Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “human system risk”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Prospects for Future Human Space Flight Missions to Near-Earth Asteroids

The forthcoming Near-Earth Object (NEO) Surveyor space telescope is a foundational asset designed to complete NASA’s congressionally-mandated goal of cataloging ≥90% of NEOs ≥140 meters in size as soon as practical, and discover Earth impactors far in advance. NEO Surveyor is also critical to near-Earth asteroid (NEA) exploration because it will find suitable low-Δv NEAs for robotic and human missions, often on Earth-like orbits with long synodic periods. Such NEAs have usually not been detected until imminent Earth launch opportunities because they were not observable until close to Earth. Discovering them far enough in advance to deploy missions requires a deep-space infrared survey telescope such as NEO Surveyor. In addition to posing hazards and being scientifically important, NEAs contain resources, such as water (OH), that could be utilized off-Earth. They also offer unique opportunities for the most ambitious human voyages ever undertaken. The Apollo program forever changed humanity’s perspective by showing us Earthrise from our Moon through human eyes. Crewed missions to NEAs will forever change our perspective again by showing us Earth as a distant point of light in the heavens as seen from an asteroid by astronauts. Planetary defense endeavors to understand asteroid and comet impact risks and develop mitigation capabilities. NEA exploration is synergistic in multiple ways. NEO Surveyor will discover and help characterize Earth impactors and accessible NEAs. Heavy-lift launch is highly enabling for both human NEA missions and planetary defense. Reconnaissance missions for planetary defense can also characterize NEAs prior to crewed missions. In situ resource utilization (ISRU) systems may be applicable to deflecting or destroying hazardous NEAs. NEA characterization data critically inform planetary defense efforts and indicate NEA types suitable for human exploration or ISRU. In 2010, NASA performed the Near-Earth Object (NEO) Human Space Flight (HSF) Accessible Targets Study (NHATS), creating an automated online system monitoring mission accessibility of NEAs 2 . NHATS database NEAs meet criteria that require less total mission Δv and/or round-trip mission duration than the Martian surface or even Mars orbit. There are currently 4,658 NHATS NEAs, and many rival or exceed lunar orbit/surface accessibility. Thus, NHATS NEAs could be explored by humans prior to attempting a Mars mission. Human missions to NEAs would test human-rated spacecraft systems with less cost and risk than Mars missions. Thus, human missions to NEAs are compelling in their own right while also providing prudent preparation for more demanding Mars missions. Lunar missions can offer similar opportunities, but they differ from NEA missions in important ways. Lunar missions pose less demanding psychological challenges to crew and ground staff. Earth light-time delay for communications is significantly longer during NEA missions. NEA missions are available that require more propulsion system consumables than lunar missions but less than Mars missions. In this paper, we summarize NEA accessibility for human missions, discuss motivations for such missions, survey knowledge about NEAs that informs future human missions, present exemplar mission opportunities to the currently known NHATS NEAs, and describe future work towards enabling human NEA missions.

Near-Earth asteroids↗
NASA NTRS2023

Technological and Medical Human Health and Well-Being Options in Deep Space

Zeroth order, maintenance of human health requires supportive protection from the hazards of space, including supplying breathable air, comfortable temperatures, a supportive diet/nutrition, radiation protection, and sufficient gravity to avoid the combinatorial impacts of such effecting human operability and health. Spacecraft operability must be “fail-safe” to ensure these basic human life support conditions are maintained throughout the mission and the mission(s) must be affordable. There are known effects and unknowns effects regarding aspects of human health for Mars duration missions. Mars has the order of a third g. We have no data regarding the health impacts of this on humans or the combinatorial effects associated with 45% GCR on the Martian surface over time. There is a suspicion that if humans survive such conditions over long times they will evolve to living at reduced g and become “Martians”. Cascading failures and subcritical degradations in systems of systems causing an overall unrecoverable failure are a potential issue. There are two exremely complex systems associated with humans-Mars missions: the technical, engineering, and architectural system of systems that enable the mission and the humans. Both need to be mutually configured and operated to mitigate the overall risks and hazards of the mission. Regarding the humans that mitigation includes both the mission risks and supporting-to-increasing the human immune and other concomitant physiological systems. This report will summarize the risks, current mitigation approaches, and putative approaches including lifestyle, nutrition, and “wellness” approaches to possibly improve the human capacity to withstand the large number of combinatorial human physiological rigors of the missions. The wellness observations also apply to and are derived from Earth terrestrial applicable research.

Dennis M Bushnell↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Risk Analysis Tool for Estimating the Risk of Electrical Failures Due to Human Induced Defects

Aerospace electrical systems are required to withstand and adequately operate in extremely harsh environments that include, for example, high radiation exposure, temperature extremes, intense vibrational stress and drastic temperature cycling. The nature of aerospace electronics also demands high reliability since, with very few exceptions, there is no chance for hardware servicing or repairs. Common risk mitigation techniques for this type of situation are to perform a Reliability Analysis of the system throughout the development cycle, and to use electrical components that are regarded as “high reliability” because of additional controls and requirements applied in their design, manufacturing and testing. Unfortunately, studies have shown that even though these techniques are used, many systems fail to meet mission requirements well before the predicted lifetimes. This paper presents the analysis of failures of electrical parts, experienced during various stages of system development, at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, between the years 2001 and 2013. These components were subjected to qualification, screening and testing in which the goal was to ensure that the components would survive the stresses of the mission. The analysis categorizes failures by part type and failure mechanisms. One of the results of the analysis was the realization that a surprising proportion of failures experienced during system integration and testing were caused by human error (i.e. human induced defect). Further analysis included the determination of root failure mechanisms and any influencing factors contributing to these failures. The major causes of these defects were attributed to electrostatic damage (ESD), electrical overstress (EOS), mechanical overstress (MOS), and thermal overstress (TOS). Finally, the study proposes a risk analysis tool which incorporates these major causes for the failures, termed error-producing conditions (EPCs), and a proportionality factor representing the number of each type of failure that has occurred at the facility under study. These factors are quantified and used to communicate the risk of human induced defects for the assembly, integration and testing of space hardware based on the system’s electrical parts list. The new risk identification can trigger risk-mitigating actions more effectively, based on the presence of component categories or other hazardous conditions that have a history of failure due to human error.

Majewicz, Peter J.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Lunar precursor missions for human exploration of Mars--III: studies of system reliability and maintenance

Discussions of future human expeditions into the solar system generally focus on whether the next explorers ought to go to the Moon or to Mars. The only mission scenario developed in any detail within NASA is an expedition to Mars with a 500-day stay at the surface. The technological capabilities and the operational experience base required for such a mission do not now exist nor has any self-consistent program plan been proposed to acquire them. In particular, the lack of an Abort-to-Earth capability implies that critical mission systems must perform reliably for 3 years or must be maintainable and repairable by the crew. As has been previously argued, a well-planned program of human exploration of the Moon would provide a context within which to develop the appropriate technologies because a lunar expedition incorporates many of the operational elements of a Mars expedition. Initial lunar expeditions can be carried out at scales consistent with the current experience base but can be expanded in any or all operational phases to produce an experience base necessary to successfully and safely conduct human exploration of Mars. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Moon↗
NASA NTRS2018

Human-Automation Allocations for Current Robotic Space Operations: Space Station Remote Manipulator System

NASA’s Human Research Program’s Risk of Inadequate Design of Human and Automation/Robotic Integration (HARI) delineates the uncertainty surrounding crew work with automation and robotics in spaceflight. HARI is concerned with detrimental effects of ineffective user interfaces, system designs and/or functional task allocation on crew performance, potentially compromising mission success and safety. This risk arises because of limited experience with complex automation and robotics in spaceflight. One key knowledge gap within the HARI risk is related to function allocation.

Chang, