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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2002

Human performance cognitive-behavioral modeling: a benefit for occupational safety

Human Performance Modeling (HPM) is a computer-aided job analysis software methodology used to generate predictions of complex human-automation integration and system flow patterns with the goal of improving operator and system safety. The use of HPM tools has recently been increasing due to reductions in computational cost, augmentations in the tools' fidelity, and usefulness in the generated output. An examination of an Air Man-machine Integration Design and Analysis System (Air MIDAS) model evaluating complex human-automation integration currently underway at NASA Ames Research Center will highlight the importance to occupational safety of considering both cognitive and physical aspects of performance when researching human error.

Occupational Health↗
NASA NTRS1971

System safety management: A new discipline

The systems theory is discussed in relation to safety management. It is suggested that systems safety management, as a new discipline, holds great promise for reducing operating errors, conserving labor resources, avoiding operating costs due to mistakes, and for improving managerial techniques. It is pointed out that managerial failures or system breakdowns are the basic reasons for human errors and condition defects. In this respect, a recommendation is made that safety engineers stop visualizing the problem only with the individual (supervisor or employee) and see the problem from the systems point of view.

W. C. Pope↗
NASA NTRS2013

MPST Software: grl_suppdoc

Due to the nature of the GRAIL mission, the GRAIL Mission Planning and Sequence Team (MPST) is required to generate ground and uplink products faster than ever done before. The existing correct_transmitter_min_dur tool that provides a similar function to grl_suppdoc lacks the ability to operate accurately or quickly enough to support the rapid turnaround required of the GRAIL MPST. The GRAIL MPST was required to build this new tool to facilitate the ground and uplink generation processes to meet a tight sequence development timeline. The grl_suppdoc tool enables the GRAIL MPST to generate automatically Deep Space Network (DSN) transmitter suppressions based on short uplinks that are found in the ground/modeled Predicted Events File (PEF). The grl_suppdoc script automatically generates applicable DSN uplink suppressions in the form of a Spacecraft Activity Sequence File (SASF) to protect the GRAIL project from short DSN uplink windows, which can be cause for operator error at the DSN antennas. Currently, no software exists that provides this functionality at the efficiency required for GRAIL sequence team operations. Compared to a manual process, this script reduces human error and saves considerable man-hours by automating and streamlining the mission planning and sequencing task for the GRAIL mission.

Call, Jared A.↗
NASA NTRS2019

High Reliability Requires More than Providing Spares

It is sometimes optimistically hoped that a space life support system can be kept working throughout a long duration mission by repairing failed components, as long as sufficient spares are flown. It is usually assumed that the components have constant known failure rates. Then the needed numbers of spares can be computed to have any particular probability that all failed components can be replaced by available spares. This approach can provide high reliability if its favorable assumptions, including constant known failure rates, are satisfied. Other favorable assumptions are that the failures are statistically independent, repair will be successful without causing further failures, and all failures are due to internal component failures. These assumptions are not usually justified. The failure rates may be estimates that are inadequately verified because of insufficient testing. Failure rates may change due to materials substitutions, manufacturing changes, redesigns to fix failures, and new failures caused by redesigns. Failures that are not statistically independent may result from one common cause, such as a design or manufacturing error or a cascade of cause and effect, possibly caused by an external event such as a power outage. Repair may be unsuccessful or cause damage. Many failures occur at component interfaces or at the overall systems level, not within isolated components. Other failures causes are completely external to the system, due to assembly, maintenance, and operational errors or to unexpected environmental challenges. Replacement with sufficient spares can compensate for expected internal component failures but may not be able to cope with unpredictable design and manufacturing flaws, human errors, and environmental impacts. Reliability estimates based on providing sufficient spares to compensate for expected failures may be far too high. They are essentially upper bounds on reliability that might be approached if many frequent but often unconsidered failure causes can be eliminated.

spares↗
NASA NTRS2001

Human Factors Engineering Guidelines for Overhead Cranes

This guideline provides standards for overhead crane cabs that can be applied to the design and modification of crane cabs to reduce the potential for human error due to design. This guideline serves as an aid during the development of a specification for purchases of cranes or for an engineering support request for crane design modification. It aids human factors engineers in evaluating existing cranes during accident investigations or safety reviews.

