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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1981

Effect of type of explosives and physical-mechanical properties of explosive rock on formation of toxic gases in atmosphere of shafts

The quality of toxic gases formed during explosive work in underground shafts depends upon the type of explosives and the conditions of explosion. Several types of explosives and rocks were examined. All remaining conditions were maintained the same (sandy-argillaceous stemming, electrical method of explosions, diameter of blast holes, and the direct triggering of charges).

Mindeli, E. O.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Parallel IO Libraries for Managing HEP Experimental Data

The computing and storage requirements of the energy and intensity frontiers will grow significantly during the Run 4 & 5 and the HL-LHC era. Similarly, in the intensity frontier, with larger trig ger readouts during supernovae explosions, the Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) will have unique computing challenges that could be addressed by the use of parallel and accelerated dataprocessing capabilities. Most of the requirements of the energy and intensity frontier experiments rely on increasing the role of high performance computing (HPC) in the HEP community. In this presentation, we will describe our ongoing efforts that are focused on using HPC resources for the next generation HEP experiments. The HEPCCE (High Energy Physics-Center for Computational Excellence) IOS (Input/Output and Storage) group has been developing approaches to map HEP data to the HDF5 , an IO library optimized for the HPC platforms to store the intermediate HEP data. The complex HEP data products are serialized using ROOT to allow for experiment independent general mapping approaches of the HEP data to the HDF5 format. The mapping approaches can be optimized for high performance parallel IO. Similarly, simpler data can be directly mapped into the HDF5, which can also be suitable for offloading into the GPUs directly. We will present our works on both complex and simple data model models.

Bashyal, Amit↗
DOE OSTI2025

STILGAR End-of-Project Report

The Subsurface Tunnel Imaging LeveraGed by Analysis of Rayleigh wave ellipticity (STILGAR) project demonstrated an integrated geophysical approach for detecting, locating, and characterizing underground structural changes using dense seismic arrays and advanced inversion techniques. Field campaigns were conducted at two operational mines—the Redmond salt mine (Utah) and Graymont Pleasant Gap limestone mine (Pennsylvania)—providing real-world testbeds for monitoring anthropogenic subsurface activity. At the Redmond salt mine, seismic interferometry combined with back-projection inversion successfully identified continuous, low-amplitude signals from mining operations. The approach differentiated stationary from migrating anthropogenic sources, captured daily operational cycles, and validated the potential of passive seismic monitoring for remote detection of underground activity. At the Graymont Pleasant Gap mine, two dense seismic deployments in the spring and fall of 2023 generated over 4 TB of high-resolution data. Key outcomes included the relocation of 199 underground and 8 surface explosions with accuracies within tens of meters and the development of a 3D P-wave velocity model using the triple-difference tomography algorithm (tomoTD) that resolved major structural features such as the mine entrance, low-velocity tunnels, and roof-collapse areas. Ambient noise cross-correlation and back-projection analyses revealed persistent sources linked to ongoing mining activity, whereas horizontal-to-vertical spectral ratio (HVSR) and ellipticity studies confirmed stable site responses across seasons and identified soil thickness trends consistent with regional erosional and depositional processes. Checkerboard and sensitivity tests further validated the robustness of the tomographic results. Overall, the findings emphasize that although significant progress has been made in subsurface imaging, further work is needed to enhance the detection and localization of underground structures. Accurate imaging requires higher frequencies, yet anthropogenic sources tend to dominate the seismic record at those frequencies, and high-frequency surface waves are affected by higher modes that complicate interpretation. The improved detection and localization of human-induced signals enabled detailed temporal and spatial mapping of daily mine operations, demonstrating the feasibility of continuous anthropogenic source monitoring. Sensitivity to signals from nontraditional sources, such as fan operations, highlights the broader applicability of this approach to other industrial environments in which continuous and impulsive signals are present. The field campaigns produced a substantial volume of high-quality seismic data, supporting the development and testing of new methods for seismic source characterization and subsurface imaging. Future deployments should include sensors capable of recording lower frequencies to probe deeper structures, increase bandwidth to enhance resolution and sensitivity to both shallow and deep targets, and collect additional large-scale datasets to refine imaging and source characterization techniques. Moreover, conducting 3D modeling studies of seismic wavefields at higher frequencies will provide a better understanding of wave scattering and cavity–wavefield interactions in complex underground environments. In conclusion, the STILGAR project demonstrated that integrated seismic monitoring can effectively characterize underground operations, capturing both natural and anthropogenic signals. The approaches developed provide a foundation for improved detection, localization, and imaging of subsurface structures and are directly transferable to broader industrial monitoring applications.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Effect of Zeolitization on Noble Gas Transport in Natural Materials [Poster]

