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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2018

High-Resolution Gamma Spectrometry Data Set for High Burnup Pressurized Water Reactor Used Fuel

Over the past decade, considerable resources have been applied to investigate verification of used nuclear fuel assemblies for international safeguards. The opportunity to expand the available data used to validate these verification techniques was presented in 2016 by the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, which made 25 high-burnup pressurized water reactor used fuel rods available for measurement in the Irradiated Fuels Examination Laboratory at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. With the support of the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, a 2017 campaign measured the 25 used fuel rods with a high-resolution gamma spectrometer. A planar high-purity germanium detector was used to provide high-efficiency across an energy range from 60 keV to 3 MeV. Gamma spectra of individual fuel rods were collected in 4.5 mm steps along the entire length of each rod. In addition, spectra were collected on select rods in rotational increments of 30 degrees to provide data on the distribution of fission products along the rod perimeter. The spectra are stored on a controlled-access website for use by others. This paper describes the measurement geometry, used fuel rod characteristics, example spectra, and preliminary analyses performed during the measurement campaign.

Smith, Susan↗
NASA NTRS1988

Systems integration for the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Robotics Applications Development Laboratory (RADL)

A laboratory for developing robotics technology for hazardous and repetitive Shuttle and payload processing activities is discussed. An overview of the computer hardware and software responsible for integrating the laboratory systems is given. The center's anthropomorphic robot is placed on a track allowing it to be moved to different stations. Various aspects of the laboratory equipment are described, including industrial robot arm control, smart systems integration, the supervisory computer, programmable process controller, real-time tracking controller, image processing hardware, and control display graphics. Topics of research include: automated loading and unloading of hypergolics for space vehicles and payloads; the use of mobile robotics for security, fire fighting, and hazardous spill operations; nondestructive testing for SRB joint and seal verification; Shuttle Orbiter radiator damage inspection; and Orbiter contour measurements. The possibility of expanding the laboratory in the future is examined.

Davis, V. Leon↗
NASA NTRS2022

How to Build a Rover: An Overview of the Mars 2020 Mission’s Vehicle System Testbed

While NASA’s Mars rover Perseverance continues to make groundbreaking achievements on the Red Planet, its twin is hard at work here on Earth. The Operational Perseverance Twin for the Integration of Mechanisms and Instruments Sent to Mars, or OPTIMISM, is the Mars 2020 Vehicle System Testbed (VSTB) rover operated by NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California. OPTIMISM’s home is the JPL Mars Yard; an outdoor field with red soil that simulates the terrain encountered by Perseverance. The VSTB is a full-scale engineering model of the flight rover, serving a number of functions to ensure mission operations can continue smoothly and on schedule. The VSTB possesses instrumentation, computers, mechanisms, cameras, and a Mobility subsystem that are nearly identical to its extraterrestrial twin. Its high fidelity allows the rover to be a highly effective tool to fully test system functionality and performance prior to commanding the flight rover. The early stages of building OPTIMISM began a few months prior to Perseverance departing JPL for Cape Canaveral, FL in early 2020. Electrical integration of the flight system avionics, and compatibility checkouts of the electrical ground support equipment ensured that the foundation of the electrical system was operational and in place. Next, the internal harnessing was installed and compatibility checks of the rover instrumentation and mechanisms were performed to confirm the system was prepared for full buildup. Finally, mechanical assembly of the rover chassis with its external components completed the integration of the system before it was moved to the Mars Yard for its initial phase of testing to perform verification & validation (V&V) of the Mobility subsystem requirements. By the time Perseverance landed at Jezero Crater in February 2021, the first phase of VSTB operations was underway. Surface guidance, navigation, and control (SGNC) testing for the Mobility subsystem ensured functionality and performance requirements were met for various capabilities such as visual odometry (VO), mapping, and automatic navigation (AutoNav). Subsequent integration of the robotic arm (RA) onto the VSTB enabled the V&V campaign for surface sampling operations (SSO) to commence. As the mission’s engineering operations (EO) have gotten underway, the VSTB has been utilized for an array of purposes including troubleshooting software anomalies, and performing dry-runs for first time activities (FTAs) prior to sending the commands to Perseverance. OPTIMISM will continue to serve mission critical functions as long as Perseverance is roving the Red Planet.

Rojas, Jose Trujillo↗
DOE OSTI2017

Consortium for Verification Technology Fellowship Report.

