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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2024

Integrated Systems Engineering, Safety, Reliability and Risk Management – Minimizing Black Swan Events

This paper examines key barriers that can possibly inhibit safe and reliable mission execution and, in the worst case, result in loss of human life due to many unknown contributory factors that can lead to Black Swan events. Some of the representative contributory factors include decision errors, overconfidence and a host of common causes including cultural and human factors. Decisions are always easy to criticize in hindsight when more information is available after a major accident. Depending on the type and complexity of the project and/or mission, the catastrophic risks of drifting into failure can be alleviated by implementing uniquely and strategically tailored Integrated-System-of-Systems, dynamic, risk-informed decision management processes. This paper presents some of the lessons learned from James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), NASA’s Human Space Flight program, and industry that provide motivation to organizations working on mega-complex missions to prudently accomplish targeted mission success. These lessons are important for future human Lunar, Mars and Beyond missions planned to be pursued by NASA through a public-private partnership using nimble but effective safety-conscious, proven sound engineering practices including implementation of integrated risk mitigation practices.

SLS↗
NASA NTRS2022

Fatigue, Schedules, Sleep, and Sleepiness in U.S. Commercial Pilots During COVID-19

Introduction: COVID-19 has had a significant impact on the aviation industry. While reduced flying capacity may intuitively translate to reduced fatigue risk by way of fewer flights and duty hours, the actual impact of the pandemic on pilot fatigue is unknown. Methods: We surveyed US commercial airline pilots in late 2020 (n = 669) and early 2021 (n = 156) to assess the impact of COVID-19 on schedules and fatigue during the pandemic. Results: Overall, pilots reported reduced flight and duty hours compared to pre-pandemic. Average sleep on workdays was slightly shorter in late 2020 (6.88 h) and recovered to pre-pandemic levels in early 2021 (6.95 h). Similarly, the frequency of sleepiness on days off and in-flight increased in late 2020, with 54% of pilots reporting an increase in in-flight sleepiness, then returned to pre-pandemic levels in early 2021. The use of in-flight sleepiness countermeasures remained the same across assessed time points. Pilots highlighted several factors which impacted their sleep and job performance, including limited access to nutritional food during duty days and layovers, reduced access to exercise facilities during layovers, increased stress due to job insecurity and health concerns, increased distractions and workload, and changes to scheduling. Discussion: Despite a reduction in flights and duty days, COVID-19 led to increased sleepiness on days off and in-flight, potentially due to the negative impact of lack of access to essential needs and heightened stress on sleep. Operators need to monitor the change in these COVID-19 related risks as the industry returns to full service.

sleep↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Characterization of Jugular Venous Blood Flow During Acute Fluid Shifts

INTRODUCTION Exposure to weightlessness induces a headward fluid shift and redistribution of fluids, resulting in increased internal jugular vein (IJV) cross-sectional area and altered IJV blood flow dynamics, including stasis and retrograde flow. These findings may contribute to various risks of spaceflight, including thrombosis or other risks affected by cerebral venous blood flow. To date, our understanding of the cerebral venous outflow dynamics in weightlessness is limited to the left IJV assessed ~45 and ~150 days into spaceflight. Therefore, it is unknown how quickly the alterations in venous blood flow dynamics change as a result of weightlessness. The purpose of this study is to determine 1) if venous stasis is an immediate effect of weightlessness and therefore a risk for short-duration missions and 2) the effect of weightlessness on brachiocephalic venous flow. METHODS In this study, we investigated the effects of acute weightlessness during parabolic flight on the right and left IJV in 12 healthy subjects. Baseline ultrasound images were obtained on the ground (1g) in the seated and supine postures and during 0g parabolic flight. Each data collection session included 2D ultrasonography to quantify IJV cross-sectional area and Doppler ultrasonography to characterize venous blood flow patterns in the bilateral IJVs. RESULTS There was a similar pattern of response in the left and right IJV area across postures and g-levels. IJV area increased from seated to supine by 0.74 mm2 (95% CI: 0.56 to 0.91 mm2, p<.001) and increased further during weightlessness by 0.29 mm2 (95% CI: 0.11 to 0.47 mm2, p=.0015). IJV Doppler images revealed stagnant flow in the left IJV in one subject during 0g exposure that was not present during any imaging on the ground; the right IJV continued to show pulsatile, nominal flow patterns in both 0g and 1g. CONCLUSIONS This study characterized the immediate effect of the weightlessness-induced headward fluid shift on venous parameters in the left and right IJV. The left IJV appears to be more susceptible to flow alterations, including stagnant flow, during both short and long-duration exposure to weightlessness that may contribute to the risk of thrombosis inflight.

