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At least 145 records · Page 8

Experiments for Securing Air Traffic Against Cyber-Physical System Attacks

This presentation describes experiments conducted with single board computers to investigate methods for creating trust for enabling the development of cyber-resilient air transportation systems. Methods included secure communication to prevent unauthorized access to data, consistency of data obtained via sensors and by processing, and built-in safeguards to prevent mission failure. The motivation for this work are the following. The future air transportation system needs to ensure availability, integrity, confidentiality and safety of operations. Safety of vehicles and operations is paramount for successful integration of Urban Air Mobility (UAM), Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), supersonic aircraft and launch vehicles with conventional aviation operations in the National Airspace System. Security is becoming critical because the sensors, networks and computers are far more vulnerable to bad actors than their mechanical or human predecessors. The goal therefore is to design and develop cyber-resilient systems that continue to function even in degraded states. The main findings are (1) off-the-shelf hardware can support development of cyber-resilient onboard flight computers and (2) trust in system design and implementation can be accomplished by integrating layers in depth (detail) and in breadth (scope).

cyber-resilient autonomy, trust, secure communicat↗

Predicting Maximum Thermal Response in a Li-ion Cell as a Thermal Runaway Predictor for a UAV Fight

As the energy storage devices continue to "pack" more energy in a small space, any damage, battery component failure, manufacturing defect, or electrically abusing the battery can lead to catastrophic thermal runaway events. A catastrophic thermal event in a cell leads to high temperature, in some instances to spewing of battery materials due to gas development from side reactions initiated due to high internal temperatures. Moreover, a thermal runaway can propagate from a single "failed" cell to a whole battery pack, resulting in a more serious event. The commercial and automotive sectors need to mitigate thermal runaway events. An electric aircraft (or air taxi) has no alternative in the event of a failure, so preventing such events is paramount. Currently, battery prognostics algorithms only predict the state-of-charge (SOC) and end-of-life (EOL) of a Li-ion battery in a UAV (unmanned air vehicle), but do not predict the maximum temperature during a flight or the likelihood of thermal runaway. Our current work focuses on adding the thermal model (based on Birkl's OCV model, in Ref. [1]) to the existing hybrid electrochemical model (single-particle model with lumped parameters as in Ref. [2]) to determine end-of-discharge, end-of-life, and maximum temperature during discharge.

Thermal runaway↗

Importance of Contrast-to-Noise Ratio Sensitivity Function in Nondestructive Evaluation

A reliable nondestructive evaluation (NDE) technique provides minimum 90% probability of detection (POD) with 95% confidence for detection of cracklike flaws of a specific size. This requirement comes from fracture control. Fracture control is a risk assessment and control approach for preventing structural failure of fracture critical hardware during its service life. One of the approaches of fracture control is damage tolerance safe life analysis, which assumes that NDE reliably detectable size flaw may exist in the hardware post nondestructive evaluation. Analysis and/or testing are performed to verify that the hardware will not fail during its service life despite existence of such a flaw. NDE methods are conventionally qualified by probability of detection (POD) demonstration testing to ensure reliable flaw detection. Here, a novel and alternative to POD flaw detection reliability approach that uses contrast-to-noise ratio (CNR) is given. The approach uses CNR sensitivity function (SF) and CNR. CNR SF is the minimum CNR needed for reliable flaw detection as a function of certain flaw indication characteristics. Primary difference between POD approaches and CNR flaw detection reliability approach is resolution of flaw detection system. POD approach does not account for the resolution of the system, while CNR approach accounts for the flaw detection resolution. Resolution is determined from the modulation transfer function (MTF) of the flaw detection system. CNR flaw detection reliability approach emphasizes quantitative assessment of “how well each flaw indication is detected”. Therefore, CNR approach is helpful in reducing number of flaws in the sample used in NDE procedure qualification, resulting in cost and time savings. CNR approach is also a case of multi-hit flaw detection analysis which has better flaw detectability size than conventional single-hit flaw detectability. Thus, CNR approach, where applicable, may be superior to conventional POD approach. The paper is an overview of development of CNR modeling, CNR SF modeling and measurement by the author. The paper gives key references to currently used NDE procedure POD qualification approaches including those specific to CNR and CNR SF development in multi-hit flaw detection in NDE. The paper covers core topics in nondestructive evaluation engineering.