The goal of this project is to quantify the effect of adsorption on noble gas transport though rocks that contain zeolite compared with rocks that don't. Success is defined by developing a coefficient called Retardation that describes the separation effect of zeolites. This coefficient can then be used by gas transport modelers to predict field-scale observations of noble gases released underground in a chemical explosion

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NASA NTRS1972

A portable life support system for use in mines

The portable life support system described in this paper represents a potential increase in the probability of survival for miners who are trapped underground by a fire or explosion. The habitability and life support capability of the prototype shelter have proved excellent. Development of survival chamber life support systems for wide use in coal mines is definitely within the capabilities of current technology.

Zeller, S. S.↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Low-Yield Nuclear Monitoring (LYNM) Experimental Science Plan

The Low-Yield Nuclear Monitoring (LYNM) Program is a long-term NNSA research and development effort designed to improve the United States’ explosion monitoring capabilities, particularly with respect to low-yield and potentially evasive underground nuclear testing. The LYNM Program focuses on researching, discovering, and exploiting unique and useful signatures, from all available technologies and sensors (e.g., seismic, acoustic, electromagnetic, gases, and particulates (both stable and radioactive)). Four Department of Energy laboratories participate in LYNM and together are referred to as the ‘quad-lab’. The R&D program execution is performed under NNSA defined structures known as “ventures”. Four science ventures were established: 1) Explosion Source Functions; 2) Containment of Low-Yield Underground Tests; 3) Local Signatures; 4) Dynamic Monitoring Networks. To organize and execute the large field scale experiment a fifth venture was established: 5) Physics Experiment One (PE-1). As part of the LYNM Program, a series of experiments are planned at various scales and levels of venture involvement. These vary from those that involve a subset of labs and/or LYNM ventures (e.g., small experiments), to full quad-lab LYNM Program field-scale integrated experiments. Such experiments may involve chemical explosions with tracer materials or other means of simulating the expected signals from a nuclear explosion. The LYNM Program does not conduct actual nuclear explosions. Since 1992, the U.S. has observed a moratorium on underground nuclear explosions. This document is intended to provide the underlying scientific basis for the LYNM planned experimental work. Each specific LYNM experiment will develop a goals, objectives, and requirements (GOR) plan following the guidance in this document. The LYNM technical staff will define the numbers and types of experiments required over the course of the Program based on technical needs and within funding constraints. As with any scientific experiment series, the number and types of experiments may change based upon the experimental results obtained. An experiment that agrees with models/codes/software signature predictions may need fewer repetitions/variations, depending upon the level of statistical rigor desired, as compared to one in which the predictions and experimental data do not match. The large LYNM field-scale integrated experiments require the longest lead-time for planning, and these are discussed in more detail near the end of this document.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for determining response and staffing requirements.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for staffing reduction. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Having the minimal possible number of access points and methods to completely block access from these points if a threat is detected will greatly help us justify staffing reduction.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Analysis of 127 Xe tracer measurements using a net counts method

