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DOE OSTI2025

Literature Review Investigating Historical Plutonium Solubility in SRS Tank Waste

The Savannah River Site (SRS) has designed the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program to accelerate the de-inventory of L-Basin and accelerate the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) disposition mission. Similarly, the H-Canyon facility at SRS is reestablishing the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver for dissolving unirradiated stainless-steel (SS) clad Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel. In both discard types (ABD and FCA), plutonium is present and its complex solubility when composited to Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF) sludge is being investigated as it may have downstream impacts to the liquid waste (LW) organization. This literature review aims to highlight and compile the existing literature on plutonium solubility in waste streams relevant to ABD and FCA discards, as well as discuss some considerations in analyzing solubility data of plutonium. This review serves to help define the analysis methods for future experiments involving plutonium (and other actinides) and in designing appropriate testing conditions surrounding these studies. This review is broken up into five parts and will discuss: (i) The possible effects of testing hold time and temperature on plutonium solubility, (ii) the influence of neutralization rate and particle size of freshly precipitated discards, (iii) the coprecipitation of plutonium with iron and uranium, (iv) predictive solubility modeling and the influence of supernate anions on solubility, and (v) the speciation of plutonium in solutionas a result of supernate anions.

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DOE OSTI2024

Sister Rod Destructive Examinations (FY23) Appendix I: SNF Aerosols Released During Rod Fracture

This report documents work performed under the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program for the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE). This work was performed to fulfill Level 3 Milestone M3SF-23OR010201026, “FY23 M3 draft report on results from testing in FY23,” within work package SF-23OR01020102 and is an updated to the work reported in M2SF-23OR010201024, M2SF-22OR010201047, M2SF-21OR010201032, M2SF-19ORO010201026, and M2SF-19OR010201028. As a part of the DOE NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations (DEs) of high burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods from the North Anna Nuclear Power Station operated by Dominion Energy. The SNF rods, called sister rods or sibling rods, are all HBU and include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin Zirc-4, ZIRLO, and M5. The DEs are being conducted to obtain a baseline of the HBU rods’ condition before dry storage and are focused on understanding overall SNF rod strength and durability. Fuel rods and defueled cladding will be tested to derive material properties. Although the data generated can be used for multiple purposes, one primary goal for obtaining the post-irradiation examination data and the associated measured mechanical properties is to support SNF dry storage licensing and relicensing activities by (1) addressing identified knowledge gaps and (2) enhancing the technical basis for post-storage transportation, handling, and subsequent disposition.This report documents the status of the ORNL Phase 1 DE activities related to the collection of SNF aerosol particles released during fuel rod fracture in 4-point bending in Phase 1 of the sister rod test program.

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DOE OSTI2025

Status of the Down-Blending of Irradiated IGR Graphite Fuel in Kazakhstan

Dry processing remains the primary solution for managing the down-blending of irradiated IGR HEU fuel. Several tasks have been initiated and completed to achieve this, including lab modernization, lab-scale and full-scale testing, designing and fabricating an in-paddle mixing drum, and commissioning both a down-blending system and a crushing and milling system. Additionally, a testing and training center was modernized, the equipment was successfully commissioned, and the IGR HEU fuel blocks were repackaged into daily containers. The training of operators and the construction of a new down-blending facility are tasks that will need to be completed in the near future. The progress in these areas continues to validate that the proposed method for down-blending irradiated HEU graphite fuel, followed by cementation of the down-blended material for permanent disposition, appears to be achievable.