Contrast-to-noise ratio↗

Detangling Safety Knowledge with Contextualism

We have contradictory intuitions about knowing that things are safe: on the one hand, we claim to have knowledge that many systems (even complex ones) are safe in ordinary language. On the other hand, when challenged by an expert, we easily admit that we do not, in fact, possess very much safety knowledge at all. This Technical Memorandum (TM) attempts to reconcile these two competing intuitions using a philosophical view called epistemic contextualism. We can use epistemic contextualism to explain the importance of safety regulations and the goal in implementing them: first, to differentiate types of disagreement and establish a common basis upon which regulators and regulatees can know that a system is safe; second, to raise ordinary consumers’ standards for safety knowledge (given adequate knowledge of the comprehensiveness of the regulation). This TM also uses the contextualist framework of relevant alternatives to elucidate types of failure possibilities and explain complications in attempts to prevent common mode failures.

language↗

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Create an improved method to calculate reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle system prior to fabrication by using historic data of actual root causes of failures. While failures have unique "proximate causes", there are typically a finite amount of common "root causes". Heretofore launch vehicle reliability evaluation typically hardware-centric statistical analyses, while most root causes of failures are been shown to be human-centric. A method based on human-centric root causes can be used to quantify reliability assessments and focus proposed actions to mitigate problems. Existing methods have been optimistic in their projections of launch vehicle reliability compared to actuals. Hypothesis: reliability of a conceptual launch vehicle can be more accurately evaluated based on a rational, probabilistic approach using past failure assessment teams' findings predicated on human-centric causes."Human Reliability Analysis Methods Selection Guidance for NASA"Chandler F.T., et al., NASA HQ/OSMA study group, July 2006. Outside HRA experts from academia, other federal labs, and the private sector. 50 system reliability methods considered, fourteen selected for further study, four finally selected as best suited for human spaceflight. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) + Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) enabled incorporating effects and probabilities of human errors. While four down-selected methods deemed appropriate for failure assessment, it did not appear that these methods could be concisely applied to perform major system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy."Engineering a Safer World", Detailed, comprehensive study external to NASA Leveson N. G., MIT, 2011.Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP). All-encompassing accident model based on systems theory analyzed accidents after they occurred and created approaches to prevent occurrence in developing systems not focused on failure prevention per se, but rather reducing hazards by influencing human behavior through use of constraints, hierarchical control structures, and process models to improve system safetySystem Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) addresses predictive part of problem (a "hazard analysis"). Includes all causal factors identified in STAMP: "...design errors, software flaws, component interaction accidents, cognitively complex human decision-making errors, and social organizational and management factors contributing to accidents" can guide design process rather than require it to exist before-hand did not appear capable of concise application for system-wide assessment of probability of failure of a conceptual design without becoming unwieldy.

Williams, Craig H.↗

Risk Assessment Overview

Risk assessment is used in many industries to identify and manage risks. Initially developed for use on aeronautical and nuclear systems, risk assessment has been applied to transportation, chemical, computer, financial, and security systems among others. It is used to gain an understanding of the weaknesses or vulnerabilities in a system so modification can be made to increase operability, efficiency, and safety and to reduce failure and down-time. Risk assessment results are primary inputs to risk-informed decision making; where risk information including uncertainty is used along with other pertinent information to assist management in the decision-making process. Therefore, to be useful, a risk assessment must be directed at specific objectives. As the world embraces the globalization of trade and manufacturing, understanding the associated risk become important to decision making. Applying risk assessment techniques to a global system of development, manufacturing, and transportation can provide insight into how the system can fail, the likelihood of system failure and the consequences of system failure. The risk assessment can identify those elements that contribute most to risk and identify measures to prevent and mitigate failures, disruptions, and damaging outcomes. In addition, risk associated with public and environment impact can be identified. The risk insights gained can be applied to making decisions concerning suitable development and manufacturing locations, supply chains, and transportation strategies. While risk assessment has been mostly applied to mechanical and electrical systems, the concepts and techniques can be applied across other systems and activities. This paper provides a basic overview of the development of a risk assessment.

