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At least 145 records · Page 8

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Technical Bulletin No. 21-01: Experimental and Computational Study of Cavitation in Hydrogen Peroxide

Cavitation in liquid propulsion systems can lead to performance degradation and hardware failures. The NESC sponsored an investigation to measure and model cavitation in pressurized hydrogen peroxide fl ow. The experimentally measured and computationally predicted cavitation lengths were compared as a function of cavitation number. The measured and predicted data exhibited close agreement over the range of pressures and temperatures studied, and no calibration of the cavitation model coefficients was needed.

NESC Technical Bulletin No. 21-01↗

Fault Propagation, EMI Propagation, and Fault Containment in Aerospace Systems

The occurrence of faults in aerospace system hardware and software have consequences ranging from minor effects to catastrophic effects, and such faults can directly affect the safety of hardware and personnel. There are many origins to fault conditions, and the hardware that is capable of still meeting its performance requirements after experiencing itself a fault is said to be fault tolerant. A fault tolerant hardware is capable of detecting, isolating, and recovering from a fault condition; and this is a subfield of control engineering. An aerospace system that has been shown to have electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) in all its subsystems and systems cannot induced faults caused by electromagnetic interference (EMI). It can be proposed that the presence of EMI (or lack of EMC) is analogous to a potential fault initiator and the effects can likewise range from minor to severe. This paper starts by addressing the consequences of hardware failure in aerospace systems from a fault perspective, because the design of fault tolerant system is a major endeavor in aerospace. To arrive to this goal the paper starts with the concepts of fault, fault propagation, and a new concept called fault containment region. The paper then proceeds to provide two very recent examples in the aircraft industry of fault propagation with catastrophic effects. The paper proceeds to introduce the concept of EMI fault containment and a brief introduction to another new concept called the EMI containment region. The paper proceeds with an example of EMI fault containment region. The paper ends with a lesson learned conclusions.

Perez, Reinaldo↗

Qualification and Performance of a High-Efficiency Laser Transmitter for Deep-Space Optical Communications

A high-power Laser Transmitter Assembly (LTA) was developed to support the Deep Space Optical Communications (DSOC) technology demonstration being developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. NASA’s Psyche Mission plans to host the DSOC flight subsystem for testing space-to-ground high-bandwidth laser communications en route to the 16 Psyche asteroid. We review the design, performance, and qualification of the LTA Engineering Model and Flight Model (EM and FM) delivered to JPL. The LTA uses a master-oscillator power amplifier (MOPA) design and delivers up to 4.5 W at 1550 nm, with a highly efficient, cladding-pumped, polarization-maintaining erbium-ytterbium fiber amplifier. The master oscillator generates a range of pulse widths and repetition rates to support modulation formats from 16- to 128-PPM for optical data transmission at >100 Mbps. The LTA was designed for high reliability and radiation hardness, and includes redundant signal and pumping paths to reduce single points of failure, hardware interlocks to ensure safe operation and protection against damage, closed-loop control of optical power, and detailed health and status via telemetry. The LTA EM and FM were subjected to unit-appropriate space qualification testing. We describe the performance testing of the EM and FM, for the characterization of key metrics such as wavelength stability, signal linewidth, optical pulse width, jitter, and extinction ratio, and polarization extinction ratio. The management of optical nonlinearities (self-phase modulation, Brillouin scattering, or pulse-to-pulse energy variation), which could result in an optical link penalty or damage to the LTA, is also detailed, and factors affecting the power efficiency are discussed.

