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At least 145 records · Page 8

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for determining response and staffing requirements.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for staffing reduction. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Having the minimal possible number of access points and methods to completely block access from these points if a threat is detected will greatly help us justify staffing reduction.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Analysis of 127 Xe tracer measurements using a net counts method

A suite of measurement systems were deployed as part of the Physical Experiment 1 series of experiments, which involved detonating chemical explosives along with radionuclide tracers in an underground cavity, at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in the United States. One of the radionuclide tracers, 127 Xe was released from the containment following the explosion and detected on a SAUNA Q B sampler situated approximately 3.5 km away. The system uses a beta-gamma coincidence detector system to measure fission product radioisotopes of xenon relevant to nuclear explosion monitoring. In this work we use the coincidence measurement data to analyse and interpret the results from the SAUNA Q B system, to calculate the measured 127 Xe activity concentration(s).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

The design and construction of a nuclear power plant must include robust structures and a security boundary that is difficult to penetrate. For security considerations, the reactors would ideally be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, which would be too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives. Additionally, all communications and power transfer lines would also be located underground and would be fortified against any possible design basis threats. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is a key aspect for determining response and staffing requirements. Considerations considered in a graded approach to physical protection are described.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Full Moment Tensor Solutions of U.S. Underground Nuclear Tests for Event Screening and Yield Estimation

Moment tensor (MT) solutions are proving increasingly valuable in explosion monitoring, especially now that they are more routinely calculated for the unconstrained, full (six component) MT. In this study, we have calculated MTs for U.S. underground nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada National Security Site using seismic recordings primarily from the Livermore Nevada Network. We are able to determine them for 130 nuclear explosions from 1970 to 1996 for a range of yields and under a variety of material conditions, which we have supplemented with 10 additional chemical explosions at the test site. The result is an extensive database of MTs that can be used to assess the performance of important monitoring tasks such as event identification and yield determination. We test the explosion event screening on the fundamental lune of the MT eigensphere and find MT screening to be a robust discriminant between earthquakes and explosions. We then explore the estimation of moment-derived yield, in which we find that material properties are the largest contributor to differences in the estimated moment-to-yield ratio. Additionally, further research conducted on this dataset can be used to develop, test, and improve various explosion monitoring methodologies.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Investigation of Non-Nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform Sites - 20447

The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Assessing Dynamic Time Warping Techniques for Discriminating Seismic Sources at Local and Regional Distances

Effective monitoring of seismic explosions and hazard assessment relies heavily on the accurate discrimination of underground seismic sources. This study investigates the application of novel nonlinear alignment techniques, specifically Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), for event-type discrimination at regional and local distances. Building on prior research that used DTW and Elastic Shape Analysis (ESA) in discrimination at regional distances, we evaluate the performance of recently developed variants of DTW, including a method that employs Pearson cross-correlation as a measure of warping distance and a time distortion coefficient that quantifies the type and degree of time distortion between signals. By analyzing observational datasets that include different source types, we assess the performance of these approaches for realistic monitoring scenarios. Specifically, we consider a dataset recorded at regional distances in the Korean Peninsula and a local-distance subset from the Unconstrained Utah Event Bulletin catalog to evaluate DTW-based discrimination across multiple distance scales. Additionally, we introduce the maximum cross-correlations of warped waveforms as a similarity metric for event classification. Through hierarchical cluster analysis and dendrogram interpretation, we present our findings, highlighting the strengths and limitations of these techniques in seismic event classification.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Office of Nuclear Verification FY 2023 Quarterly Report TSVT Q1

This project encompasses the continued development and training of a U.S. operational team, the Test Site Verification Team (TSVT), supporting verification of nuclear testing activities. TSVT builds on decades of U.S. nuclear testing history and nuclear explosion monitoring experience. The Team maintains readiness to deploy internationally on short notice to provide field-based support of verification of declared or undeclared nuclear testing and associated activities, as well as follow-on activities including monitoring and capability disablement and dismantlement, as established by negotiated agreement or treaty. The roles and structure of the TSVT are integrated with other NA-243 deployable verification teams and the interagency. FY23 TSVT activities focus on continued capability buildup within the team, including Team trainings and exercises with a focus on missions in confined spaces (e.g., tunnels, mines, other underground facilities), increased familiarity with foreign nuclear weapons testing programs, demonstration of Team capacity to deploy, train, and practice sustained OPSEC in non-western locations, establishment of sustainable storage and maintenance of equipment, specification and procurement of additional equipment to support field observations, further evolution of concepts of operation documents (CONOPs), and mission coordination with Headquarters and associated Stakeholders. Activities will culminate with a full-scale domestic team exercise at the end of FY23 focusing on underground activities signatures/observations and safety including advanced outdoor safety and familiarity in working around explosive test environments. In addition, we will be further articulating approaches and capacity relevant to the identification of nuclear tests, as well as monitoring of nuclear testing activities and/or dismantlement of nuclear test sites and anticipate developing additional equipment requests in support of this evolution. The TSVT Team Leads will also coordinate with its Senior Advisor, the TSVT Logistics and Readiness (L&R) Training Lead, and NNSA Headquarters to draft a five-year TSVT training and exercise plan, that strategically and incrementally builds capacity and expertise in key areas of significance for the continuum of nuclear and nuclear-related testing activities that fall within the team’s mission space.