Chandler, Faith↗
NASA NTRS1989

The problem of automation: Inappropriate feedback and interaction, not overautomation

As automation increasingly takes its place in industry, especially high-risk industry, it is often blamed for causing harm and increasing the chance of human error when failures occur. It is proposed that the problem is not the presence of automation, but rather its inappropriate design. The problem is that the operations are performed appropriately under normal conditions, but there is inadequate feedback and interaction with the humans who must control the overall conduct of the task. When the situations exceed the capabilities of the automatic equipment, then the inadequate feedback leads to difficulties for the human controllers. The problem is that the automation is at an intermediate level of intelligence, powerful enough to take over control that which used to be done by people, but not powerful enough to handle all abnormalities. Moreover, its level of intelligence is insufficient to provide the continual, appropriate feedback that occurs naturally among human operators. To solve this problem, the automation should either be made less intelligent or more so, but the current level is quite inappropriate. The overall message is that it is possible to reduce error through appropriate design considerations.

Norman, Donald A.↗
NASA NTRS1990

The 'problem' with automation - Inappropriate feedback and interaction, not 'over-automation'

Automation in high-risk industry is often blamed for causing harm and increasing the chance of human error when failures occur. It is proposed that the problem is not the presence of automation, but rather its inappropriate design. The problem is that the operations are performed appropriately under normal conditions, but there is inadequate feedback and interaction with the humans who must control the overall conduct of the task. The problem is that the automation is at an intermediate level of intelligence, powerful enough to take over control which used to be done by people, but not powerful enough to handle all abnormalities. Moreover, its level of intelligence is insufficient to provide the continual, appropriate feedback that occurs naturally among human operators. To solve this problem, the automation should either be made less intelligent or more so, but the current level is quite inappropriate. The overall message is that it is possible to reduce error through appropriate design considerations.

Norman, D. A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planned Investigations to Address Acute Central Nervous System Effects of Space Radiation Exposure with Human Performance Data

This work intends to generate evidence of acute, incremental human performance decrement similar to that due to space radiation andits impacts on the brain, to accompany ongoing human performance modeling work. The planned work will explore the boundaries of human behavioral and performance decrement after exposure to stress, which may be expected based in part on rodent responses found afterexposure to ionizing radiation. The collection of evidence via simulation studies can characterize real human errors toward determining what stress levels lead to significantly-low levels of performance (below permissible outcome limits) which would imperilmission accomplishment. If mission-relevant animal-study-linked tasks are used, human and animal performance levels may be aligned to enable quantitative assignment of permissible exposure limits based on animal exposure studies. Ultimately, a transfer function between the performances of exposed rodents and humans under stress can be developed using shared impairment mechanisms.

human performance↗
NASA NTRS1999

Non-Traditional Displays for Mission Monitoring

Advances in automation capability and reliability have changed the role of humans from operating and controlling processes to simply monitoring them for anomalies. However, humans are traditionally bad monitors of highly reliable systems over time. Thus, the human is assigned a task for which he is ill equipped. We believe that this has led to the dominance of human error in process control activities such as operating transportation systems (aircraft and trains), monitoring patient health in the medical industry, and controlling plant operations. Research has shown, though, that an automated monitor can assist humans in recognizing and dealing with failures. One possible solution to this predicament is to use a polar-star display that will show deviations from normal states based on parameters that are most indicative of mission health.

Trujillo, Anna C.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planned Investigations to Address Acute Central Nervous System Effects of Space Radiation Exposure with Human Performance Data

This work intends to generate evidence of acute, incremental human performance decrement similar to that due to space radiation and its impacts on the brain, to accompany ongoing human performance modeling work. The planned work will explore the boundaries of human behavioral and performance decrement after expo-sure to stress, which may be expected based in part on rodent responses found after exposure to ionizing radiation. The collection of evidence via simulation studies can characterize real human errors toward determining what stress levels lead to significantly-low levels of performance (below permissible outcome limits) which would imperil mission accomplishment. If mission-relevant yet animal-study-linked tasks are used, human and animal performance levels may be aligned to enable quantitative assignment of permissible exposure limits based on animal exposure studies. Ultimately, a transfer function between the performances of exposed rodents and humans under stress can be developed using shared impairment mechanisms.

human performance↗
NASA NTRS2011

Human Factors Throughout the Life Cycle: Lessons Learned from the Shuttle Program

