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Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Strategic Research and Development Insights for Digital Twins

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is pleased to provide our response to the NITRD RFI on Digital Twins Research and Development. Digital twins are virtual representations of physical systems, leveraging real-time data to simulate and predict behaviors. ORNL is advancing digital twin technology across various disciplines, including neutron scattering, networking, science ecosystems, supercomputing, secure facilities, mobility technologies, materials design and discovery, power systems, fusion reactors, biological sciences, and earth observation. These efforts aim to enhance scientific research, operational efficiency, and decision-making processes. ORNL facilities, such as the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), Grid-C, Spallation Neutron Source (SNS), and Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF), provide the infrastructure to develop and demonstrate these digital twin technologies. In this document, we lay out key challenges, research gaps, and future opportunities based on our experience with digital twins that aim to serve as useful contributions towards a National Digital Twins R&D Strategic Plan. In the remaining document, we address nine of the thirteen topic areas specified in the RFI.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Material Accountancy for Molten Salt Reactors: Challenges and Opportunities

The large upfront capital costs associated with new nuclear facilities is a substantial barrier to future growth. Facility retrofits to accommodate effective nuclear security can be expensive, particularly in facilities with large inventories of bulk nuclear material. The recent and sustained interest in advanced nuclear power presents the opportunity to implement material control and accountancy (MC&A) measures in the design phase to lower the possibility of costly retrofits.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

​​Integrity Enhancing Protocols (IEP) Evaluation Framework​

​Protocols play an essential role in Advance Reactor systems. A diverse set of protocols are available to these reactors. Advanced Reactors benefit from technologies that can minimize their resource utilization and costs. Evaluation frameworks are often used when assessing protocols and processes related to cryptographic security systems. The following report discusses the various characteristics associated with these protocol evaluation frameworks, and derives a novel evaluative framework.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Physical & Cyber Security Modeling Interfacing Through Dante and ARCADE

Physical security is increasingly facing new threats from cyber attackers, for which there is little research in the way of characterizing this threat. This report discusses the efforts to combine cyber and physical security modeling tools to investigate this novel combinatorial threat space. To accomplish this, the Dante force-on-force modeling and simulation software and the Advanced Reactor Cyber Analysis and Development Environment (ARCADE) were integrated. Dante provides a 3D environment which models the physical world, while ARCADE provides the cyber and control systems world.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Operation and Security Considerations for Heat Pipe Cooled Microreactors

Microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs) are anticipated to be key elements in the United States' carbon-free energy portfolio, serving as reliable power sources for remote communities, disaster relief zones, extraterrestrial deployments, and backup power needs. Microreactors employ technologies that are substantially more advanced and recent compared to conventional reactors. Furthermore, they are of a drastically smaller scale and are designed to be operated in a diverse set of locations, offering operational flexibility and mobility. In addition, the autonomous or semi-autonomous operation of microreactors with minimal or no on-site staff is anticipated. These factors give rise to specific challenges with regards to their safety and security. The present work investigates considerations related to heat pipe operation, reactor transport, and cyber/cyberphysical security to ensure the indirect and direct consequences of nefarious actors’ actions are understood and can be mitigated by design or through physical security measures. In addition, future directions are proposed for consideration by both HPMR designers and for regulators.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Advanced Reactor Fragility Considerations

This presentation describes advanced reactor concepts at a high level and discusses them with respect to their implications on failure modes, criticality safety, and proliferation. The presentation is meant to give cyber security specialists with no nuclear background a high level overview of future technologies and how they may be impacted by cyber security concerns. The conference will be held on Wednesday, July 21st so the presentation needs to be approved by the morning on July 20th.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Passive Temperature Sensors for Nuclear Applications