Prassinos, Peter G.↗

Some practical examples of cavitation erosion and their prevention

The problem of failures caused by cavitation erosion are discussed. The concepts of intensity of erosion, erosion strength, and the time dependence of erosion rate are analyzed. The relation of these parameters to system variables such as pressure and velocity, and to the properties of materials are investigated. Using several examples of actual cavitation erosion, methods of prevention and their limitations are examined.

Conn, A. F.↗

Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management

The draft NASA Fault Management (FM) Handbook (2012) states that Fault Management (FM) is a "part of systems engineering", and that it "demands a system-level perspective" (NASAHDBK- 1002, 7). What, exactly, is the relationship between systems engineering and FM? To NASA, systems engineering (SE) is "the art and science of developing an operable system capable of meeting requirements within often opposed constraints" (NASA/SP-2007-6105, 3). Systems engineering starts with the elucidation and development of requirements, which set the goals that the system is to achieve. To achieve these goals, the systems engineer typically defines functions, and the functions in turn are the basis for design trades to determine the best means to perform the functions. System Health Management (SHM), by contrast, defines "the capabilities of a system that preserve the system's ability to function as intended" (Johnson et al., 2011, 3). Fault Management, in turn, is the operational subset of SHM, which detects current or future failures, and takes operational measures to prevent or respond to these failures. Failure, in turn, is the "unacceptable performance of intended function." (Johnson 2011, 605) Thus the relationship of SE to FM is that SE defines the functions and the design to perform those functions to meet system goals and requirements, while FM detects the inability to perform those functions and takes action. SHM and FM are in essence "the dark side" of SE. For every function to be performed (SE), there is the possibility that it is not successfully performed (SHM); FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this lack of success. We can also describe this in terms of goals: for every goal to be achieved, there is the possibility that it is not achieved; FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this inability to achieve the goal. This brief description of relationships between SE, SHM, and FM provide hints to a modeling approach to provide formal connectivity between the nominal (SE), and off-nominal (SHM and FM) aspects of functions and designs. This paper describes a formal modeling approach to the initial phases of the development process that integrates the nominal and off-nominal perspectives in a model that unites SE goals and functions of with the failure to achieve goals and functions (SHM/FM). This methodology and corresponding model, known as a Goal-Function Tree (GFT), provides a means to represent, decompose, and elaborate system goals and functions in a rigorous manner that connects directly to design through use of state variables that translate natural language requirements and goals into logical-physical state language. The state variable-based approach also provides the means to directly connect FM to the design, by specifying the range in which state variables must be controlled to achieve goals, and conversely, the failures that exist if system behavior go out-of-range. This in turn allows for the systems engineers and SHM/FM engineers to determine which state variables to monitor, and what action(s) to take should the system fail to achieve that goal. In sum, the GFT representation provides a unified approach to early-phase SE and FM development. This representation and methodology has been successfully developed and implemented using Systems Modeling Language (SysML) on the NASA Space Launch System (SLS) Program. It enabled early design trade studies of failure detection coverage to ensure complete detection coverage of all crew-threatening failures. The representation maps directly both to FM algorithm designs, and to failure scenario definitions needed for design analysis and testing. The GFT representation provided the basis for mapping of abort triggers into scenarios, both needed for initial, and successful quantitative analyses of abort effectiveness (detection and response to crew-threatening events).