A suite of measurement systems were deployed as part of the Physical Experiment 1 series of experiments, which involved detonating chemical explosives along with radionuclide tracers in an underground cavity, at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in the United States. One of the radionuclide tracers, 127 Xe was released from the containment following the explosion and detected on a SAUNA Q B sampler situated approximately 3.5 km away. The system uses a beta-gamma coincidence detector system to measure fission product radioisotopes of xenon relevant to nuclear explosion monitoring. In this work we use the coincidence measurement data to analyse and interpret the results from the SAUNA Q B system, to calculate the measured 127 Xe activity concentration(s).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

The design and construction of a nuclear power plant must include robust structures and a security boundary that is difficult to penetrate. For security considerations, the reactors would ideally be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, which would be too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives. Additionally, all communications and power transfer lines would also be located underground and would be fortified against any possible design basis threats. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is a key aspect for determining response and staffing requirements. Considerations considered in a graded approach to physical protection are described.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Full Moment Tensor Solutions of U.S. Underground Nuclear Tests for Event Screening and Yield Estimation

Moment tensor (MT) solutions are proving increasingly valuable in explosion monitoring, especially now that they are more routinely calculated for the unconstrained, full (six component) MT. In this study, we have calculated MTs for U.S. underground nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada National Security Site using seismic recordings primarily from the Livermore Nevada Network. We are able to determine them for 130 nuclear explosions from 1970 to 1996 for a range of yields and under a variety of material conditions, which we have supplemented with 10 additional chemical explosions at the test site. The result is an extensive database of MTs that can be used to assess the performance of important monitoring tasks such as event identification and yield determination. We test the explosion event screening on the fundamental lune of the MT eigensphere and find MT screening to be a robust discriminant between earthquakes and explosions. We then explore the estimation of moment-derived yield, in which we find that material properties are the largest contributor to differences in the estimated moment-to-yield ratio. Additionally, further research conducted on this dataset can be used to develop, test, and improve various explosion monitoring methodologies.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Investigation of Non-Nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform Sites - 20447

The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Assessing Dynamic Time Warping Techniques for Discriminating Seismic Sources at Local and Regional Distances

Effective monitoring of seismic explosions and hazard assessment relies heavily on the accurate discrimination of underground seismic sources. This study investigates the application of novel nonlinear alignment techniques, specifically Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), for event-type discrimination at regional and local distances. Building on prior research that used DTW and Elastic Shape Analysis (ESA) in discrimination at regional distances, we evaluate the performance of recently developed variants of DTW, including a method that employs Pearson cross-correlation as a measure of warping distance and a time distortion coefficient that quantifies the type and degree of time distortion between signals. By analyzing observational datasets that include different source types, we assess the performance of these approaches for realistic monitoring scenarios. Specifically, we consider a dataset recorded at regional distances in the Korean Peninsula and a local-distance subset from the Unconstrained Utah Event Bulletin catalog to evaluate DTW-based discrimination across multiple distance scales. Additionally, we introduce the maximum cross-correlations of warped waveforms as a similarity metric for event classification. Through hierarchical cluster analysis and dendrogram interpretation, we present our findings, highlighting the strengths and limitations of these techniques in seismic event classification.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2013