In April 2007, the Department of Energy (DOE) designated the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) a National Scientific User Facility (NSUF) to advance US leadership in nuclear science and technology. By attracting new users from universities, laboratories, and industry, this program supports basic and applied nuclear research to help address the nation's energy security needs. In support of this program, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) established in-house capabilities to develop, fabricate, test, and qualify new and enhanced temperature sensors for irradiation testing. This effort is continuing today through the DOE?s Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (ASI) program. Although most efforts emphasize sensors capable of providing real-time data, selected tasks have been completed to enhance passive sensors for irradiations where instrumentation leads cannot be included. These sensors include silicon carbide (SiC) monitors, melt wires and the sublime temperature monitor. SiC monitors are available to detect peak irradiation temperatures between 200°C and 800°C in reactor locations where instrumentation leads cannot be used. SiC monitors may be evaluated using specialized equipment installed at INL?s Measurement Sciences Laboratory (MSL). A melt wire inventory is also maintained at MSL. This inventory contains wires for specific use in irradiation experiments ranging in temperatures from 30°C to 1500°C. Melt wires and SiC monitors have had decades of research and application. Recent research has produced a passive monitor known as the sublime temperature monitor. This passive sensor has the capability of recording temperature gradients. This paper will discuss passive temperature sensors currently being researched and implemented under the ASI program.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Need for research and training reactors for advanced reactor designs

Full text of publication follows. Research and training reactors have served a valuable role in helping train workforce for currently operating fleet of light water reactors. These research and training reactors have been used in reactor laboratory classes to familiarize the students with such vital concepts as approach to criticality, reactor period, neutron moderation, reactivity, flux distribution and leakage, etc. As the industry moves toward advanced non-light-water reactor designs, it is critical that research and training reactors be developed and deployed at university campuses to help train the new generation of nuclear and non-nuclear engineers who are likely to design, build, and operate these advanced reactors. Among the designs currently being pursued for nuclear power generation include molten salt, sodium cooled, and gas cooled designs, with options for various fuel forms. Thus, industry and DOE in collaboration with academic institutions should devise plans on how to familiarize the next generation of nuclear workforce with hands-on experience necessary for such designs. These research and training reactors will play a vital role in familiarizing the future workforce with hands-on experience with concepts associated with fast spectrum reactors, gas cooled reactors, and other features not associated with light water reactors. In addition to classical nuclear engineering concepts, these advanced research and training reactors can also be used for hands-on training as well as for research on features being considered in the design of GEN-IV reactors: cyber security for digital control room operations, hybrid energy system, hydrogen generation, district heating, autonomous control... (author)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Sensitive Resources Assessment and Forest Analysis for the Proposed Versatile Test Reactor, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

