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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Employing a Hardware-in-the-Loop Approach to Realize a Fully Homomorphic Controller for a Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor

This paper addresses the cybersecurity challenges of advanced nuclear reactors by integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) into their control systems, enabling encrypted processing of control signals without compromising functionality. Advanced nuclear reactors, including Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and microreactors, aim to achieve autonomous and remote operations, reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness. However, these advancements expand the attack surface for cyberattacks, particularly in autonomous and remote operation scenarios. Cyberattacks can exploit vulnerabilities to manipulate physical processes, causing shutdowns, asset damage, or public harm. Such attacks begin with passive reconnaissance, where adversaries intercept communications or observe behaviors to gather information, which is then leveraged to execute cyber-physical attacks by injecting malicious commands. Nuclear power must adopt cybersecurity protection measures to secure the integrity and availability of their digital control systems. This paper demonstrates the application of FHE to secure operations by enabling encrypted processing of sensitive signals and parameters -- ensuring privacy without exposing data. FHE supports secure mathematical operations on encrypted data without requiring decryption. Using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) approach, this paper implements an FHE-integrated controller on a BeagleBone Black (BBB) controlling a simulation of the Small Modular Advanced High Temperature Reactor (SmAHTR). By doing so, the encrypted controller protects the integrity of critical set points and control signals during transmission and processing. Thus, FHE-integrated controllers enhance secure operations of advanced nuclear reactors while maintaining functionality.

control systems↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber and Physical Security Analysis of GSI and Noventum Application for IoT Communications

We present our findings of the red team exercise conducted on the device and application developed by Guardian Sensors, Inc. (GSI) and Noventum. The app is used for situational awareness and control of photovoltaics (PV) and microgrid energy systems. The assessments performed are practical case scenarios that assess the risks and vulnerabilities posed by the app through targeted activities that could be engaged by an adversary. The assessment team’s results and recommendations are provided to inform on and mitigate the identified weaknesses to improve secure user authentication, connections, and communications. The recommendations in this report are not intended to be a security panacea but will add the desired defense-in-depth layer to securing communication of such interconnected systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cyber Secure Sensor Network for Fossil Fuel Power Generation Assets Monitoring

The energy sector is undergoing digital transformation which is to say more and more power generation assets have become automated and connected to the internet. The connected sensors can tap into plants to monitor the health of assets and manage fleets remotely. These are just some of the benefits digitalization is bringing to the power industry. Within a power plant, control systems are no longer concerned with one system or one piece of equipment, but rather whole fleet of assets inter-connected with smart sensors which have the function of continuously monitoring and transmitting real-time operational data to operators. These connected systems will form a part of the industrial internet of things (IIoT). The big data scenarios provide benefits of performing system prognostics and optimization which is a key selling point of power plant digitalization.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cyber-Attack Detection for Photovoltaic Farms Based on Power-Electronics-Enabled Harmonic State Space Modeling

Here in this paper, a physics-data-based detection method is proposed to detect a variety of cyber-attacks in Photovoltaic (PV) farms using the power electronics-enabled harmonic state space (HSS) models, which, to our knowledge, is original. At the device level, HSS-based detection is developed to monitor harmonic vectors of individual PV converter with minimum sensor measurements, thus improving accuracy and robustness compared to Kalman Filter-based detection. At the system level that involves multiple PV converters, a clustering approach is developed to investigate attack propagation and accurately locate attack sources within a PV farm. The proposed approach is one of the first attempts to address PV security through interaction between the device and system, maximizing the accuracy and robustness at different levels. To verify the feasibility, a comprehensive attacks model is built, including single attack, coordinated attacks, and replay attacks. Besides, the impacts of irradiance changes are taken into consideration in the test scenarios. With the real-time data acquisition and hardware-in-the-loop testbed, comprehensive test results are provided to verify the feasibility of the proposed detection methodology.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Impact of Open Communication Networks on Load Frequency Control with Plug-In Electric Vehicles by Cyber-Physical Dynamic Co-Simulation

