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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Notional Artemis Lunar Surface Exploration Package (ArLSEP) based on the Gandalf Staff Platform

Introduction: The Artemis program is planning to deliver crew and cargo to the lunar surface, but there is no current package for supporting lunar in-struments and experiments similar to the Apollo Lunar Surface Exploration Package (ALSEP). This abstract provides a possible concept for such a package using the Gandalf Staff Platform as a common core. Gandalf Staff: The Gandalf Staff is an early prototype system developed over FY’21/FY’22 using NASA Science Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) Center Information Fund (CIF) grants to de-sign, build and test “proof-of-concept” components. These components include a 24v battery powered monopole that powers a suite of subsystems, including a Graphical User Interface (GUI) for crew, surface voice and data communications, Lunar Search and Rescue (LunaSAR) navigation and communications, LiDAR, field site external lighting, 360-degree camera, and a geothermal instrument for measuring sub-surface temperature gradient. The staff can be carried independently by an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) astronaut, or can be mounted into a tripod for “hands free” support at a surface site being investigated. The staff can be attached to an external solar array and power storage system for long-duration operations. [1,2] ALSEP: An ASLEP flew on each mission Apollo 12 to Apollo 17. For Apollo 11, a simplified packaged called the Early Apollo Scientific Experiments Pack-age (EASEP) was flown. Each package included a “Central Station” that provided the power and communications connected to a variety of instruments and sensors. The power was provided by a Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) fueled by Plutoni-um-238 generating 70 watts of power (initially, decayed over time) [3]. The communications system provide for direct to Earth data transfer from the lunar surface. Each pack-age was stowed externally in the Lunar Module (LM) Scientific Equipment (SEQ) bay with a mass up to 163 kg (Apollo 17). The crew unloaded the ALSEP from the LM and deployed the instruments on the lunar surface. Although designed to operate for only 1 year, many sites operated for up to 8 years successfully [4]. The Active Seismic Experiment (ASE) included 3 geophones for detecting seismic waves created by mortars and thumpers deployed by the crew. Other active experiments measured the lunar atmosphere, the heat flow in the subsurface, the lunar gravity and potential gravity waves, the lunar magnetic field, the solar wind and plasma interactions in cislunar space. Passive experiments included collectors for dust and cosmic rays, and retroreflectors for precise measurements of distance using a laser from Earth. The ALSEP program continues to generate insights into lunar formation and evolution. ArLSEP Concepts: The lunar surface science package for the Artemis program will hopefully exceed the capability of the ALSEP. There are multiple issues for discussion leading to the design of a new ArLSEP, needing requirements definition from the science community, NASA mission architecture, and NASA budget planners. 1. Delivery Mechanism Two possible projects currently provide capability to deliver scientific cargo to the lunar surface: 1) the Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) [5] and the Human Landing System (HLS) [6, 7]. Each project is controlled by a different organization within NASA and budgeted with different criteria although both support lunar exploration. The HLS system delivers crew (and potentially cargo) to human landing sites. If an ArLSEP is “predeployed” to such a site, the design must include power (either from the vehicle or independently) to keep the electronics functioning until deployed by the crew. If an ArLSEP is delivered on a vehicle after the crew is present on the lunar surface, safety protocols require adequate distance from the humans for impact from descent propelled sur-face regolith ejecta. This distance can not exceed the capability of the crew to walk (if no rover) to the vehicle for ArLSEP deployment. 2. Overall Guidelines The general design of ArLSEP will likely follow the ALSEP with a common system for communications and power; however, significant architecture differences between Apollo and Artemis exist. Power: The RTG will not be available for early Artemis missions nor likely follow-on Lunar Exploration Transportation Services (LETS) missions [8]. Thus, ArLSEP power must be supplied by solar arrays with sufficient battery capability to “keep alive” necessary electronics during any lunar surface eclipse period. Communication: The Artemis program is developing a series of communications satellites for lunar orbit to provide surface transmission of data and voice to Earth. Called “LunaNET”, this network is component useful for ArLSEP since south polar locations may not always have direct “line-of-sight” to Earth [9]. 3. Concept of Operations (ConOps) The general ConOps for ArLSEP is to deliver the package to lunar surface before the crew arrives, and then have the crew deploy the package after some period of time. This requires coordinated design (for power systems) and launch window (for schedule) on both the cargo and crew missions. Once the ArLSEP is deployed, it will operate autonomously for a number of years. It should be designed to be EVA compatible for crew maintenance and upgrade. 4. Notional Design (for discussion purpose only) The landing site near the South Pole is expected to have no eclipse cycle exceeding 5 days, so the “keep alive” power is 144 hours (6 days to include margin). A 12v ArLSEP will use rechargeable LiFePO4 cells, which are common in the Electric Vehicle (EV) industry. With a current of 5 amps and a 125 watt system, the mass is about 90kg. The comm. system and structure adds another 10kg, thus the “Central Station” is approximately 100kg. The solar power is collected on four arrays (each 2m above the surface), and the entire ArLSEP is designed to stow in a 2m x 1m x 1m volume. The experiment and instrument design will vary for each installation and add mass to the total (although they are expected to fit within the 2m3 volume). Seismic wave generation will likely not be provided with mortars, thus an electric “thumper” will be required. Active instruments such as imaging systems and sensing instruments will benefit from the additional power and communication capability provided by ArLSEP. Passive systems such as retroreflectors, witness plates, and cosmic dust collectors can be added to either the landing vehicle and/or the ArLSEP. With repeated HLS missions to the same human site, the ArLSEP can be expanded and easily maintained for long duration science collection on the lunar surface.