Jaques, J.↗

NASA Johnson Space Center Astromaterials Research Exploration Science Image Science and Analysis Group (ISAG) ISAG Support to the ISS Program

- Primary focus is on maintaining the safety of the crew and vehicle. - ISAG personnel request and screen imagery to: - Monitor changes in the ISS external condition - Anomalous indications - Hardware out of configuration - Detect Micro-Meteoroid or Orbital Debris (MMOD) impacts leading to: - Hardware failure - EVA sharp edges - ISAG personnel derive engineering data from imagery for: - Anomaly investigations - Structural dynamics measurements - Clearance assessments - Verifying ISS configuration against models and requirements - Jettison trajectory calculation - Provide Real-Time Support to the ISS and Anomalies

Dwight Osborne↗

Online Diagnostics at Scale

The Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) housed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory recently acquired a 200-cabinet Cray XK6. The computer will primarily provide capability computing cycles to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science INCITE program. The OLCF has a tradition of installing very large computer systems requiring unique methods in order to achieve production status in the most expeditious and efficient manner. This paper will explore some of the methods that have been used over the years at OLCF to eliminate both early-life hardware failures and ongoing failures giving users a more stable machine for production.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

System for detecting operating errors in a variable valve timing engine using pressure sensors

A method and control module includes a pressure sensor data comparison module that compares measured pressure volume signal segments to ideal pressure volume segments. A valve actuation hardware remedy module performs a hardware remedy in response to comparing the measured pressure volume signal segments to the ideal pressure volume segments when a valve actuation hardware failure is detected.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Adding Fault Tolerance to NPB Benchmarks Using ULFM

In the world of high-performance computing, fault tolerance and application resilience are becoming some of the primary concerns because of increasing hardware failures and memory corruptions. While the research community has been investigating various options, from system-level solutions to application-level solutions, standards such as the Message Passing Interface (MPI) are also starting to include such capabilities. The current proposal for MPI fault tolerant is centered around the User-Level Failure Mitigation (ULFM) concept, which provides means for fault detection and recovery of the MPI layer. This approach does not address application-level recovery, which is currently left to application developers. In this work, we present a mod- ification of some of the benchmarks of the NAS parallel benchmark (NPB) to include support of the ULFM capabilities as well as application-level strategies and mechanisms for application-level failure recovery. As such, we present: (i) an application-level library to checkpoint and restore data, (ii) extensions of NPB benchmarks for fault tolerance based on different strategies, (iii) a fault injection tool, and (iv) some preliminary results that show the impact of such fault tolerant strategies on the application execution.

Parchman, Zachary W↗

Replacement of Legacy Analytical Codes at the Advanced Test Reactor

For each operating cycle of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory, a Core Safety Assurance Package (CSAP) is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the safety basis approved by the United State Department of Energy (DOE). Certain computer codes are used in CSAP development, most of them developed in-house. This work describes replacement of a large set of these codes and updates previous work. Replacement of legacy codes is necessary due to computer hardware failure but also has generally improved user-friendliness.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Replacement of Legacy Analytical Codes at the Advanced Test Reactor

For each operating cycle of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory, a Core Safety Assurance Package (CSAP) is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the safety basis approved by the United State Department of Energy (DOE). Certain computer codes are used in CSAP development, most of them developed in-house. This work describes replacement of a large set of these codes and updates previous work. Replacement of legacy codes is necessary due to computer hardware failure but also has generally improved user-friendliness.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This paper presents the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗

Fault Management Algorithm Risk Assessment for the NASA Space Launch System

This presentation describes the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) risk assessment process currently being conducted for the Space Launch System (SLS) Artemis II Fault Management (FM) detection functions. The analysis scope, general assumptions and guide rules, and key modeling concepts were discussed to establish the basis of the risk assessments conducted. Initial analyses indicated a dominance in the total risk by software and firmware failures. This paper presents efforts applied to refine the software risks and the overall impact of implementing those modifications. Current analyses conducted on the detection functions implemented for the SLS Artemis II mission indicate primary risk drivers for the individual FM detection functions are flight software failures, firmware design failures, and hardware Common Cause Failures (CCFs). There still remains issues of how to account for time and redundancy in the software risk estimations.

probability risk analysis↗

Keeping checkpoint/restart viable for exascale systems.

