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At least 145 records · Page 8

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Proposed Products to Support Shelter-Evacuation Decision Making in the Event of a Nuclear Detonation

Response strategies implemented in the first few hours to days after a nuclear detonation on the US homeland may save more than 100,000 lives. Effective planning and pre-event capability development can increase the response efficacy and so the number of lives saved. During such an event, the US Department of Defense, Joint Task Force Civil Support (DoD JTF-CS) provides command and control for the DoD forces supporting civil authority response operations. Among other activities, JTF-CS expects to support FEMA as well as State and local agencies in shelter and evacuation response activities. JTF-CS currently uses a manual method to generate evacuation decision making products. This method compares the dose that would be (a) acquired remaining at a given location to that (b) acquired during evacuation along a small number of routes. In these products, evacuation may be warranted when the projected “remain” dose is greater than the “evacuate” dose. This method only provides a limited consideration of the protection buildings provide their occupants. To inform the JTF-CS nuclear detonation response, the DoD Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has tasked Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to design a set of planning and response products to support shelter-evacuation activities. This report documents these products to facilitate DTRA and JTF-CS planning efforts. To provide context, we also provide appendices that summarize US planning guidance response zones, early (<72 h) response strategies, and other key topics.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Achieving Cyber-Resilience for Power Systems using a Learning, Model-Assisted Blockchain Framework

The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

TrojAI Alternate Analysis

In this portion of the TrojAI evaluation, we focus on the cyber-network-c2-mar2024 dataset. Recall that in this round ResNet18 and ResNet34 neural networks (NN) were trained on the USTC-TFC2016 dataset with the aim of distinguishing between benign versus botnet command and control (c2) packets. A range of bytes from each packet was reformatted into a 28x28 pixel image, and the collection of reformatted packets served as the training (and testing) data for the two ResNet models. For some of the data a trigger watermark was strategically placed to affect various inputs to the NNs. This watermarked, or poisoned, data in turn created a poisoned, or trojaned NN. The data were poisoned in different ways ultimately creating different trojaned NNs. This collection of trojaned NNs was combined with various versions of not trojaned NNs and served as the training and testing data for the performers. The performers’ task was to construct a classifier to distinguish between the trojaned and not trojaned models. It was previously noted that the performers struggled with the cyber-network-c2-mar2024 dataset, motivating this investigation of potential reasons the performers experienced challenges.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Human Supervision of Autonomous Vehicle Fleet Operations and Associated Passenger Communications: Preprint

Advances in automated vehicle (AV) technology and expanded operations are rapidly emerging with Automated Mobility District (AMD) deployments in global cities. NLR's AMD research addresses critical elements of human supervision of AV fleet operations and associated passenger communications for vehicles in which no driver or safety attendant is present. Although sufficiently advanced AVs no longer have direct oversight by a driver, fleet management remains staffed with operations personnel at the operations command and control (OCC) facility. This paper examines the functionality of the OCC, drawing comparisons of how automated train control and automated people mover OCCs operate. Within an AMD, the OCC manages various vehicle types, sizes, and operational modes, including on-demand and fixed route service, to facilitate a 'network of networks' for transport within a metropolitan area. The OCC serves as oversight for multiple AV fleets assisting AVs via remote operation of vehicles, communication, and dispatching personnel to resolve problems. The OCC also coordinates system operation, geographically staging vehicles, and managing weather, police, and emergency events. Informed by traffic management center (TMC) strategies using highly integrated software and communications, OCCs facilitate seamless information flows. OCC personnel remotely assist passengers and oversee multi-party operation to ensure safety and security. Although social norms mitigate large-capacity unattended vehicle operations, social interaction in multi-party automated small vehicles has little precedent. This poses a new frontier for society and requires research to effectively understand and manage. Future research will monitor OCC implementations, passenger interfaces, and deployment scaling of initial AMD systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

The IAEA Assistance Training Programme for Transport Security

The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security is working cooperatively with the U.S. Department of Energy's Global Threat Reduction Initiative, European Union and Australia to provide transport security assistance to countries throughout the world. Assistance is available to countries in reviewing and upgrading their transport security programs at all levels: (1) National level (regulatory and other government agencies); and (2) Operator level (shippers and carriers). Assistance is directed at implementing a consistent level of security throughout the life cycle of radioactive material (same level of security during transport as when in a fixed facility) Upgrade assistance can include: (1) Expert advisory missions to provide advice and guidance; (2) Training courses for regulatory, governmental and industry personnel; (3) Transport security awareness; (4) Detailed training on designing and implementing transport security programs; (5) Planning to identify and prioritize needs (developing security approaches and plans); (6) Developing model security plans and procedures; and (7) Equipment (vehicles, packages, command and control equipment, etc.). Country visits are now being scheduled to initiate transport security cooperative activities. A training course has been developed to assist countries in developing and implementing transport security programs. The training course has been given as a national training course (three times) and as a Regional training course (three times). The course addresses recommended security provisions for the transport of all radioactive material.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Integrated and adaptive management of water resources: Tensions, legacies, and the next best thing