ALSEP↗
NASA NTRS2002

A Flight Deck Decision Support Tool for Autonomous Airborne Operations

NASA is developing a flight deck decision support tool to support research into autonomous operations in a future distributed air/ground traffic management environment. This interactive real-time decision aid, referred to as the Autonomous Operations Planner (AOP), will enable the flight crew to plan autonomously in the presence of dense traffic and complex flight management constraints. In assisting the flight crew, the AOP accounts for traffic flow management and airspace constraints, schedule requirements, weather hazards, aircraft operational limits, and crew or airline flight-planning goals. This paper describes the AOP and presents an overview of functional and implementation design considerations required for its development. Required AOP functionality is described, its application in autonomous operations research is discussed, and a prototype software architecture for the AOP is presented.

Ballin, Mark G.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Humans are Capable of Achieving Sufficient Sleep in Microgravity

Studies consistently find that humans average approximately six hours of sleep per night in space, which is less than they sleep on Earth. Consensus recommendations suggest that humans need at least seven hours of sleep per night for appropriate functioning. Such short sleep duration has been associated with reduced alertness and performance in space. It is unclear whether this sleep loss is related to modifiable factors, such as irregular scheduling, poor sleep environment, and excessive workload or due to features of spaceflight that alter physiology (e.g., microgravity). Recent missions have afforded crew better, more stable sleep and work schedules, and an improved sleep environment, including private, dark, and quiet crew quarters. Hence, the evaluation of sleep under these conditions should provide insight into the causes of sleep deficiency observed in space thus far.

fatigue↗
NASA NTRS2003

Equivalent Mass versus Life Cycle Cost for Life Support Technology Selection

The decision to develop a particular life support technology or to select it for flight usually depends on the cost to develop and fly it. Other criteria such as performance, safety, reliability, crew time, and technical and schedule risk are considered, but cost is always an important factor. Because launch cost would account for much of the cost of a future planetary mission, and because launch cost is directly proportional to the mass launched, equivalent mass has been used instead of cost to select advanced life support technology. The equivalent mass of a life support system includes the estimated mass of the hardware and of the spacecraft pressurized volume, power supply, and cooling system that the hardware requires. The equivalent mass of a system is defined as the total payload launch mass needed to provide and support the system. An extension of equivalent mass, Equivalent System Mass (ESM), has been established for use in the Advanced Life Support project. ESM adds a mass-equivalent of crew time and possibly other cost factors to equivalent mass. Traditional equivalent mass is strictly based on flown mass and reflects only the launch cost. ESM includes other important cost factors, but it complicates the simple flown mass definition of equivalent mass by adding a non-physical mass penalty for crew time that may exceed the actual flown mass. Equivalent mass is used only in life support analysis. Life Cycle Cost (LCC) is much more commonly used. LCC includes DDT&E, launch, and operations costs. For Earth orbit rather than planetary missions, the launch cost is less than the cost of Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDTBE). LCC is a more inclusive cost estimator than equivalent mass. The relative costs of development, launch, and operations vary depending on the mission destination and duration. Since DDTBE or operations may cost more than launch, LCC gives a more accurate relative cost ranking than equivalent mass. To select the lowest cost technology for a particular application we should use LCC rather than equivalent mass.