Patterson, Jonathan D.↗

Goal-Function Tree Modeling for Systems Engineering and Fault Management

The draft NASA Fault Management (FM) Handbook (2012) states that Fault Management (FM) is a "part of systems engineering", and that it "demands a system-level perspective" (NASAHDBK- 1002, 7). What, exactly, is the relationship between systems engineering and FM? To NASA, systems engineering (SE) is "the art and science of developing an operable system capable of meeting requirements within often opposed constraints" (NASA/SP-2007-6105, 3). Systems engineering starts with the elucidation and development of requirements, which set the goals that the system is to achieve. To achieve these goals, the systems engineer typically defines functions, and the functions in turn are the basis for design trades to determine the best means to perform the functions. System Health Management (SHM), by contrast, defines "the capabilities of a system that preserve the system's ability to function as intended" (Johnson et al., 2011, 3). Fault Management, in turn, is the operational subset of SHM, which detects current or future failures, and takes operational measures to prevent or respond to these failures. Failure, in turn, is the "unacceptable performance of intended function." (Johnson 2011, 605) Thus the relationship of SE to FM is that SE defines the functions and the design to perform those functions to meet system goals and requirements, while FM detects the inability to perform those functions and takes action. SHM and FM are in essence "the dark side" of SE. For every function to be performed (SE), there is the possibility that it is not successfully performed (SHM); FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this lack of success. We can also describe this in terms of goals: for every goal to be achieved, there is the possibility that it is not achieved; FM defines the means to operationally detect and respond to this inability to achieve the goal. This brief description of relationships between SE, SHM, and FM provide hints to a modeling approach to provide formal connectivity between the nominal (SE), and off-nominal (SHM and FM) aspects of functions and designs. This paper describes a formal modeling approach to the initial phases of the development process that integrates the nominal and off-nominal perspectives in a model that unites SE goals and functions of with the failure to achieve goals and functions (SHM/FM).

Johnson, Stephen B.↗

Strain isolated ceramic coatings

Plasma sprayed ceramic coatings are used in gas turbine engines to improve component temperature capability and cooling air efficiency. A compliant metal fiber strain isolator between a plasma sprayed ceramic coating and a metal substrate improves ceramic durability while allowing thicker coatings for better insulation. Development of strain isolated coatings has concentrated on design and fabrication of coatings and coating evaluation via thermal shock testing. In thermal shock testing, five types of failure are possible: buckling failure im compression on heat up, bimetal type failure, isothermal expansion mismatch failure, mudflat cracking during cool down, and long term fatigue. A primary failure mode for thermally cycled coatings is designated bimetal type failure. Bimetal failure is tensile failure in the ceramic near the ceramic-metal interface. One of the significant benefits of the strain isolator is an insulating layer protecting the metal substrate from heat deformation and thereby preventing bimetal type failure.

Tolokan, R. P.↗

A Comparison of Functional Models for Use in the Function-Failure Design Method

When failure analysis and prevention, guided by historical design knowledge, are coupled with product design at its conception, shorter design cycles are possible. By decreasing the design time of a product in this manner, design costs are reduced and the product will better suit the customer s needs. Prior work indicates that similar failure modes occur with products (or components) with similar functionality. To capitalize on this finding, a knowledge base of historical failure information linked to functionality is assembled for use by designers. One possible use for this knowledge base is within the Elemental Function-Failure Design Method (EFDM). This design methodology and failure analysis tool begins at conceptual design and keeps the designer cognizant of failures that are likely to occur based on the product s functionality. The EFDM offers potential improvement over current failure analysis methods, such as FMEA, FMECA, and Fault Tree Analysis, because it can be implemented hand in hand with other conceptual design steps and carried throughout a product s design cycle. These other failure analysis methods can only truly be effective after a physical design has been completed. The EFDM however is only as good as the knowledge base that it draws from, and therefore it is of utmost importance to develop a knowledge base that will be suitable for use across a wide spectrum of products. One fundamental question that arises in using the EFDM is: At what level of detail should functional descriptions of components be encoded? This paper explores two approaches to populating a knowledge base with actual failure occurrence information from Bell 206 helicopters. Functional models expressed at various levels of detail are investigated to determine the necessary detail for an applicable knowledge base that can be used by designers in both new designs as well as redesigns. High level and more detailed functional descriptions are derived for each failed component based on NTSB accident reports. To best record this data, standardized functional and failure mode vocabularies are used. Two separate function-failure knowledge bases are then created aid compared. Results indicate that encoding failure data using more detailed functional models allows for a more robust knowledge base. Interestingly however, when applying the EFDM, high level descriptions continue to produce useful results when using the knowledge base generated from the detailed functional models.