With the increasing electrification of the transportation sector to achieve the carbon neutrality objective, despite the challenges of charging electric vehicles (EV), there are also opportunities through smart charging EVs to improve system frequency stability; however, EV control technologies might require nontraditional communication support. This paper investigates the impacts of communication variations of EV on power system load frequency control through a cyber-physical dynamic system (CPDS) co-simulation. Here, the CPDS is built upon our previously developed transmission-and-distribution dynamic co-simulation model with the added communication variation functions (i.e., delay and packet loss). The case studies consider multiple communication variation scenarios when the system experiences an N-1 generation trip contingency. The scenarios include communication delays and packet loss using both homogeneous and heterogeneous assumptions. The outcomes of this work can help improve EV frequency regulation services and provide robust and effective tests for different load frequency control algorithms of the future power systems.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,ENERGY PLANNING, POLIC↗
DOE OSTI2025

ResDesign: Resilient by Design Platform for CPS Assessment and Validation

ResDesign project has developed integrated capabilities to help cyber physical system modelers and analysts to evaluate vulnerabilities and resilience of such systems using co-simulation-based attack testbed, graph-based visualization and monitoring tool, and Bayesian optimization-based co-design capability. The project demonstrates a collection of attack scenarios and use cases in an integrated software environment.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2026

The NREL Sensor Laboratory Detection of Hydrogen Emissions

The development of a functional hydrogen detection system is a multifaceted process that integrates hardware, deployments strategies, and analytics which can be supported by the NREL Sensor Laboratory: 1. Support of the design, validation and optimization of sensing prototypes; 2. Guide optimized sensing element development, including control electronics; 3. Laboratory testing to validate/optimize metrological performance (measurement range, detection limit, etc.); 4. Provide test sites for field deployments representative of real-world scenarios with controlled hydrogen releases; 5. Develop sensor placement and operation guidance; 6. Provide guidance on electronics to accommodate facility integration; 7. Electrical safety designs to allow for operation within restricted zones; 8. Integration into facility monitoring and control systems; 9. Guide incorporation of cyber security elements to protect facilities from malicious attacks; 10. Modeling and application of advanced analytics to detect and quantify emissions; 11. Higher Order dispersion models to guide sensor placement for reliable detection; 12. Advanced analytics for improved metrological performances, and to inform inverse modeling; 13. Market support and commercialization (national and international markets); 14. Commercial deployments in H2@SCALE markets (e.g., HUBs and other large-scale hydrogen markets); and 15. Leverage off international collaborations/partnerships (e.g., NREL is on the advisory board for the European initiative "pre-Normative Research on Hydrogen Releases Assessment"-NHyRA).

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Advancing Cyber-Attack Detection in Power Systems: A Comparative Study of Machine Learning and Graph Neural Network Approaches

This paper explores the detection and localization of cyber-attacks on power systems, focusing on comparing conventional machine learning (ML) and deep learning methods, and graph neural network (GNN)-based techniques. We assess the detection accuracy of these approaches and their potential to pinpoint the locations of specific buses under attack. Given the demonstrated success of GNNs in other time series anomaly detection applications, we aim to evaluate their performance within the context of power systems cyber-attack. Utilizing the IEEE 68-bus system, we simulated four types of attacks to test the selected approaches. Our results indicate that GNN-based methods outperform conventional machine learning and deep learning models in detection. Additionally, GNNs show promise in accurately localizing attacks for simple scenarios, although they still face challenges in more complex cases.

artificial intelligence↗
DOE OSTI2026

Voltage Service Limits Smart Contract Using Distributed Ledger Technology for Electrical Utility Grid with Customer-Owned Generator

Modern electrical grids face growing stability risks from customer-owned generators, especially at points of common couplings (PCCs). Disruptive behavior from power-electronic sources can cause protective relays to isolate problematic generators, making measurement integrity critical. This article presents a distributed ledger technology (DLT) approach that uses smart contracts to evaluate PCC voltage measurements and trigger backup breaker operations. The approach is framed as a verifiable, multi-organization attestation and audit layer, not as a real-time control security mechanism. In the proposed architecture, voltage measurements from a hardware protective relay are anchored on a DLT through the Cyber Grid Guard (CGG) system for attestation by both the grid utility and customer-owned generator. A Voltage Service Limits (VSLs) smart contract evaluates the on-chain measurements against allowable phase-voltage limits derived from the ANSI C84.1 standard. The framework is validated in a hardware-relay-in-the-loop test bed under sustained-undervoltage, sustained-overvoltage, and transient line-to-line fault scenarios. The results show that the VSL smart contract can process these measurements and issue backup breaker actions consistent with the defined service-limit criteria, demonstrating the DLT potential as a verifiable audit layer at the PCC that complements primary protection.

