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At least 145 records · Page 8

North Carolina Water Utility Builds Resilience with Distributed Energy Resources

As the frequency and duration of grid outages increase, backup power systems are becoming more important for ensuring that critical infrastructure continues to provide essential services. Most facilities rely on diesel generators, which may be ineffective during long outages owing to limited fuel supplies and high generator failure rates. Distributed energy resources such as solar, storage, and combined-heat-and-power systems, coupled with on-site biofuel production, offer an alternative source of on-site generation that can provide both cost savings and resilience (i.e., the ability to respond to catastrophic events with longer-term consequences). A mixed-integer linear program minimizes costs and maximizes resilience at a wastewater treatment plant in Wilmington, North Carolina. We find that the plant can reduce life-cycle energy costs by 3.1% through the installation of a hybrid combined-heat-and-power, photovoltaic, and storage system. When paired with existing diesel generators, this system can sustain full load for seven days while saving $664,000 over 25 years and reducing diesel fuel use by 48% compared with the diesel-only solution. This analysis informed a decision by the Cape Fear Public Utility Authority to allocate funds for the implementation of a combined-heat-and-power system at the wastewater treatment plant in fiscal year 2023. Finally, the benefits of deploying hybrid combined-heat-and-power technologies and the utilization of on-site biofuel production extend, on a national scale, to thousands of wastewater treatment facilities and other types of critical infrastructure.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Rapidly Viable Sustained Grid

Rapid recovery of power flow, possibly after a blackout, is a crucial need arising in scenarios that are increasingly becoming more frequent; here, solutions for rapid viability of power while the grid is being restored are urgently needed to keep critical infrastructure (CI) online. Increasingly, after the initial recovery phase, sustenance of reliable power requires assistive services to the grid for long periods of time. Even though the need is urgent, there is only sparse effort present toward a comprehensive framework/strategy for making power rapidly viable with an emphasis on sustained grid ancillary services; which is the focus of this proposal. The proposed concept envisions four phases. In the first phase, when a large portion of power is disrupted (see Figure 1(a)), emphasis is on bringing CI online with the objective of maximizing the time horizon of power viability using resources available at the CI. In the second phase (Figure 1(b)), neighborhood resources are tightly coordinated that forms the CI’s central-core (CC) to provide guaranteed viability of CI over a longer horizon. In the third phase, self-organizing power networks are expanded in a distributed layer supporting the central-core (Figure 1(c)). In the fourth phase, separate CI-networks coalesce and are controlled in a coordinated fashion to provide grid ancillary services (AS), such as primary frequency control and enhancing grid resiliency. With time, system efficiencies and penetration of renewables increase, while the time-horizon of guaranteed sustenance of CI is maximized. Under proposed work, the concept will be instantiated with a focus on medical centers as CI. Comprehensive power hardware in the loop strategies and emulated field tests will guide and validate devised solutions. A strong T2M effort to commercialize resulting technology is outlined. The proposed technology will be transformative for the grid. It will fundamentally change the way large contingencies are managed where power systems and critical infrastructure transition from being fragile to being robust using intelligent, self-organizing control for coordinating resources, enhanced resiliency and use of sustainable energy sources.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Advanced Computational Techniques for Improving Resilience of Critical Energy Infrastructure under Cyber-Physical Attacks

In this chapter, we present recent advances in improving the resilience of cyber-physical systems, especially with regards to energy systems. We provide discussions around various types of cyber-physical events that can cause disruptions and new advances in optimization, control, and reinforcement learning (RL) to deal with the challenges posed by such cyber-physical events. The presented methods range from distributed robust optimization, autonomous and coordinated control, reinforcement learning based resilient control and topology reconfiguration in Inter-System resilient control.

