Results for “Unmanned Aviation Systems” — Page 8

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

What Went Wrong: A Survey of Wildfire UAS Mishaps through Named Entity Recognition

Increasingly, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being applied to wildfire incidents for tasks such as mapping, aerial ignition, and delivery. As a result, aviation incident reporting systems for wildfires are beginning to accumulate data related to UAS mishaps in wildfire response. In this research, we apply state-of-the-art natural language processing (NLP) techniques to develop a custom Named Entity Recognition (NER) model which extracts entities relevant to safety analysts. The custom NER model is built by fine-tuning an existing Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) model, resulting in a generalizable NER model that can extract engineering relevant entities including failure modes, causes, effects, control processes, and recommendations from failure-relevant text. This model performs passably, with a weighted average f1 score of 0.33 across entity types, indicating more labeled training data is needed. Extracted entities are used to form a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)-style survey of wildfire UAS mishaps reported using the SAFECOM system. Similar mishaps are manually clustered and reported as single rows within an FMEA. Foreach cluster, we compute frequency, severity, and overall riskin accordance with FAA standards. This methodology can beapplied as part of a broader safety management system totrack trends in mishaps (e.g., likelihood, severity) and discoverknowledge (e.g., causes, effects) that can be utilized to improvesafety outcomes and system performance.

Machine Learning↗

NASA NTRS2015

Parameter Impact on Sharing Studies Between UAS CNPC Satellite Transmitters and Terrestrial Systems

In order to provide a control and non-payload communication (CNPC) link for civil-use unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) when operating in beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) conditions, satellite communication links are generally required. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has determined that the CNPC link must operate over protected aviation safety spectrum allocations. Although a suitable allocation exists in the 5030-5091 MHz band, no satellites provide operations in this band and none are currently planned. In order to avoid a very lengthy delay in the deployment of UAS in BLOS conditions, it has been proposed to use existing satellites operating in the Fixed Satellite Service (FSS), of which many operate in several spectrum bands. Regulatory actions by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) are needed to enable such a use on an international basis, and indeed Agenda Item (AI) 1.5 for the 2015 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) was established to decide on the enactment of possible regulatory provisions. As part of the preparation for AI 1.5, studies on the sharing FSS bands between existing services and CNPC for UAS are being contributed by NASA and others. These studies evaluate the potential impact of satellite CNPC transmitters operating from UAS on other in-band services, and on the potential impact of other in-band services on satellite CNPC receivers operating on UAS platforms. Such studies are made more complex by the inclusion of what are essentially moving FSS earth stations, compared to typical sharing studies between fixed elements. Hence, the process of determining the appropriate technical parameters for the studies meets with difficulty. In order to enable a sharing study to be completed in a less-than-infinite amount of time, the number of parameters exercised must be greatly limited. Therefore, understanding the impact of various parameter choices is accomplished through selectivity analyses. In the case of sharing studies for AI 1.5, identification of worst-case parameters allows the studies to be focused on worst-case scenarios with assurance that other parameter combinations will yield comparatively better results and therefore do not need to be fully analyzed. In this paper, the results of such sensitivity analyses are presented for the case of sharing between UAS CNPC satellite transmitters and terrestrial receivers using the Fixed Service (FS) operating in the same bands, and the implications of these analyses on sharing study results.

air traffic control↗

NASA NTRS2015

Safely Enabling Low-Altitude Airspace Operations: Unmanned Aerial System Traffic Management (UTM)

Many beneficial civilian applications of UAS have been proposed, from goods delivery and infrastructure surveillance, to search and rescue, and agricultural monitoring. As UAS operations require interactions with a mix of general aviation aircraft, helicopters and gliders, there is a strong need to safely accommodate all of these vehicles at lower altitudes. Currently, there is no established infrastructure to enable and safely manage the widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, regardless of the type of UAS. A UAS traffic management (UTM) system for low-altitude airspace is needed, much like today's surface vehicles that operate within a system consisting of roads, lanes, stop signs, rules, and lights, regardless of whether the vehicle is automated or driven by a human. This talk will focus on the UAS Traffic Managment Concept of Operations.