cyber security↗
DOE OSTI2022

Systems and methods for detecting and mitigating cyber attacks on power systems comprising distributed energy resources

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cybersecurity attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and the generation-load balance. Investigations of the impact to the power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary show that each grid-support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The invention provides methods for minimizing the risks to distribution and transmission systems using an engineered control system which detects and mitigates unsafe control commands.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Systems and methods for detecting and mitigating cyber attacks on power systems comprising distributed energy resources

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cybersecurity attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and the generation-load balance. Investigations of the impact to the power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary show that each grid-support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The invention provides methods for minimizing the risks to distribution and transmission systems using an engineered control system which detects and mitigates unsafe control commands.

Johnson, Jay Tillay↗
DOE OSTI2025

Edge ML for CAN bus intrusion detection in AVs

Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are revolutionizing transportation, but their reliance on interconnected cyber-physical systems exposes them to unprecedented cybersecurity risks. This study addresses the critical challenge of detecting real-time cyber intrusions in self-driving vehicles by leveraging a dataset from the Udacity self-driving car project. We simulate four high-impact attack vectors, Denial of Service (DoS), spoofing, replay, and fuzzy attacks, by injecting noise into spatial features (e.g., bounding box coordinates) to replicate adversarial scenarios. We develop and evaluate two lightweight neural network architectures (NN-1 and NN-2) alongside a logistic regression baseline (LG-1) for intrusion detection. The models achieve exceptional performance, with NN-2 attaining an AUC score of 93.15% and 93.15% accuracy, demonstrating their suitability for edge deployment in AV environments. Through explainable AI techniques, we uncover unique forensic fingerprints of each attack type, such as spatial corruption in fuzzy attacks and temporal anomalies in replay attacks, offering actionable insights for feature engineering and proactive defense. Visual analytics, including confusion matrices, ROC curves, and feature importance plots, validate the models' robustness and interpretability. This research sets a new benchmark for AV cybersecurity, delivering a scalable, field-ready toolkit for Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and policymakers. By aligning intrusion fingerprints with SAE J3061 automotive security standards, we provide a pathway for integrating machine learning into safety-critical AV systems. Our findings underscore the urgent need for security-by-design AI, ensuring that AVs not only drive autonomously but also defend autonomously. This work bridges the gap between theoretical cybersecurity and life-preserving engineering, offering a leap toward safer, more secure autonomous transportation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Utility-Scale Operational Consequences for Solar Grid Services

This report delves into the critical aspects of grid services provided by solar inverter-based resources (IBRs), with an emphasis on the evolving landscape of microgrids, virtual power plants (VPPs), aggregators, and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). As the energy sector undergoes a transformative shift towards more decentralized and resilient grid architectures, understanding the multifaceted risks associated with these technologies becomes paramount. The report categorizes these risks into organizational, technical, and procedural domains, providing a thorough risk assessment framework that stakeholders can utilize to anticipate and mitigate potential issues. In addressing the increasing complexity of grid interconnections, the report highlights the importance of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). By embedding engineering controls and cybersecurity measures into the early stages of system design, this approach aims to fortify grid infrastructure against emerging cyber threats. The analysis includes an exploration of best practices and strategies for integrating CIE principles to enhance grid security and resilience. To provide practical insights, the report conducts a detailed consequence analysis of various grid services and cyber mitigations that can be applied through the interconnection process. This analysis evaluates the potential impacts of different failure modes and vulnerabilities, offering a clear understanding of the consequences that could arise from disruptions within the energy grid. The findings are further enriched by a series of case studies that illustrate real-world scenarios and lessons learned from past incidents. Through this comprehensive examination of grid services and their criticality, the report aims to prepare industry professionals with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate the complexities of modern energy systems. By providing a comprehensive approach that includes risk assessment, cybersecurity, and consequence analysis, solar stakeholders can more effectively guarantee the reliability, efficiency, and security of the energy grid.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Decentralised Reinforcement Learning for Dynamic Cyberattack Response in Microgrid Networks

