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Current proposed work is: See if the inherent security that comes with Named Networking (NDN) can be applied to Industrial Control Systems; and, Every packet is required to be cryptographically signed which makes every single piece of data communicated in the system secure and authenticated.
The rapid evolution of electric vehicle (EV) technology and the corresponding growth of the Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI) brings to light significant cybersecurity concerns, notably in the context of emerging post-quantum computing capabilities. This report, prepared by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) under the U.S. Department of Energy contract, delves into the challenges associated with integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) into EVCI to safeguard against potential quantum computing threats. Post-quantum computers will eventually be able to invalidate technologies secured through public key cryptography. As part of this effort, the primary gaps and challenges in the EVCI were investigated with a focus on comparing traditional algorithms against PQC algorithms. One of the notable findings was that the P-521 algorithm was frequently surpassed in performance by PQC algorithms. This document provides a thorough examination of the hurdles the industry can expect when transitioning to PQC within the EVCI, such as interoperability concerns, the computational and memory demands of PQC algorithms, and the organizational readiness for such a transition. It emphasizes the necessity of a forward-thinking approach to cybersecurity, advocating for early and strategic engagement among EVCI stakeholders to ensure a seamless and cost-effective migration to quantum-resistant cryptographic standards. Through this report, the authors aim to catalyze awareness and action among policymakers, industry leaders, and cybersecurity professionals towards fortifying the EVCI against emerging quantum threats, thereby securing the infrastructure essential for the future of electric mobility.
Protocols play an essential role in Advance Reactor systems. A diverse set of protocols are available to these reactors. Advanced Reactors benefit from technologies that can minimize their resource utilization and costs. Evaluation frameworks are often used when assessing protocols and processes related to cryptographic security systems. The following report discusses the various characteristics associated with these protocol evaluation frameworks, and derives a novel evaluative framework.
In the dynamic landscape of Operational Technology (OT), and specifically the emerging landscape for Advanced Reactors, the establishment of trust between digital assets emerges as a challenge for cybersecurity modernization. This report reviews existing approaches to authentication in Enterprise environments, and proposed methods for authentication in OT, and analyzes each for its applicability to future Advanced Reactor digital networks. Principles of authentication ranging from underlying cryptographic mechanisms to trust authorities are evaluated through the lens of OT. These facets emphasize the importance of mutual authentication in real-time environments, enabling a paradigm shift from the current approach of strong boundaries to a more malleable network that allows for flexible operation. This work finds that there is a need for evaluation and decision making by industry stakeholders, but current technologies and approaches can be adapted to fit needs and risk tolerances.
The Synchronic Web is a distributed network for securing data provenance on the World Wide Web. By enabling clients around the world to freely commit digital information into a single shared view of history, it provides a foundational basis of truth on which to build decentralized and scalable trust across the Internet. Its core cryptographical capability allows mutually distrusting parties to create and verify statements of the following form: “I commit to this information—and only this information—at this moment in time.” The backbone of the Synchronic Web infrastructure is a simple, small, and semantic-free blockchain that is accessible to any Internet-enabled entity. The infrastructure is maintained by a permissioned network of well-known servers, called notaries, and accessed by a permissionless group of clients, called journals. Through an evolving stack of flexible and composable semantic specifications, the parties cooperate to generate synchronic commitments over arbitrary data. When integrated with existing infrastructures, adapted to diverse domains, and scaled across the breadth of cyberspace, the Synchronic Web provides a ubiquitous mechanism to lock the world’s data into unique points in discrete time and digital space. This document provides a technical description of the core Synchronic Web system. The distinguishing innovation in our design—and the enabling mechanism behind the model—is the novel use of verifiable maps to place authenticated content into canonically defined locations off-chain. While concrete specifications and software implementations of the Synchronic Web continue to evolve, the information covered in the body of this document should remain stable. We aim to present this information clearly and concisely for technical non-experts to understand the essential functionality and value proposition of the network. In the interest of promoting discourse, we take some liberty in projecting the potential implications of the new model.
For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.
For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.