42 ENGINEERING↗

An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.

12-201800↗

Regional Source-Type Discrimination Using Nonlinear Alignment Algorithms

The discrimination problem in seismology aims to accurately classify different underground source types based on local, regional, and/or teleseismic observations of ground motion. Typical discriminant approaches are rooted in fundamental, physics-based differences in radiation pattern or wave excitation, which can be frequency-dependent and may not make use of the full waveform. In this article, we explore whether phase and amplitude distances derived from dynamic time warping (DTW) and elastic shape analysis (ESA) can inform event discrimination. We demonstrate the ability to distinguish underground point sources using synthetic waveforms calculated for a 1D Earth model and various source mechanisms. We then apply the method to recorded data from events in the Korean Peninsula, which includes declared nuclear explosions, a collapse event, and naturally occurring earthquakes. Phase and amplitude distances derived from DTW and ESA are then used to classify the event types via dendrogram and k-nearest-neighbor clustering analyses. Using information from the full waveform, we show how different underground sources can be distinguished at regional distances. We highlight the potential of these nonlinear alignment algorithms for discrimination and comment on ways we can extend the framework presented here.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Kubernetes for the Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment Data Acquisition

The Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) is a next-generation long-baseline neutrino experiment based in the USA which is expected to start taking data in 2029. DUNE aims to precisely measure neutrino oscillation parameters by detecting neutrinos from the LBNF beamline (Fermilab) at the Far Detector, 1,300 kilometres away, in South Dakota at the Sanford Underground Research Facility. The Far Detector will consist of four cryogenic Liquid Argon Time Projection Chamber detectors of 17 kT, each producing more than 1 TB/sec of data. The main requirements for the data acquisition system are the ability to run continuously for extended periods of time, with a 99% up-time requirement, and the functionality to record both beam neutrinos and low energy neutrinos from the explosion of a neighbouring supernova, should one occur during the lifetime of the experiment. The key challenges are the high data rates that the detectors generate and the deep underground environment, which places constraints on power and space. To overcome these challenges, DUNE plans to use a highly optimised C++ software suite and a server farm of about 110 nodes continuously running about two hundred multicore processes located close to the detector, 1.5 kilometres underground. Thirty nodes will be at the surface and will run around two hundred processes simultaneously. DUNE is studying the use of the Kubernetes framework to manage containerised workloads and take advantage of its resource definitions and high up-time services to run the DAQ system. Progress in deploying these systems at the CERN neutrino platform on the prototype DUNE experiments is reported.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DATASET RELEASE AND QUALITY CONTROL REVIEW OF LIVERMORE NEVADA NETWORK (LNN) RECORDINGS OF A SUBSET OF NEVADA NUCLEAR SECURITY SITE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FROM 1979 TO 1992.

Geophysical research on historical nuclear tests is an important aspect of future monitoring capabilities in seismic research. This research is challenging due to the limited number of digital seismic recordings during the peak of nuclear testing (1945-1992). These limited records are unique and non-reproducible data with potential high research impact. Releasing available nuclear explosion seismic records to the explosion monitoring community is thus of high value and is the motivation for this dataset release. The target of this effort was on compilation and quality control of regional seismic records of nuclear explosions recorded on Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory stations ELK, KNB, LAC, and MNV, known collectively as the Livermore National Network (LNN) (Figure 1). LNN was established in the early 1960s for the primary purpose of monitoring underground nuclear testing at the former Nevada Test Site (NTS), now known as the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS) following the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). LNN consisted initially of short-period vertical component Benioff’s recorded on film located at Mina, NV (MNV) and Kanab, Utah (KNB). LNN added two additional stations at Landers, CA (LAC) and Elko, NV (ELK) in 1967 and upgraded equipment to broadband seismometers recorded on frequency modulation (FM) tapes from 1967-1979, followed by digital recordings after 1979 (Jarpe, 1989). The digital recordings were on a variety of now obsolete media, including 9-track, Exabyte, and DAT tapes. Jarpe (1989) describes the seismic station instrumentation details over the period of deployment. LNN recorded valuable non-repeatable unique data of several hundreds of nuclear explosions at NNSS, as well as earthquakes and chemical and mining explosions (Walter, 2020). The details of these nuclear tests are provided in the Department of Energy Report NV-209 Rev 16 (DOE, 2015).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Harnessing Uncertainty through Functional Data Analysis in Gas Breakthrough Data