Pyroclastic Deposits in the Floor-fractured Crater Alphonsus

Alphonsus, the 118 km diameter floor-fractured crater, is located immediately east of Mare Nubium. Eleven pyroclastic deposits have been identified on the crater's floor. Early telescopic spectra suggest that the floor of Alphonsus is noritic, and that the pyroclastic deposits contain mixtures of floor material and a juvenile component including basaltic glass. Head and Wilson contend that Nubium lavas intruded the breccia zone beneath Alphonsus, forming dikes and fractures on the crater floor. In this model, the magma ascended to the level of the mare but cooled underground, and a portion broke thru to the surface in vulcanian (explosive) eruptions. Alternatively, the erupted material could be from a source unrelated to the mare, in the style of regional pyroclastic deposits. High-resolution images and spectroscopy from the Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M3), Diviner Lunar Radiometer, and Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter Camera Narrow Angle Camera (NAC) provide data to test these formation models. Spectra from M3 confirm that the crater floor is primarily composed of noritic material, and that the Nubium lavas are basaltic. Spectra from the three largest pyroclastic deposits in Alphonsus are consistent with a minor low- Ca pyroxene component in a glass-rich matrix. The centers of the 2 micron absorption bands have wavelengths too short to be of the same origin as the Nubium basalts. Diviner Christiansen feature (CF) values were used to estimate FeO abundances for the crater floor, Nubium soil, and pyroclastic deposits. The estimated abundance for the crater floor (7.5 +/- 1.4 wt.%) is within the range of FeO values for Apollo norite samples. However, the estimated FeO abundance for Nubium soil (13.4 +/- 1.4 wt.%) is lower than those measured in most mare samples. The difference may reflect contamination of the mare soil by highland ejecta. The Diviner-derived FeO abundance for the western pyroclastic deposit is 13.8 +/- 3.3 wt.%. This is lower than the values for mare soil samples, but within the range of analyzed pyroclastic glasses. The NAC images of the pyroclastic vents highlight their bright wall materials. The M3 spectra of the southeastern vent indicate that this bright material is noritic, likely crater floor material exposed by explosive eruption. These observations address the hypothesis that Nubium lavas intruded the fracture network beneath Alphonsus, leading to localized vulcanian-style eruptions. This model implies that the eruption products should be dominated by crystalline basalt fragments similar in elemental composition and mineralogy to mare lavas. The bright noritic material exposed in the vent walls is consistent with explosive eruptions. The estimated FeO abundances for the pyroclastic deposits are too low to be consistent with FeO abundances measured in mare basalts, but are within the range of pyroclastic glass samples. The visible- to near-infrared (VIS-NIR) spectra of the pyroclastic deposits and Nubium soils are significantly different, suggesting that the pyroclastics are unrelated to the mare basalts. The pyroclastic spectra are consistent with Fe-bearing glass plus small amounts of noritic wall rock. Similar glassy materials dominate regional pyroclastic deposits, suggesting a deep source for the pyroclastics observed in Alphonsus.

Allen, Carlton C.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Office of Nuclear Verification FY 2023 Quarterly Report TSVT Q1

This project encompasses the continued development and training of a U.S. operational team, the Test Site Verification Team (TSVT), supporting verification of nuclear testing activities. TSVT builds on decades of U.S. nuclear testing history and nuclear explosion monitoring experience. The Team maintains readiness to deploy internationally on short notice to provide field-based support of verification of declared or undeclared nuclear testing and associated activities, as well as follow-on activities including monitoring and capability disablement and dismantlement, as established by negotiated agreement or treaty. The roles and structure of the TSVT are integrated with other NA-243 deployable verification teams and the interagency. FY23 TSVT activities focus on continued capability buildup within the team, including Team trainings and exercises with a focus on missions in confined spaces (e.g., tunnels, mines, other underground facilities), increased familiarity with foreign nuclear weapons testing programs, demonstration of Team capacity to deploy, train, and practice sustained OPSEC in non-western locations, establishment of sustainable storage and maintenance of equipment, specification and procurement of additional equipment to support field observations, further evolution of concepts of operation documents (CONOPs), and mission coordination with Headquarters and associated Stakeholders. Activities will culminate with a full-scale domestic team exercise at the end of FY23 focusing on underground activities signatures/observations and safety including advanced outdoor safety and familiarity in working around explosive test environments. In addition, we will be further articulating approaches and capacity relevant to the identification of nuclear tests, as well as monitoring of nuclear testing activities and/or dismantlement of nuclear test sites and anticipate developing additional equipment requests in support of this evolution. The TSVT Team Leads will also coordinate with its Senior Advisor, the TSVT Logistics and Readiness (L&R) Training Lead, and NNSA Headquarters to draft a five-year TSVT training and exercise plan, that strategically and incrementally builds capacity and expertise in key areas of significance for the continuum of nuclear and nuclear-related testing activities that fall within the team’s mission space.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.

12-201800↗