Smart grid technologies have rapidly become one of the largest and most comprehensive sources of data for the modern utility. For the most part, data streams are seen as an essential tool that enable utilities to carry their day-to-day business operations, but they also create the need for efficient and secure data management strategies. In the context of the smart grid, ensuring data privacy is becoming an increasing concern due to a combination of factors that range from shifts in operational paradigms and rapid technology evolution to changes in legislation. Furthermore, researchers have highlighted the risks associated with improperly protected energy records. For example, energy consumption data from homes could be used to infer the behaviors and habits of home occupants through activity recognition or user profiling (Fan, 2017), which may lead to unfair service pricing, targeted advertising, or other personal security violations. Similarly, Electric Vehicles’ (EVs) charging metadata could be used to reveal private information about the owner such as their payment methods, preferred charging stations, and other locational and timing information that could be used to reconstruct the vehicle owner’s behaviors. The privacy of user data, even when used for statistical analysis or machine learning training processes, also needs to be carefully considered, as an individual’s private traits may still be vulnerable if their inclusion/exclusion greatly impacts the result or could be linked to a public dataset through cross-reference. The breach of user privacy also has severe impacts for organizations that store, transmit, or work on the data in the form of diminishing the public’s trust in them while potentially incurring legal consequences (e.g., fines and suspensions under the European Union General Data Protection Regulation, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, etc.). Because of these risks, several privacy-preserving mechanisms are available to help organizations comply with privacy legislations and prevent the unauthorized and malicious use of user data. In light of these concerns, this report focuses on performing a computational review of privacy-preserving mechanisms that have received a significant amount of interest in literature. It specifically focuses on 1) homomorphic encryption, 2) zero-knowledge proofs, 3) differential privacy, and 4) federated learning. It is worth noting that although many of the methods presented in this document rely on cryptographic primitives, their intent is not to provide perfect secrecy, but rather to enable users to maintain privacy, and thus they shall not be compared or equated to other constructs that are aimed to address cybersecurity constructs.
This paper provides descriptions of the key components of different distributed ledger technology platforms. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) allows for distribution of databases among different organizations and devices. The platforms use cryptographically linked “blocks” to store and verify transactional information between these organizations. DLT increases data security, data integrity, trust among its participants. Different organizations are looking to deploy this distributed and decentralized approach to avoid the single-point-of-failure vulnerabilities associated with centralized data repositories. In this study we examine twelve different DLT platforms. There is agreement within the community that of all the platforms considered here, Hyperledger and Ethereum are the most mature when it comes to privacy and permissions. These DLT platforms are being used for applications such as transactive energy, health care, and the food and goods supply chain. However, further development is required to realize the full promise of DLT. Our assessment includes a general description of each DLT and its key characteristics. Such characteristics include consensus protocol and cryptography used, public vs. private, and permissioned or permissionless. The selection and implementation of a DLT architecture depends heavily on the use case and performance requirements. During this research we found key parameters to measure performance and existing tools for assessment. Four different parameters were identified 1) consensus, 2) throughput, 3) latency, and 4) scalability. The architectures of Hyperledger Caliper and Blockbench are described as different performance assessment frameworks. From this preliminary study it is evident that there are dissimilarities on the performance assessments methods developers and users are characterizing DLT architectures. The purpose of this paper is to identify key parameters to test performance, tools that are being used and provide information on results from previous studies.
As search, social media, and artificial intelligence continue to reshape collective knowledge, the preservation of trust on the public infosphere has become a defining challenge of our time. Given the breadth and versatility of adversarial threats, the best—and perhaps only—defense is an equally broad and versatile infrastructure for digital identity. This document discusses the opportunities and implications of building such an infrastructure from the perspective of a national laboratory. The technical foundation for this discussion is the emergence of the Synchronic Web, a Sandia-developed infrastructure for asserting cryptographic provenance at Internet scale. As of the writing of this document, there is ongoing work to develop the underlying technology and apply it to multiple mission-specific domains within Sandia. The primary objective of this document to extend the body of existing work toward the more public-facing domain of digital identity. Our approach depends on a non-standard, but philosophically defensible notion of identity: digital identity is an unbroken sequence of states in a well-defined digital space. From this foundation, we abstractly describe the infrastructural foundations and applied configurations that we expect to underpin future notions of digital identity.
