power generation, monitoring of equipment and plant parameters, as well as aiding operator control. However, the addition of digital components and systems also adds cyber risks with previously unanalyzed failure modes and attack vectors are introduced with these new systems. These risks are difficult to identify, analyze, and mitigate due to the increasingly complex nature of the digital components and the integration of these components with additional plant processes and communication networks. The research presented in this paper develops a new method that addresses the cyber risk to inform appropriate levels of protection. EPRI and Sandia are working under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement to develop an effective method of evaluating the cyber risk in production nuclear power facilities. The Cyber Hazards Analysis Risk Methodology (CHARM) focuses on ensuring adequate controls are in place for appropriate cyber protection of the plant from radiological release or generation risk. Existing plant hazards analyses (e.g., PRA, FTA) do not account for software deficiencies or adversarial intent. This method leverages existing plant analyses and MIT's Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to create cyber informed fault trees. These new fault trees will provide the basis for comprehensive cyber risk analysis and help ensure potential gaps in cyber security controls are identified and corrected. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2015

RCRA Part B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU)

This volume of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection provides facility information on the design, processes, and security features associated with the Cell 18 Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU) at the Nevada National Security Site, under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). Onsite and offsite containerized low-level mixed waste (LLMW) that has an approved DOE nexus, DOE non-radioactive classified hazardous waste, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agency non-radioactive classified hazardous waste (hereafter called waste) are disposed in the unit. Classified waste is the only non-radioactive waste accepted for disposal and is required to meet waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste. The MWDU is located in the southeast portion of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). The RWMC includes transuranic waste storage units, breaching and re-packaging facilities, and the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS). The RWMS is an active disposal site for waste. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and friable and non-friable asbestos are accepted for disposal. The MWDU has been compliantly operating since January 26, 2011, and approximately 60 percent of its capacity has been used for disposal. In addition to the requirements of the RCRA, the MWDU is also subject to DOE orders, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations (for receipt of offsite waste), and State of Nevada requirements. General information and hazardous waste codes identified for disposal at the MWDU are described. State-only designated hazardous waste may also be received at the NNSS as hazardous waste. For safety and security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This public version of the application contains most, but not all, of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Digital Twin Technology for Safety, Security, and Training in Spent Nuclear Fuel Handling

The increasing complexity of spent nuclear fuel handling requires significant resources to ensure safety, security, and personnel training. As nuclear facilities have continued to advance in scale and technology, the integration of digital tools has become indispensable. Among these tools, digital twins, which are virtual models of physical systems, are emerging as invaluable tools for enhancing safety protocols, security measures, and training in the nuclear sector. These models were conceptualized in the Industry 4.0 revolution. Digital twins can process data from physical systems in real time (by using sensors), include multiple code packages to enable simulations of different physics applications, and even implement artificial intelligence or machine learning techniques for advanced data processing. Despite the advantages that digital twins provide, challenges still exist regarding their widespread implementation. For instance, data used by a digital twin must be accurate to ensure that the digital twin is accurately tuned. Furthermore, if insecure digital twins are targeted by hackers, then they can pose serious risks to the security and safety of nuclear facilities.

Digital twins↗
DOE OSTI2023

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2015

ASME Code Considerations for the Compact Heat Exchanger

The mission of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy is to advance nuclear power in order to meet the nation's energy, environmental, and energy security needs. Advanced high temperature reactor systems such as sodium fast reactors and high and very high temperature gas-cooled reactors are being considered for the next generation of nuclear reactor plant designs. The coolants for these high temperature reactor systems include liquid sodium and helium gas. Supercritical carbon dioxide (sCO₂), a fluid at a temperature and pressure above the supercritical point of CO₂, is currently being investigated by DOE as a working fluid for a nuclear or fossil-heated recompression closed Brayton cycle energy conversion system that operates at 550°C (1022°F) at 200 bar (2900 psi). Higher operating temperatures are envisioned in future developments. All of these design concepts require a highly effective heat exchanger that transfers heat from the nuclear or chemical reactor to the chemical process fluid or the to the power cycle. In the nuclear designs described above, heat is transferred from the primary to the secondary loop via an intermediate heat exchanger (IHX) and then from the intermediate loop to either a working process or a power cycle via a secondary heat exchanger (SHX). The IHX is a component in the primary coolant loop which will be classified as "safety related." The intermediate loop will likely be classified as "not safety related but important to safety." These safety classifications have a direct bearing on heat exchanger design approaches for the IHX and SHX. The very high temperatures being considered for the VHTR will require the use of very high temperature alloys for the IHX and SHX. Material cost considerations alone will dictate that the IHX and SHX be highly effective; that is, provide high heat transfer area in a small volume. This feature must be accompanied by low pressure drop and mechanical reliability and robustness. Classic shell and tube designs will be large and costly, and may only be appropriate in steam generator service in the SHX where boiling inside the tubes occurs. For other energy conversion systems, all of these features can be met in a compact heat exchanger design. This report will examine some of the ASME Code issues that will need to be addressed to allow use of a Code-qualified compact heat exchanger in IHX or SHX nuclear service. Most effort will focus on the IHX, since the safety-related (Class A) design rules are more extensive than those for important-to-safety (Class B) or commercial rules that are relevant to the SHX.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Evaluation of Naturally Occurring Be-7 Activity on LANL Stack Filter Clumps

