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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2021

Electric Propulsion for the Psyche Mission: One Year to Launch

NASA’s Psyche mission will launch in 2022 and begin a 3.6-year cruise to the metallic asteroid Psyche, the largest metal asteroid in the solar system. The baseline spacecraft design is a hybrid of JPL’s deep-space heritage subsystems with commercial partner Maxar’s electric propulsion, power, and structure subsystems. The Psyche mission will feature the first use of Hall thrusters for a NASA mission, and the first use of Hall thrusters beyond cis-lunar space. This paper will provide an overview of the electric propulsion subsystem and details of the flight system implementation for the Psyche mission. The concept of operations is discussed including subsystem-level operations, the initial checkout after launch, and cruise and orbital operations. Command and control interfaces with the spacecraft and fault protection design are presented. Finally, the status of subsystem assembly and test is described.

Li, Julie↗
NASA NTRS2022

Mars 2020 Entry, Descent, and Landing System Software Implementation

On February 18th, 2021, the Mars 2020 project's Perseverance Rover successfully touched down on the Martian surface after nearly eight years of development. The Mars 2020 Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) System largely leveraged heritage from the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) EDL System while employing targeted technological advancements. The landing process is autonomously directed by a software behavior implemented in the rover's primary flight computer called the EDL Timeline that assumes control of the vehicle six days before atmospheric entry. This paper first walks through the basics of the EDL Timeline mechanics and how the behavior is designed to account for internal system variations and environmental unknowns. It then summarizes the interactions between the EDL timeline and other high-level system behaviors like spacecraft mode transitions and system fault protection, focusing on the complications that arise when passing spacecraft control between executive functions. Although the MSL-inherited EDL System is reliable and capable, targeted updates and a thorough verification and validation program were required for Mars 2020. This paper discusses changes made to close vulnerabilities discovered during both MSL and Mars 2020 development cycles, landing system capability enhancements that were enabling for Mars 2020's mission, and how these updates were integrated with the heritage system. It then describes how both analysis and testing campaigns were utilized to verify and validate all aspects of EDL and system behaviors that run during the six days before landing, as well as the operational workarounds that were needed to address problems found during the development and commissioning process. Finally, this paper imparts lessons learned from Mars 2020 EDL development, implementation, and operations, emphasizing how systems designed to conduct time-critical mission events with low margin of error can be improved in the future.

Stehura, Aaron↗
NASA NTRS2022

Actuator and Motor Control End-to-End V&V on the Mars 2020 Rover

The Mars 2020 Perseverance rover is the most advanced robotic exploration system ever sent to another planet. To support the complex scientific and mobility needs of the mission, the rover utilizes 33 actuators, three multi-degree-of-freedom force-torque sensors, fifteen single or dual-speed resolvers, two solenoid valves, and twelve contact switches. The control for these actuators and sensors is achieved by several levels of flight software, coordinated between two computers with varying bandwidth control loops. Furthermore, the actuators and sensors were integrated into multiple larger robotic mechanisms that were delivered by different organizations at various points in the Integration and Test (I&T) timeline. All of this created a very complex Verification and Validation (V&V) scenario involving multiple subsystems and teams, several hardware and software testbeds with varying levels of fidelity, and significant systems engineering to ensure the overall I&T schedule could be maintained while ensuring system hardware safety.This paper details the integrated V&V effort across multiple teams and venues to provide full coverage of all necessary functionality, performance, and fault protection. First, it provides an overview of how the V&V campaign was subdivided among teams and venues and provides descriptions of the various hardware configurations used to support the testing. The Mars 2020 implementation of the plan incorporates many of the lessons learned from Mars Science Laboratory’s test campaign, and these value-added modifications are discussed here. Also included in this section is the system-level environmental testing approach used for mechanisms. Second, the paper describes the phased approach used by the teams to support new hardware and software deliveries to testbed and Systems I&T. In this approach the test campaign was built upon higher-level mechanism needs for performance, functionality, and safety at specific times in the campaign. Finally, the paper discusses lessons learned from the V&V campaign that should be applied to future large-scale motion control testing efforts.