Cryptography with quantum states exhibits a number of surprising and counterintuitive features. In a 2002 work, Barnum et al. argue that these features imply that digital signatures for quantum states are impossible (Barnum et al., FOCS 2002). In this work, we ask: can all forms of signing quantum data, even in a possibly weak sense, be completely ruled out? We give two results which shed significant light on this basic question. First, we prove an impossibility result for digital signatures for quantum data, which extends the result of Barnum et al. Specifically, we show that no nontrivial combination of correctness and security requirements can be fulfilled, beyond what is achievable simply by measuring the quantum message and then signing the outcome. In other words, only classical signature schemes exist. We then show a positive result: a quantum state can be signed with the same security guarantees as classically, provided that it is also encrypted with the public key of the intended recipient. Following classical nomenclature, we call this notion quantum signcryption. Classically, signcryption is only interesting if it provides superior performance to encrypt-then-sign. Quantumly, it is far more interesting: it is the only signing method available. We develop "as-strong-as-classical" security definitions for quantum signcryption and give secure constructions based on post-quantum public-key primitives. Along the way, we show that a natural hybrid method of combining classical and quantum schemes can be used to "upgrade" a secure classical scheme to the fully-quantum setting, in a wide range of cryptographic settings including signcryption, authenticated encryption, and CCA security.
One of the primary objectives in the field of quantum state learning is to develop algorithms that are time-efficient for learning states generated from quantum circuits. Earlier investigations have demonstrated time-efficient algorithms for states generated from Clifford circuits with at most log ⁡ ( n ) non-Clifford gates. However, these algorithms necessitate multi-copy measurements, posing implementation challenges in the near term due to the requisite quantum memory. On the contrary, using solely single-qubit measurements in the computational basis is insufficient in learning even the output distribution of a Clifford circuit with one additional T gate under reasonable post-quantum cryptographic assumptions. In this work, we introduce an efficient quantum algorithm that employs only nonadaptive single-copy measurement to learn states produced by Clifford circuits with a maximum of O ( log ⁡ n ) non-Clifford gates, filling a gap between the previous positive and negative results.
Guesswork is an information–theoretic quantity which can be seen as an alternate security criterion to entropy. Recent work has established the theoretical framework for guesswork in the presence of quantum side information, which we extend both theoretically and experimentally. We consider guesswork when the side information consists of the BB84 states and their higher-dimensional generalizations. With this side information, we compute the guesswork for two different scenarios for each dimension. We then performed a proof-of-principle experiment using Laguerre–Gauss modes to experimentally compute the guesswork for higher-dimensional generalizations of the BB84 states. We find that our experimental results agree closely with our theoretical predictions. This work shows that guesswork can be a viable security criterion in cryptographic tasks and is experimentally accessible in a number of optical setups.
Characterizing the entanglement structure of ground states of local Hamiltonians is a fundamental problem in quantum information. In this work we study the computational complexity of this problem, given the Hamiltonian as input. Our main result is that to show it is cryptographically hard to determine if the ground state of a geometrically local, polynomially gapped Hamiltonian on qudits (d=O(1)) has near-area law vs near-volume law entanglement. This improves prior work of Bouland et al. (arXiv:2311.12017) showing this for non-geometrically local Hamiltonians. In particular we show this problem is roughly factoring-hard in 1D, and LWE-hard in 2D. Our proof works by constructing a novel form of public-key pseudo-entanglement which is highly space-efficient, and combining this with a modification of Gottesman and Irani's quantum Turing machine to Hamiltonian construction. Our work suggests that the problem of learning so-called "gapless" quantum phases of matter might be intractable.