The US Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a leading institution in advanced materials, supercomputing, neutrons, and nuclear science. As a research laboratory managed by UT-Battelle, LLC for DOE, ORNL has national priorities in energy, security, and scientific discovery that necessitate facility improvements and expansions. DOE is also committed to environmental stewardship. The laboratory is located on the ~32,000-acre (~13,000-ha) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), much of which is categorized as a National Environmental Research Park (NERP) and a state Wildlife Management Area. DOE works with the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency (TWRA), Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), US Department of Agriculture, and other agencies to serve as an effective steward of the ORR. Accordingly, project managers must conform to environmental regulations, agreements, and policies at the federal, state, and institutional levels. Per 40 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) 1508.14, potential effects on research and science education also represent potential effects of federal actions on the NERP, and impacts on, e.g., deer harvest, must be considered on the Oak Ridge Wildlife Management Area when other aspects of the human environment are affected. The United States currently has no fast neutron testing capability to support advanced nuclear research and development. The proposed Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) will take advantage of current investments by the US government and private industry in nuclear reactors to expedite the design and construction process, using proven technology to create a world-class scientific infrastructure. The VTR will take advantage of fast neutrons provided by this proven technology, along with a capability to rapidly insert, conduct, and remove state-of-the-art experiments. An advantage of the VTR is that it can support future innovations in experimental capabilities without modifying the facility. The VTR will support progress in a variety of science and technology areas, including testing and qualification of advanced reactor fuels; testing and qualification of innovative structural materials; testing of innovative components and instruments; validation of advanced modeling and simulation tools; and versatility for future technical missions. Through proven technology, the VTR can take advantage of existing reactor designs and operating experience to reduce the risk, cost, and time for design and construction. The top available resources of DOE laboratories, industry, and universities will be used to expedite reactor design and construction toward developing the scientific infrastructure that affords a strong testing capability that can be sustained over many years. This report summarizes current knowledge of natural and cultural resources primarily within the VTR construction area. At the time of this report, the proposed VTR site design includes a construction area of ~150.4 acres (~69.9 ha), which contains an ~51.3-acre (~20.8-ha) operations area, located within forested natural areas of the ORR. The primary goal of the work presented here was to evaluate potential effects on sensitive resources that might result from development and construction activities associated with VTR. In addition to on-the-ground surveys during spring and summer 2020 by the ORNL Natural Resources Management Program and Aquatic Ecology Group staff, this report makes use of historical (pre-1995) and contemporary (1995 to present) data from additional confirmed sources (e.g., TDEC). Likewise, forest conditions were compiled from a 2011 forest inventory and supplemented with limited ground observations in 2020. The individuals who obtained and compiled the data presented here are familiar with and routinely assess sensitive resources on the ORR. Anyone who references this report must consider that the timing of surveys did not permit a complete delineation of the resources that will be affected. If the VTR project proceeds, additional surveys will be required to account for the seasonal patterns of various threatened and endangered species. Data deficiencies and potential resources that likely went undetected are indicated where possible. Accordingly, this report should facilitate more environmentally sound decisions during planning and 2 development of the VTR site, provide a foundation for further assessment of sensitive and cultural resources, and help project managers better address regulatory guidance and DOE policies on sustainable development in compliance with, for example, the US Endangered Species Act (ESA), Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), Tennessee Rare Plant Protection and Conservation Act of 1985, Tennessee Nongame and Endangered or Threatened Wildlife Species Conservation Act of 1974, several federal and state regulations regarding aquatic resource protection, and site-specific policies as outlined in various ORR management plans developed by ORNL and TWRA for DOE.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Research Reactor

The nuclear industry recognizes the difficulties involved in developing effective managerial and leadership skills in a highly technical and proficient workforce such as that found in nuclear facilities. Implementing an insider threat mitigation program (ITMP) within the nuclear industry is a complex and ongoing process that demands a comprehensive understanding of human behavior, an organization’s security culture, and rigorous regulatory requirements yet also accounts for facility characteristics, physical security, material flow, and activities involving nuclear material. Given the high-consequence nature of research reactor operations, even minor lapses can lead to safety, security, and reputational risks. An effective ITMP requires a defense-in-depth approach that incorporates behavioral analysis, robust vetting procedures, continuous monitoring, and cross-disciplinary coordination. It must also promote a culture of vigilance and accountability at all levels up to and including executive leadership but be flexible enough to adapt to evolving global threats and technological advances. Insider threat mitigation is not a one-time effort but rather a sustained commitment to excellence in safety and security. Establishing a culture in which personnel proactively report incidents and issues that could affect nuclear safety and security is vital to maintaining a safe and secure operational environment. This document was developed to guide senior management and research reactor organizations in creating comprehensive programs to effectively manage and mitigate insider threat behaviors and actions. It focuses on the key pillars of an effective ITMP, including the national legal framework, security culture, preventive and protective measures, cyber security, and performance evaluation. By using a systematic approach during implementation, facilities can foster environments conducive to insider threat detection and support long-term program sustainability. The document also provides strategies for improving communication across all levels of an organization, helping to eliminate barriers that hinder the development of robust ITMPs and enhance overall security culture. In today’s organizations, the concept of leveraging safety and security culture lessons to facilitate knowledge transfer is rapidly evolving to expedite insider threat management and security culture improvements. This document outlines the rationale for evaluating an ITMP based on national customs, culture, and stakeholders. The elements are all germane to reliability and trustworthiness and relate to security concerns that states may encounter. The document focuses not only on individual perceptions regarding security issues and capability building but also on team building and how to resolve concerns. The implementers of a facility’s ITMP may zero in on indicators of insider threats within their enterprise. This material will benefit organizations when it is applied using a systematic and structured approach as demonstrated throughout the document.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Fact Sheet - Long-length Scintillating Fibers for Radiation Detection