As one recipient of the Consortium for Verification Technology (CVT) Fellowship, I spent eight days as a visiting scientist at the University of Michigan, Department of Nuclear Engineering and Radiological Sciences (NERS). During this time, I participated in multiple department and research group meetings and presentations, met with individual faculty and students, toured multiple laboratories, and taught one-half of a one-unit class on Risk Analysis in Nuclear Arms control (six 1.5 hour lectures). The following report describes some of the interactions that I had during my time as well as a brief discussion of the impact of this fellowship on members of the consortium and on me/my laboratory’s technical knowledge and network.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1990

Space station definitions, design, and development. Task 5: Multiple arm telerobot coordination and control: Manipulator design methodology

A proposed methodology applicable to the design of manipulator systems is described. The current design process is especially weak in the preliminary design phase, since there is no accepted measure to be used in trading off different options available for the various subsystems. The design process described uses Cartesian End-Effector Impedance as a measure of performance for the system. Having this measure of performance, it is shown how it may be used to determine the trade-offs necessary to the preliminary design phase. The design process involves three main parts: (1) determination of desired system performance in terms of End-Effector Impedance; (2) trade-off design options to achieve this desired performance; and (3) verification of system performance through laboratory testing. The design process is developed using numerous examples and experiments to demonstrate the feasability of this approach to manipulator design.

Stoughton, R. M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Isolating Insecurely: A Call to Arms for the Security and Privacy Community During the Time of COVID-19

The privacy question is one that has only begun to be addressed. While on one hand, many of the staunchest privacy advocates have argued for relaxation of privacy controls in order to develop better tests, “back to work” protocols, and vaccines and other treatments, the same advocates point out that any loss of privacy for the public good should be temporary, transparent, necessary, proportionate, and follow a due process. What should solutions look like for data gathering, sharing, use, and disposal; or for protocols requiring strong individual identity verification and validation?

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2014

The 'Room within a Room' Concept for Monitored Warhead Dismantlement

Over the past 10 years, US and UK experts have engaged in a technical collaboration with the aim of improving scientific and technological abilities in support of potential future nuclear arms control and non-proliferation agreements. In 2011 a monitored dismantlement exercise provided an opportunity to develop and test potential monitoring technologies and approaches. The exercise followed a simulated nuclear object through a dismantlement process and looked to explore, with a level of realism, issues surrounding device and material monitoring, chain of custody, authentication and certification of equipment, data management and managed access. This paper focuses on the development and deployment of the ‘room-within-a-room’ system, which was designed to maintain chain of custody during disassembly operations. A key challenge for any verification regime operating within a nuclear weapon complex is to provide the monitoring party with the opportunity to gather sufficient evidence, whilst protecting sensitive or proliferative information held by the host. The requirement to address both monitoring and host party concerns led to a dual function design which: • Created a controlled boundary around the disassembly process area which could provide evidence of unauthorised diversion activities. • Shielded sensitive disassembly operations from monitoring party observation. The deployed room-within-a-room was an integrated system which combined a number of chain of custody technologies (i.e. cameras, tamper indicating panels and enclosures, seals, unique identifiers and radiation portals) and supporting deployment procedures. This paper discusses the bounding aims and constraints identified by the monitoring and host parties with respect to the disassembly phase, the design of the room-within-a-room system, lessons learned during deployment, conclusions and potential areas of future work. Overall it was agreed that the room-within-a-room approach was effective but the individual technologies used to create the system deployed during this exercise required further development.