Next-generation exascale systems, those capable of performing a quintillion (10{sup 18}) operations per second, are expected to be delivered in the next 8-10 years. These systems, which will be 1,000 times faster than current systems, will be of unprecedented scale. As these systems continue to grow in size, faults will become increasingly common, even over the course of small calculations. Therefore, issues such as fault tolerance and reliability will limit application scalability. Current techniques to ensure progress across faults like checkpoint/restart, the dominant fault tolerance mechanism for the last 25 years, are increasingly problematic at the scales of future systems due to their excessive overheads. In this work, we evaluate a number of techniques to decrease the overhead of checkpoint/restart and keep this method viable for future exascale systems. More specifically, this work evaluates state-machine replication to dramatically increase the checkpoint interval (the time between successive checkpoint) and hash-based, probabilistic incremental checkpointing using graphics processing units to decrease the checkpoint commit time (the time to save one checkpoint). Using a combination of empirical analysis, modeling, and simulation, we study the costs and benefits of these approaches on a wide range of parameters. These results, which cover of number of high-performance computing capability workloads, different failure distributions, hardware mean time to failures, and I/O bandwidths, show the potential benefits of these techniques for meeting the reliability demands of future exascale platforms.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Hybrid Modeling for Scenario-Based Evaluation of Failure Effects in Advanced Hardware-Software Designs

This paper describes an incremental scenario-based simulation approach to evaluation of intelligent software for control and management of hardware systems. A hybrid continuous/discrete event simulation of the hardware dynamically interacts with the intelligent software in operations scenarios. Embedded anomalous conditions and failures in simulated hardware can lead to emergent software behavior and identification of missing or faulty software or hardware requirements. An approach is described for extending simulation-based automated incremental failure modes and effects analysis, to support concurrent evaluation of intelligent software and the hardware controlled by the software

Malin, Jane T.↗

SU-F-R-12: Prediction of TrueBeam Hardware Issues Using Trajectory Log Analysis

Purpose: To predict potential failures of hardware within the Varian TrueBeam linear accelerator in order to proactively replace parts and decrease machine downtime. Methods: Machine downtime is a problem for all radiation oncology departments and vendors. Most often it is the result of unexpected equipment failure, and increased due to lack of in-house clinical engineering support. Preventative maintenance attempts to assuage downtime, but often is ineffective at preemptively preventing many failure modes such as MLC motor failures, the need to tighten a gantry chain, or the replacement of a jaw motor, among other things. To attempt to alleviate downtime, software was developed in house that determines the maximum value of each axis enumerated in the Truebeam trajectory log files. After patient treatments, this data is stored in a SQL database. Microsoft Power BI is used to plot the average maximum error of each day of each machine as a function of time. The results are then correlated with actual faults that occurred at the machine with the help of Varian service engineers. Results: Over the course of six months, 76,312 trajectory logs have been written into the database and plotted in Power BI. Throughout the course of analysis MLC motors have been replaced on three machines due to the early warning of the trajectory log analysis. The service engineers have also been alerted to possible gantry issues on one occasion due to the aforementioned analysis. Conclusion: Analyzing the trajectory log data is a viable and effective early warning system for potential failures of the TrueBeam linear accelerator. With further analysis and tightening of the tolerance values used to determine a possible imminent failure, it should be possible to pinpoint future issues more thoroughly and for more axes of motion.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Laser Peening Effects on Friction Stir Welding

The laser peening process can result in considerable improvement to crack initiation, propagation, and mechanical properties in FSW which equates to longer hardware service life Processed hardware safety is improved by producing higher failure tolerant hardware, and reducing risk. Lowering hardware maintenance cost produces longer hardware service life, and lower hardware down time. Application of this proposed technology will result in substantial benefits and savings throughout the life of the treated components