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is responsible for providing solutions to challenging issues through multidisciplinary science, engineering, and technology that impact national security. As part of the Radioactive Air Emissions Management (RAEM) Team, it is our responsibility to ensure LANL operates within the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 40 CFR 61, Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (Rad-NESHAP). The standard states, “Emissions of radionuclides to the ambient air from Department of Energy facilities shall not exceed those amounts that would cause any member of the public to receive in any year an effective dose equivalent of 10 mrem/yr” (EPA, 2002) During a routine assessment of LANL’s Rad-NESHAP compliance program, an opportunity for improvement was identified that addresses the evaluation of routine stack samples which potentially have naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) on the filter media. In the past and based on professional judgment, detections of NORM such as K-40 and Be-7 typically were rejected from the analytical results. The assessment finding suggested developing a technical criterion to ensure that such rejections were justified, comparing actual measured values with anticipated NORM concentrations for various stacks located at LANL. The significance of accepting or rejecting samples as “true” or “NORM” and its impact on the RAEM’s mission and compliance to the regulations is explained later in the document. Additionally, this document will describe the process and calculations for how such results are to be accepted as actual samples “true positive” or rejected as NORM.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Design of virtual SCADA simulation system for pressurized water reactor

The Virtual SCADA system is a software-based Human-Machine Interface that can visualize the process of a plant. This paper described the results of the virtual SCADA system design that aims to recognize the principle of the Nuclear Power Plant type Pressurized Water Reactor. This simulation uses technical data of the Nuclear Power Plant Unit Olkiluoto 3 in Finland. This device was developed using Wonderware Intouch, which is equipped with manual books for each component, animation links, alarm systems, real time and historical trending, and security system. The results showed that in general this device can demonstrate clearly the principles of energy flow and energy conversion processes in Pressurized Water Reactors. This virtual SCADA simulation system can be used as instructional media to recognize the principle of Pressurized Water Reactor.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Resilient Information Architecture Platform for Smart Grid (RIAPS)

A number of emerging trends will substantially alter the operation and control of the electric grid over the next several decades. These trends include ensuring resiliency under severe weather events, increasing integration of renewable electricity generation, supporting changing electricity demand patterns, and the improving cost effectiveness of distributed energy resources. To address these challenges, the future “Smart Grid” management will need to transition from centralized to coordinated distributed control paradigm. Reliable operation of the Smart Grid depends on distributed intelligence realized through software applications that run on distributed computing devices attached to the power system to collect data and collaboratively manage resources. However, much of the existing software for Smart Grid-enabled devices is either proprietary or developed with custom solutions, which limits interoperability among the heterogeneous devices and hinders the ability to manage system-level reliability, security, and resiliency requirements. Additionally, this approach makes Smart Grid applications hard to maintain, evolve, verify, and replace; resulting in high development and deployment costs. Further development of the Smart Grid requires a reusable software base-layer to move from hard-coded functionality to a plug-and-play architecture capable of managing system-level objectives and constraints in addition to providing consistent common services across heterogeneous devices and applications. Vanderbilt University, in collaboration with North Carolina State University and Washington State University has developed a foundation ‘software platform’ for developing and deploying robust, reliable, effective and secure software applications for the Smart Grid. The Resilient Information Architecture Platform for the Smart Grid (RIAPS) provides core services for building effective and powerful smart grid applications. It offers unique services for real-time data dissemination, fault tolerance, and coordination across apps distributed over the network.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2016

Pulsed Power Science and Technology: A Strategic Outlook for the National Nuclear Security Administration (Summary)