Nuclear Weapon, Dismantlement, Chain of Custody, C↗
NASA NTRS2014

SpaceCube v2.0 Space Flight Hybrid Reconfigurable Data Processing System

This paper details the design architecture, design methodology, and the advantages of the SpaceCube v2.0 high performance data processing system for space applications. The purpose in building the SpaceCube v2.0 system is to create a superior high performance, reconfigurable, hybrid data processing system that can be used in a multitude of applications including those that require a radiation hardened and reliable solution. The SpaceCube v2.0 system leverages seven years of board design, avionics systems design, and space flight application experiences. This paper shows how SpaceCube v2.0 solves the increasing computing demands of space data processing applications that cannot be attained with a standalone processor approach.The main objective during the design stage is to find a good system balance between power, size, reliability, cost, and data processing capability. These design variables directly impact each other, and it is important to understand how to achieve a suitable balance. This paper will detail how these critical design factors were managed including the construction of an Engineering Model for an experiment on the International Space Station to test out design concepts. We will describe the designs for the processor card, power card, backplane, and a mission unique interface card. The mechanical design for the box will also be detailed since it is critical in meeting the stringent thermal and structural requirements imposed by the processing system. In addition, the mechanical design uses advanced thermal conduction techniques to solve the internal thermal challenges.The SpaceCube v2.0 processing system is based on an extended version of the 3U cPCI standard form factor where each card is 190mm x 100mm in size The typical power draw of the processor card is 8 to 10W and scales with application complexity. The SpaceCube v2.0 data processing card features two Xilinx Virtex-5 QV Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA), eight memory modules, a monitor FPGA with analog monitoring, Ethernet, configurable interconnect to the Xilinx FPGAs including gigabit transceivers, and the necessary voltage regulation. The processor board uses a back-to-back design methodology for common parts that maximizes the board real estate available. This paper will show how to meet the IPC 6012B Class 3A standard with a 22-layer board that has two column grid array devices with 1.0mm pitch. All layout trades such as stack-up options, via selection, and FPGA signal breakout will be discussed with feature size results. The overall board design process will be discussed including parts selection, circuit design, proper signal termination, layout placement and route planning, signal integrity design and verification, and power integrity results. The radiation mitigation techniques will also be detailed including configuration scrubbing options, Xilinx circuit mitigation and FPGA functional monitoring, and memory protection.Finally, this paper will describe how this system is being used to solve the extreme challenges of a robotic satellite servicing mission where typical space-rated processors are not sufficient enough to meet the intensive data processing requirements. The SpaceCube v2.0 is the main payload control computer and is required to control critical subsystems such as autonomous rendezvous and docking using a suite of vision sensors and object avoidance when controlling two robotic arms.

Xilinx FPGA↗
DOE OSTI2017

IAEA Domestic Inspections in the US

The Voluntary Offer Agreement between the United States and the IAEA for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the United States, INFCIRC/288, entered into force in 1980. Under this Agreement, the United States provides to the IAEA an Eligible Facilities List, which lists facilities eligible for IAEA inspection and verification of compliance through either a reporting-only process or for full-scope safeguards (to include inspections). Approximately 300 facilities are currently listed on the Eligible Facilities List. Since 1981, the IAEA has conducted over 700 inspections on ~20 of these facilities. Currently, four NRC-licensed facilities have been selected under the Initial (Reporting) Protocol, and one DOE facility, KAMS at the SRS, has been selected for full-scope safeguards. These IAEA inspections are documented in the ID/288 database managed by staff at ORNL and the Y-12 National Security Complex for the NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. This database also maintains records of US designated inspectors, the status of indices checks, and inspection schedules. The database was most recently updated in FY 2014 to include information related to the IAEA visit to URENCO-USA in New Mexico and will be upgraded again via proposal in FY 2017 to include the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) inspections in the US Caribbean territories, associated with INFCIRC/366. During the FY 2017 upgrade, the system will also be overhauled to allow for quicker updates and to improve performance using a modern software package.

White-Horton, Jessica↗
NASA NTRS2014

Simscape Modeling Verification in the Simulink Development Environment

The purpose of the Simulation Product Group of the Control and Data Systems division of the NASA Engineering branch at Kennedy Space Center is to provide a realtime model and simulation of the Ground Subsystems participating in vehicle launching activities. The simulation software is part of the Spaceport Command and Control System (SCCS) and is designed to support integrated launch operation software verification, and console operator training. Using Mathworks Simulink tools, modeling engineers currently build models from the custom-built blocks to accurately represent ground hardware. This is time consuming and costly due to required rigorous testing and peer reviews to be conducted for each custom-built block. Using Mathworks Simscape tools, modeling time can be reduced since there would be no custom-code developed. After careful research, the group came to the conclusion it is feasible to use Simscape's blocks in MatLab's Simulink. My project this fall was to verify the accuracy of the Crew Access Arm model developed using Simscape tools running in the Simulink development environment.

