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At least 145 records · Page 8

Applications of fiber optics technology to the Space Station

Attention is given to the EM interference, data bandwidth requirement, zero gravity operation, data security, crew safety, and modular expansion considerations affecting the future design of fiber-optical systems for large manned orbiting stations. Emphasis is given to replacing current, solar cell array electric systems technology for onboard furnace operation, leading to the formulation of a concentrated solar energy (thermal IR) transport system that yields higher efficiency than photovoltaics, despite its lower weight, in conjunction with Brayton, Rankine or Stirling cycle engines. The optical characteristics of the optical fibers employed by this system are discussed.

Erwin, H. O.↗

A Hybrid Power Management (HPM) Based Vehicle Architecture

Society desires vehicles with reduced fuel consumption and reduced emissions. This presents a challenge and an opportunity for industry and the government. The NASA John H. Glenn Research Center (GRC) has developed a Hybrid Power Management (HPM) based vehicle architecture for space and terrestrial vehicles. GRC's Electrical and Electromagnetics Branch of the Avionics and Electrical Systems Division initiated the HPM Program for the GRC Technology Transfer and Partnership Office. HPM is the innovative integration of diverse, state-of-the-art power devices in an optimal configuration for space and terrestrial applications. The appropriate application and control of the various power devices significantly improves overall system performance and efficiency. The basic vehicle architecture consists of a primary power source, and possibly other power sources, providing all power to a common energy storage system, which is used to power the drive motors and vehicle accessory systems, as well as provide power as an emergency power system. Each component is independent, permitting it to be optimized for its intended purpose. This flexible vehicle architecture can be applied to all vehicles to considerably improve system efficiency, reliability, safety, security, and performance. This unique vehicle architecture has the potential to alleviate global energy concerns, improve the environment, stimulate the economy, and enable new missions.

Eichenberg, Dennis J.↗

Hybrid Power Management-Based Vehicle Architecture

Hybrid Power Management (HPM) is the integration of diverse, state-of-the-art power devices in an optimal configuration for space and terrestrial applications (s ee figure). The appropriate application and control of the various power devices significantly improves overall system performance and efficiency. The basic vehicle architecture consists of a primary power source, and possibly other power sources, that provides all power to a common energy storage system that is used to power the drive motors and vehicle accessory systems. This architecture also provides power as an emergency power system. Each component is independent, permitting it to be optimized for its intended purpose. The key element of HPM is the energy storage system. All generated power is sent to the energy storage system, and all loads derive their power from that system. This can significantly reduce the power requirement of the primary power source, while increasing the vehicle reliability. Ultracapacitors are ideal for an HPM-based energy storage system due to their exceptionally long cycle life, high reliability, high efficiency, high power density, and excellent low-temperature performance. Multiple power sources and multiple loads are easily incorporated into an HPM-based vehicle. A gas turbine is a good primary power source because of its high efficiency, high power density, long life, high reliability, and ability to operate on a wide range of fuels. An HPM controller maintains optimal control over each vehicle component. This flexible operating system can be applied to all vehicles to considerably improve vehicle efficiency, reliability, safety, security, and performance. The HPM-based vehicle architecture has many advantages over conventional vehicle architectures. Ultracapacitors have a much longer cycle life than batteries, which greatly improves system reliability, reduces life-of-system costs, and reduces environmental impact as ultracapacitors will probably never need to be replaced and disposed of. The environmentally safe ultracapacitor components reduce disposal concerns, and their recyclable nature reduces the environmental impact. High ultracapacitor power density provides high power during surges, and the ability to absorb high power during recharging. Ultracapacitors are extremely efficient in capturing recharging energy, are rugged, reliable, maintenance-free, have excellent lowtemperature characteristic, provide consistent performance over time, and promote safety as they can be left indefinitely in a safe, discharged state whereas batteries cannot.