ATM↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

RTCA Special Committee 228 Working Group (DAA) 1

The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) is an American organization comprised of government, industry, and academic stakeholders in aviation for the purpose of providing technical guidance to regulatory authorities. In late 2022, RTCA Special Committee 228 (Minimum Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems) decided to form a working group to study a burgeoning multi-vehicle, supervisory control paradigm colloquially known as "m:N" (vocalized as "em-to-en"). Within the m:N control paradigm, multiple aircraft (N) are collaboratively managed by a body of operators/pilots (m). This presentation describes the scope of the m:N working group and its goal of producing an Operational Service and Environment Definition (OSED) for m:N operations.

RTCA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Roadmap to Cooperative Operating Practices for Strategic Conflict Detection and Resolution in the Upper Class-E Traffic Management Concept

As the governing body of flight operations in the highly anticipated emergent area of Upper Class E airspace (60,000 ft and above), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has recognized the potential for a possible extensible traffic management system for new entrants into this domain. Following the successes with Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) and Advanced / Urban Air Mobility (AAM / UAM) Traffic Management programs, FAA put forth an initial concept of operations for supporting the start of the Upper Class E Traffic Management (ETM) concept. Like UTM and AAM / UAM, ETM is envisioned to also be a community-based, industry driven cooperative management concept. However, tailoring it to be adaptable to the atmospheric communication, navigation, and surveillance deficits, as well as the diverse vehicle and mission profiles operating in the ETM environment will be the challenge. As such, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Ames Research Center has been investigating several technologies that will help enable industry in the development of this new type of cooperative operating environment. These technologies are being prototyped and will be tested in a collaborative evaluation of an initial ETM system in late 2023. The evaluation will concentrate on building out ETM system technologies that will inform the participants regarding operational intent sharing, strategic conflict detection, and the resultant deconfliction process. In addition to the technical aspects, key roles and responsibilities will need to be defined. This will be done through exploring community-agreed upon Cooperative Operating Practices (COPs) that include procedures and capabilities to aid in timely, strategic conflict identification and resolution to be developed during the evaluation. As an initial step to the evaluation, the ETM research team at NASA Ames solicited industry feedback on various aspects of ETM operations from subject matter experts. A virtual tabletop walkthrough session was held over a two-day period to follow a roadmap through the functional steps needed to build COPs, focusing on strategic conflict detection and resolution. Overall, the ETM tabletop provided insights into how the community wanted to instantiate the generation and sharing of operational intent, detect strategic conflicts and resolve those conflicts using a preliminary set of procedural community-agreed upon COPs.

Upper Class-E Traffic Management (ETM)↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Roadmap to Cooperative Operating Practices for Strategic Conflict Detection and Resolution in the Upper Class E Traffic Management Concept

As the governing body of flight operations in the highly anticipated emergent area of Upper Class E airspace (60,000 ft and above), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has recognized the potential for a possible extensible traffic management system for new entrants into this domain. Following the successes with Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) and Advanced / Urban Air Mobility (AAM / UAM) Traffic Management programs, FAA put forth an initial concept of operations for supporting the start of the Upper Class E Traffic Management (ETM) concept. Like UTM and AAM / UAM, ETM is envisioned to also be a community-based, industry driven cooperative management concept. However, tailoring it to be adaptable to the atmospheric communication, navigation, and surveillance deficits, as well as the diverse vehicle and mission profiles operating in the ETM environment will be the challenge. As such, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Ames Research Center has been investigating several technologies that will help enable industry in the development of this new type of cooperative operating environment. These technologies are being prototyped and will be tested in a collaborative evaluation of an initial ETM system in late 2023. The evaluation will concentrate on building out ETM system technologies that will inform the participants regarding operational intent sharing, strategic conflict detection, and the resultant deconfliction process. In addition to the technical aspects, key roles and responsibilities will need to be defined. This will be done through exploring community-agreed upon Cooperative Operating Practices (COPs) that include procedures and capabilities to aid in timely, strategic conflict identification and resolution to be developed during the evaluation. As an initial step to the evaluation, the ETM research team at NASA Ames solicited industry feedback on various aspects of ETM operations from subject matter experts. A virtual tabletop walkthrough session was held over a two-day period to follow a roadmap through the functional steps needed to build COPs, focusing on strategic conflict detection and resolution.