SIMSCAPE↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Tech Briefs, July 2011

Topics covered include: 1) Collaborative Clustering for Sensor Networks; 2) Teleoperated Marsupial Mobile Sensor Platform Pair for Telepresence Insertion Into Challenging Structures; 3) Automated Verification of Spatial Resolution in Remotely Sensed Imagery; 4) Electrical Connector Mechanical Seating Sensor; 5) In Situ Aerosol Detector; 6) Multi-Parameter Aerosol Scattering Sensor; 7) MOSFET Switching Circuit Protects Shape Memory Alloy Actuators; 8) Optimized FPGA Implementation of Multi-Rate FIR Filters Through Thread Decomposition; 9) Circuit for Communication Over Power Lines; 10) High-Efficiency Ka-Band Waveguide Two-Way Asymmetric Power Combiner; 11) 10-100 Gbps Offload NIC for WAN, NLR, and Grid Computing; 12) Pulsed Laser System to Simulate Effects of Cosmic Rays in Semiconductor Devices; 13) Flight Planning in the Cloud; 14) MPS Editor; 15) Object-Oriented Multi Disciplinary Design, Analysis, and Optimization Tool; 16) Cryogenic-Compatible Winchester Connector Mount and Retaining System for Composite Tubes; 17) Development of Position-Sensitive Magnetic Calorimeters for X-Ray Astronomy; 18) Planar Rotary Piezoelectric Motor Using Ultrasonic Horns; 19) Self-Rupturing Hermetic Valve; 20) Explosive Bolt Dual-Initiated from One Side; 21) Dampers for Stationary Labyrinth Seals; 22) Two-Arm Flexible Thermal Strap; 23) Carbon Dioxide Removal via Passive Thermal Approaches; 24) Polymer Electrolyte-Based Ambient Temperature Oxygen Microsensors for Environmental Monitoring; 25) Pressure Shell Approach to Integrated Environmental Protection; 26) Image Quality Indicator for Infrared Inspections; 27) Micro-Slit Collimators for X-Ray/Gamma-Ray Imaging; 28) Scatterometer-Calibrated Stability Verification Method; 29) Test Port for Fiber-Optic-Coupled Laser Altimeter; 30) Phase Retrieval System for Assessing Diamond Turning and Optical Surface Defects; 31) Laser Oscillator Incorporating a Wedged Polarization Rotator and a Porro Prism as Cavity Mirror; 32) Generic, Extensible, Configurable Push-Pull Framework for Large-Scale Science Missions; 33) Dynamic Loads Generation for Multi-Point Vibration Excitation Problems; 34) Optimal Control via Self-Generated Stochasticity; 35) Space-Time Localization of Plasma Turbulence Using Multiple Spacecraft Radio Links; 36) Surface Contact Model for Comets and Asteroids; 37) Dust Mitigation Vehicle; 38) Optical Coating Performance for Heat Reflectors of the JWST-ISIM Electronic Component; 39) SpaceCube Demonstration Platform; 40) Aperture Mask for Unambiguous Parity Determination in Long Wavelength Imagers; 41) Spaceflight Ka-Band High-Rate Radiation-Hard Modulator; 42) Enabling Disabled Persons to Gain Access to Digital Media; 43) Cytometer on a Chip; 44) Principles, Techniques, and Applications of Tissue Microfluidics; and 45) Two-Stage Winch for Kites and Tethered Balloons or Blimps.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2020

EVALUATING NUCLEAR SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPLINTERNET

The internet, which for years has been viewed as a global online commons with standardized protocols but few regulations is, according to some experts, starting to mirror the contentious political and commercial contours of the physical world. Contributing to this is the rise in data breaches, cyber-enabled attacks on critical infrastructure, government surveillance operations, theft of intellectual property, manipulation of electoral processes, and perceived erosion of privacy, all of which are resulting in a growing skepticism that an open internet will naturally serve the best interests of users, communities, countries, and the global economy. In addition, the rapidly emerging and increasingly lucrative power of data has global superpowers scrambling to protect their informational sovereignty as an urgent matter of national security. Underscoring this urgency is the fact that, despite its global reach and cosmopolitan contributor base, internet infrastructure and governance of the World Wide Web remain largely under U.S. corporate auspices, which reinforces the perception of U.S. control. Whether fragmentation is politically, economically, or socially motivated, there appears to be a growing appetite for an internet that is partitioned and controlled at the national level. From “the Great Firewall of China” to the “Halal” internet of Iran, the trend towards a “Splinternet” has courts and governments embarking on what some call a "legal arms race" to impose a maze of national or regional rules, often conflicting, in the digital realm. The paper explores the emerging Splinternet phenomenon, analyses the implications of this trend on nuclear security, and identifies questions that present opportunities for future research.