Borne, Davis↗
NASA NTRS2022

Mars 2020 Entry, Descent, and Landing Software Implementation

On February 18th, 2021, the Mars 2020 project's Perseverance Rover successfully touched down on the Martian surface after nearly eight years of development. The Mars 2020 Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) System largely leveraged heritage from the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) EDL System while employing targeted technological advancements. The landing process is autonomously directed by a software behavior implemented in the rover's primary flight computer called the EDL Timeline that assumes control of the vehicle six days before atmospheric entry. In addition to performing the critical function of landing the rover on the Martian surface, the EDL timeline behavior must co-exist in a non-partitioned software and system environment with other high-level functions that accomplish the goals for the rest of the mission. Due to the criticality of EDL, the potential for loss of mission, and a need for complete system autonomy, the standard for how the EDL Timeline interacts with other functions in the system is highly constrained. This paper first walks through the basics of the EDL Timeline mechanics and how the behavior is designed to account for internal system variations and environmental unknowns. It then summarizes the interactions between the EDL timeline and other high-level system behaviors like spacecraft mode transitions and system fault protection, focusing on the complications that arise when passing spacecraft control between executive functions. Although the MSL-inherited EDL System is reliable and capable, targeted updates and a thorough verification and validation program were required for Mars 2020. This paper discusses changes made to close vulnerabilities discovered during both MSL and Mars 2020 development cycles, landing system capability enhancements that were enabling for Mars 2020's mission, and how these updates were integrated with the heritage system. It then describes how both analysis and testing campaigns were utilized to verify and validate all aspects of EDL and system behaviors that run during the six days before landing, as well as the operational workarounds that were needed to address problems found during the development and commissioning process. Finally, this paper imparts lessons learned from Mars 2020 EDL development, implementation, and operations, emphasizing how systems designed to conduct time-critical mission events with low margin of error can be improved in the future.

Stehura, Aaron↗
NASA NTRS2016

Orion GN&C Fault Management System Verification: Scope And Methodology

In order to ensure long-term ability to meet mission goals and to provide for the safety of the public, ground personnel, and any crew members, nearly all spacecraft include a fault management (FM) system. For a manned vehicle such as Orion, the safety of the crew is of paramount importance. The goal of the Orion Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) fault management system is to detect, isolate, and respond to faults before they can result in harm to the human crew or loss of the spacecraft. Verification of fault management/fault protection capability is challenging due to the large number of possible faults in a complex spacecraft, the inherent unpredictability of faults, the complexity of interactions among the various spacecraft components, and the inability to easily quantify human reactions to failure scenarios. The Orion GN&C Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) team has developed a methodology for bounding the scope of FM system verification while ensuring sufficient coverage of the failure space and providing high confidence that the fault management system meets all safety requirements. The methodology utilizes a swarm search algorithm to identify failure cases that can result in catastrophic loss of the crew or the vehicle and rare event sequential Monte Carlo to verify safety and FDIR performance requirements.

Brown, Denise↗
NASA NTRS1987

Incipient fault detection and power system protection for spaceborne systems

A program was initiated to study the feasibility of using advanced terrestrial power system protection techniques for spacecraft power systems. It was designed to enhance and automate spacecraft power distribution systems in the areas of safety, reliability and maintenance. The proposed power management/distribution system is described as well as security assessment and control, incipient and low current fault detection, and the proposed spaceborne protection system. It is noted that the intelligent remote power controller permits the implementation of digital relaying algorithms with both adaptive and programmable characteristics.

Russell, B. Don↗
NASA NTRS1973

Control and protection system for paralleled modular static inverter-converter systems

A control and protection system was developed for use with a paralleled 2.5-kWe-per-module static inverter-converter system. The control and protection system senses internal and external fault parameters such as voltage, frequency, current, and paralleling current unbalance. A logic system controls contactors to isolate defective power conditioners or loads. The system sequences contactor operation to automatically control parallel operation, startup, and fault isolation. Transient overload protection and fault checking sequences are included. The operation and performance of a control and protection system, with detailed circuit descriptions, are presented.

Birchenough, A. G.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Design and evaluation of executable assertions for concurrent error detection

System level concurrent detection of errors due to hardware faults can be accomplished by introducing software redundancy in the form of executable assertions into a program to monitor the correct operation of the system during its execution. This paper attempts to formalize the use of executable assertions for the purpose of concurrent error detection, and discusses a transformation approach to the design of assertion statements. The second part deals with the effectiveness of the error detection technique. A fault simulation method for the evaluation of the reliability of the assertion statements is described. This scheme was used to study the effectiveness of a nontrivial program in providing protection against faults in the underlying system. The experimental results shows that the use of executable assertions provides an effective approach to achieve concurrent error detection.