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DOE OSTI2025

Plutonium Solubility and Supernate Concentration for Neutralized Fast Critical Assembly Discards to Savannah River Site Tank Waste

The Savannah River Site (SRS) plans to dissolve non-irradiated stainless steel (SS)-clad bundles of Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) materials in eighteen batches.1 FCA dissolution is currently underway in the 6.3D dissolver by simultaneous chemical and electrolytic dissolution, which is required to generate the harsh conditions necessary for dissolution of metal-oxide (MOX) and non-aluminum spent nuclear fuels (NASNFs).2 Nitric acid and potassium fluoride are used to promote chemical dissolution.2 Gadolinium will be added during processing as a thermal neutron poison for criticality control. There are no plans for recovering plutonium from this waste stream. After FCA dissolution, the acidic (HNO3/KF) “discards” containing the dissolved metals will be neutralized by addition of 50 wt% sodium hydroxide to a final free hydroxide concentration of 1.2 M.1 Neutralization will precipitate a slurry of insoluble solids, predominantly metal oxides/hydroxides of plutonium, uranium, and SS components. Small fractions of the SS components, Pu, U, and Gd will remain dissolved in the supernate. The neutralized slurry will be composited to existing radioactive waste storage tanks within the SRS Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) containing other similar sludge batch (SB) materials.1 The fate of soluble plutonium and freshly-precipitated, colloidal plutonium from this process are of concern since the total Pu can challenge the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) at the downstream SRS Liquid Waste (LW) facility. Supernate decants including the neutralized FCA discards (nFCAd) within the CSTF will be composited with salt batch (StB) materials and transferred to the SRS Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), where total plutonium is also of concern.

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DOE OSTI2024

Brine Availability Test in Salt (BATS) FY24 Update

This report summarizes fiscal year 2024 (FY24) activities centered around a series of field tests in bedded salt at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) funded by the Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology in the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) program of the US Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE). High-level Purpose of Experiments: The Brine Availability Test in Salt (BATS) field tests are revealing both brine occurrence (i.e., where, and how much) and brine migration (i.e., how easily it moves) in the excavation damaged zone (EDZ). This understanding is foundational to develop a safety case for a future heat-generating waste repository in salt, and to starting up a generic repository program in salt to buy down risk. BATS seeks to predict how much brine can flow into both ambient and heated excavations (e.g., boreholes or rooms) in salt. This work is educating and empowering new repository scientists on two fronts: “design and execution of field tests” and “prediction and modeling of coupled processes.” DOE-NE capabilities in salt have grown and been tested through international modeling and benchmarking exercises (e.g., DECOVALEX, RANGERS, KOMPASS, and MEASURES; see Mills et al., 2024). The hands-on expertise we are building is a necessary step towards large-scale disposal demonstrations and eventual implementation.

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DOE OSTI2024

GDSA Framework Development and Process Model Integration FY2024

The Disposal Research & Development (Disposal R&D) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Spent Fuel & High-Level Waste Disposition is conducting research and development (R&D) on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). A high priority for Disposal R&D is disposal system modeling (Sassani et al. 2023). The Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) work package is charged with developing a disposal system modeling and analysis capability for evaluating generic disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media.

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DOE OSTI2024

Dissolution Flowsheet for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Campaign 1

As part of the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program, H Canyon plans to dissolve non-aluminum spent nuclear fuel (NASNF) in the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver. NASNF Campaign 1 plans to electrolytically dissolve 68 bundles of fuel assemblies from the Carolinas-Virginia Tube Reactor (CVTR), Heavy Water Components Test Reactor (HWCTR), and Experimental Boiling Water Reactor (EBWR). The fuel assemblies are intact Zircaloy or stainless steel (SS) clad UO 2 rods, tubes, and plates. The H Canyon electrolytic dissolver previously dissolved a variety of UO 2 core fuel types in SS, Zircaloy, Nichrome, or Incoloy cladding from 1969 to 1980. The objective of this study was to identify flowsheet conditions through literature review and laboratory experimentation to safely dissolve NASNF Campaign 1 bundles in the H Canyon electrolytic dissolver. Bench-scale electrolytic dissolution tests were performed to demonstrate a flowsheet for NASNF Campaign 1 bundles. The outer bundles are composed of SS or Al alloy, Al 6061-T6, and contain intact Zircaloy or SS clad UO 2 fuel assemblies. The key objectives of these tests were to determine bounding dissolver chemistries and the sparge requirement to ensure H 2 concentration remain less than 60 vol % of the lower flammability limit (LFL) during dissolution. The impact of HNO 3 concentration and the addition of fluoride on the dissolution efficiency of Zircaloy, 304L SS, Al 6061-T6, and Inconel 625 were examined. While SS, Al, and Inconel 625 readily dissolve utilizing electrolytic dissolution, Zircaloy disintegrated anodically; the surface of Zircaloy oxidized and the oxide layer spalled off and settled at the bottom of the dissolver as an insoluble material. The black flakes were identified as ZrO 2 and 85% of the Zr processed was converted to black ZrO 2 flakes when Zr was anodically disintegrated in 9.5 M HNO 3 .