As the world looks to underground geological repositories for storing nuclear waste, technologies to safeguard the material are needed. An example of a project that developed a new technology is Tripwire. Tripwire proposes a multi-sensor system approach for geological spent nuclear fuel repositories that relies of radiation, vibration, and electromagnetic detection. Tripwire was developed by the Applied Radiation Measurements and Systems (ARMS) group at INL and sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The ARMS group performs research and development, testing and evaluation, operational support, and training focused on applied ionizing radiation detection and measurement. Application areas include nuclear engineering for advanced reactors and fuel cycle operations, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear counterproliferation, nuclear forensics, and arms control and disarmament.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗

U.S. Domestic Security-by-Design: On Site Response Force Strategies

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost- effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and microreactors. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR and microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility and microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and onsite response forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs and microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can lead to efficient security systems that utilize an onsite response force. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Lessons Learned from Industry Engagement in Export Controls

There are several U.S. government-sponsored programs with significant experience engaging with foreign government and industry partners to support capacity-building in export controls. This work seeks to answer the question: How can the outreach experience of the U.S. government-sponsored export control capacity-building programs (ECCBP) inform best practices for engaging with advanced reactor vendors in the domain of international nuclear safeguards? To answer this question, we interviewed export control subject matter experts with experience working for the U.S. ECCBPs – the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, and the International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) – and developed a set of recommendations for industry engagement based on the collective experience of interviewees.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integrating PCTRAN with AI-Driven Host-Intrusion Detection and Secured Container Systems for Advanced Malware Analysis (Summer Internship Report)

This study presents a solution for enhancing the security of the Personal Computer Transient Analyzer (PCTRAN) PC-based Nuclear Power Plant Simulator by integrating the software with an artificial intelligence (AI)-driven host-intrusion detection system (HIDS), in addition to a secured container system, for malware analysis. PCTRAN is a Windows XP-based software package that has the ability to simulate a variety of accident and transient conditions for nuclear power plants (NPPs). It offers a high-resolution replica of the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) and displays the status of important parameters allowing for operator interaction. By including AI-driven HIDS for the NSSS, the framework can identify security threats in real-time, ensuring the integrity of the nuclear simulation environment. Additionally, the secured container system offers the ability to isolate and analyze malware, preventing potential threats from affecting core systems. The integration process involves extensive testing and validation in order to ensure accuracy, reliability, and compliance with security policies. This framework sets a new precedent for secure simulation and training in NPP operations, and offers insight for future advancements in cybersecurity.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

U.S. Domestic Small Modular Reactor Security by Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting evolving security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the past approach) can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. This effort will intend to integrate security into the design phase of a model SMR that meets current NRC physical protection requirements and provide advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D, PATHTRACE and Blender were used to model a hypothetical generic domestic SMR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. One outsider sabotage scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic SMRs. The purpose of this project is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy Complex can impact the design of U.S. domestic SMRs and the complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Infrastructure and resource development needs to support a significant expansion of US nuclear capacity

In December 2023, the United States pledged at a United Nations conference to triple nuclear energy by 2050. In May of 2025 a new administration announced plans to quadruple nuclear energy by 2025, setting a new target that requires understanding the key infrastructure and resources needed to achieve large-scale deployment. This study attempts to quantify “what it takes” to deploy an additional 200 GWe of nuclear capacity. It projects demand levels for workforce, fuel, uranium mining and enrichment, waste management, supply chain, land, licensing, and water. Demand growth is also contextualized. For example, the peak number of construction workers required is approximately 215,000, a 37 % increase in the current US utility construction workforce. Up to 80,000 MT/year of mined uranium will be needed, necessitating a 60-fold increase in US mining production or a doubling of global mining if sourced externally. Advanced reactor fuels, uranium mining, and nuclear-grade equipment production would need substantial expansion. Operational workforce, enrichment needs, and licensing submissions also face significant increases. Although water consumption may see relatively lower increases, securing water rights poses unique challenges. This study consolidates various demand metrics in a broad context, highlighting the necessity of early preparations, such as workforce training, to support a tripling of nuclear energy. While it outlines the demand-side requirements, it does not assess the difficulties of ramping up or other supply-side issues. The findings also shed light on the impact of reactor size and reactor technology on various demand metrics.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Assessing the interfacial corrosion mechanism of Inconel 617 in chloride molten salt corrosion using multi-modal advanced characterization techniques