Upper Class E Traffic Management (ETM)↗

NASA NTRS2015

Impact of Co-Site Interference on L/C-Band Spectrum for UAS Control and Non-Payload Communications

In order to provide for the safe integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the National Airspace System, the control and non-payload communications (CNPC) link connecting the ground-based pilot with the unmanned aircraft must be highly reliable. A specific requirement is that it must operate using aviation safety radiofrequency spectrum. The 2012 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-12) provided a potentially suitable allocation for LOS CNPC spectrum in C-Band at 5030-5091 MHz band which, when combined with a previous allocation in L-Band (960-1164 MHz) may satisfy the LOS spectrum requirement and provide for high reliability through dual-band redundancy. However, the LBand spectrum hosts a number of aeronautical navigation systems which require high-power transmitters on-board the aircraft. These high-power transmitters co-located with sensitive CNPC receivers operating in the same frequency band have the potential to create co-site interference, reducing the performance of the CNPC receivers and ultimately reducing the usability of the L-Band for CNPC. This paper examines the potential for co-site interference, as highlighted in recent flight tests, and discusses the impact on the UAS CNPC spectrum availability and requirements for further testing and analysis.

radiofrequency spectrum↗

DOE OSTI2021

Combined Mesonet and Tracker

Title: Combined Mesonet and Trackers (UNL Mobile Mesonets) Authors University of Nebraska PI: Adam Houston, UNL Professor (ahouston2@unl.edu) Mailing Address: 126 Bessey Hall P.O. Box 880340 Lincoln, NE 68588-0340 CoMeT Overview The University of Nebraska-Lincoln operates three Combined Mesonet and Tracker (CoMeTs). CoMeTs are Ford Explorers (model years 2015, 2017, and 2019) with forward-mounted suites of meteorological sensors and dual moonroofs, combining the capability of a mobile mesonet to collect near-surface observations with the capability of an unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) tracker vehicle, which enables an observer in the second row of seats to see the aircraft and maintain compliance with Federal Aviation Administration policies on UAS operation. The CoMeTs collect observations of slow temperature and humidity at ~2 m above ground level (AGL) using a Vaisala HMP155A, fast temperature at ~2 m AGL using a Campbell Scientific 109SS-L thermistor, pressure at ~2.5 m AGL using a Vaisala PTB210, wind speed and direction at ~3.25 m AGL using an R.M. Young 05103 propeller anemometer, and vehicle heading using a KVH Industries C-100 fluxgate compass (Barbieri et al. 2019). The HMP155A and 109SS-L thermistor are shielded and aspirated within a U-tube (Waugh and Frederickson 2010; Houston et al. 2016). This list of sensors is also included in the CoMeT data file metadata. Manufacturer specifications for these instruments are given in Table 1 of Hanft and Houston (2018). The reported measured quantities are summarized below.CoMeT-3 was funded through an equipment allocation included in the NSF TORUS award (AGS-1824649). Instrument Description The specific sensors included on each CoMeT are summarized in the table at the end of this section. In general each CoMeT collects observations of slow temperature and humidity at ~2 m above ground level (AGL) using a Vaisala HMP155, fast temperature at ~2 m AGL using a Campbell Scientific 109SS-L thermistor, pressure at ~2.5 m AGL using a Vaisala PTB210 barometer with a Gill pressure port, wind speed and direction at ~3.25 m AGL using an R.M. Young 05103 propeller anemometer, position using a Garmin 19x HVS receiver, and vehicle heading using a KVH Industries C-100 fluxgate compass. The HMP155 and 109SS are shielded and aspirated within a U-tube (Waugh and