Integrated water resources management (IWRM) and adaptive management (AM) are two institutional and management paradigms designed to address shortcomings within water systems governance – the limits of hierarchical water institutional arrangements in the case of IWRM and the challenge of making water management decisions under uncertainty in the case of AM. Recently, there has been a trend to merge these paradigms to address the growing complexity of stressors shaping water management, such as globalization and climate change. However, because many of these joint approaches have received little empirical attention, questions remain about how they might work (or not) in practice. Here, we explore a few of these issues using empirical research carried out in Brazil. We focus on highlighting the potentially negative interactions, tensions, and tradeoffs between different institutions/mechanisms perceived as desirable as research and practice attempt to make water systems management simultaneously integrated and adaptive. Our examples pertain mainly on the use of techno-scientific knowledge in water management and governance in Brazil’s IWRM model and how it relates to participation, democracy, deliberation, diversity, and adaptability. We show that a legacy of technical and hierarchical management has shaped the integration of management, and subsequently, the degree to which management might also be adaptive. While integrated systems may be more legitimate and accountable than top-down command and control ones, the mechanisms of IWRM may be at odds with the flexible, experimental, and self-organizing nature of AM.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Rotary fast tool servo system and methods

A high bandwidth rotary fast tool servo provides tool motion in a direction nominally parallel to the surface-normal of a workpiece at the point of contact between the cutting tool and workpiece. Three or more flexure blades having all ends fixed are used to form an axis of rotation for a swing arm that carries a cutting tool at a set radius from the axis of rotation. An actuator rotates a swing arm assembly such that a cutting tool is moved in and away from the lathe-mounted, rotating workpiece in a rapid and controlled manner in order to machine the workpiece. One or more position sensors provides rotation and position information for a swing arm to a control system. A control system commands and coordinates motion of the fast tool servo with the motion of a spindle, rotating table, cross-feed slide, and in-feed slide of a precision lathe.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Complex Failure Forewarning System - DHS Conference Proceedings

As the critical infrastructures of the United States have become more and more dependent on public and private networks, the potential for widespread national impact resulting from disruption or failure of these networks has also increased. Securing the nation s critical infrastructures requires protecting not only their physical systems but, just as important, the cyber portions of the systems on which they rely. A failure is inclusive of random events, design flaws, and instabilities caused by cyber (and/or physical) attack. One such domain, aging bridges, is used to explain the Complex Structure Failure Forewarning System. We discuss the workings of such a system in the context of the necessary sensors, command and control and data collection as well as the cyber security efforts that would support this system. Their application and the implications of this computing architecture are also discussed, with respect to our nation s aging infrastructure.

5th Annual University Network Summit↗

Forewarning of Failure in Complex Systems

As the critical infrastructures of the United States have become more and more dependent on public and private networks, the potential for widespread national impact resulting from disruption or failure of these networks has also increased. Securing the nation s critical infrastructures requires protecting not only their physical systems but, just as important, the cyber portions of the systems on which they rely. A failure is inclusive of random events, design flaws, and instabilities caused by cyber (and/or physical) attack. One such domain is failure in critical equipment. A second is aging bridges. We discuss the workings of such a system in the context of the necessary sensors, command and control and data collection as well as the cyber security efforts that would support this system. Their application and the implications of this computing architecture are also discussed, with respect to our nation s aging infrastructure.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Measuring the effectiveness of infrastructure-level detection of large-scale botnets

Botnets are one of the most serious security threats to the Internet and its end users. In recent years, utilizing P2P as a Command and Control (C&C) protocol has gained popularity due to its decentralized nature that can help hide the hotmaster's identity. Most bot detection approaches targeting P2P botnets either rely on behavior monitoring or traffic flow and packet analysis, requiring fine-grained information collected locally. This requirement limits the scale of detection. In this paper, we consider detection of P2P botnets at a high-level - the infrastructure level - by exploiting their structural properties from a graph analysis perspective. Using three different P2P overlay structures, we measure the effectiveness of detecting each structure at various locations (the Autonomous System (AS), the Point of Presence (PoP), and the router rendezvous) in the Internet infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Technology Integration Initiative In Support of Outage Management