K Marshall-Goebel↗
NASA NTRS2017

Designing to Sample the Unknown: Lessons from OSIRIS-REx Project Systems Engineering

On September 8, 2016, the third NASA New Frontiers mission launched on an Atlas V 411. The Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security-Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) will rendezvous with asteroid Bennu in 2018, collect a sample in 2020, and return that sample to Earth in September 2023. The development team has overcome a number of challenges in order to design and build a system that will make contact with an unexplored, airless, low-gravity body. This paper will provide an overview of the mission, then focus in on the system-level challenges and some of the key system-level processes. Some of the lessons here are unique to the type of mission, like discussion of operating at a largely-unknown, low-gravity object. Other lessons, particularly from the build phase, have broad implications. The OSIRIS-REx risk management process was particularly effective in achieving an on-time and under-budget development effort. The systematic requirements management and verification and the system validation also helped identify numerous potential problems. The final assessment of the OSIRIS-REx performance will need to wait until the sample is returned in 2023, but this post-launch assessment will capture some of the key systems-engineering lessons from the development team.

Asteroid↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

Extravehicular activity (EVA) on the lunar surface presents unique risks to crew with possibility for injury. Without appropriate assistance or rescue capability, inability to nominally ambulate and return to a lander, especially during early Artemis missions, could have catastrophic consequences. Mapping likelihood and consequence safety risk associated with identified injury scenarios establishes a baseline from which to assess potential mitigation solutions to ensure crew health and safety. Causes leading to the need for incapacitated crew rescue (ICR) during EVA on the lunar surface were previously identified and classified using an ICR/Acute Injury scenario spectrum. Severe scenarios are those when the affected astronaut requires either partial or full continuous assistance from the rescuer. Evaluation of these continual reliance conditions included calculating event probabilities (likelihoods) associated with an early Artemis mission and mapping them to established Exploration System Directorate (ESD) probability thresholds; safety consequences were analyzed and correlated to defined ESD personnel safety categories. These resulting likelihood and consequence values served as a baseline for assessing risk reduction of three mitigation capabilities: crew assistance (rescuer crew) only, walking assist devices, and a wheeled transport device. Of the twenty-five continual reliance conditions, ten were evaluated as “catastrophic” (Level 5, loss of life) during EVA on the lunar surface with probabilities ranging from moderate to very low during an early Artemis mission. Crew assistance only and walking assist devices showed similar potential for risk reduction, with four of the ten causes decreasing to Level 4. A wheeled transport device further increased risk reduction with six of the ten conditions decreasing to Level 4. Given the catastrophic consequence of several identified conditions, assessments should be performed to determine the feasibility of mitigation capabilities. It is currently unknown whether a rescuer astronaut could effectively provide continuous assistance to enable both crew to return safely to the lander from the standpoint of both suit geometry and human performance. Although resulting in an increase in resources, providing a wheeled transport provides the highest risk reduction potential, and walking assist devices may have prevention as well as mitigation benefits.

lunar surface↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessing Environmental and Socioeconomic Factors of Urban Flood Vulnerability in Kansas City, Kansas