Frederickson 2010; Houston et al. 2016). Fast temperature and corrected RH measurements (using sensors housed within the U-tube) have a time constant of 10-12 s based on data collected across a temperature and RH shock during the CLOUD-MAP 2017 calibration/validation tests on June 26, 2017. Vehicle speed was < 10 kts for this test. CoMeT-1 CoMeT-2 CoMeT-3 Slow Temperature Slow RH Vaisala HMP155A-L20-PT Part #: 22280-7 Vaisala HMP155E Part #: E1AA11A0B1A1A0A Vaisala HMP155E Part #: E1AA11A0B1A1A0A Fast temperature Campbell Scientific 109SS-L20-PT Part #: 21448-3 Campbell Scientific 109SS-L12-PW Part #: 21448-109 Campbell Scientific 109SS-L12-PW Part #: 21448-150 Pressure Vaisala PTB-210 Part #: A1A1B Gill Pressure Port Part #: 61002 Vaisala PTB-210 Part #: A1A1B Gill Pressure Port Part #: 61002 Vaisala PTB-210 Part #: A1A1B Gill Pressure Port Part #: 61002 Wind RM Young 05103-L20-PT Part #: 18435-310 RM Young 05103-L20-PW Part #: 18435-244 RM Young 05103-L20-PW Part #: 18435-244 GPS Garmin GPS 19x HVS (NMEA 0183) Part #: 010-01010-00 Garmin GPS 19x HVS (NMEA 0183) Part #: 010-01010-00 Garmin GPS 19x HVS (NMEA 0183) Part #: 010-01010-00 Compass KVH C-100 Part #: 01-0177-15 KVH C-100 Part #: 01-0177-15 KVH C-100 Part #: 01-0177-15 Logger Campbell Scientific CR6-NA-XT-SW Part #: 28385-9 Campbell Scientific CR6-WIFI-XT-SW Part #: 28385-6 Campbell Scientific CR6-WIFI-XT-SW Part #: 28385-6 Data Collection and Real-Time Processing The reported measured quantities are summarized in the table below. Quantity Units Source Epoch time Seconds GPS Latitude and longitude Degrees GPS Altitude m GPS Pressure hPa PTB210 Temperature (fast) deg C 109SS-L Temperature (slow) deg C HMP155 RH (slow) % HMP155 Vehicle speed m/s GPS Vehicle heading deg C-100 and GPS In addition to the measured variables, several derived variables are calculated. Corrected/fast relative humidity (%) Relative humidity is adjusted to the fast temperature following Richardson et al. (1998) and Houston et al. (2016). Water vapor mixing ratio (g/kg) Dew point temperature (°C) Potential temperature (Kelvin) Virtual potential temperature (Kelvin) Equivalent potential temperature (Kelvin) Regular intercomparisons between all three CoMeTs were performed during TORUS 2019. Comparisons were also conducted between CoMeT-1 and CoMeT-2 during LAPSE-RATE (2018) on 14 July. In these intercomparisons, the vehicles were parked adjacent to each other aligned perpendicular to (and facing into) the wind. To minimize engine heating effects, intercomparisons were only conducted when the wind speed was >10 kts. Data Format Original data files for each deployment are saved as text files and then converted to NetCDF. NetCDF versions have units that are CF compliant and may not match the original units in the txt files. The naming convention for the NetCDF files is as follows: UNL.CoMeT3.{deployment date YYYYMMDD}.{start time of observation collection in UTC HHMM}.L2.{post-processing codes}.cdf example: UNL.CoMeT3.20190627.1931.L2.g1.f1.cdf Post-processing codes are included to track modifications to the raw data. These codes are closely connected to error flags associated with each record. Each letter corresponds to a particular instrument: g: GPS p: Barometer tf: Fast temperature ts: Slow temperature rh: Relative humidity f: Compass w: Wind monitor a: All instruments Each number corresponds to a particular post-processing action described more below. Measured and derived variables are included in the following table. Variable Heading Standard Name Units time Time seconds since 00:00:00, 01-01-1970 Alt Altitude meters lat Latitude degrees north lon Longitude degrees east fast_temp Air Temperature kelvin slow_temp Air Temperature kelvin pressure Air Pressure pascals logger_RH Relative Humidity percent calc_corr_RH Relative Humidity percent wind_speed Wind Speed meters per second wind_dir Wind From Direction degrees