Jones, Harry↗
NASA NTRS1999

Thermal Protection System Design and Development for the X-38

The purpose of the X-38 program is to greatly reduce the costs and schedule for the development of Crew Return Vehicles (CRV's) and Crew Transfer Vehicles (CTV's) through the use of the rapid development methodology associated with an X-project (Ground Testing, Atmospheric Testing and Space Flight Testing).

T John Kowal↗
NASA NTRS2000

STS-101: Crew Interview / Yuri Vladimirovich Usachev

Live footage of a preflight interview with Mission Specialist Yuri Vladimirovich Usachev is seen. The interview addresses many different questions including why Usachev became a cosmonaut, the individuals who influenced him, and the events that led to his interest. Other interesting information that this one-on-one interview discusses is his reaction and integration into the STS-101 crew. Usachev also mentions the scheduled space-walk of James S. Voss and Jeffrey N. Williams, his feeling once he steps into the International Space Station (ISS), the repairs of equipment, his handling of the hand held laser, and the change of the batteries.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2014

A Guideline for the Management of Renal Stones in Astronauts

There are no specific guidelines for the management of renal stones in astronauts. Given the increased risk for bone loss, hypercalcuria, and stone formation due to microgravity, a clinical practice guideline is needed. Methods An extensive review of the literature and current aeromedical standards for the management of renal stones was done. The NASA Flight Medicine Clinic's electronic medical record and Longitudinal Survey of Astronaut Health were also reviewed. This information was used to create an algorithm for the management of renal stones in astronauts. Results Guidelines are proposed based on accepted standards of care, with consideration to the environment of spaceflight. In a usual medical setting, asymptomatic, small stones less than 7 mm are often observed over time. Given the constraints of schedule, and the risks to crew health and mission, this approach is too liberal. An upper limit of 3 mm stone diameter was adopted before requiring intervention, because this is the largest size that has a significant chance of spontaneous passage on its own. Other specific guidelines were also created. Discussion The spaceflight environment requires more aggressive treatment than would otherwise be found with the usual practice of medicine. A small stone can become a major problem because it may ultimately require medical evacuation from orbit. Thus renal stones are a significant mission threat and should be managed in a systematic way to mitigate risks to crew health and mission success.

Reyes, David↗
NASA NTRS2005

Crew-Centered Operations: What HAL 9000 Should Have Been

To date, manned space flight has maintained the locus of control for the mission on the ground. Mission control performs tasks such as activity planning, system health management, resource allocation, and astronaut health monitoring. Future exploration missions require the locus of control to shift to on-board due light speed constraints and potential loss of communication. The lunar campaign must begin to utilize a shared control approach to validate and understand the limitations of the technology allowing astronauts to oversee and direct aspects of operation that require timely decision making. Crew-centered Operations require a system-level approach that integrates multiple technologies together to allow a crew-prime concept of operations. This paper will provide an overview of the driving mission requirements, highlighting the limitations of existing approaches to mission operations and identifying the critical technologies necessary to enable a crew-centered mode of operations. The paper will focus on the requirements, trade spaces, and concepts for fulfillment of this capability. The paper will provide a broad overview of relevant technologies including: Activity Planning and Scheduling; System Monitoring; Repair and Recovery; Crew Work Practices.

Korsmeyer, David J.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Advanced Regenerative Environmental Control and Life Support Systems: Air and Water Regeneration

Extended manned space missions will require regenerative life support techniques. Past manned missions used nonregenerative expendables, except for a molecular sieve based carbon dioxide removal system aboard Skylab. The resupply penalties associated with expendables becomes prohibitive as crew size and mission duration increase. The Space Station scheduled to be operational in the 1990's is based on a crew of four to sixteen and a resupply period of 90 days or greater. It will be the first major spacecraft to employ regenerable techniques for life support. The techniques to be used in the requirements for the space station are addressed.

Schubert, F. H.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Crew Alertness Management on the Flight Deck: Cognitive and Vigilance Performance

This project had three broad goals: (1) to identify environmental and organismic risks to performance of long-haul cockpit crews; (2) to assess how cognitive and psychomotor vigilance performance, and subjective measures of alertness, were affected by work-rest schedules typical of long-haul cockpit crews; and (3) to determine the alertness-promoting effectiveness of behavioral and technological countermeasures to fatigue on the flight deck. During the course of the research, a number of studies were completed in cooperation with the NASA Ames Fatigue Countermeasures Program. The publications emerging from this project are listed in a bibliography in the appendix. Progress toward these goals will be summarized below according to the period in which it was accomplished.