Pluvial flooding, over-saturated ground, and drainage systems disproportionately impact historically marginalized urban neighborhoods during extreme rainfall events. These communities are impacted by physical and socioeconomic factors that make them vulnerable to flooding events, such as high concentrations of impervious landcover, high precipitation rates, and a combined sewer system framework. Despite known vulnerability to environmental hazards, understanding potential pluvial street-level flooding events are largely unknown. Using the open-source National Capital Project’s Integrated Valuation of Ecosystem Services and Tradeoffs (InVEST) Urban Flood Risk Mitigation model, NASA DEVELOP examined neighborhood scale runoff retention and potential economic damages for risk mapping throughout Kansas City, Kansas. The generated outputs aid in identifying vulnerable neighborhoods susceptible to flooding and in need of future intervention. Previous studies have applied this model framework to understand urban flood vulnerability regarding ecosystem services, urban planning, and flood mitigation strategies. We utilized the InVEST outputs to develop indices pertaining to environmental justice factors of race, socioeconomic status, social vulnerability, and health. The findings indicate that historically redlined neighborhoods in Kansas City, Kansas face disproportional impacts from flood events and are subject to greater environmental stressors. This research provides an approach to utilizing an open-source flood vulnerability model to empower neighborhood-scale environmental justice analysis, enhancing the local communities' understanding of present-day impacts of historical environmental injustices.

Hadwynne Gross↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA-DoD Lead-Free Electronics Project. DRAFT Joint Test Report

The use of conventional tin-lead (SnPb) in circuit board manufacturing is under ever-increasing political scrutiny due to increasing regulations concerning lead. The "Restriction of Hazardous Substances" (RoHS) directive enacted by the European Union (EU) and a pact between the United States National Electronics Manufacturing Initiative (NEMI), Europe's Soldertec at Tin Technology Ltd. and the Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association (JEITA) are just two examples where worldwide legislative actions and partnerships/agreements are affecting the electronics industry. As a result, many global commercial-grade electronic component suppliers are initiating efforts to transition to lead-free (Pb-free) in order to retain their worldwide market. Pb-free components are likely to find their way into the inventory of aerospace or military assembly processes under current government acquisition reform initiatives. Inventories "contaminated" by Pb-free will result in increased risks associated with the manufacturing, product reliability, and subsequent repair of aerospace and military electronic systems. Although electronics for military and aerospace applications are not included in the RoHS legislation, engineers are beginning to find that the commercial industry's move towards RoHS compliance has affected their supply chain and changed their parts. Most parts suppliers plan to phase out their non-compliant, leaded production and many have already done so. As a result, the ability to find leaded components is getting harder and harder. Some buyers are now attempting to acquire the remaining SnPb inventory, if it's not already obsolete. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), depots, and support contractors have to be prepared to deal with an electronics supply chain that increasingly provides more and more parts with Pb-free finishes-some labeled no differently than their Pb counterparts-while at the same time providing the traditional Pb parts. The longer the transition period, the greater the likelihood of Pb-free parts inadvertently being mixed with Pb parts and ending up on what are supposed to be Pb systems. As a result, OEMs, depots, and support contractors need to take action now to either abate the influx of Pb-free parts, or accept it and deal with the likely interim consequences of reduced reliability due to a wide variety of matters, such as Pb contamination, high temperature incompatibility, and tin whiskering. Allowance of Pb-free components produces one of the greatest risks to the reliability of a weapon system. This is due to new and poorly understood failure mechanisms, as well as unknown long-term reliability. If the decision is made to consciously allow Pb-free solder and component finishes into SnPb electronics, additional effort (and cost) will be required to make the significant number of changes to drawings and task order procedures. This project is a follow-on effort to the Joint Council on Aging Aircraft/Joint Group on Pollution Prevention (JCAA/JG-PP) Pb-free Solder Project which was the first group to test the reliability of Pb-free solder joints against the requirements of the aerospace and military community.

Kessel, Kurt↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of the occurrences of injury during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crewmembers and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80 individual crew landings has been collected through this study. Injuries are classified as either contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), and Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3 %). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), and then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings. The MDRI is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI also vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it will be important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles, and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning.