vehicle_dir Vehicle Direction degrees dewpoint Dew Point Temperature kelvin mixing_ratio Humidity Mixing Ratio g/g theta Air Potential Temperature kelvin theta_v Virtual Potential Temperature kelvin theta_e Equivalent Potential Temperature Kelvin error_flag The error_flag variable is a string that matches the post-processing codes listed above. All instruments will have an associated code, but will have a “0” if the datum is unchanged from the initial processed value. Error Codes The following table summarizes the error codes for data collected before 2020: Error Code Relevant CoMeT Description g1 1,2,3 Exact correction. GPS position and time reprocessed from raw data g2 1 As far as we can tell this is an exact correction to an error in the GPS time. During the correct time periods the time suddenly went backwards ~250s and stayed at this offset for 750s when it corrected itself. The offset was applied to the “time warp” period. p1 2 Approximate correction. Hole in the pressure tube connecting the pressure port to the barometer. Resulted in erroneously low air pressure measurements when the vehicle was in motion. Derived variables recalculated (dew point temperature [e depends on qv and p], water vapor mixing ratio, potential temperature, virtual potential temperature, equivalent potential temperature) a1 3 Exact correction. Missing data reprocessed from raw data a2 1 Bug fix to bias correction for ts1, ts2, and rh1: water vapor mixing ratio was off by a factor of 10 and virtual potential temperature was wrong because of this. f1 3 No correction, missing data. Fluxgate compass inoperable. Wind speed and direction calculated using GPS-derived vehicle heading instead. rh1 1 Approximate correction. Constant bias of +1.7% removed from relative humidity. Derived variables recalculated (corrected/fast relative humidity, dew point temperature, water vapor mixing ratio, virtual potential temperature, equivalent potential temperature) ts1 1 Approximate correction. Constant bias of +0.6 K removed from slow temperature. Derived variables recalculated (corrected/fast relative humidity, dew point temperature, water vapor mixing ratio, virtual potential temperature, equivalent potential temperature) ts2 1 Approximate correction. Constant bias of +1.0 K removed. Derived variables recalculated (corrected/fast relative humidity, dew point temperature, water vapor mixing ratio, virtual potential temperature, equivalent potential temperature) References Bolton, D., 1980: The Computation of Equivalent Potential Temperature. Mon. Wea. Rev., 108, 1046–1053, https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0493(1980)108<1046:TCOEPT>2.0.CO;2. Hanft, W., and A. L. Houston, 2018: An Observational and Modeling Study of Mesoscale Air Masses with High Theta-E. Mon. Wea. Rev., 146, 2503–2524, https://doi.org/10.1175/MWR-D-17-0389.1.Wexler Houston, A. L., R. J. Laurence III, T. W. Nichols, S. Waugh, B. Argrow, and C. L. Ziegler, 2016: Intercomparison of unmanned aircraft-borne and mobile mesonet atmospheric sensors. Journal of Atmospheric and Oceanic Technology. 33, 1569-1582, doi: 10.1175/JTECH-D-15-0178.1. Lowe, P. R., 1977: An Approximating Polynomial for the Computation of Saturation Vapor Pressure. J. Applied Meteorology, 16, 100–103. Richardson, S. J., S. E. Frederickson, F. V. Brock, and J. A. Brotzge, 1998: Combination temperature and relative humidity probes: Avoiding large air temperature errors and associated relative humidity errors. Preprints, 10th Symp. On Meteorological Observations and Instrumentation, Phoenix, AZ, Amer. Meteor. Soc., 278–283. Waugh, S., and S. E. Frederickson, 2010: An improved aspirated temperature system for mobile meteorological observations, especially in severe weather. 25th Conf. on Severe Local Storms, Denver, CO, Amer. Meteor. Soc., P5.2. [Available online at https://ams.confex.com/ams/25SLS/techprogram/paper_176205.htm.]