Eichenberg, Dennis J.↗

NASA Strategy for Technology Development

At the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), foresight is a coordinated, iterative, and continual process for making informed decisions. NASA faces diverse and relatively unique challenges and opportunities as the leading U.S. agency for aeronautics development, cutting-edge scientific discovery, and human space exploration. To address these challenges and leverage opportunities, NASA uses foresight to strategically plan technology development across four mission directorates: Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate, Space Technology Mission Directorate, Science Mission Directorate, and Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. The mission directorates leverage a broad community of experts and partners to incorporate technology foresight into mission and program planning. Through this process NASA realizes tangible benefits to the agency’s science, technology, and exploration programs. As an independent office, NASA’s Office of the Chief Technologist (OCT) serves as a trusted authority to inform technology strategy and advocacy at the agency, enabling future missions and advancing U.S. economic competitiveness. Specifically, OCT coordinates and uses inputs from abroad community of experts, both internal and external to NASA, to inform decision making for technology plans, investments, and partnerships. OCT develops the NASA Technology Taxonomy to standardize communication across the agency’s diverse technology portfolio and the related Strategic Technology Investment Plan that integrates priorities and informs technology investment. Through these efforts, OCT has refined elements of foresight-informed strategic planning that may be applicable to other technology-driven industries where foresight is essential for resilience. This chapter describes the processes of foresight for technology development at NASA and provides insight into the value the agency derives from these processes. The chapter further describes the role of OCT as an independent advisory office that supports NASA’s efforts to capitalize on foresight and strategic technology planning. We present these examples with consideration for how organizations in defense, security, and other technology-driven industries can operationalize foresight in their own strategic technology development.

Erica Rodgers↗

Corridor Design and Analysis for UAM Operations

The Urban Air Mobility (UAM) concept is a part of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), a joint initiative between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NASA, and industry to develop an air transportation system that uses new electric (i.e., green) air vehicles in geographical areas previously underserved by traditional aviation. Market forecast studies predict that there will be demand for alternate modes of air transportation using electric Vertical Take-off and Landing aircraft. UAM expands transportation networks by introducing short flights to move people and goods around metropolitan areas​. UAM is expected to improve mobility for the public, decongest road traffic, reduce trip time, and decrease strain on existing public transportation networks. Various challenges exist to make the introduction of UAM operations successful in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS). These include but are not limited to integration with existing airports and airspace, provision of air traffic services (e.g., separation), vehicle design and certification, and community acceptance. The focus of this paper is on integration of UAM operations into the NAS via introduction of new airspace structures. UAM will operate within a regulatory, operational, and technical environment that is incorporated into the NAS​. As per the UAM Concept of Operations (ConOps), the FAA retains regulatory authority and is responsible for establishing operational parameters and maintaining oversight. The FAA’s UAM ConOps describes flights at low altitudes (below 5,000 ft) with minimal disruption to established conventional aircraft traffic and limited voice interactions with the Air Traffic Control (ATC). Early stages of UAM may use existing procedures to safely integrate UAM with conventional flights. This would involve flying under Part 91 Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and using voice for communications. The initial UAM ecosystem will utilize the current infrastructure such as routes, helipads, and ATC services, where practicable. ​A NASA study explored the use of existing helicopter routes in Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) airspace for initial UAM operations with a Letter of Agreement (LOA) that included procedures to request a Class B (controlled airspace) clearance. The research showed that the chosen approach was feasible for near-term, low-demand UAM traffic, but was not scalable. The growth of operations in today’s aviation system has resulted in airspace reorganization and procedures to ensure safety and efficiency as traffic rates increase. One proposed operating innovation that can help with the scalability of UAM is establishing routes and corridors. This may look similar to the Area Navigation (RNAV) procedures used today to streamline operations into busy airports. However, instead of FAA automation systems and ATC managing the flow of traffic, some UAM concepts envision a third-party service provider performing this role as part of the Provider of Services for UAM (PSU) network. The FAA’s UAM ConOps posits that new airspace structures such as UAM corridors include the following design criteria: 1) Minimal impact on existing NAS operations, 2) no or minimal additional ATC services, 3) public interest considerations such as noise, safety, and security, and 4) customer needs. The airspace available in urban environments is limited by the height of buildings, the effect of weather including wind gusts, privacy needs, and a clearance envelope. The new airspace structure would need to be designed around large airports and urban areas where the initial market demand is likely to exist. NASA has started evaluating airspace in the Dallas Fort Worth area to design new airspace structures, keeping the first two design criteria in mind. It is assumed that there will be an on-board pilot-in-command, and the flights will operate under VFR in Visual Meteorological Conditions. Corridors will be required in controlled airspace, whereas UAM operations can fly in uncontrolled Class G and E airspace using current day rules. Keeler et. al identified factors and heuristics for development of routes for UAM operations for integration with airspace close to large airports such as Dallas Fort Worth and Dallas Love Field. This paper describes the heuristics applied to define the corridors, analyzes them with respect to legacy traffic and presents key results.