Nazir, Mohammad Nawaf [BATTELLE (PACIFIC NW LAB)]↗

Critical Energy Infrastructure Cybersecurity: Enhanced Cyber Resilience for Federal Energy Systems

This presentation is an overview of FEMP Resilient and Secure Infrastructure and Facilities. An educational and interactive workshop centered on resilient and secure federal infrastructure and facilities, with a focus on inverter-based resources at Federal sites, building automation systems, and Federal supply chains. This workshop will illustrate an all-hazards scenario and discuss how Federal agencies can be positioned to resist these real-world scenarios.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Towers: Critical Initial Infrastructure for the Moon, Such as a Power Module Support

Towers are an efficient structure commonly used to elevate systems against a gravity field, such as above the surface of a planet or the Moon. Towers can be used to elevate antennas, transmitters and sensors for communication, navigation, and observation infrastructure in support of surface operations. Near the Lunar poles, elevation of rotating solar panels enables nearly continuous panel illumination for solar power production despite the Sun remaining near the horizon year-round. Further, once technology is developed for tower assembly, this same technology can be extended to the assembly of a variety of structures including rocket blast containment shields, bridges, shelters, and habitats from either Earth-sourced or Lunar-sourced structural members. Environmental factors on the Lunar surface are vastly different than those found on Earth and have significant impact on the design of towers. Towers designed for the Lunar surface have no heritage nor Earth analog. The designs discussed herein are therefore breaking new ground creating a fundamentally new class of structures outside of current experience and intuition. The purpose of this paper is to: a) describe the unique environmental factors affecting tower design on the Lunar surface compared to Earth-based systems, b) evaluate two structural forms for the tower; telescoping tubes and an assembled truss, as well as c)provide recommendations on when each structural form is most suitable. A major contribution presented in the current paper is to provide parametric plots and supporting equations of mass and volume versus module power level and blanket height above the Lunar surface for the solar array application, to enable system level studies of optimum power module distribution and size. A secondary contribution are plots of the mass and volume of aluminum or structural glass required for assembled truss towers formed from Lunar derived structural members. An objective of achieving 1 MW of total power has been used to enable comparison of structural forms, because the total mass of solar arrays is consistent. It will be shown that for moderate module sizes, up to ~50 kW power modules, based on a telescoping tube tower have advantages, but for power modules from 50 kW to 200 kW an assembled truss tower can be created with half to one third of the tube tower mass. More significantly, when shipped from Earth, an assembled truss tower can be packed into 1/14th to 1/25th of the tube tower volume. Truss designs in the 100 kW to 200 kW range will be shown to be a favorable when assembled from either graphite-epoxy angles shipped from Earth or aluminum angles fabricated from Lunar materials. 50 kW towers are an attractive choice for both a telescoping or assembled tower with the solar arrays elevated 10 m above the Lunar surface, while increased solar array elevation favors 100 kW to 200 kW power modules.

assembly↗

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Quantitative approaches for including equity in risk and resilience infrastructure planning analyses

Risk and resilience assessments for critical infrastructure focus on myriad objectives, from natural hazard evaluations to optimizing investments. Although research has started to characterize externalities associated with current or possible future states, incorporation of equity priorities at project inception is increasingly being recognized as critical for planning related activities. However, there is no standard methodology that guides development of equity-informed quantitative approaches for infrastructure planning activities. Here, to address this gap, we introduce a logic model that can be tailored to capture nuances about specific geographies and community priorities, effectively incorporating them into different mathematical approaches for quantitative risk assessments. Specifically, the logic model uses a graded, iterative approach to clarify specific equity objectives as well as inform the development of equations being used to support analysis. We demonstrate the utility of this framework using case studies spanning aviation fuel, produced water, and microgrid electricity infrastructures. For each case study, the use of the logic model helps clarify the ways that local priorities and infrastructure needs are used to drive the types of data and quantitative methodologies used in the respective analyses. The explicit consideration of methodological limitations (e.g., data mismatches) and stakeholder engagements serves to increase the transparency of the associated findings as well as effectively integrate community nuances (e.g., ownership of assets) into infrastructure assessments. Such integration will become increasingly important to ensure that planning activities (which occur throughout the lifecycle of the infrastructure projects) lead to long-lasting solutions to meet both energy and sustainable development goals for communities.

community-based↗

Resilience assessment and planning in power distribution systems: Past and future considerations