Hatameleh, Omar↗

Reliability Growth in Space Life Support Systems

A hardware system's failure rate often increases over time due to wear and aging, but not always. Some systems instead show reliability growth, a decreasing failure rate with time, due to effective failure analysis and remedial hardware upgrades. Reliability grows when failure causes are removed by improved design. A mathematical reliability growth model allows the reliability growth rate to be computed from the failure data. The space shuttle was extensively maintained, refurbished, and upgraded after each flight and it experienced significant reliability growth during its operational life. In contrast, the International Space Station (ISS) is much more difficult to maintain and upgrade and its failure rate has been constant over time. The ISS Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) reliability has slightly decreased. Failures on ISS and with the ISS CDRA continue to be a challenge.

life support↗

A Comprehensive Reliability Methodology for Assessing Risk of Reusing Failed Hardware Without Corrective Actions with and Without Redundancy

This paper deals with the development of a reliability methodology to assess the consequences of using hardware, without failure analysis or corrective action, that has previously demonstrated that it did not perform per specification. The subject of this paper arose from the need to provide a detailed probabilistic analysis to calculate the change in probability of failures with respect to the base or non-failed hardware. The methodology used for the analysis is primarily based on principles of Monte Carlo simulation. The random variables in the analysis are: Maximum Time of Operation (MTO) and operation Time of each Unit (OTU) The failure of a unit is considered to happen if (OTU) is less than MTO for the Normal Operational Period (NOP) in which this unit is used. NOP as a whole uses a total of 4 units. Two cases are considered. in the first specialized scenario, the failure of any operation or system failure is considered to happen if any of the units used during the NOP fail. in the second specialized scenario, the failure of any operation or system failure is considered to happen only if any two of the units used during the MOP fail together. The probability of failure of the units and the system as a whole is determined for 3 kinds of systems - Perfect System, Imperfect System 1 and Imperfect System 2. in a Perfect System, the operation time of the failed unit is the same as that of the MTO. In an Imperfect System 1, the operation time of the failed unit is assumed as 1 percent of the MTO. In an Imperfect System 2, the operation time of the failed unit is assumed as zero. in addition, simulated operation time of failed units is assumed as 10 percent of the corresponding units before zero value. Monte Carlo simulation analysis is used for this study. Necessary software has been developed as part of this study to perform the reliability calculations. The results of the analysis showed that the predicted change in failure probability (P(sub F)) for the previously failed units is as high as 49 percent above the baseline (perfect system) for the worst case. The predicted change in system P(sub F) for the previously failed units is as high as 36% for single unit failure without any redundancy. For redundant systems, with dual unit failure, the predicted change in P(sub F) for the previously failed units is as high as 16%. These results will help management to make decisions regarding the consequences of using previously failed units without adequate failure analysis or corrective action.

Putcha, Chandra S.↗

ISS Fiber Optic Failure Investigation Root Cause Report

In August of 1999, Boeing Corporation (Boeing) engineers began investigating failures of optical fiber being used on International Space Station flight hardware. Catastrophic failures of the fiber were linked to a defect in the glass fiber. Following several meetings of Boeing and NASA engineers and managers, Boeing created and led an investigation team, which examined the reliability of the cable installed in the U.S. Lab. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Components Technologies and Radiation Effects Branch (GSFC) led a team investigating the root cause of the failures. Information was gathered from: regular telecons and other communications with the investigation team, investigative trips to the cable distributor's plant, the cable manufacturing plant and the fiber manufacturing plant (including a review of build records), destructive and non-destructive testing, and expertise supplied by scientists from Dupont, and Lucent-Bell Laboratories. Several theories were established early on which were not able to completely address the destructive physical analysis and experiential evidence. Lucent suggested hydrofluoric acid (HF) etching of the glass and successfully duplicated the "rocket engine" defect. Strength testing coupled with examination of the low strength break sites linked features in the polyimide coating with latent defect sites. The information provided below explains what was learned about the susceptibility of the pre-cabled fiber to failure when cabled as it was for Space Station and the nature of the latent defects.

Leidecker, Henning↗