Hua, Kien A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Assurance of Fault Management: Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness

Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of criticality within flight software, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance for NASA projects, especially as spaceflight systems continue to increase in complexity. Insight into specific characteristics of FM architectures seen embedded within safety- and mission-critical software systems analyzed by the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program has been enhanced with an FM Technical Reference (TR) suite. Benefits are aimed beyond the IVV community to those that seek ways to efficiently and effectively provide software assurance to reduce the FM risk posture of NASA and other space missions. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IVV techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. The role FM has with regard to overall asset protection of flight software systems is being addressed with the development of an adverse condition (AC) database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities.Identification of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine how a system responds to these conditions are important aspects of hazard analysis and fault management. Understanding what ACs the mission may face, and ensuring they are prevented or addressed is the responsibility of the assurance team, which necessarily should have insight into ACs beyond those defined by the project itself. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs, and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. The repository has a firm structure, initial collection of data, and an interface established for informational queries, with plans for integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV, enabling support and accessibility across the Agency. The development of an improved workflow process for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance is currently underway.

Software Verification & Validation↗
NASA NTRS2016

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IV&V projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IV&V techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. Additionally, the role FM has with regard to strengthened security requirements, with potential to advance overall asset protection of flight software systems, is being addressed with the development of an adverse conditions database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities. Capitalizing on the established framework, this TR suite provides assurance capability for a variety of FM architectures and varied development approaches. Research results are being disseminated across NASA, other agencies, and the software community. This paper discusses the findings and TR suite informing the FM domain in best practices for FM architectural design, visibility observations, and methods employed for IV&V and mission assurance.

Fitz, Rhonda↗
NASA NTRS1973

Molecular solid-state inverter-converter system

A modular approach for aerospace electrical systems has been developed, using lightweight high efficiency pulse width modulation techniques. With the modular approach, a required system is obtained by paralleling modules. The modular system includes the inverters and converters, a paralleling system, and an automatic control and fault-sensing protection system with a visual annunciator. The output is 150 V dc, or a low distortion three phase sine wave at 120 V, 400 Hz. Input power is unregulated 56 V dc. Each module is rated 2.5 kW or 3.6 kVA at 0.7 power factor.

Birchenough, A. G.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Orbit-on-demand vehicles - Mission possible, but one-day turnaround?

The next generation launch-on-demand manned orbital vehicles will ideally be able to perform plane change maneuvers for rendezvous. Plane-changes of, e.g., 11 deg, will require a 3000 fps on-orbit maneuver velocity. Any plane-change capabilities beyond 800 fps rapidly increase the necessary vehicle weight. Sensitivity studies of the payload weight/vehicle weight, the presence or absence of air-breathing engines, high acceleration, etc., indicated that advances are required in the payload stowage pallet, thermal protection system, fault detection electronics, line-replaceable units, and accessibility to realize one-day turnaround. The spacecraft would also need autonomous systems checks and launch from minimum support sites reached by air ferry. A horizontal take-off, two-stage subsonic launch vehicle so far offers the lowest weight, maximum flexibility and minimum support combination of all configurations under consideration.

Talay, T. A.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Fault tolerance in onboard processors - Protecting efficient FDM demultiplexers

The application of convolutional codes to protect demultiplexer filter banks is demonstrated analytically for efficient implementations. An overview is given of the parameters for the efficient implementations of filter banks, and real convolutional codes are discussed in terms of DSP operations. Methods for composite filtering and parity generation are outlined, and attention is given to the protection of polyphase filter demultiplexing systems. Real convolutional codes can be applied to protect demultiplexer filter banks by employing two forms of low-rate parity calculation to each filter bank. The parity values are computed either by the output with an FIR parity filter or in parallel with the normal processing by a composite filter. Hardware similarities between the filter bank and the main demultiplexer bank permit efficient redeployment of the processing resources to the main processing function in any configuration.

Redinbo, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2001

Engineering sensors for the Cassini spacecraft

The intent of this paper is to review the subsystems of the Cassini spacecraft and to discuss the types of devices that are used to collect engineering data for each of these subsystems.

vehicle health management fault protection spacecr↗
NASA NTRS2001

A summary of spacecraft engineering sensors

This paper gives a data table summary of the different types of engineering sensors that are used onboard a typical spacecraft.

vehicle health management fault protection spacecr↗