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2018

UAS Integration in the NAS: Detect and Avoid

This presentation will cover the structure of the unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) integration into the national airspace system (NAS) project (UAS-NAS Project). The talk also details the motivation of the project to help develop standards for a detect-and-avoid (DAA) system, which is required in order to comply with requirements in manned aviation to see-and-avoid other traffic so as to maintain well clear. The presentation covers accomplishments reached by the project in Phase 1 of the research, and touches on the work to be done in Phase 2. The discussion ends with examples of the display work developed as a result of the Phase 1 research.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessing the Use of UAS-Related Terms in ASRS Using Seed Topic Modeling

Context: The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary confidential system that disseminates reports received from personnel involved in aviation operations after de-identifying them. These reports are used by the community to improve overall aviation system safety. Aim: We propose and execute an experiment to assess the use of seed term topic modeling over the database narratives to identify Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) reports. The use of seed term topic modeling enables users to identify groups of conceptually similar narratives associated to a topic of their interest. Method: We use a collection of narratives, expert-selected words, and report metadata that separates UAS from non-UAS reports to assess if seed topic modeling can be used to improve ASRS searches. Results: For simpler queries, seed topic search observes a higher recall and lower precision than the existing DBOL (DataBase OnLine) search in operation. However, the best results are obtained when seed topic search is used as a search suggestion system to be executed on the DBOL. Conclusion: Utilizing a combination of both the existing method and the proposed method, users can expand their search vocabulary about subjects of interest while improving the quality of results.

Text Mining↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessing the Use of UAS-Related Terms in ASRS using Seeds for Topic Modeling

Context: The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary confidential system that disseminates reports received from personnel involved in aviation operations after de-identifying them. These reports are used by the community to improve overall aviation system safety. Aim: We propose and execute an experiment to assess the use of seed term topic modeling over the database narratives to identify Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) reports. The use of seed term topic modeling enables users to identify groups of conceptually similar narratives associated to a topic of their interest. Method: We use a collection of narratives, expert-selected words, and report metadata that separates UAS from non-UAS reports to assess if seed topic modeling can be used to improve ASRS searches. Results: For simpler queries, seed topic search observes a higher recall and lower precision than the existing DBOL (DataBase OnLine) search in operation. However, the best results are obtained when seed topic search is used as a search suggestion system to be executed on the DBOL. Conclusion: Utilizing a combination of both the existing method and the proposed method, users can expand their search vocabulary about subjects of interest while improving the quality of results.

LDA↗

NASA NTRS2017

Operational Overview for UAS Integration in the NAS Project Flight Test Series 3

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System Project has conducted a series of flight tests intended to support the reduction of barriers that prevent unmanned aircraft from flying without the required waivers from the Federal Aviation Administration. The 2015 Flight Test Series 3, supported two separate test configurations. The first configuration investigated the timing of Detect and Avoid alerting thresholds using a radar equipped unmanned vehicle and multiple live intruders flown at varying encounter geometries. The second configuration included a surrogate unmanned vehicle (flown from a ground control station, with a safety pilot on board) flying a mission in a virtual air traffic control airspace sector using research pilot displays and Detect and Avoid advisories to maintain separation from live and virtual aircraft. The test was conducted over an eight-week span within the R-2508 Special Use Airspace. Over 200 encounters were flown for the first configuration, and although the second configuration was cancelled after three data collection flights, Flight Test 3 proved to be invaluable for the purposes of planning, managing, and execution of this type of integrated flight test.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