Major advances in pulsed power technology and applications over the last twenty years have expanded the mission areas for pulsed power and created compelling new opportunities for the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). This summary document is a forward look at the development of pulsed power science and technology (PPS&T) capabilities in support of the next 20 years of the SSP. This outlook was developed during a three-month-long tri-lab study on the future of PPS&T research and capabilities in support of applications to: (1) Dynamic Materials, (2) Thermonuclear Burn Physics and Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF), and (3) Radiation Effects and Nuclear Survivability. It also considers necessary associated developments in next-generation codes and pulsed power technology as well as opportunities for academic, industry, and international engagement. The document identifies both imperatives and opportunities to address future SSP mission needs. This study was commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). A copy of the memo request is contained in the Appendix. NNSA guidance received during this study explicitly directed that it not be constrained by resource limitations and not attempt to prioritize its findings against plans and priorities in other areas of the national weapons program. That prioritization, including the relative balance amongst the three focus areas themselves, must of course occur before any action is taken on the observations presented herein. This unclassified summary document presents the principal imperatives and opportunities identified in each mission and supporting area during this study. Preceding this area-specific outlook, we discuss a cross-cutting opportunity to increase the shot capacity on the Z pulsed power facility as a near-term, cost-effective way to broadly impact PPS&T for SSP as well as advancing the science and technology to inform future SSMP milestones over the next 5-10 years. The final page of the summary presents two timelines that couch the opportunities discussed here in terms of the broader strategic timelines encapsulated in the fiscal year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP).

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2016

Supplemental Thermal-Hydraulic Transient Analyses of BR2 in Support of Conversion to LEU Fuel

Belgian Reactor 2 (BR2) is a research and test reactor located in Mol, Belgium and is primarily used for radioisotope production and materials testing. The Materials Management and Minimization (M3) Reactor Conversion Program of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is supporting the conversion of the BR2 reactor from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel. The RELAP5/Mod 3.3 code has been used to perform transient thermal-hydraulic safety analyses of the BR2 reactor to support reactor conversion. A RELAP5 model of BR2 has been validated against select transient BR2 reactor experiments performed in 1963 by showing agreement with measured cladding temperatures. Following the validation, the RELAP5 model was then updated to represent the current use of the reactor; taking into account core configuration, neutronic parameters, trip settings, component changes, etc. Simulations of the 1963 experiments were repeated with this updated model to re-evaluate the boiling risks associated with the currently allowed maximum heat flux limit of 470 W/cm 2 and temporary heat flux limit of 600 W/cm 2 . This document provides analysis of additional transient simulations that are required as part of a modern BR2 safety analysis report (SAR). The additional simulations included in this report are effect of pool temperature, reduced steady-state flow rate, in-pool loss of coolant accidents, and loss of external cooling. The simulations described in this document have been performed for both an HEU- and LEU-fueled core.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

14 Steps to Creating Value in Cost and Schedule Resources for Nuclear Waste Management - 20188

While Waste Management budgets are shrinking, DOE required cost and schedule controls are becoming increasingly stringent. At the same time, there is a scarcity of adept, qualified, and competent projects controls staff who both understand nuclear waste management and are capable of addressing today's cost and schedule challenges. In response, we have developed a systematic approach to training and mentoring project controls staff. The approach is based on the observations and lessons learned on projects, both successful and unsuccessful, over the past 20 years. During that time, we evaluated staff development and used that experience to design a program that progresses the maturity, knowledge and experience of the individual. The program is based on the unique needs of cost and schedule specialists while incorporating the best leadership and managerial applications. The system is not limited to developing individual software skills, which is a primary focus of many project controls training programs. Instead, our system develops an individual's soft and hard skill sets. The system develops the user's skill, talent, attitude, and drive to do the best job possible. It focuses on all aspects of becoming a more productive technical team while accepting responsibility for individual growth. It also enhances the project controls team by setting up checks and balances that everyone is aware of and participates in. The system is based on 14 steps of increasing complexity in knowledge and application. The system clarifies roles, responsibilities and expectations. It helps eliminate uncertainty and reduces stress on staff and managers. It contains everyday routine actions and is simple to implement. It allows the development of a consistent rhythm to staff growth and development. Mastering the steps will allow the user to achieve excellence in cost and schedule control. The 14 steps are: 1 - Key Performance Objectives, 2 - Check Lists, 3 - Desktop Guides, 4 - System Description, 5 - Procedures, 6 - Software and On the Job Training (OTJ), 7 - Traceability Checks, 8 - Surveillances, 9 - 32 Criteria, 10 - The Contract, 11 - Customer/Government Guidance, 12 - Training and Mentoring Others, 13 - Master your weekly and daily schedules, 14 - Improving your interpersonal skills. Application and mastery of this system will produce better cost and schedule control results. Your project controls staff will write better reports, analyze data better, make better use of their time, and be more valuable to decision makers. If followed rigorously, our system will produce a great project controls team, which is invaluable to the success of each project. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