High impact low probability (HILP) events such as hurricanes, heat waves, and floods have instigated widespread power outages and blackouts around the globe in the past decade. With the increasing challenges concerning the threats to the power distribution systems and the growing need to mitigate the impacts of the HILP events, resilience has become a crucial requirement for the power grid infrastructures. Numerous efforts have been made to define, measure, and characterize the resilience of power distribution systems. This study thoroughly reviews the state-of-the-art methods on the existing resilience evaluation framework and metrics. Here, the desirable characteristics of resilience metrics are highlighted, and the challenges associated with formulating, developing, and calculating such metrics are discussed. Next, we detail the state-of-the-art literature on planning solutions to ensure distribution system resilience. This paper aims to extract a deep insight into this challenging and critical research area and envision future opportunities that can guide the power distribution system operators/planners to formulate more effective mitigation strategies to enhance the resilience of power distribution systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Climate Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Planning for Idaho National Laboratory

Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) mission is to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear energy solutions, other clean energy options, and critical infrastructure. This INL’s Climate Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Plan (VARP) was developed to enable and sustain that mission while ensuring the viability of operations considering expected climate change impacts. The VARP was developed according to the narrative requirements from the “Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Planning Guidance, Version 1.2” document issued in February 2022. A prescribed process was used to identify mission-critical systems and components, determine historical and expected climate impacts, and develop resilient solutions. Experts from across INL, including operations staff, researchers, and climate scientists supplied input to the process. Analyses of climate modeling sources revealed that under scenarios of higher and lower greenhouse gas emissions (Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 4.5 and RCP 8.5), INL anticipates an increase in climate hazards, including drought, heat waves, wildfire, and precipitation. Increased frequency and duration of climatic hazards forecasts high impacts on certain mission-critical asset and infrastructure types. Utilizing the VARP Risk Assessment Tool, projected high climate hazard impacts across multiple asset and infrastructure types at the INL include energy generation and distribution systems, Site buildings, specialized or mission-critical equipment, and transportation and fleet infrastructure. Some of these mission-critical asset and infrastructure types maintain high adaptive capacity to climatic changes; however, others may need additional adaptive capacity to withstand increased frequency and duration of climate hazards. INL identified close to 300 resilient solutions that were consolidated into 11 solution categories to be tracked in the Department of Energy Sustainability Dashboard. The identified solutions are a starting point for future project development and analysis. These data are intended to inform decision makers on climate issues and potential solutions across INL and associated communities. The VARP is not intended to be a budget tool or project decision document on its own, but rather one of many tools used by decision makers to establish resilient priorities. This initial document provides the framework and foundation to resilient solutions. In the coming years, each solution needs to be fully developed, costed, and prioritized based on mission-critical risk and funding priorities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Toward Common Weakness Enumerations in Industrial Control Systems

Here, the storyline of MITRE’s common weakness enumeration framework illustrates how the security and privacy technical community can collaborate/cooperate with policy makers to advance policy, giving it specifics and filling gaps of technical knowledge to improve security and resilience of critical infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

CCE Phase 1: Consequence Prioritization

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) developed the Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) methodology to provide public and private organizations with steps to work collaboratively and establish a working relationship to protect critical infrastructure and other national assets. This process is a considerable undertaking, iterative in nature, and—as time and resources allow—should become a part of a company’s culture. By focusing on the impact of potentially negative Events, CCE provides a better understanding of how and why adversaries can affect critical functions and services using cyber-enabled sabotage. This document describes Phase 1 of the CCE process.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Deep Cyber-Physical Situational Awareness for Energy Systems: A Secure Foundation for Next-Generation Energy Management