Dinges, David F.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Astronaut Sleep Duration Varies by Timing of Scheduled Sleep

INTRODUCTION: Studies find that humans average approximately six hours of sleep per night in space, which is less than they sleep on Earth. Such short sleep duration has been associated with reduced alertness and performance in space. It is unclear whether this sleep loss is related to modifiable factors, such as irregular scheduling, poor sleep environment, and excessive workload or due to features of spaceflight that alter physiology (e.g., microgravity). Recent missions have afforded crew better, more stable sleep and work schedules, and an improved sleep environment. Despite these improvements, schedules do still vary enough to cause decrements in sleep duration. METHODS: Crewmembers (n = 19) who volunteered for the NASA Standard Measures protocol between January 2019 and March 2022 were provided with actiwatches (Phillips, Respironics, Bend OR) that they wore for two bouts of data collection lasting two weeks each before flight (at approximately L-270 and L-180), either continuously (n = 9) or for two weeks every two months while in space (n = 10), and for seven days postflight, immediately upon return to Earth (R+0). A regularly scheduled (or “nominal”) sleep episode would take place between the hours of 9:30pm and 6:00am. We looked at sleep outcomes (sleep duration, wake after sleep onset [WASO], sleep efficiency) depending on the distance from nominal sleep offset to see whether scheduled sleep period affected sleep durations and other metrics of sleep quality. RESULTS: Crewmembers provided data from 402 nights preflight, 2,137 nights inflight, and 275 nights postflight. They averaged 7.33 hours of sleep per night (± 1.16, SD) in space. Though this was significantly less sleep than they achieved preflight (7.87 ± 1.10) or postflight (7.75 ± 1.43, p < .01), this duration of sleep meets the recommended amount for optimal human health and well-being. For every hour after the nominal sleep period a crewmember woke up, their total sleep increased by 25 minutes (up to 5 hours). CONCLUSIONS: We conclude that humans are capable of achieving sufficient sleep in space, especially when their schedules afford adequate sleep (namely, schedules that phase delay rather than advance). Future studies are needed to determine whether microgravity impacts sleep architecture and sleep quality. Going forward, it is imperative that crewmembers are provided with stable schedules, with moderate workload, and environments that are conducive to sleep.

fatigue↗
NASA NTRS1991

Research on sleep, circadian rhythms and aging - Applications to manned spaceflight

Disorders of sleep and circadian rhythmicity are characteristic of both advancing age and manned spaceflight. Sleep fragmentation, reduced nocturnal sleep tendency and sleep efficiency, reduced daytime alertness, and increased daytime napping are common to both of these conditions. Recent research on the pathophysiology and treatment of disrupted sleep in older people has led to a better understanding of how the human circadian pacemaker regulates the timing of the daily sleep-wake cycle and how it responds to the periodic changes in the light-dark cycle to which we are ordinarily exposed. These findings have led to new treatments for some of the sleep disorders common to older individuals, using carefully timed exposure to bright light and darkness to manipulate the phase and/or amplitude of the circadian timing system. These insights and treatment approaches have direct applications in the design of countermeasures allowing astronauts to overcome some of the challenges which manned spaceflight poses for the human circadian timing system. We have conducted an operational feasibility study on the use of scheduled exposure to bright light and darkness prior to launch in order to facilitate adaptation of the circadian system of a NASA Space Shuttle crew to the altered sleep-wake schedule required for their mission. The results of this study illustrate how an understanding of the properties of the human circadian timing system and the consequences of circadian disruption can be applied to manned spaceflight.

Czeisler, Charles A.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Advanced regenerative environmental control and life support systems - Air and water regeneration

Extended manned space missions will require regenerative life support techniques. Past U.S. manned missions used nonregenerative expendables, except for a molecular sieve-based carbon dioxide removal system aboard Skylab. The resupply penalties associated with expandables becomes prohibitive as crew size and mission duration increase. The U.S. Space Station, scheduled to be operational in the 1990's, is based on a crew of four to sixteen and a resupply period of 90 days or greater. It will be the first major spacecraft to employ regenerable techniques for life support. The paper uses the requirements for the Space Station to address these techniques.