Overview: Anonymized job-level records from the Kestrel HPC system at the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR). Each record represents a Slurm batch job with scheduling metadata, resource requests, utilization, energy estimates, and efficiency metrics. Sensitive fields (user, account, job name, submit line, working directory, submit script, and job type) are replaced with 7-character cryptographic hashes. System & Timeframe: Kestrel is located at the NLR campus. Standard compute nodes have 104 cores and 256 GB RAM; bigmem nodes have 2,000 GB. GPU nodes (gpu-h100 partition) use NVIDIA H100 GPUs. Data covers jobs submitted August 2023 through December 2025. Funding provided by the U.S. Department of Energy, EERE. Files: esif.hpc.kestrel.job-anon.zip — Anonymized job records (Hive-partitioned Parquet) datacard.md — Full dataset documentation ~11 million rows, 50 variables. Readable with PyArrow, pandas, DuckDB, Apache Spark, or any Parquet-compatible tool. Data Collection: Jobs collected via sacct with timezone-aware export (SLURM_TIME_FORMAT="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S%z"), loaded into PostgreSQL. Calculated columns updated via database triggers and batch functions. All timestamps use timestamptz and correctly handle DST transitions. Preprocessing: Anonymization of name, user, account, submit_line, work_dir, submit_script, and job_type via 7-char hex hashes Derived columns: queue_wait, cpu_eff, max/min/avg_mem_eff, energy estimates Simplified job state mapping (e.g., "CANCELLED by 132357" → "CANCELLED") Boolean flags: python_job, reframe_job Temporal decomposition: year, month, day, day_of_week, hour, minute from submit_time Shared node tracking: shared_job_count, nodes_shared, jobs_shared Key Variables: Scheduling: job_id, partition, state_simple, submit_time, start_time, end_time, queue_wait Resources: nodes_req/used, processors_req/used, memory_req, wallclock_req/used, gpus_requested Efficiency: cpu_eff, max/min/avg_mem_eff Energy: cpu_energy_tdp_estimated_max/used_watt_hours, consumed_energy_raw_joules, consumed_energy_raw_watt_hours Sharing: shared_job_count, nodes_shared, jobs_shared Partitions: short, standard, debug, gpu-h100 Job States: CANCELLED, COMPLETED, FAILED, PENDING, RUNNING QoS Levels: normal, high Important Notes: Timestamps include timezone offsets; DST transitions are handled correctly, though adding intervals across DST boundaries requires offset adjustment shared_job_count reflects physical node co-residency, not use of the shared partition Job step records and raw Slurm JSONB fields are excluded Do not attempt to re-identify individuals from hashed fields
Finite field arithmetic logic is central in the implementation of Reed-Solomon coders and in some cryptographic algorithms. There is a need for good multiplication and inversion algorithms that are easily realized on VLSI chips. Massey and Omura recently developed a new multiplication algorithm for Galois fields based on a normal basis representation. A pipeline structure is developed to realize the Massey-Omura multiplier in the finite field GF(2m). With the simple squaring property of the normal-basis representation used together with this multiplier, a pipeline architecture is also developed for computing inverse elements in GF(2m). The designs developed for the Massey-Omura multiplier and the computation of inverse elements are regular, simple, expandable and, therefore, naturally suitable for VLSI implementation.
Multipliers based on new algorithm for Galois-field (GF) arithmetic regular and expandable. Pipeline structures used for computing both multiplications and inverses. Designs suitable for implementation in very-large-scale integrated (VLSI) circuits. This general type of inverter and multiplier architecture especially useful in performing finite-field arithmetic of Reed-Solomon error-correcting codes and of some cryptographic algorithms.
Finite field arithmetic logic is central in the implementation of Reed-Solomon coders and in some cryptographic algorithms. There is a need for good multiplication and inversion algorithms that are easily realized on VLSI chips. Massey and Omura recently developed a new multiplication algorithm for Galois fields based on a normal basis representation. A pipeline structure is developed to realize the Massey-Omura multiplier in the finite field GF(2m). With the simple squaring property of the normal-basis representation used together with this multiplier, a pipeline architecture is also developed for computing inverse elements in GF(2m). The designs developed for the Massey-Omura multiplier and the computation of inverse elements are regular, simple, expandable and, therefore, naturally suitable for VLSI implementation.