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has committed to expanding the domestic clean energy portfolio in response to the rising challenges of energy security in the wake of climate change. Accordingly, the construction of a series of Generation IV reactor technologies are being demonstrated, including sodium-cooled, small modular, and molten chloride fast reactors (MCFRs). To date, there are no fully qualified structural materials for constructing MCFRs. A number of commercial structural alloys have been considered for the construction of MCFRs, including alloys from the Inconel and Hastelloy series. Informed qualification of structural materials for the construction of MCFRs in the future can only be ensured by expanding the current fundamental knowledgebase of information pertaining to material performance under environmental stressors relevant to operation of the reactor, including corrosion susceptibility. The purpose of this investigation is to illustrate how a correlative multi-modal electron microscopy characterization approach, including the novel application of focused-ion beam 3D reconstruction capabilities, can elucidate the corrosion mechanism of a candidate structural material Inconel 617 for MCFR in NaCl-MgCl 2 eutectic salt at 700°C for 1,000 h. Evidence of intergranular corrosion, Ni and Fe dealloying, and Cr-O enrichment along the grain boundary, which most likely corresponds to Cr 2 O 3 , is a phenomenon that has been documented in other Ni-based superalloys exposed to chloride molten salt systems. Additional corrosion products, including the formation of insoluble MgAl 2 O 4 , within the porous network produced by the salt attack is a novel observation. In addition, Mo 3 Si 5 and τ 2 precipitates are detected in the alloy bulk and are dissolved by the salt. Furthermore, the lack of detection of design γ' precipitates in Inconel 617 after 1,000 h could indicate that the molten salt corrosion mechanism has indirectly induced a phase transformation of Al 2 TiNi (τ 2 ) and Ni 3 (Al,Ti) (γ’) phase. This investigation provides a comprehensive understanding of molten salt corrosion mechanisms in a complex material system such as a commercial structural alloy for applications in MCFRs.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Wireless Sensing and Communication Capability from In-Core to a Monitoring Center

Significant cost savings can be made if electrical cables can be replaced by wireless technology in current Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) and in advance reactor designs. Wireless technology can also provide in-core opportunities by significantly reducing the number of penetrations in the pressure vessel, cost and complexity of sensor installation and by increasing the efficiency of current and advanced reactors. Unlike other deployment scenarios for an industrial environment, operators need to have centralized control over all the networks. Centralized control will reduce implementation costs, provide single point control and enable monitoring of network devices, improve security, and enhance connectivity. Micro-sensors that can simultaneously monitor temperature and pressure within a fuel rod inside nuclear reactors will enable preventative actions during abnormal operating conditions. This ability could avert accidents and enable the expedient development of accident tolerant fuels. A novel micro-sensor suite (~ mm) to simultaneously measure multiple parameters such as temperature, strain, pressure, and neutron/gamma flux inside a fuel rod is being developed for use in reactors. The necessary communication architecture is also being developed to transmit measurement signals from the core to the plant's data cloud or control room. A three three-tier strategy has been developed to support wireless transmission of in-core measurements to the control room or to a secure cloud platform for control, analytics, and decision-making purposes. 1. In-core: data signal from in-core to outside of the pressure vessel within the containment building 2. Containment building: data signal from inside to the outside of the containment building and into the balance of the plant network 3. Balance of the plant network: information transmitted to the data cloud and control room This plan presents a wireless sensing and communication system for use within a reactor core and elsewhere. The communication technology is advantageous to compensate for network equipment failures and adverse data transmission conditions. Wireless technology will significantly increase the resiliency of the plants network system. The wireless system naturally provides multiple transmission path capability and data redundancy.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