Urban Air Mobility↗

NASA Strategy for Technology Development

At the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), foresight is a coordinated, iterative, and continual process for making informed decisions. NASA faces diverse and relatively unique challenges and opportunities as the leading U.S. agency for aeronautics development, cutting-edge scientific discovery, and human space exploration. To address these challenges and leverage opportunities, NASA uses foresight to strategically plan technology development across four mission directorates: Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate, Space Technology Mission Directorate, Science Mission Directorate, and Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (recently separated into the new Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate and Space Operations Mission Directorate). The mission directorates leverage a broad community of experts and partners to incorporate technology foresight into mission and program planning. Through this process NASA realizes tangible benefits to the agency’s science, technology, and exploration programs. As an independent office, NASA’s Office of Technology, Policy, and Strategy (OTPS) provides strategic advice, supported by independent assessments and rigorous analysis, to inform NASA senior leadership on key areas to align mission and agency-level activities. OTPS serves as a trusted authority to inform technology strategy at the agency to enable future missions. Specifically, OTPS coordinates and uses inputs from a broad community of experts, both internal and external to NASA, to inform decision making for technology plans, investments, and partnerships. OTPS develops and maintains the NASA Technology Taxonomy to standardize communication across the agency’s diverse technology portfolio and the related Strategic Technology Investment Plan that integrates priorities and informs technology investment. Through these efforts, OTPS has refined elements of foresight-informed strategic planning that may be applicable to other technology-driven industries where foresight is essential for resilience. This chapter describes the processes of foresight for technology development at NASA and provides insight into the value the agency derives from these processes. The chapter further describes the role of OTPS as an independent advisory office that supports NASA’s efforts to capitalize on foresight and strategic technology planning. We present these examples with consideration for how organizations in defense, security, and other technology-driven industries can operationalize foresight in their own strategic technology development.

Erica Rodgers↗

Initial Site-Specific Studies for Removing SNF from Six Shutdown Sites - 18042

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is exploring options for developing a large-scale transportation system for the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste to future storage or disposal facilities. This complex, large-scale transportation system will involve coordinated, integrated activities. Interfaces with various transportation and non-transportation activities must be defined, and systems must be developed to ensure successful integration when the system becomes operational. To provide an understanding of the tasks and interfaces required for the complete de-inventory of particular sites where SNF is stored, DOE solicited bids from integrating contractors to develop initial site-specific de-inventory reports. The reports were developed for several nuclear power plant sites selected to represent a range of geographic locations, existing on-site SNF storage systems, and expected transportation modal options. Each report is presented in a self-contained narrative describing a potential campaign for removing all SNF and greater-than-class-C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) from each specified site. Each study narrative includes site information; an analysis of the near-site transportation infrastructure; a concept of operations for the de-inventory; an estimated budget and schedule for the duration of operations; and a safety and security plan with site-specific considerations, emergency response considerations, and recommendations for the next steps DOE could take to de-inventory the site. The reports provide cost estimates for analytical purposes only; they do not attempt to specify the party or parties responsible for the costs. These reports present a first look at how an integrating contractor might recommend removing SNF from particular sites. They are written from the perspective of the contractor and do not represent DOE's plans. At this writing, six sites have been studied: - Connecticut Yankee, - Big Rock Point, - Humboldt Bay, - Maine Yankee, - Trojan, - Kewaunee. DOE may develop de-inventory reports for all reactor sites, with an initial focus on shutdown reactor sites. The order in which sites have been selected for study should not be considered an indicator of the order used by DOE to remove SNF from the sites. Since the SNF's destination is not important for the purpose of this work, DOE tasked the contractor with planning transportation of the SNF from the site to a generic railroad location in the approximate geographical center of the United States. These reports represent an initial study of the specific sites. Per the terms of the contract, the contractor was not permitted to engage in dialogue with power plant site personnel; near-site railroad personnel; or any local, state, or regional stakeholders about the studies. DOE provided site-specific data. The contractor was tasked to rely on past corporate experience, data available from DOE, and publicly available data when making site-specific recommendations for removing all SNF from each site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