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DOE OSTI2025

Engineered Barrier System Research Activities at SNL: FY25 Report

This report describes research and development (R&D) activities conducted at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) during Fiscal Year 2025 (FY25) specifically related to the Engineered Barrier System (EBS) Properties & Processes Work Package in the Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste Disposition (SFHLWD) Campaign supported by the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE). SNL activities focus on understanding EBS component evolution and interactions within the EBS, as well as interactions between the host media and the EBS. The team represented in this report consists of individuals from SNL, Argonne National Laboratory (Advanced Photon Source), and Vanderbilt University. The activities represented in this report include development of anion sorbent materials for buffer formulations, properties of pure bentonite and bentonite mixtures, and characterization of cement interfaces relevant to the EBS. The SNL EBS activities also leverage interactions with EBS teams from other national laboratories, and international collaborations to ensure that the DOE program is active and abreast of the latest advances in nuclear waste disposal.

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DOE OSTI2025

Sister Rod Destructive Examinations (FY23) Appendix B: Segmentation, Defueling, Metallographic Data and Total Cladding Hydrogen

As a part of the DOE-NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations (DEs) of high burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods from the North Anna Nuclear Power Station operated by Dominion Energy. The SNF rods, called sister rods or sibling rods are all HBU and include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin (LT) Zirc-4, ZIRLO ® , and M5 ® . The DEs are being conducted to obtain a baseline of the HBU rod’s condition before dry storage and are focused on understanding overall SNF rod strength and durability. Both composite fuel and defueled cladding will be tested to derive material properties. Although the data generated can be used for multiple purposes, one primary goal for obtaining the post-irradiation examination data and associated measured mechanical properties is to support SNF dry storage licensing and relicensing activities by (1) addressing identified knowledge gaps and (2) enhancing the technical basis for post-storage transportation, handling, and subsequent disposition of the SNF. This report documents the status of the ORNL Phase 1 DE activities related to: Rough segmentation (RS), Defueling (DEF), DE.02 optical microscopy (MET), and DE.03, cladding total hydrogen measurements. It is a cumulative update to the FY22 status report.

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DOE OSTI2025

Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in the GDSA Framework (FY2025)

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign (SFWST) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) is conducting research and development on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). Two priorities for SFWST are design concept development and disposal system modeling. These priorities are directly addressed in the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) control account, which is charged with developing a geologic repository system modeling and analysis capability, and the associated software, GDSA Framework, for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media. This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 associated with the GDSA Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods work package. This report fulfills the GDSA Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods work package (SF-25SN01030407) level 3 milestone, Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in GDSA Framework (FY2025) (M3SF-25SN010304072). This work was closely coordinated with the other Sandia National Laboratory GDSA work packages: the GDSA Framework Development work package (SF-25SN01030408), the GDSA Repository Systems Analysis work package (SF-25SN01030409), and the GDSA PFLOTRAN Development work package (SF-25SN01030410). This report builds on developments reported in previous GDSA Framework milestones, particularly M3SF-24SN010304072.