Detecting subsurface explosions from radionuclide gas migration through rock fractures is an effective way to identify nuclear activity. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has developed simulation methods, based on data from the 1962 Hardhat underground nuclear test, to predict gas breakthrough times at the surface. However, these methods rely on an imperfect understanding of the relationship between rock damage and fracture permeability. Our clinic project studies methods for predicting breakthrough curves that characterize total mass produced as a function of time, as well as quantifying the uncertainty associated with these predictions. The model that is currently employed to relate damage to permeability uses an empirically motivated power-law expression, with a range of parameter values that are compatible with the experimental Hardhat data. We develop emulators, built from functional data analysis techniques and trained on simulation data, that rapidly predict the gas breakthrough curve given a damage field and given the parameter values of the power-law equation. Using Bayesian regression, we address the problem of uncertainty quantification in our emulators. Finally, in order to test the robustness of the model, we further validate it on a damage field representing different physical conditions.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

The Study on the Shock Wave Propagation Rule of a Gas Explosion in a Gas Compartment

Combined with the k-ε turbulence model of general application, a refined finite element model of a utility tunnel’s gas compartment filled with the methane/air mixture is developed. A series of analyses are made by using the powerful industry-leading computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software flame acceleration simulator (FLACS) to study the shock wave propagation rule in the gas compartment. The longitudinal and transversal distribution laws of the explosion shock wave are gained taking into consideration the spatial characteristics of the gas compartment. The influences of a few parameters, such as initial conditions and section size of the gas compartment, on the shock wave propagation rule are further discussed. The basic procedure for predicting the peak pressure of the blast wave is provided by considering the initial conditions and the gas compartment, and the corresponding injury effect of the explosion wave on the living beings is assessed. The investigation demonstrates that the peak pressure by the coupled effect between the initial conditions is significantly influenced, especially at the upper and lower gas explosion limits. The peak pressure increases gradually as the width or height increases, and both basically meet the linear relation. The proposed method can forecast the peak pressure of the explosion shock wave in the gas compartment accurately. According to the peak pressure longitudinal and transversal distributions of the blast wave, the peak pressure is far greater than the killing pressure threshold in the underground and closed space; consequently, it is not safe for the living beings in the gas compartment.

Lin, Shu-Chao↗

Bayesian Seismoacoustic Source Location: Acoustic Approach

Seismic waves and infrasound are key technologies in the International Monitoring System (IMS) to monitor explosive events in the solid Earth and atmosphere. Energetic man-made or natural events (e.g., chemical/nuclear explosions, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes) near the Earth’s surface produce both ground motion and atmospheric pressure disturbances which propagate as seismic waves and infrasound, respectively. Seismic waves have been generally used to detect and identify underground and near-surface events (Myers, et. al., 2007), and infrasound are sensitive to events near the surface or in the atmosphere (Modrak et. al., 2010). Due to their different sensitivities to events, they can complement to each other to improve the event detection and discrimination. The framework of joint seismoacoustic event location has recently reviewed by theoretical research (Koch and Arrowsmith, 2019). Although the early applications showed promising results to improve the accuracy of event location, their application were still limited to a small set of events selected to prove the concepts, and practical capability of the method for operational purpose is not fully evaluated with data. Our final goal is to apply the method of seismoacoustic event location to a larger set of events and evaluate its applicability for operational event location in practice. To that end, we focus on developing and verifying acoustic source location method in this study.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Retrieval of Transuranic Drums with Deflagration to Detonation Potential from a Vault at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 20207