EMS and DMS Integration of the Coordinative Real-time Sub-Transmission Volt-Var Control Tool under High DER Penetration

This paper proposes an applicable approach to deploy the Coordinative Real-time Sub-Transmission Volt-Var Control Tool (CReST-VCT), and a holistic system integration framework considering both the energy management system (EMS) and distribution system management system (DMS). This provides an architectural basis and can serve as the implementation guideline of CReST-VCT and other advanced grid support tools, to co-optimize the operation benefits of DERs and assets in both transmission and distribution networks. Potential communication protocols for different physical domains of a real application is included. Performance and security issues are also discussed, along with specific considerations for field deployment. Finally, the paper presents a viable pathway for CReST-VCT and other advanced grid support tools, which could be integrated in an open-source standardized-based platform that supports distribution utilities.

Nguyen, Quan H.↗

The future of infrastructure security :

Sandia National Laboratories hosted a workshop on the future of infrastructure security on February 27-28, 2013, in Albuquerque, NM. The 17 participants came from backgrounds as diverse as federal policy, the insurance industry, infrastructure management, and technology development. The purpose of the workshop was to surface key issues, identify directions forward, and lay groundwork for cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary collaborations. The workshop addressed issues such as the problem space (what is included in infrastructure problems?), the general types of threats to infrastructure (such as acute or chronic, system-inherent or exogenously imposed) and definitions of secure and resilient infrastructures. The workshop concluded with a consideration of stakeholders and players in the infrastructure world, and identification of specific activities that could be undertaken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other players.

Garcia, Pablo↗

Romanian Experience for Enhancing Safety and Security in Transport of Radioactive Material - 12223

The transport of Dangerous Goods-Class no.7 Radioactive Material (RAM), is an important part of the Romanian Radioactive Material Management. The overall aim of this activity is for enhancing operational safety and security measures during the transport of the radioactive materials, in order to ensure the protection of the people and the environment. The paper will present an overall of the safety and security measures recommended and implemented during transportation of RAM in Romania. Some aspects on the potential threat environment will be also approached with special referring to the low level radioactive material (waste) and NORM transportation either by road or by rail. A special attention is given to the assessment and evaluation of the possible radiological consequences due to RAM transportation. The paper is a part of the IAEA's Vienna Scientific Research Contract on the State Management of Nuclear Security Regime (Framework) concluded with the Institute for Nuclear Research, Romania, where the author is the CSI (Chief Scientific Investigator). The transport of RAM in Romania is a very sensible and complex problem taking into consideration the importance and the need of the security and safety for such activities. The Romanian Nuclear Regulatory Body set up strictly regulation and procedures according to the Recommendation of the IAEA Vienna and other international organizations. There were implemented the adequate regulation and procedures in order to keep the environmental impacts and the radiological consequences at the lower possible level and to assure the effectiveness of state nuclear security regime due to possible malicious acts in carrying out these activities including transport and the disposal site at the acceptable international levels. The levels of the estimated doses and risk expectation values for transport and disposal are within the acceptable limits provided by national and international regulations and recommendations but can increase, significantly during potential malicious acts. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 2 of 2 – Insights into Developing a Cloud-hosted Security Technology

