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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuator (ATVD) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ATVC hardware. The IOA product for the ATVC actuator analysis consisted of 25 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 16 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 21 FMEAs and 13 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the landing/deceleration (LDG/DEC) subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Landing/Deceleration (LDG/DEC) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LDG/DEC hardware. The IOA product for the LDG/DEC analysis consisted of 259 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 124 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 267 FMEA's and 120 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 75 FMEA's which caused differences in 51 CIL items.

Odonnell, R. A.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the body flap subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Body Flap (BF) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BF hardware. The IOA product for the BF analysis consisted of 43 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 19 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 34 FMEAs and 15 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the elevon actuator subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Elevon Subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Elevon hardware. The IOA product for the Elevon analysis consisted of 25 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 17 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA FMEA/CIL, which consisted of 23 FMEAs and 13 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the crew equipment subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Crew Equipment hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Crew Equipment hardware. The IOA product for the Crew Equipment analysis consisted of 352 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 78 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 351 FMEAs and 82 CIL items.

Saxon, H.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the backup flight system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BFS hardware. The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI) being identified. This product was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline and subsequently compared with the applicable Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. The original assessment determined there were numerous failure modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product.

Prust, E. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the rudder/speed brake subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Rudder/Speed Brake (RSB) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline along with the proposed Post 51-L CIL updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter RSB hardware. The IOA product for the RSB analysis consisted of 38 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 27 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 34 FMEAs and 18 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. The IOA product for the EPD and C analysis consisted of 1671 failure mode analysis worksheets that resulted in 468 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline which consisted of FMEAs and 158 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the EPD and C subsystem description, analysis results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem, Volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPD and C hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the communication and tracking subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. The IOA product for the Communication and Tracking consisted of 1,108 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 298 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consists of 697 FMEAs and 239 CIL items. The comparison determined if there were any results which had been found by IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced agreement on all but 407 FMEAs which caused differences in 294 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Long, W. C.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the communication and tracking subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Long, W. C.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the communication and tracking subsystem, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list, detailed analysis, and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Long, W. C.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler (HYD/WSB) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter HYD/WSB hardware. The IOA product for the HYD/WSB analysis consisted of 447 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 183 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 364 FMEAs and 111 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 68 FMEAs which caused differences in 23 CIL items.

Bynum, M. C.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Apollo 15 mission report, supplement 4: Descent propulsion system final flight evaluation

The results of a postflight analysis of the LM-10 Descent Propulsion System (DPS) during the Apollo 15 Mission are reported. The analysis determined the steady state performance of the DPS during the descent phase of the manned lunar landing. Flight measurement discrepancies are discussed. Simulated throttle performance results are cited along with overall performance results. Evaluations of the propellant quantity gaging system, propellant loading, pressurization system, and engine are reported. Graphic illustrations of the evaluations are included.

Avvenire, A. T.↗
NASA NTRS1971

Gyroscopic stimulation of the semicircular canals during sensory deprivation.

A static object revolving at a constant velocity is stationary with respect to that environment. When the object is rotated outside the plane of spin, a gyroscopic or cross-coupled acceleration is produced orthogonal to the two planes of rotation. In this situation, a man feels himself moving in a direction other than that which his visual or proprioceptive sensors perceive. The conflict in spatial orientation is the cross-coupled acceleration imposed on the semicircular canals. This perceptual conflict and the thresholds involved were studied by partial isolation of the physiological stimuli through sensory deprivation. Subjects weighted to neutral buoyancy were submerged in 94 F water in the dark. The subjects were then rotated while being revolved about a displaced axis. Thresholds for detection of angular acceleration were higher than those reported in the literature for detection of acceleration of a single plane. This discrepancy may be attributable to the length of time the stimuli are imposed to each of the canals and the cupular response periods.

Newsom, B. D.↗
NASA NTRS1973

Apollo 16 LM-11 descent propulsion system final flight evaluation

The performance of the LM-11 Descent Propulsion System during the Apollo 16 Mission was evaluated and found to be satisfactory. The average engine effective specific impulse was 0.1 second higher than predicted, but well within the predicted 1 sigma uncertainty of 0.2 seconds. The engine performance corrected to standard inlet conditions for the FTP portion of the burn at 50 seconds after ignition was as follows: thrust, 9839 lbf; specific impulse, 306.9 sec; and propellant mixture ratio, 1.592. These values are +0.34, +0.03 and +0.0 percent different, respectively, from the values reported from engine acceptance tests and were within specification limits. Several flight measurement discrepancies that existed during the flight are discussed.

Avvenire, A. T.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Thematic mapper flight model preshipment review data package. Volume 4: Appendix. Part B: Scan mirror assembly data

Data from the thematic mapper scan mirror assembly (SMA) acceptance test are presented. Documentation includes: (1) a list of the acceptance test discrepancies; (2) flight 1 SMA test data book; (3) flight 1 SMA environmental report; (4) the configuration verification index; (5) the flight 1 SMA test failure reports; (6) the flight 1 data tapes log; and (7) the requests for deviation/waivers.

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