During the final phase of a long-term project, a total of 80 TRU waste drums at ORNL have been retrieved from a below-grade storage vault in which they have remained untouched for about 25 years. The drums, which house material generated from past ORNL operations, are now stored and ready for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, located on Highway 95 in Oak Ridge. The Transuranic Waste Processing Center will process and ship the drums to WIPP in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for disposal. Workers lifted the drums one-by-one from the underground storage vault with a 110-ton crane over a one-week period in October 2017. Although the physical work was performed in one week, years of detailed planning preceded the fieldwork. A key obstacle needed to be overcome before the project could safely proceed. This obstacle involved the need to ensure controls were developed for the Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) potential. DDT refers to a phenomenon in ignitable mixtures of a flammable gas and air (or oxygen) when a sudden transition takes place from a deflagration type of combustion to a detonation type of explosion. Basically, these drums, under certain circumstances, have a potential to detonate and overpressurize. Extensive analysis of the drums verified that detonation, while unlikely, was possible. Of the total 103 drums that were retrieved or moved in preparation for retrieval, 18 had DDT potential. Extensive security requirements were also necessary, due to the nature of the material, and this added another layer of complexity to the fieldwork. Prior to retrieving the drums from the underground storage vault, space needed to be made for them within the various above-grade facilities. Inventory and security requirements dictated what could be stored where, and the first step of the field work involved a number of drum movements in preparation for storage of the newly retrieved drums. This effort involved moving 21 drums already in the storage area to facilitate the addition of the newly retrieved ones. The retrieval project required a total of 107 critical lifts using the 110-ton crane, under 3 critical lift plans. The TRU waste storage facility is a Category 2 Nuclear Facility and is managed under an extensive Documented Safety Analysis. The TRU retrieval project was conducted in accordance with DOE Order 425.1D and included three Implementation Verification Reviews, two Management Assessments, one Readiness Assessment, and seven mock-ups in preparation for the field work. Despite being stored for 25 years, the drums were in good shape due to the integrity of the facilities where the drums were stored. Of the 80 drums that were retrieved, 12 were placed in special containers called 'overpacks' based on their content. The drums were removed safely and without incident, thanks to a lot of preparation and the efforts of a highly skilled team. Lessons learned through the DDT control development and the drum retrieval and overpacking process could be beneficial to others having to manage similar drums of TRU waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Modeling the formation of Sedan Crater using the FLAG and HOSS codes

Numerical modeling of explosion crater formation requires accounting for complex physical processes. Numerical validation of explosion cratering is an important step in modeling and requires experimental data for comparison. Models using discrete elements and continuum models have both benefits and drawbacks to their approaches. In this work, we consider both an arbitrary Lagrangian–Eulerian (ALE) hydrocode and a finite discrete element method (FDEM) approach to modeling the formation of the Sedan crater, the largest human-made crater in the United States. The Sedan crater formed from an underground nuclear detonation in the Nevada desert as part of Project Plowshare. Our models show that the continuum approach of the hydrocode matched well compared to early test time prior to the mound rupture and subsequent fireball venting, when most of the alluvium exhibited fluid behavior. Our FDEM approach matched the final crater dimensions well, after material had settled back into the crater, when material strength and solid mechanics play key roles. Our work shows how leveraging the benefits of multiple numerical approaches can lead to better understanding of complex physical problems, especially problems with limited experimental data. By using a continuum approach to early-time hydrodynamics and an FDEM approach to later-time solid mechanics, we can better understand the different physical regimes of explosion crater formation.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Seismic Event Characterization Using Full Moment Tensors on the Hypersphere

Moment tensor solutions provide insights into the deformation that has occurred in the source region of a seismic event and are therefore of great value in identifying different types of seismic sources, such as when monitoring for underground nuclear tests. Despite this utility, inversion of waveforms recorded by seismometers for their full seismic moment tensor is not yet routine, and development of robust methods to classify events based on this information is in its infancy. Here, we assemble an inventory of 1405 full moment tensor solutions that include explosive, earthquake, and collapse events, and investigate the use of anisotropic probability distribution functions on the 5D hypersphere to discriminate between these sources. Using a Bayesian classifier, we obtain optimal success rates of 98.4% across all events and demonstrate that modification of the prior probabilities provides a natural way to alter the balance between not missing desirable events (such as explosions) versus misclassifying large numbers of undesired events (such as earthquakes). The approach is specifically designed to progress from traditional, bipolar event screening metrics to more generalized event identification across multiple types of seismic sources. Despite current databases containing insufficient numbers of events to definitively demonstrate at present, we also find intriguing evidence of subgroupings within individual source populations on the hypersphere, for example, between chemical and nuclear explosions, raising the potential possibility of discriminating between these event types in the future.

Geosciences↗