NASA NTRS2022

Spectrum Research for Aviation Final Report

Task TO-G-026 was established to identify possible spectrum allocations to support the Scalable Traffic Management for Emergency Response Operations (STEReO) Project’s approach of applying Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) concepts to the management of disaster response. Both large and small unmanned aircraft have been found to provide significant benefits in disaster response. However, application of unmanned aircraft is limited by the difficulty in managing disaster area airspace. UTM concepts can greatly increase the ability to safely apply UAS to many disaster response requirements. The use of UAS requires communication links to provide command and control, telemetry, delivery of mission payload data, and situational awareness/navigation functionality to enable safe operations. The outcome of Task TO-G-026 research provides guidance in identifying appropriate potential spectrum bands required to support STEReO disaster response operations. This report presents these research results.

Robert J. Kerczewski↗

NASA NTRS2010

The NASA Langley Research Center's Unmanned Aerial System Surrogate Research Aircraft

Research is needed to determine what procedures, aircraft sensors and other systems will be required to allow Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to safely operate with manned aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS). The NASA Langley Research Center has transformed a Cirrus Design SR22 general aviation (GA) aircraft into a UAS Surrogate research aircraft to serve as a platform for UAS systems research, development, flight testing and evaluation. The aircraft is manned with a Safety Pilot and systems operator that allows for flight operations almost anywhere in the NAS without the need for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Certificate of Authorization (COA). The UAS Surrogate can be controlled from a modular, transportable ground station like a true UAS. The UAS Surrogate is able to file and fly in the NAS with normal traffic and is a better platform for real world UAS research and development than existing vehicles flying in restricted ranges or other sterilized airspace. The Cirrus Design SR22 aircraft is a small, singleengine, four-place, composite-construction aircraft that NASA Langley acquired to support NASA flight-research programs like the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) Project. Systems were installed to support flight test research and data gathering. These systems include: separate research power; multi-function flat-panel displays; research computers; research air data and inertial state sensors; video recording; data acquisition; data-link; S-band video and data telemetry; Common Airborne Instrumentation System (CAIS); Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B); instrumented surfaces and controls; and a systems operator work station. The transformation of the SR22 to a UAS Surrogate was accomplished in phases. The first phase was to modify the existing autopilot to accept external commands from a research computer that was connected by redundant data-link radios to a ground control station. An electro-mechanical auto-throttle was added in the next phase to provide ground station control of airspeed. Additional phases are in progress to add waypoint navigation and long range satellite voice and data communications. Potential areas for UAS Surrogate research include the development, flight test and evaluation of sensors to aid in the process of air traffic detect-sense-and-avoid. These sensors could be evaluated in real-time and compared with onboard human evaluation pilots. This paper describes the systems and design considerations that were incorporated in the development of the UAS Surrogate along with details of development problems encountered and the corresponding solutions.