Stock, Michael E.↗

Structural Health Monitoring with Fiber Bragg Grating and Piezo Arrays

Structural health monitoring (SHM) is one of the most important tools available for the maintenance, safety, and integrity of aerospace structural systems. Lightweight, electromagnetic-interference- immune, fiber-optic sensor-based SHM will play an increasing role in more secure air transportation systems. Manufacturers and maintenance personnel have pressing needs for significantly improving safety and reliability while providing for lower inspection and maintenance costs. Undetected or untreated damage may grow and lead to catastrophic structural failure. Damage can originate from the strain/stress history of the material, imperfections of domain boundaries in metals, delamination in multi-layer materials, or the impact of machine tools in the manufacturing process. Damage can likewise develop during service life from wear and tear, or under extraordinary circumstances such as with unusual forces, temperature cycling, or impact of flying objects. Monitoring and early detection are key to preventing a catastrophic failure of structures, especially when these are expected to perform near their limit conditions.

Black, Richard J.↗

Current Status of Hybrid Bearing Damage Detection

Advances in material development and processing have led to the introduction of ceramic hybrid bearings for many applications. The introduction of silicon nitride hybrid bearings into the high pressure oxidizer turbopump, on the space shuttle main engine, led NASA to solve a highly persistent and troublesome bearing problem. Hybrid bearings consist of ceramic balls and steel races. The majority of hybrid bearings utilize Si3N4 balls. The aerospace industry is currently studying the use of hybrid bearings and naturally the failure modes of these bearings become an issue in light of the limited data available. In today s turbine engines and helicopter transmissions, the health of the bearings is detected by the properties of the debris found in the lubrication line when damage begins to occur. Current oil debris sensor technology relies on the magnetic properties of the debris to detect damage. Since the ceramic rolling elements of hybrid bearings have no metallic properties, a new sensing system must be developed to indicate the system health if ceramic components are to be safely implemented in aerospace applications. The ceramic oil debris sensor must be capable of detecting ceramic and metallic component damage with sufficient reliability and forewarning to prevent a catastrophic failure. The objective of this research is to provide a background summary on what is currently known about hybrid bearing failure modes and to report preliminary results on the detection of silicon nitride debris, in oil, using a commercial particle counter.

Dempsey, Paula J.↗

Detection of structural deterioration and associated airline maintenance problems

Airline operations involving the detection of structural deterioration and associated maintenance problems are discussed. The standard approach to the maintenance and inspection of aircraft components and systems is described. The frequency of inspections and the application of preventive maintenance practices are examined. The types of failure which airline transport aircraft encounter and the steps taken to prevent catastrophic failure are reported.

Henniker, H. D.↗

Preliminary criteria for the fracture control of space shuttle structures

The complex and multidisciplinary factors are presented which relate to the prevention of structural failure due to the initiation or propagation of cracks or crack-like defects. The fracture control criteria are applicable to space shuttle components which are: (1) susceptible to cracking or fracture on the basis of anticipated loads and environment, and (2) critical to either crew safety or system performance. The criteria define the design, fabrication, environmental control, inspection, maintenance, repair, and verification procedures required for adequate fracture control.

Source record↗

NASA 30,000 hour test demonstration of closed Brayton cycle reliability

Four Brayton rotating units (BRU) developed by an American company were tested in connection with studies concerning the feasibility to use closed Brayton power conversion systems for space applications. The rotating assembly operates at a speed of 36,000 rpm and consists of a radial outflow compressor, a four-pole Rice alternator/motor, and a radial inflow turbine. The cycle working fluid consists of a mixture of helium and xenon. After 20,000 hours of operation, there was no apparent wear on failure mode to prevent attainment of the 5-year BRU design life objective.

Mccormick, J. E.↗

How Safe Is Control Software

Paper examines issue of software safety. Presents four case histories of software-safety analysis. Concludes that, to be safe, software, for all practical purposes, must be free of errors. Backup systems still needed to prevent catastrophic software failures.

Dunn, William R.↗