Schubert, F. H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluation of Self-Scheduling Exercises Completed by Analog Crewmembers in NASA's Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA)

NASA human spaceflight missions are inherently dynamic and require frequent scheduling changes in order to adapt to changing mission priorities and objectives. Tactical level changes to the mission plan are traditionally made by a team of expert planners and operations specialists on the ground. However, astronauts are expected to execute missions more autonomously during future long duration missions. Astronauts will need to take on some of the responsibility of managing their own schedule while still abiding by the numerous constraints required by human spaceflight operations. This paper summarizes salient elements of crew performance in NASA’s Human Exploration Research Analog Campaign 3. Analog crewmembers completed a series of self-scheduling exercises to evaluate Playbook’s usability towards enabling self-scheduling without support from ground control. Playbook is a self-scheduling software tool designed and developed by our team. We also investigated how to best communicate self-scheduling tasks and constraints to the crew in order to facilitate efficient self-scheduling during isolation in a realistic environment. Our analysis identified that 30 minutes was sufficient to complete complex self-scheduling tasks. Our evaluation also identified differences between individual and collaborative performance; analog crewmembers completed self-scheduling exercises more quickly as a team as opposed to individually and reported lower subjective difficulty ratings overall.

HERA↗
NASA NTRS1980

Synthesized voice approach callouts for air transport operations

A flight simulation experiment was performed to determine the effectiveness of synthesized voice approach callouts for air transport operations. Flight deck data was first collected on scheduled air carrier operations to describe existing pilot-not-flying callout procedures in the flight context and to document the types and amounts of other auditory cockpit information during different types of air carrier operations. A flight simulation scenario for a wide-body jet transport airline training simulator was developed in collaboration with a major U.S. air carrier and flown by three-man crews of qualified line pilots as part of their normally scheduled recurrent training. Each crew flew half their approaches using the experimental synthesized voice approach callout system (SYNCALL) and the other half using the company pilot-not-flying approach callout procedures (PNF). Airspeed and sink rate performance was better with the SYNCALL system than with the PNF system for non-precision approaches. For the one-engine approach, for which SYNCALL made inappropriate deviation callouts, airspeed performance was worse with SYNCALL than with PNF. Reliability of normal altitude approach callouts was comparable for PNF on the line and in the simulator and for SYNCALL in the simulator.

Simpson, C. A.↗
NASA NTRS1986

X-29A technology demonstrator flight test program overview

An overview of the X-29A functional flight program and concept evaluation program is presented, including some of the unique and different preparations for the first flight. Included are a discussion of the many organizational responsibilities and a description of the program management structure for the test team. Also discussed are preflight ground, flight functional envelope expansion, and flight research test objectives and qualitive results to date for both a limited-envelope flight control system and an expanded-envelope system. The aircraft, including the instrumentation system and measurements, is described. In addition, a discussion is included regarding the use of major support facilities, such as ground and flight simulators, the NASA Western Aeronautical Test Range and mission control center, and the Grumman automated telemetry station. An overview of the associated real-time and postflight batch data processing software approaches is presented. The use of hardware-in-the-loop simulation for independent verification and validation and mission planning and practice is discussed. Also included is a description of the flight-readiness review, the airworthiness and flight safety review, work scheduling, technical briefings, and preflight and postflight crew briefings. The configuration control process used on the X-29A program is described, and its relationship to both simulation and aircraft operations is discussed. An X-29A schedule overview is presented with an outline of a proposed follow-on program.

Sefic, W. J.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Crew Factors in Flight Operations X: Alertness Management in Flight Operations

In response to a 1980 congressional request, NASA Ames Research Center initiated a Fatigue/Jet Lag Program to examine fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption in aviation. Research has examined fatigue in a variety of flight environments using a range of measures (from self-report to performance to physiological). In 1991, the program evolved into the Fatigue Countermeasures Program, emphasizing the development and evaluation of strategies to maintain alertness and performance in operational settings. Over the years, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has become a collaborative partner in support of fatigue research and other Program activities. From the inception of the Program, a principal goal was to return the information learned from research and other Program activities to the operational community. The objectives of this Education and Training Module are to explain what has been learned about the physiological mechanisms that underlie fatigue, demonstrate the application of this information in flight operations, and offer some specific fatigue countermeasure recommendations. It is intended for all segments of the aeronautics industry, including pilots, flight attendants, managers, schedulers, safety and policy personnel, maintenance crews, and others involved in an operational environment that challenges human physiological capabilities because of fatigue, sleep loss, and circadian disruption.

Rosekind, Mark R.↗