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DOE OSTI2025

Charpy Impact Characterization of Surveillance Specimens Harvested from Palisades High Fluence A-60 Capsule

Located on the shores of Lake Michigan, the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station (PNGS) was a nuclear power plant that operated in Covert Township, Michigan. The plant had a single pressurized water reactor that produced electricity for the region. The PNGS was shut down in 2022 after more than four decades of service. The PNGS included in its surveillance program a surveillance capsule, designated A-60, containing specimens of a weld metal with nickel content of about 1.36 wt% and copper content of about 0.25 wt%. The capsule was removed from its surveillance position in early 1995 and has been resident in the spent fuel pool since that time. This capsule was irradiated to a fluence of 1.96×10 20 n/cm 2 (E>1MeV) that is equivalent for more than 150 effective full power years (EFPYs) for the US reactor pressure vessel (RPV) fleet. The material is also of special interest because of its very high nickel content and potential for development of NiMnSi (nickel-manganese-silicon) precipitates. Combination of very high fluence and very high Ni and Cu content makes the material in this capsule of great interest as benchmark for currently developing embrittlement trend curves (ETC) aiming to predict embrittlement at high fluences. Multi-year efforts by the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program personnel from the Materials Research Pathway (MRP) to harvest this capsule finally succeeded in 2023. As a result, the Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) through contract with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) came to PNGS site, retrieved the A-60 capsule, brought it to WEC Churchill hot cell facility, opened the capsule and sent all surveillance specimens in the capsule to ORNL for future characterization by July 2023. Total of 9 tensile and 48 Charpy specimens were inventoried in the ORNL hot cells. Testing plan has been developed based on available specimens. It includes hardness, tensile, Charpy impact, Mini-CT fracture toughness testing, in-situ thermal annealing, and microstructural characterization, including Atom Probe Tomography (APT). Charpy impact testing has been completed and results are presented in this report. Moreover, negotiations with Pressurized Water Reactors Owners Group (PWROG) and Westinghouse resulted in Westinghouse donating to ORNL a piece of archive weld and base metal such that unirradiated characterization of these materials can be performed as part of this project. Comparison of measured hardening and embrittlement has been performed and data are compared to available large database.

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DOE OSTI2026

Analysis of the Effects of Postclosure Criticality on Repository Performance

The United States Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy’s Disposal Research & Development Campaign seeks to better understand the technical basis, risks, and uncertainty associated with the safe and secure disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). Commercial nuclear power generation in the United States has resulted in thousands of metric tons of SNF, the disposal of which is the responsibility of DOE (Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended). Any repository licensed to dispose of SNF will be subject to requirements regarding the long-term performance of that repository. Evaluating the long-term performance of the repository may consider the consequences of the SNF achieving a critical configuration during the postclosure period. Of particular interest is the potential for this to occur in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), which are currently licensed and being used to store and transport SNF but were not designed for permanent geologic disposal. DOE has been considering disposing of SNF in DPCs to avoid the costs and worker dose associated with repackaging the SNF currently stored in DPCs into repository-specific canisters. This report examines the consequences of postclosure criticality to provide technical support to DOE in developing a disposal plan.

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DOE OSTI2024

Oxygen Limit for Flammability of a Gas Mixture of Helium – Hydrogen – Oxygen in the U.S. Department of Energy Standard Canister

The radiolytic breakdown of residual free, physisorbed, and chemisorbed waters is anticipated in the sealed dry storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), releasing H 2 gas into the initial cover gas of helium. For aluminum-clad SNF (ASNF) in particular, the expected total hydrogen in the canister is enough to dominate the cover gas mixture if fully released, and based on experimental rates of H 2 generation, H 2 percentages exceeding the lower flammability limit appear likely. However, no evidence of radiolytic generation of O 2 has been observed to date, so the potential for flammability is averted due to the lack O 2 . Lack of oxygen has been credited for avoiding flammability in some existing storage and transportation approaches for SNF and other waste. This report reviews literature on flammability limits with a focus on the limiting oxygen concentration to provide technical underpinnings to refine a flammability criterion for gas mixtures of helium, hydrogen, and oxygen where the oxygen is expected to be the limiting species. While there is general consensus on H 2 flammability limits at standard temperature and pressure, the decay heat and gas generation within ASNF sealed dry storage canisters could push them to elevated temperatures and pressures, so the goal is to identify an oxygen threshold that will bound the behavior over the temperature and pressure range of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Standard Canister. The information reviewed in this document supports the criterion that the oxygen concentration in a He-H 2 -O 2 mixture should be less than 1.5% to avoid flammability at temperatures and pressures relevant to sealed dry storage of ASNF in the DOE Standard Canister, i.e., up to 343°C (650°F) and 500 psig, respectively. Note that while data covering the full range of temperature at atmospheric pressure and nearly the full range of pressure at room temperature were available, data for the combined effects was available only at moderate temperatures and pressures; the recommended 1.5% O 2 threshold is based on the breadth of available data reported here and apparent trends therein.