N Newby↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of injury occurrence during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crewmembers and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80 individual crew landings has been collected through this study as of 2021. Injuries are classified either as contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), or Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3 %) (n.b. This is the percent for whom contusion/abrasion was the worst injury. Those with class I or II injuries typically also received contusions/abrasions). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings, but it is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it is important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning. Future work includes expanding this study to involve private space missions on new vehicles to better characterize the effects of time in flight, suit and seat design, and vehicle dynamics.

N Newby↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of injury occurrence during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crew members and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80individual crew landings has been collected through this study as of September 2023. Injuries are classified either as contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), or Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3%) (n.b. This is the percent for whom contusion/abrasion was the worst injury. Those with class I or II injuries typically also received contusions/abrasions). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings, but it is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it is important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning. Future work includes expanding this study to involve private space missions on new vehicles to better characterize the effects of time in flight, suit and seat design, and vehicle dynamics.

N Newby↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of injury occurrence during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crewmembers and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80 individual crew landings has been collected through this study as of September 2023. Injuries are classified either as contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), or Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3 %) (n.b. This is the percent for whom contusion/abrasion was the worst injury. Those with class I or II injuries typically also received contusions/abrasions). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings, but it is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it is important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning. Future work includes expanding this study to involve private space missions on new vehicles to better characterize the effects of time in flight, suit and seat design, and vehicle dynamics.

P Greenhalgh↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Navigation Performance of the BioSentinel Deep Space CubeSat Mission

The BioSentinel mission was recently launched aboard the SLS launch vehicle (LV) as part of the Artemis- 1 campaign. The BioSentinel navigation team successfully tracked and guided the spacecraft through a lunar gravity assist to its destination Earth-trailing heliocentric orbit. This 6U CubeSat carries live yeast cells to analyze the effects of radiation at large distances from Earth, becoming the first biological payload in Deep Space. Prelaunch activities included mission design updates, orbit determination rehearsals and the development of a tracking schedule in coordination with the Artemis-1 payload office and the Deep Space Network (DSN). An important influence on the trajectories of Artemis I secondaries was the uncertainty associated with deployment from the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion System (ICPS), the upper stage of the SLS LV. The ICPS was rotating at a rate of 1 rpm; there was also an uncertainty in the spin axis attitude, which translated into an unknown clock angle of deployment. The variability in this angle and magnitude of deployment implied the existence of a non-negligible risk of a lunar impact, which was evaluated for various potential launch dates. We present the results of Monte Carlo analyses and compute the pertinent maneuvers to avoid it. In addition, we present a comparison with the actual deployment once the mission launched by reconstructing our trajectory with tracking data. On November 16th 2022 BioSentinel successfully deployed from ICPS and the navigation team started to receive 2-way Doppler and Sequential Ranging data from the DSN. We processed early data to try to obtain a first ephemeris using Initial Orbit Determination (IOD) methods such as the least squares. Soon after deployment, the spacecraft was tumbling and entered safe mode, creating a period where the tracking data were sparse. The mission team recovered the spacecraft and after four tracking passes, we solved for a first ephemeris that was sent to the DSN for better tracking of the spacecraft. After propagating this first ephemeris solution, we determined that we avoided impact with a margin of a few hundred km from the lunar surface. More tracking data over the next few days (from DSN as well as ESA antennas) allowed for a more refined orbit solution predicting a periselene altitude of 406 km and a lunar eclipse lasting 36.5 minutes. Therefore, BioSentinel operators aborted any correction maneuvers. This periselene altitude also gave us the necessary energy to achieve a heliocentric orbit. The next challenge was due to the necessary adjustments in our orbit determination method due to the large energy boost resulting from the lunar flyby. After a series of tracking passes we were able to get a nominal solution that resulted into a stable trajectory. This paper discusses in detail the navigation performance using the X-band IRIS transponder, as well as the challenges and lessons learned prior to and during this deep space, CubeSat mission.