Microgrids rely on communication networks for reliable operation, which makes them inherently vulnerable to cyberattacks. Such attacks can destabilise system dynamics and drive states away from their nominal operating trajectories. Although several physics-informed and machine learning-based strategies have been developed to counter these threats, the rapidly evolving cyber landscape enables adversaries to bypass static defences or rules-based mitigation approaches. This paper proposes a dynamic, online-trained and fully decentralised reinforcement learning (RL)-based cyberattack response framework to protect microgrids from evolving cyberattacks. The proposed framework deploys multiple deep Q-networks (DQNs), each associated with a distributed energy resource (DER), to enable localised and adaptive attack mitigation. In this framework, each DQN processes local voltage and frequency measurements—combined with intrusion detection system (IDS) alerts—as observations and rewards to guide decision-making. Extensive simulation studies demonstrate the robustness of the proposed framework under diverse attack scenarios and varying IDS-induced detection delays. Comparative analysis highlights its superiority over existing static or preexisting rules-based mitigation approaches. Finally, we present an analysis that shows the framework's scalability to real-life microgrids with more interacting agents.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

IViz-OT (Intrusion Detection Visualizer for Operational Technology Network) [SWR-22-63]

The Visualizer dashboard provides grid operator highly-trusted alarming environment for an ongoing or potential cyber-attack based on system anomalies and network-based verification. Once anomalies are detected by the IDS tool (HIDES, NREL SWR-19-65), this platform stores the signatures or alert logs that are generated by the intrusion detector, lays out the detailed summary of the possible alerts, and maps these attacks with high-level scenarios. These scenarios are later combined to define a final event using a decision tree approach and a final report is generated out of this tool for further forensic analysis. It also supports authentication and authorization to support roles-based access control (RBAC) for users and a group of people.

Singh, Vivek Kumar↗
DOE OSTI2024

Isolating Signatures of Cyberattacks under Stressed Grid Conditions

In a controlled cyber-physical network, such as a power grid, any malicious data injection in the sensor measurements can lead to widespread impact due to the actions of the closed-loop controllers. While fast identification of the attack signatures is imperative for reliable operations, it is challenging to do so in a large dynamical network with tightly coupled nodes. A particularly challenging scenario arises when the cyberattacks are strategically launched during a grid stress condition, caused by non-malicious physical disturbances.

Ghosh, Sanchita [BATTELLE (PACIFIC NW LAB)]↗
DOE OSTI2020

Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 1 of 2 – Using a Cloud Solution to Compress the Timely Detection Model

The design and implementation of new security technologies must account for numerous and complex operational challenges. For example, traditionally isolated systems must now survive amid the proliferation of network connectivity and endure the dynamic environments created by organizations tolerating bring-your-own-device policies. When evaluating the cyber, physical, or cyber-physical security of an asset, a common practice in the security industry is to apply the Timely Detection Model (TDM)—a versatile concept that relates the security functions of detection, delay, and response to the progression of an oppositional force’s attack timeline. If implemented correctly, security enhancements can compress the TDM to offer efficiencies to the stakeholders responsible for adjudicating threat scenarios. The efficiencies gained by the response force allow for more effective protection strategies to be realized. One such enhancement, deployed within the radiological security domain—the Sentry-Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS)—is a stand-alone security system that detects, assesses, and communicates priority alarms as a means of thwarting internal and external threats. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform—an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS—is being developed to facilitate more efficient alarm adjudication by site stakeholders and, if necessary, a faster response by law enforcement. This Cloud-hosted platform receives protected information from deployed Sentry-RMS units and relays it to stakeholders that have vested interests in maintaining an elevated level of situational awareness. Operationally, this enables real-time delivery of high-priority alarm and video imagery directly to an identified response stakeholder, such as local law enforcement or site management, via natively developed mobile applications or full platform integration. The Sentry-SECURE platform, as implemented by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Radiological Security, is an example of an innovative security technology that compresses the TDM by (1) enabling a more efficient time to target and (2) better informing a response force’s predetermined tactics, techniques, and procedures. This paper explores the platform’s operational roles, highlights its principal functions, and presents a use case that demonstrates how the platform provides enhanced situational awareness when adjudicating priority alarms.

Sentry-RMS, Timely Detection Model, Sentry-SECURE↗