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DOE OSTI2024

HTO and selenate diffusion through compacted Na-, Na–Ca-, and Ca-montmorillonite

Radionuclide transport in smectite clay barrier systems used for nuclear waste disposal is controlled by diffusion, with adsorption significantly retarding transport rates. While a relatively minor component of spent nuclear fuel, 79 Se is a major driver of the safety case for spent fuel disposal due to its long half-life (3.3×10 5 yr) and its low adsorption to clay (K D < 10 L/kg), thus a thorough understanding of Se diffusion through clay is critical for understanding the long-term safety of spent fuel disposal systems. Through-diffusion experiments with tritiated water (HTO, conservative tracer) and Se(VI) were conducted with a well-characterized, purified montmorillonite source clay (SWy-2) under a constant ionic strength (0.1 M) and three different electrolyte compositions: Na + , Ca 2+ , and a Na + -Ca 2+ mixture at pH 6.5 in order to probe the effects of electrolyte composition and interlayer cation composition on clay microstructure, Se(VI) aqueous speciation, and ultimately diffusion. Further, the results were modeled using a reactive transport modeling approach to determine values of porosity (ε), D e (effective diffusion coefficient), and K D (distribution coefficient for adsorption). HTO diffusive flux was higher in Ca-montmorillonite (D e =1.68×10 -10 m 2 s -1 ) compared to Na-montmorillonite (De=7.83×10 -11 m 2 s -1 ). This increase in flux is likely due to a greater degree of clay layer stacking in the presence of Ca 2+ compared to Na + , which leads to larger inter-particle pores. Overall, the Se(VI) flux was much lower than the HTO flux due to anion exclusion, with Se(VI) flux following the order Ca (D e = 1.03×10 -11 m 2 s -1 ) > Na–Ca (D e = 2.12×10 -12 m 2 s -1 ) > Na (D e = 1.28×10 -12 m 2 s -1 ). These differences in Se(VI) flux are due to a combination of factors, including (1) larger accessible porosity in Ca-montmorillonite due to clay layer stacking and smaller electrostatic effects compared to Na-montmorillonite, (2) larger accessible porosity for neutral-charge CaSeO4 species which makes up 32% of aqueous Se(VI) in the pure Ca system, and (3) possibly higher Se(VI) adsorption for Ca-montmorillonite. Through a combination of experimental and modeling work, this study highlights the compounding effects that electrolyte and counterion compositions can have on radionuclide transport through clay. Diffusion models that neglect these effects are not transferable from laboratory experimental conditions to in situ repository conditions.

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DOE OSTI2024

RANGERS: Modeling Report on Integrity and Performance Assessment of Engineered Barrier Systems in a Salt Repository for HLW/SNF