Andres Dono Perez↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

BioSentinel Deep Space CubeSat Mission

The BioSentinel mission was recently launched aboard the SLS launch vehicle (LV) as part of the Artemis-1 campaign. This 6U CubeSat carries yeast cells to analyze the effects of radiation at large distances from Earth, becoming the first biological payload in Deep Space. Prelaunch activities included mission design updates, orbit determination rehearsals and the development of a tracking schedule in coordination with the Artemis-1 payload office and the Deep Space Network (DSN). An important influence on the trajectories of Artemis I secondaries was the uncertainty associated with deployment from the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion System (ICPS), the upper stage of the SLS LV. The ICPS was rotating at a rate of 1 rpm; there was also uncertainty in the spin axis attitude, which translated into an unknown clock angle of deployment. The variability in this angle and magnitude of deployment implied the existence of a non-negligible risk of a lunar impact, which was evaluated for various potential launch dates. On November 16 th 2022 BioSentinel successfully deployed from ICPS and the navigation team started to receive tracking data from the DSN and ESA antennas. Soon after deployment, the spacecraft was tumbling and entered safe mode. The mission team recovered the spacecraft and after four tracking passes, we solved for a first ephemeris that was sent to the DSN for better tracking of the spacecraft. After propagating this first ephemeris solution, we determined that we avoided impact with a margin of a few hundred km from the lunar surface. More tracking data over the next few days allowed for a more refined orbit solution predicting a periselene altitude of 406 km and a lunar eclipse lasting 36.5 minutes. Therefore, BioSentinel operators avoided any correction maneuvers on the trajectory and successfully tracked and guide the spacecraft. The spacecraft performed a nominal lunar flyby which provided the pertinent energy to achieve a final Earth-trailing heliocentric orbit. Over the course of two weeks, the mission operators corroborated that the subsystems were functioning as expected after the lunar eclipse and the large ΔV incurred. Science operations started once the mission achieved the nominal orbit in Deep Space. This paper discusses in detail the BioSentinel flight performance, as well as the challenges and lessons learned prior to and during this CubeSat mission.

Andres Dono Perez↗
NASA NTRS1992

An expert system for diagnosing environmentally induced spacecraft anomalies

A new rule-based, machine independent analytical tool was designed for diagnosing spacecraft anomalies using an expert system. Expert systems provide an effective method for saving knowledge, allow computers to sift through large amounts of data pinpointing significant parts, and most importantly, use heuristics in addition to algorithms, which allow approximate reasoning and inference and the ability to attack problems not rigidly defined. The knowledge base consists of over two-hundred (200) rules and provides links to historical and environmental databases. The environmental causes considered are bulk charging, single event upsets (SEU), surface charging, and total radiation dose. The system's driver translates forward chaining rules into a backward chaining sequence, prompting the user for information pertinent to the causes considered. The use of heuristics frees the user from searching through large amounts of irrelevant information and allows the user to input partial information (varying degrees of confidence in an answer) or 'unknown' to any question. The modularity of the expert system allows for easy updates and modifications. It not only provides scientists with needed risk analysis and confidence not found in algorithmic programs, but is also an effective learning tool, and the window implementation makes it very easy to use. The system currently runs on a Micro VAX II at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The inference engine used is NASA's C Language Integrated Production System (CLIPS).

Rolincik, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2001

Microbial contamination of spacecraft

Spacecraft and space habitats supporting human exploration contain a diverse population of microorganisms. Microorganisms may threaten human habitation in many ways that directly or indirectly impact the health, safety, or performance of astronauts. The ability to produce and maintain spacecraft and space stations with environments suitable for human habitation has been established over 40 years of human space flight. An extensive database of environmental microbiological parameters has been provided for short-term (< 20 days) space flight by more than 100 missions aboard the Space Shuttle. The NASA Mir Program provided similar data for long-duration missions. Interestingly, the major bacterial and fungal species found in the Space Shuttle are similar to those encountered in the nearly 15-year-old Mir. Lessons learned from both the US and Russian space programs have been incorporated into the habitability plan for the International Space Station. The focus is on preventive measures developed for spacecraft, cargo, and crews. On-orbit regular housekeeping practices complete with visual inspections are essential, along with microbiological monitoring. Risks associated with extended stays on the Moon or a Mars exploration mission will be much greater than previous experiences because of additional unknown variables. The current knowledge base is insufficient for exploration missions, and research is essential to understand the effects of space flight on biological functions and population dynamics of microorganisms in spacecraft. Equally important is a better understanding of the immune response and of human-microorganism-environment interactions during long-term space habitation.