Internet, Data Security, Cyber Security, Nuclear S↗
DOE OSTI2014

Causal Analysis of the Inadvertent Contact with an Uncontrolled Electrical Hazardous Energy Source (120 Volts AC)

On September 25, 2013, a Health Physics Technician (HPT) was performing preparations to support a pneumatic transfer from the HFEF Decon Cell to the Room 130 Glovebox in HFEF, per HFEF OI 3165 section 3.5, Field Preparations. This activity involves an HPT setting up and climbing a portable ladder to remove the 14-C meter probe from above ball valve HBV-7. The HPT source checks the meter and probe and then replaces the probe above HBV-7, which is located above Hood ID# 130 HP. At approximately 13:20, while reaching past the HBV-7 valve position indicator switches in an attempt to place the 14-C meter probe in the desired location, the HPT’s left forearm came in contact with one of the three sets of exposed terminals on the valve position indication switches for HBV 7. This resulted in the HPT receiving an electrical shock from a 120 Volt AC source. Upon moving the arm, following the electrical shock, the HPT noticed two exposed electrical connections on a switch. The HPT then notified the HFEF HPT Supervisor, who in turn notified the MFC Radiological Controls Manager and HFEF Operations Manager of the situation. Work was stopped in the area and the hazard was roped off and posted to prevent access to the hazard. The HPT was escorted by the HPT Supervisor to the MFC Dispensary and then preceded to CFA medical for further evaluation. The individual was evaluated and released without any medical restrictions. Causal Factor (Root Cause) A3B3C01/A5B2C08: - Knowledge based error/Attention was given to wrong issues - Written Communication content LTA, Incomplete/situation not covered The Causal Factor (root cause) was attention being given to the wrong issues during the creation, reviews, verifications, and actual performance of HFEF OI-3165, which covers the need to perform the weekly source check and ensure placement of the probe prior to performing a “rabbit” transfer. This resulted in the hazard not being identified and mitigated in the procedure. Work activities with in HFEF-OI-3165 placed the HPT in proximity of an unmitigated hazard directly resulting in this event. Contributing Factor A3B3C04/A4B5C04: - Knowledge Based Error, LTA Review Based on Assumption That Process Will Not Change - Change Management LTA, Risks/consequences associated with change not adequately reviewed/assessed Prior to the pneumatic system being out of service, the probe and meter were not being source checked together. The source check issue was identified and addressed during the period of time when the system was out of service. The corrective actions for this issue resulted in the requirement that a meter and probe be source checked together as it is intended to be used. This changed the activity and required an HPT to weekly, when in use, remove and install the probe from above HBV-7 to meet the requirement of LRD 15001 Part 5 Article 551.5. Risks and consequences associated with this change were not adequately reviewed or assessed. Failure to identify the hazard associated with this change directly contributed to this event.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2016