Plant outage management is a high priority concern for the nuclear industry from cost and safety perspectives. Often, command and control during outages is maintained in the outage control center where many of the underlying technologies supporting outage control are the same as those used in the 1980’s. This research reports on the use of advanced integrating software technologies and hand held mobile devices as a means by which to reduce cycle time, improve accuracy, and enhance transparency among outage team members. This paper reports on the first phase of research supported by the DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program that is performed in close collaboration with industry to examine the introduction of newly available technology allowing for safe and efficient outage performance. It is thought that this research will result in: improved resource management among various plant stakeholder groups, reduced paper work, and enhanced overall situation awareness for the outage control center management team. A description of field data collection methods, including personnel interview data, success factors, end-user evaluation and integration of hand held devices in achieving an integrated design are also evaluated. Finally, the necessity of obtaining operations cooperation support in field studies and technology evaluation is acknowledged.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Communications systems and methods for subsea processors

A subsea processor may be located near the seabed of a drilling site and used to coordinate operations of underwater drilling components. The subsea processor may be enclosed in a single interchangeable unit that fits a receptor on an underwater drilling component, such as a blow-out preventer (BOP). The subsea processor may issue commands to control the BOP and receive measurements from sensors located throughout the BOP. A shared communications bus may interconnect the subsea processor and underwater components and the subsea processor and a surface or onshore network. The shared communications bus may be operated according to a time division multiple access (TDMA) scheme.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Subsea processor for underwater drilling operations

A subsea processor may be located near the seabed of a drilling site and used to coordinate operations of underwater drilling components. The subsea processor may be enclosed in a single interchangeable unit that fits a receptor on an underwater drilling component, such as a blow-out preventer (BOP). The subsea processor may issue commands to control the BOP and receive measurements from sensors located throughout the BOP. The subsea processor may relay information to the surface for recording or monitoring. The subsea processor may also be programmed with a model from which to base operation of the BOP, such as in emergency conditions.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Deploying Software-Defined Networking in Operational Technology Environments

Software Defined Networking for Operational Technologies, referred to as OT-SDN, is a leading technology to secure critical infrastructure and command and control (C2) systems. As the name implies, OT-SDN networks are programmable, which allows system owners to utilize the characteristics of their physical process to inform the security of their network. There are best practices for deploying OT-SDN into an environment, whether it is all at once or over time (hybrid) that the network is converted to SDN technologies. Through the development of data mining tools and standardized process control, OT-SDN can be deployed reliably. These tools will minimize or eliminate any communication failures during the transition and provide the network owner with complete documentation of their environment. This documentation could enable or facilitate the network owner to pass any audits or policy checks (Authority to Operate) before being allowed to utilize the OT-SDN infrastructure.

Software Defined Networking, Operational Technolog↗

Module-OT: A Turnkey Solution for Securing Energy Systems

The Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command-and-Control Messages on Operational Technology Networks (Module-OT) is a flexible and lightweight solution for grid-edge devices focusing on end-to-end security. It is a bump- in- the-wire solution acting as a secure conduit for data between devices or systems across a network. It improves the cybersecurity posture of DER systems by providing authentication, authorization, and data integrity to secure DER communications. Additionally, it performs key management, provides data security through whitelisting Internet Protocol addresses and ports, blocks unauthorized connections, controls user access, and allows serial or Ethernet connections for added flexibility. The core software is portable to various Linux-based operating systems and is developed to be customized by the developer and researcher communities. Module-OT has been validated in the lab, has been demonstrated at a 500-KW PV-plus-storage site, and has been proven ready to secure operational technology devices. Its core functionality meets current standards, including validation procedures of the NIST Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 140-2). Because of its capability to provide an accessible and affordable option for stepping up security across modern energy systems, Module-OT can serve as an effective technological option to standardize cybersecurity moving forward.

cryptography↗

Integrated behavior-based infrastructure command validation

A cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system is provided herein for validating asset commands issued within an infrastructure network. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can be integrated into an infrastructure network to monitor and validate infrastructure asset commands in real-time or while the infrastructure network is active. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can receive or intercept commands issued by asset controllers. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can validate the commands based on a command validation model. The command validation model can represent normal operating behavior of the infrastructure network. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can provide valid commands to the intended infrastructure asset, or can reject invalid commands. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can store validation results for use in updating the command validation model. The cybersecurity infrastructure command validation system can flag or otherwise warn the infrastructure network or administrators of invalid commands.

Akyol, Bora A.↗