Howell, Charles T., III↗

NASA NTRS2021

Best Practices Identified Through the Completion of UAS Flight Demonstrations

After several years of research into Detect and Avoid (DAA) and Command and Control (C2) systems for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) UAS Integration into the National Airspace System project initiated a focused two-year effort along with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and three industry partners to investigate remaining issues in the specification, test, certification and airspace integration to allow UAS operations in non-segregated airspace. The approach taken had the industry partners propose a flight demonstration approximating a commercial operation, while NASA helped, as needed, the partners through design and test phases and NASA observed interactions with the FAA. During this effort NASA collected best practices intended to be of value to similar UAS endeavors. These best practices can be divided into different sets, including practices that describe the relationship between business considerations to UAS design or describe several UAS development challenges. Another set includes best practices focused on navigating the UAS design and type certification processes. A third set includes best practices that relate to the design of the DAA system. Deploying DAA systems in this timeframe posed unique challenges. Commercial off-the-shelf DAA systems do not exist, necessitating custom development and, for two of the partners, the use of low-size, -weight, and -power (SWaP) sensors not completely specified for DAA. A fourth set of best practices relates to lost-link contingency planning. The final set of best practices relates to the design and testing of C2 systems and obtaining spectrum licenses. The UAS demonstrations were piloted remotely, and for all aspects of flight safety, a C2 system was required to communicate DAA and other UAS subsystem data to the remote pilot and to allow the pilot to issue commands to the vehicle. Throughout the course of this effort, the partners integrated prototype DAA and C2 systems into unmanned aircraft, tested those systems, and laid the groundwork for type certification programs that are expected to continue.

NASA↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach to Identifying Aspects of Positive Pilot Behavior within the Aviation Safety Reporting System

The National Airspace System (NAS) is constantly evolving as air traffic continues to ramp up to pre-pandemic numbers and projected to grow to unprecedented levels in the coming years. As well as increasing demand to the current system, emerging operations such as Unmanned Autonomous Systems are also expected to add to complexity in the airspace. To address these issues, the industry and government agencies supporting the NAS will need to rely upon additional automation and new technologies to address future operational requirements, while continuing to be a world-leading safe transportation system. As these new technologies are implemented, the system continues to rely on human pilots and controllers in the loop to monitor the system and intervene in situations the automation cannot handle. The goal of proactively addressing safety is of foremost concern to ensure passenger confidence. The industry has implemented various Safety Monitoring Systems to identify safety risks and proactively address them before they result in a serious incident or accident. One such program is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). ASRS is a long-established system where pilots and controllers voluntarily and anonymously report safety incidents they experienced and observed during line operations by providing rich text narratives describing the events, the environment, and conditions leading to the safety event of concern. These narratives provide insight and context around events of interest and can be used to identify emerging problems. They can trigger investigations within Flight Operational Quality Assurance or Flight Data Monitoring programs. However, this process typically focuses on the adverse events and the unsafe aspects of the operations surrounding the reported or detected events. This perspective of investigating factors that went wrong around an adverse event is commonly referred to as Safety I. Alternatively, characterizing successful actions that operators perform every day under varying conditions that keep the system within safe operating bounds is a concept referred to as Safety II. The benefit of the Safety II view is that the scope is much larger than that of Safety I since a vast majority of the operations result in successful flights. Many of the successful techniques used to manage operational threats are not documented in standard operating procedures or taught during training. They are typically acquired over time by working with experienced pilots during line operations or in many cases after experiencing a problem for the first time and reacting to it in situ, drawing from years of experience to manage the threat. In an attempt to quantify these positive actions, we are proposing an approach to extracting key behaviors within ASRS reports that can support the Safety II concept. Our analysis assumes that ASRS reports contain some descriptions of corrective actions that operators performed to prevent a situation from leading to an accident. Leveraging recent advances in Natural Language Process modeling, we have developed an approach to extract positive sentiment from reports, embed these positive statements in a vector space where they can be numerically analyzed, and clustering these statements into similar contextual categories. From these contextualized categories we can attempt to summarized and distilled aspects of the positive behavior. The goal is to identify categories of behavior that describe consistent operator techniques that supports the Safety II concept. With this information, airlines may enable learning from these positive actions, or address procedures that need to be changed to avoid having pilots implement a workaround. These insights can provide a lens into what is “going right” in the operations that may otherwise not be known widely within the community. It is envisioned that this approach can be extended to other narrative programs such as Line Operation Safety Audit or Learning Improvement Team reports where similar observed behavior can be analyzed to extract positive actions and inform the overall operations.

NLP↗