FIELD IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR A WILLISTON BASIN BRINE EXTRACTION AND STORAGE TEST

The Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC) successfully completed all technical work of Phase I, including development of a field implementation plan (FIP) for a brine extraction and storage test (BEST) in the North Dakota portion of the Williston Basin. This implementation plan was commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) as a proxy for managing formation pressure plumes and measuring/monitoring the movement of differential pressure and CO2 plumes in the subsurface for future saline CO2 storage projects. BEST comprises the demonstration and validation of active reservoir management (ARM) strategies and extracted brine treatment technologies. Two prospective commercial brine injection sites were evaluated for BEST to satisfy DOE’s goals. Ultimately, an active saltwater disposal (SWD) site, Johnsons Corner, was selected because it possesses an ideal combination of key factors making it uniquely suited to host BEST. This site is located in western North Dakota and operated by Nuverra Environmental Solutions (Nuverra), a national leader in brine handling, treatment, and injection. An integrated management approach was used to incorporate local and regional geologic characterization activities with geologic and simulation models, inform a monitoring, verification, and accounting (MVA) plan, and to conduct a risk assessment. This approach was used to design a FIP for an ARM schema and an extracted brine treatment technology test bed facility. The FIP leverages an existing pressure plume generated by two commercial SWD wells. These wells, in conjunction with a new brine extraction well, will be used to conduct the ARM schema. Results of these tests will be quantified based on their impact on the performance of the existing SWD wells and the surrounding reservoir system. Extracted brine will be injected into an underlying deep saline formation through a new injection well. The locations of proposed extraction and injection wells were selected during the Phase I efforts. These wells will be permitted as North Dakota Administrative Code Underground Injection Control Class II wells and will yield additional characterization data which will further refine the FIP in Phase II. An array of surface and downhole monitoring techniques will validate ARM performance against predictive simulation results. Infrastructure will be constructed to manage extracted fluids at the surface and provide brine to a treatment test bed facility. Treatment of extracted brine can provide a means of reducing extracted brine disposal volumes, an alternate source of water, and/or salable products for beneficial use. A test bed facility will be constructed to provide a means of demonstrating these technologies on a wide range of brine concentrations. Screening criteria based on a techno-economic and life cycle assessment were developed to select high-salinity brine treatment technologies for extended duration treatment (30–60 days) in Phase II. A detailed cost assessment determined total implementation costs for BEST of $19,901,065 million (DOE share $15,680,505). These costs are inclusive of all necessary equipment, infrastructure construction, operations and project closeout costs required to implement BEST. An ideal combination of key factors makes the Johnsons Corner site uniquely suited to be the BEST demonstration.

10 SYNTHETIC FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Experiment Automation with a Robot Arm using the Liquids Reflectometer Instrument at the Spallation Neutron Source

The Liquids Reflectometer instrument installed at the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) enables observations of chemical kinetics, solid-state reactions and phase-transitions of thin film materials at both solid and liquid surfaces. Effective measurement of these behaviors requires each sample to be calibrated dynamically using the neutron beam and the data acquisition system in a feedback loop. Since the SNS is an intense neutron source, the time needed to perform the measurement can be the same as the alignment process, leading to a labor-intensive operation that is exhausting to users. An update to the instrument control system, completed in March 2013, implemented the key features of automated sample alignment and robot-driven sample management, allowing for unattended operation over extended periods, lasting as long as 20 hours. We present a case study of the effort, detailing the mechanical, electrical and software modifications that were made as well as the lessons learned during the integration, verification and testing process.

automated alignment↗
DOE OSTI2016

The history and outlook for seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Modern methods of nuclear-explosion monitoring are vastly more capable than they were when underground nuclear testing began in the late 1950s, in part because a cycle of improvements in explosion monitoring in the 1960–80 period led to improvements in monitoring for earthquakes and other phenomena, which then led to a general growth in monitoring assets that in turn has been applied back to explosion monitoring. Practical experiences in nuclear-explosion monitoring, acquired during the era of active testing prior to finalization of the CTBT text in 1996, laid the basis for monitoring in support of this arms-control initiative. This article elaborates on the future of nuclear-test-monitoring technology, which can build upon an additional and remarkable growth of general monitoring assets that began in the 1990s, largely unrelated to the specifics of nuclear-test monitoring. A new cycle of improvements in earthquake monitoring is likely to improve monitoring for explosions. While it is not easy to quantify the degree of monitoring improvement afforded by such new assets, an example from North Korea indicates the improvement can be substantial.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1989

Manipulation strategies for massive space payloads

Control for the bracing strategy is being examined. It was concluded earlier that trajectory planning must be improved to best achieve the bracing motion. Very interesting results were achieved which enable the inverse dynamics of flexible arms to be calculated for linearized motion in a more efficient manner than previously published. The desired motion of the end point beginning at t=0 and ending at t=t sub f is used to calculate the required torque at the joint. The solution is separated into a causal function that is zero for t is less than 0 and an accusal function which is zero for t is greater than t sub f. A number of alternative end point trajectories were explored in terms of the peak torque required, the amount of anticipatory action, and other issues. The single link case is the immediate subject and an experimental verification of that case is being performed. Modeling with experimental verification of closed chain dynamics continues. Modeling effort has pointed out inaccuracies that result from the choice of numerical techniques used to incorporate the closed chain constraints when modeling our experimental prototype RALF (Robotic Arm Large and Flexible). Results were compared to TREETOPS, a multi body code. The experimental verification work is suggesting new ways to make comparisons with systems having structural linearity and joint and geometric nonlinearity. The generation of inertial forces was studied with a small arm that will damp the large arm's vibration.

Book, Wayne J.↗