Mir Project↗
NASA NTRS2001

Microbial Contamination in the Spacecraft

Spacecraft and space habitats supporting human exploration contain a diverse population of microorganisms. Microorganisms may threaten human habitation in many ways that directly or indirectly impact the health, safety, or performance of astronauts. The ability to produce and maintain spacecraft and space stations with environments suitable for human habitation has been established over 40 years of human spaceflight. An extensive database of environmental microbiological parameters has been provided for short-term (< 20 days) spaceflight by more than 100 missions aboard the Space Shuttle. The NASA Mir Program provided similar data for long-duration missions. Interestingly, the major bacterial and fungal species found in the Space Shuttle are similar to those encountered in the nearly 15-year-old Mir. Lessons learned from both the US and Russian space programs have been incorporated into the habitability plan for the International Space Station. The focus is on preventive measures developed for spacecraft, cargo, and crews. On-orbit regular housekeeping practices complete with visual inspections are essential, along with microbiological monitoring. Risks associated with extended stays on the Moon or a Mars exploration mission will be much greater than previous experiences because of additional unknown variables. The current knowledge base is insufficient for exploration missions, and research is essential to understand the effects of spaceflight on biological functions and population dynamics of microorganisms in spacecraft.

Pierson, Duane L.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Persistence of Gamma-H2AX Foci in Irradiated Bronchial Cells Correlates with Susceptibility to Radiation Associated Lung Cancer in Mice

The risk of developing radiation-induced lung cancer differs between different strains of mice, but the underlying cause of the strain differences is unknown. Strains of mice also differ in their ability to efficiently repair DNA double strand breaks resulting from radiation exposure. We phenotyped mouse strains from the CcS/Dem recombinant congenic strain set for their efficacy in repairing DNA double strand breaks during protracted radiation exposures. We monitored persistent gamma-H2AX radiation induced foci (RIF) 24 hours after exposure to chronic gamma-rays as a surrogate marker for repair deficiency in bronchial epithelial cells for 17 of the CcS/Dem strains and the BALB/cHeN founder strain. We observed a very strong correlation R2 = 79.18%, P < 0.001) between the level of persistent RIF and radiogenic lung cancer percent incidence measured in the same strains. Interestingly, spontaneous levels of foci in non-irradiated strains also showed good correlation with lung cancer incidence (R2=32.74%, P =0.013). These results suggest that genetic differences in DNA repair capacity largely account for differing susceptibilities to radiation-induced lung cancer among CcS/Dem mouse strains and that high levels of spontaneous DNA damage is also a relatively good marker of cancer predisposition. In a smaller pilot study, we found that the repair capacity measured in peripheral blood leucocytes also correlated well with radiogenic lung cancer susceptibility, raising the possibility that such phenotyping assay could be used to detect radiogenic lung cancer susceptibility in humans.

Ochola, Donasian O.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Risk of Performance Decrements and Adverse Health Outcomes Resulting from Sleep Loss, Circadian Desynchronization, and Work Overload