The Engineered Barrier System (EBS) plays an important role in ensuring the long-term safety and containment of high-level waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in deep geological repositories in salt formation. As part of a multi-barrier system, the EBS works alongside the natural barrier, which is the salt formation itself and the technical barrier comprising the disposal casks. The primary function of the EBS is to maintain containment during a defined period until the backfill used in the repository made of crushed salt, develops its sealing capacity through compaction. Over the time, the backfill eventually compacts to a state of low porosity and permeability, acting as a long-term seal. However, until this process is complete, the EBS must retain its structural and functional integrity. Regulatory guidelines in Germany currently require the EBS to remain effective for up to next ice age, that is expected in 50,000 years. The significant hydro-geological and topographic changes expected during an ice age could make it impossible to accurately predict the hydro-chemical conditions within the repository system at that time. In response to these challenges, BGE TECHNOLOGY GmbH (BGE TEC) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have jointly developed a comprehensive methodology for the design and safety assessment of engineered barrier systems within the scope of the RANGERS project. This methodology is tailored for repositories in salt formations. The developed methodology provides a structured approach for designing and assessing the performance of the EBS in salt-based repositories. It begins with defining a sealing concept based on the geological characteristics of the selected site and the overall repository design. The entire repository system, comprising the geological site, repository infrastructure, and EBS, is then subjected to a Features, Events, and Processes (FEP) analysis, focusing solely on those FEPs that affect the EBS. The derived FEPs help identify the loads and stresses acting on the EBS, which serve as the foundation for conducting an integrity assessment. This analysis helps predict the EBS’s evolution and performance over the regulatory time frame, feeding into integrated performance assessment simulations.

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DOE OSTI1988

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 1, January-March 1988]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Core History and Nuclide Inventory of the Chernobyl Core at the Time of Accident by Gerald Kirchner and Cornelius C. Noack; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 6 Nonprescriptive Nuclear Safety Regulation: The Example of Loss of Offsite Power by M. W. Golay, V. P. Manno, and C. Vlahoplus, Jr., 20 Nuclear Power Safety Goals in Light of the Chernobyl Accident by C. Whipple and C. Starr; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Containment Loads from Severe Accidents—U.S. Program by W. Kerr and M. K. Dey; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 36 Safety Characteristics of Modern High-Temperature Reactors: Focus on German Designs by W. Kröger, H. Nickel, and R. Schulten; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 49 Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety by C. C. Congdon; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 58 Evaluation of Nonradiological Water Chemistry at Power Reactors by Harvey Zibulsky, James J. Kottan, Walter J. Pasciak, Mary Ann Castrogivanni, and Sujit Banerjee, 64 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 67 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 85 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 94 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 100 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 103 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1987; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 5 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 28 International Approach to Nuclear Safety (After Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl), 57 RPI Short Course on Modern Developments in Boiling Heat Transfer and Two-Phase Flow, 107 20th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning Conference, 110 Third International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Power Plant Thermal Hydraulics and Operations, 108 The Authors, 111 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 28.

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DOE OSTI1988

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 1, January-March 1988]

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DOE OSTI1975

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 1, January-February 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 AEC Working Paper on Population Density Around Nuclear Power-Plant Sites Adapted by J. Ft. Buchanan, 8 Water-Reactor Safety-Research Information Meeting by Wm. B. Cottrell, D. O. Hobson, and G. D. Whitman; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Burnout in Boiling Heat Transfer. Part I: Pool-Boiling Systems by A. E. Bergles; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 43 Radionuclide Behavior During Normal Operation of Liquid-Metal-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactors. Part 1: Production by C. A. Erdman and A. B. Reynolds; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 60 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 1: AEC-Owned Facilities by M. B. Biles and F. E. Coffman, 71 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 2: AEC-Licensed Facilities by L. B. Higginbotham and J. T. Collins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 76 Incident at the Lucens Reactor by J. M. Miller, 79 IAEA Symposium on Experience from Operating and Fueling of Nuclear Power Reactors by William A. Pryor, 87 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto, 98 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Nov. 1. 1974, 101 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in September and October 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 104 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 110 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 119 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 121 Proposed Rule Changes as of Oct. 31, 1974; MISCELLANY: 97 ASTM—Euratom Symposium on Radiation Dosimetry: Developments and Standardization (Announcement), 118 Workshops on In-Pile Filter Testing (Announcement), 119 IAEA Symposium on Radiological Impacts from Releases from Nuclear Facilities into Aquatic Environments (Announcement).

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