With the ending of the Space Shuttle Program, it is critical that we not forget the Human Factors lessons we have learned over the years. At every phase of the life cycle, from manufacturing, processing and integrating vehicle and payload, to launch, flight operations, mission control and landing, hundreds of teams have worked together to achieve mission success in one of the most complex, high-risk socio-technical enterprises ever designed. Just as there was great diversity in the types of operations performed at every stage, there was a myriad of human factors that could further complicate these human systems. A single mishap or close call could point to issues at the individual level (perceptual or workload limitations, training, fatigue, human error susceptibilities), the task level (design of tools, procedures and aspects of the workplace), as well as the organizational level (appropriate resources, safety policies, information access and communication channels). While we have often had to learn through human mistakes and technological failures, we have also begun to understand how to design human systems in which individuals can excel, where tasks and procedures are not only safe but efficient, and how organizations can foster a proactive approach to managing risk and supporting human enterprises. Panelists will talk about their experiences as they relate human factors to a particular phase of the shuttle life cycle. They will conclude with a framework for tying together human factors lessons-learned into system-level risk management strategies.

human factors↗
NASA NTRS1997

Demonstration of a Safety Analysis on a Complex System

For the past 17 years, Professor Leveson and her graduate students have been developing a theoretical foundation for safety in complex systems and building a methodology upon that foundation. The methodology includes special management structures and procedures, system hazard analyses, software hazard analysis, requirements modeling and analysis for completeness and safety, special software design techniques including the design of human-machine interaction, verification, operational feedback, and change analysis. The Safeware methodology is based on system safety techniques that are extended to deal with software and human error. Automation is used to enhance our ability to cope with complex systems. Identification, classification, and evaluation of hazards is done using modeling and analysis. To be effective, the models and analysis tools must consider the hardware, software, and human components in these systems. They also need to include a variety of analysis techniques and orthogonal approaches: There exists no single safety analysis or evaluation technique that can handle all aspects of complex systems. Applying only one or two may make us feel satisfied, but will produce limited results. We report here on a demonstration, performed as part of a contract with NASA Langley Research Center, of the Safeware methodology on the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) portion of the air traffic control (ATC) system and procedures currently employed at the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol). CTAS is an automated system to assist controllers in handling arrival traffic in the DFW area. Safety is a system property, not a component property, so our safety analysis considers the entire system and not simply the automated components. Because safety analysis of a complex system is an interdisciplinary effort, our team included system engineers, software engineers, human factors experts, and cognitive psychologists.

Leveson, Nancy↗
NASA NTRS2005

Cognition in Space Workshop: Metrics and Models - 1

"Cognition in Space Workshop I: Metrics and Models" was the first in a series of workshops sponsored by NASA to develop an integrated research and development plan supporting human cognition in space exploration. The workshop was held in Chandler, Arizona, October 25-27, 2004. The participants represented academia, government agencies, and medical centers. This workshop addressed the following goal of the NASA Human System Integration Program for Exploration: to develop a program to manage risks due to human performance and human error, specifically ones tied to cognition. Risks range from catastrophic error to degradation of efficiency and failure to accomplish mission goals. Cognition itself includes memory, decision making, initiation of motor responses, sensation, and perception. Four subgoals were also defined at the workshop as follows: (1) NASA needs to develop a human-centered design process that incorporates standards for human cognition, human performance, and assessment of human interfaces; (2) NASA needs to identify and assess factors that increase risks associated with cognition; (3) NASA needs to predict risks associated with cognition; and (4) NASA needs to mitigate risk, both prior to actual missions and in real time. This report develops the material relating to these four subgoals.

Woolford, Barbara↗
NASA NTRS2018

Considerations in Assuring Safety of Increasingly Autonomous Systems

Recent technological advances have accelerated the development and application of increasingly autonomous (IA) systems in civil and military aviation. IA systems can provide automation of complex mission tasks-ranging across reduced crew operations, air-traffic management, and unmanned, autonomous aircraft-with most applications calling for collaboration and teaming among humans and IA agents. IA systems are expected to provide benefits in terms of safety, reliability, efficiency, affordability, and previously unattainable mission capability. There is also a potential for improving safety by removal of human errors. There are, however, several challenges in the safety assurance of these systems due to the highly adaptive and non-deterministic behavior of these systems, and vulnerabilities due to potential divergence of airplane state awareness between the IA system and humans. These systems must deal with external sensors and actuators, and they must respond in time commensurate with the activities of the system in its environment. One of the main challenges is that safety assurance, currently relying upon authority transfer from an autonomous function to a human to mitigate safety concerns, will need to address their mitigation by automation in a collaborative dynamic context. These challenges have a fundamental, multidimensional impact on the safety assurance methods, system architecture, and V&V capabilities to be employed. The goal of this report is to identify relevant issues to be addressed in these areas, the potential gaps in the current safety assurance techniques, and critical questions that would need to be answered to assure safety of IA systems. We focus on a scenario of reduced crew operation when an IA system is employed which reduces, changes or eliminates a human's role in transition from two-pilot operations.

Alves, Erin E.↗
NASA NTRS1994

A rose by any other name: Certification seen as process rather than content

Green (1990) believes that the two main factors safeguarding flying from human error are both related to certification and regulation. First is the increasingly proceduralized nature of flying whereby as much as possible is reduced to a rule-based activity. Second is the emphasis placed upon training and competency checking of aircrew in simulators and in the air, both generally and for all particular types of aircraft flown. This leaves, believes Green, other human factors that are relatively unaddressed as yet and which can give rise to human reliability problems. These include: hardware factors and especially pilot/co-pilot relationships; and system factors including fatigue and cost/safety trade-offs. He also, importantly, identifies problems with the integration of the 'electronic crew member' following increased automation. Human reliability failures with artificial intelligence and automation, due to over-reliance on the system fail-safe mechanisms, or to operator under- confidence in the integrity or self-regulating capacity of the system, or to out-of-loop effects, are widely accepted as being due to deficiencies in plant design, planning, management and maintenance more than to 'operator error' - Reason's (1990) latent error or organization pathogens argument. Reliability failures in complex systems are well enough documented to give cause for concern and at least promote a debate on the merits of a full certification program. The purpose of this short paper is to seek out and explore what is valuable in certification, at the least to show that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages and at best to identify positive outcomes perhaps not obtainable in other ways. On both sides of the debate on certification there is general agreement on the need for a better human factors perspective and effort in complex aviation systems design. What is at issue is how this is to be promoted. It is incumbent upon opponents of certification to say how else such promotion be enabled. This is an exploratory and philosophical review, not a focused and specific one, and it will draw upon much that is not firmly in the domain of complex aviation systems.

Wilson, John R.↗
NASA NTRS2012

CCD Camera Lens Interface for Real-Time Theodolite Alignment

Theodolites are a common instrument in the testing, alignment, and building of various systems ranging from a single optical component to an entire instrument. They provide a precise way to measure horizontal and vertical angles. They can be used to align multiple objects in a desired way at specific angles. They can also be used to reference a specific location or orientation of an object that has moved. Some systems may require a small margin of error in position of components. A theodolite can assist with accurately measuring and/or minimizing that error. The technology is an adapter for a CCD camera with lens to attach to a Leica Wild T3000 Theodolite eyepiece that enables viewing on a connected monitor, and thus can be utilized with multiple theodolites simultaneously. This technology removes a substantial part of human error by relying on the CCD camera and monitors. It also allows image recording of the alignment, and therefore provides a quantitative means to measure such error.

Wake, Shane↗
NASA NTRS1984

Aircraft automation - The problem of the pilot interface

In recent years, aviation has been experiencing a rapid growth. This growth is expected to continue, and aircraft operations in the IFR (instrument flight rules) environment, for example, are predicted to increase dramatically in the next 10 to 12 years. However, it has been found the IFR accidents are increasing at about the same rate as IFR operations, because an associated high workload can lead to human error. For this reason, NASA and others are exploring the use of aircraft systems technology as a means for reducing the pilot workload and enhancing the safety and utility of the aircraft operations. However, recent research has shown that automation, implemented with insufficient consideration to the human factors interface, can frequently create more problems than it solves. Some of this research is discussed, examples of the encountered problems are shown, and solutions regarding the arising problems are suggested.

Bergeron, H. P.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Fallible humans and vulnerable systems - Lessons learned from aviation

It is suggested that the problems being experienced in complex automatic systems are essentially due to the failure of information management and communication. The failure covers the entire spectrum: display devices and techniques, coding information so as to reduce human error, and information economy, i.e., resisting the temptation to bombard the operator with unlimited information simply because the system possesses the capability to do so. Since there has been great progress in hardware engineering, it is suggested that further attention is needed in the 'soft' side of systems. The approach should focus on (1) preventing human cognitive slips and (2) making the systems less vulnerable to such slips when they do occur. Most of the examples are taken from studies of cockpit automation.

Wiener, Earl L.↗