Sleep loss, circadian desynchronization, and work overload occur to some extent for ground and flight crews, prior to and during spaceflight missions. Ground evidence indicates that such risk factors may lead to performance decrements and adverse health outcomes, which could potentially compromise mission objectives. Efforts are needed to identify the environmental and mission conditions that interfere with sleep and circadian alignment, as well as individual differences in vulnerability and resiliency to sleep loss and circadian desynchronization. Specifically, this report highlights a collection of new evidence to better characterize the risk and reveals new gaps in this risk as follows: Sleep loss is apparent during spaceflight. Astronauts consistently average less sleep during spaceflight relative to on the ground. The causes of this sleep loss remain unknown, however ground-based evidence suggests that the sleep duration of astronauts is likely to lead to performance impairment and short and long-term health consequences. Further research is needed in this area in order to develop screening tools to assess individual astronaut sleep need in order to quantify the magnitude of sleep loss during spaceflight; current and planned efforts in BHP's research portfolio address this need. In addition, it is still unclear whether the conditions of spaceflight environment lead to sleep loss or whether other factors, such as work overload lead to the reduced sleep duration. Future data mining efforts and continued data collection on the ISS will help to further characterize factors contributing to sleep loss. Sleep inertia has not been evaluated during spaceflight. Ground-based studies confirm that it takes two to four hours to achieve optimal performance after waking from a sleep episode. Sleep inertia has been associated with increased accidents and reduced performance in operational environments. Sleep inertia poses considerable risk during spaceflight when emergency situations necessitate that crewmembers wake from sleep and make quick decisions. A recently completed BHP investigation assesses the effects of sleep inertia upon abrupt awakening, with and without hypnotics currently used in spaceflight; results from this investigation will help to inform strategies relative to sleep inertia effects on performance. Circadian desynchrony has been observed during spaceflight. Circadian desynchrony during spaceflight develops due to schedule constraints requiring non-24 operations or 'slam-shifts' and due to insufficient or mis-timed light exposure. In addition, circadian misalignment has been associated with reduced sleep duration and increased medication use. In ground-based studies, circadian desynchrony has been associated with significant performance impairment and increased risk of accidents when operations coincide with the circadian nadir. There is a great deal of information available on how to manage circadian misalignment, however, there are currently no easily collected biomarkers that can be used during spaceflight to determine circadian phase. Current research efforts are addressing this gap. Work overload has been documented during current spaceflight operations. NASA has established work hour guidelines that limit shift duration, however, schedule creep, where duty requirements necessitate working beyond scheduled work hours, has been reported. This observation warrants the documentation of actual work hours in order to improve planning and in order to ensure that astronauts receive adequate down time. In addition to concerns about work overload, ground based evidence suggests that work underload may be a concern during deep space missions, where torpor may develop and physically demanding workload will be exchanged for monitoring of autonomous systems. Given that increased automation is anticipated for exploration vehicles, fatigue effects in the context of such systems needs to be further understood. Performance metrics are needed to evaluate fitness-for-duty during spaceflight. Although ground-based evidence supports the notion that sleep loss, circadian desynchronization and work overload lead to performance impairment, inconsistency in the measures used to evaluate performance during spaceflight make it difficult to evaluate the magnitude of performance impairment during spaceflight. Work is underway to standardize measures of performance evaluation during spaceflight. Once established, such performance indicators need to be correlated with operational performance. Individual differences in sleep need and circadian preference, phase shifting ability and period have been documented in ground-based studies. Individual differences in response to sleep loss and circadian misalignment have also been documented and are presumed to be associated with genetic polymorphisms. No studies have systematically reported individual differences in sleep or circadian-related outcomes during spaceflight. More work is needed in this area in order to identify genetic or phenotypic biomarkers that predict resilience or vulnerability to sleep loss in order to personalize countermeasure strategies and mitigate performance impairment during spaceflight. Two laboratory and field investigations specific to this topic are currently ongoing; additional efforts, including an effort to mine existing biological data from spaceflight relative to sleep and circadian outcomes, are planned. Sex differences in sleep need and circadian period and phase have been reported in ground-based studies. The impact of these sex differences on performance is unclear. Sex differences in sleep need and circadian rhythms have not been systematically studied during spaceflight, presumably due to the small number of women that have flown in space. More research is needed in this area to evaluate whether any of the observed sex differences in physiology lead to altered performance in spaceflight and on the ground.

Flynn-Evans, Erin↗