This document provides the final report for the CYPRES project. The purpose is (1) to highlight and summarize its major accomplishments and (2) to provide guidance on how its outcomes have informed and can inform important additional research and technology transfer. The goal of CYPRES was the research, development, and demonstration of a security-oriented next generation cyber-physical EMS for electric power systems that detects malicious and abnormal events through the fusion of cyber and physical data. To achieve this, the CYPRES project team researched, developed, and built a prototype of the solution, referred to as the CYPRES EMS. The CYPRES EMS is a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that demonstrates the management of the energy system, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. As part of the capabilities of the CYPRES EMS, the team designed and developed a suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control that are inherently cyberaware. At its core, the project aimed to research, develop, and demonstrate a security-oriented next-generation cyber-physical Energy Management System (EMS) capable of detecting malicious and abnormal events through the innovative fusion of cyber and physical data. This approach represents a fundamental shift from traditional EMS, reimagining how critical infrastructure can be protected through unified cyber-aware and physics-aware secure data flow pipelines. The project’s cornerstone deliverable, the CYPRES EMS, serves as a proof-of-concept cyber-physical platform that revolutionizes the management of energy systems, communications, security, and cyber-physical grid modeling and analytics. This prototype implements a comprehensive suite of power system applications for monitoring, risk analyses, detection, and control, all designed with inherent cyber awareness. The system’s architecture extends from end-devices in the field through to control center applications, establishing a secure and resilient control framework that addresses the challenges posed by diverse devices of unknown trustworthiness connecting to modern power systems. Through this innovative approach to deep cyber-physical situational awareness, the CYPRES project not only advances the state-of-the-art in energy infrastructure protection but also establishes a new paradigm for how EMS can be designed, deployed, and operated in an increasingly complex threat landscape. The findings and developments from this project provide crucial insights for stakeholders across the energy sector, offering a blueprint for enhancing the reliability and resilience of our nation’s critical energy infrastructure in the face of evolving cyber threats.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Consequence Based Framework for Deployment of Cloud Solutions in the Digital Energy Transition

This study proposes a framework for evaluating cloud computing deployment in the electric sector, focusing on the digital transition of energy systems. It assesses the implications of cloud technology adoption, particularly in terms of security, operational resilience, and efficiency. The paper introduces a method for consequence-driven risk analysis, enabling utilities to prioritize and mitigate potential threats effectively. It also discusses the shared responsibility model in cloud computing, highlighting the need for collaborative security efforts. The research aims to provide utilities with a strategic assessment tool for cloud adoption, emphasizing the importance of security culture in enhancing cloud computing's role in critical infrastructure.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance: Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS), Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Modeling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system performance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example usecases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance, Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis (Version 3, July 2023)

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Mod eling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system per formance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example use cases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Improving Resiliency in Planning MW-Scale Medium and Heavy Duty EV Charging Stations Considering TSCOTS Optimization

Electrification of heavy-duty (HD) vehicles marks an important milestone and technical challenge in the electric vehicle (EV) industry and the public grid. However, implementing EV charging at this scale will necessitate that traditional truck stops be updated with EV charging infrastructure that could represent 10's of MW in electricity consumption. Furthermore, as the transportation sector is represented as critical infrastructure, supporting resiliency considerations in EV charging infrastructure will be critical. This paper proposes an optimization-based approach for optimally designing a MW-scale microgrid charging network. This approach transforms conventional designed truck stops into a reliable HDEV charging stations capable of overnight slow charging and 30-minute to 1 hour fast charging. Using a mixed-integer linear program formulation blending capacity planning and reliability constraints, an optimal network configuration can be solved for a proposed EV charging station that includes photovoltaic and battery energy storage capabilities.

Ponce, Moises [University of Tennessee, Knoxville ↗

Resilience Analytics for Interdependent Power and Water Distribution Systems

The occurrence of large-scale outages in power distribution systems (PDSs) caused, for instance, by extreme weather events has raised concerns on the cascading impact of the power outages on the resilience of other critical infrastructures, including water distribution systems (WDSs), whose healthy operation highly relies on the availability of power from PDSs. Here, this paper proposes an analytics model for quantifying the interdependence between the resilience of power and water distribution systems. The proposed model first performs spatio-temporal outage analysis on the PDS and WDS to determine the PDS power serving capability and the resulting cascading impact on the WDS water serving capability during the occurrence of disruptions. The resilience interdependence is then determined by a proposed set of six metrics calculated using the power and water serving capability profiles, which trace and quantify the cascading impacts of power outages in the operation of WDSs during the degradation and recovery stages. The proposed analytics model is implemented on the IEEE 33-bus power distribution system supplying power for pumping stations of a 15-node test WDS, considering multiple cases of water storage capacity, single and multiple outage scenarios, and availability of distributed generation. The numerical results demonstrate that the proposed metrics track the temporal and spatial interdependence between the resilience of power and water distribution systems, providing a mechanism to identify weak spots, and assess options to enhance the resilience of the critical water infrastructure.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