A Sentry Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS) is a stand-alone security system that provides detection, assessment, and communication of priority alarms as an additional means of thwarting internal and external threats to sites that maintain radiological material. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform is an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS that relays priority alarm information to the identified response stakeholders. Sentry-SECURE is hosted in a cloud environment that abstracts the data owner’s and data consumer’s platforms to allow for greater information sharing. This promotes situational awareness amongst authorized users and enables future innovation among modern response platforms. When securely architecting a cloud solution such as this, the use of design paradigms can be an effective tool to increase the accuracy and reliability of cyber- and information-security-related decisions made throughout the development process. This approach also supports the categorization of design considerations into three levels: industry concepts, project approaches, and data protections for digital processes. Industry concepts consist of the notional underpinnings that guide or motivate a security process, system, or design but often lack any tangible attributes. Project approaches represent decisions made during the design and development process to prioritize a solution, method, or practice above another that may provide a comparable functional output but lacks a desired security benefit. Data protections for digital processes represent the selection, integration, and implementation of specific controls for a given asset. This paper will explore specific examples of how Sentry-SECURE has been designed to account for considerations at each of these three levels, while balancing the operational intent of the platform with the security enhancements necessary to maintain data integrity, availability, and confidentiality.

assessment, RMS, security, physical, cloud, Cyber ↗

Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Methodology for Evaluating Security Controls Based on Key Performance Indicators and Stakeholder Mission

Information security continues to evolve in response to disruptive changes with a persistent focus on information-centric controls and a healthy debate about balancing endpoint and network protection, with a goal of improved enterprise/business risk management. Economic uncertainty, intensively collaborative styles of work, virtualization, increased outsourcing and ongoing compliance pressures require careful consideration and adaptation. This paper proposes a Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES) that provides a measure (i.e., a quantitative indication) of reliability, performance and/or safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a function of one or more stakeholders interests in that requirement. For a given stakeholder, CSES reflects the variance that may exist among the stakes she/he attaches to meeting each requirement. This paper introduces the basis, objectives and capabilities for the CSES including inputs/outputs as well as the structural and mathematical underpinnings.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Entropy uncertainty relations and stability of phase-temporal quantum cryptography with finite-length transmitted strings

Any key-generation session contains a finite number of quantum-state messages, and it is there-fore important to understand the fundamental restrictions imposed on the minimal length of a string required to obtain a secret key with a specified length. The entropy uncertainty relations for smooth min and max entropies considerably simplify and shorten the proof of security. A proof of security of quantum key distribution with phase-temporal encryption is presented. This protocol provides the maximum critical error compared to other protocols up to which secure key distribution is guaranteed. In addition, unlike other basic protocols (of the BB84 type), which are vulnerable with respect to an attack by 'blinding' of avalanche photodetectors, this protocol is stable with respect to such an attack and guarantees key security.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Material Control & Accountancy for Molten Salt Reactors (FY2021 Report)

There is significant domestic and international interest, investment, and research and development momentum to pursue advanced nuclear reactor technologies. Molten salt reactor (MSR) concepts display the largest variability in fuel type and design features among the current advanced concepts. MSRs have been proposed with various core designs, sizes (power), and fuel cycles. Salt-fueled molten salt systems represent the only advanced reactor type with fuel that is not in a solid form during operation. These “liquid-fueled” MSRs are unique from perspectives of fuel fabrication, spent irradiated fuel and waste components, licensing, and material control and accountability (MC&A) including the potential of fissile material holdup. The liquid fuel salt is the defining distinction in comparison to other advanced reactors that propose TRI-structural ISOtropic particle fuel pebbles, various coolant options (e.g., molten salts or metals, high temperature gas), or small modular alternatives using solid fuel variants including both light water reactors and non-light water reactors. MSRs are appealing to the nuclear energy industry because of the diverse reactor characteristics they can support including various neutron energy spectra, fueling requirements, fuel cycles, and/or fuel utilization. However, because of the significant deviation and diversity of a salt-fueled system compared to traditional solid fuel light water-cooled reactors (LWRs), the history, regulatory licensing framework, modeling capabilities, and supporting engineering technology are either lacking or, in some cases, nonexistent. Therefore, the research community is actively supporting advanced MSR development on many of these fronts in particular to assist MSR vendors with licensing requirements. ORNL is leading the research and development of respective MC&A approaches for salt-fueled MSRs. This report summarizes the research performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) under the US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program to investigate safeguards and security by design concepts, licensing and regulatory considerations, and dynamic system-level modeling to understand radioisotope concentrations for salt-fueled MSRs. The report builds upon the previous research and literature, identifies the MC&A challenges inherent to a salt-fueled MSR, reviews current regulatory frameworks for LWRs and their applicability towards salt-fueled MSRs, summarizes the status and progress of an MSR dynamic modeling tool, and discusses a prospective MC&A approach based on the Molten Salt Demonstration Reactor (MSDR) model.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Analyzing the security of an existing computer system

Most work concerning secure computer systems has dealt with the design, verification, and implementation of provably secure computer systems, or has explored ways of making existing computer systems more secure. The problem of locating security holes in existing systems has received considerably less attention; methods generally rely on thought experiments as a critical step in the procedure. The difficulty is that such experiments require that a large amount of information be available in a format that makes correlating the details of various programs straightforward. This paper describes a method of providing such a basis for the thought experiment by writing a special manual for parts of the operating system, system programs, and library subroutines.

Bishop, M.↗

Present status and future plans for the restoration of Fukushima Daiichi NPS

There are many challenges at Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, even though the reactors have reached a condition equivalent to cold shutdown. Cooling of reactors is maintained using the circulating cooling system, which contains some temporary equipments and consists of long pipes reaching to about 4 km. The reliability of the cooling system is one of the keys to maintaining the stabilized condition. Therefore a variety of activities, such as the replacement of hoses with more durable pipes, is being conducted to improve the reliability of the cooling system. The first fuel bundle will be removed from the spent fuel pool (SFP) at Unit 4 in November, which is earlier than the original plan. In preparation for the fuel debris removal, investigations inside the primary containment vessel (PCVs) have been initiated. Visual images and other data, such as water level, radiation dose and temperature inside the PCVs, have been taken at Units 1 and 2. The issue of excessive contaminated water is the most urgent one. About 400 tons of ground water is intruding into the turbine and reactor buildings every day. This intruding water mixes with the core cooling water and becomes a large amount of contaminated water. It has to be stored on the site, despite the fact that some radioactive nuclides remain in it even after cesium is removed. The amount of water stored on the site has reached about 290,000 tons so far and is increasing. Counter measures for this issue, such as reduction of intruding water, cleaning up of the contaminated water and securing of water storage tanks, are under consideration and being conducted. However, certain recent events, such as the power loss of the SFP cooling systems and leakage of contaminated water from the underground tanks, have raised concerns about reliability. Vulnerabilities have been evaluated systematically and counter measures are being taken. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Use of the WECC WAMS in Wide Area Probing Tests for Validation of System Performance & Modeling

During 2005 and 2006 the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) performed three major tests of western system dynamics. These tests used a Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS) based primarily on Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) to determine response to events including the insertion of the 1400-MW Chief Joseph braking resistor, probing signals, and ambient events. Test security was reinforced through real-time analysis of wide area effects, and high-quality data provided dynamic profiles for interarea modes across the entire western interconnection. The tests established that low-level optimized pseudo-random ±20-MW probing with the Pacific DC Intertie (PDCI) roughly doubles the apparent noise that is natural to the power system, providing sharp dynamic information with negligible interference to system operations. Such probing is an effective alternative to use of the 1400-MW Chief Joseph dynamic brake, and it is under consideration as a standard means for assessing dynamic security.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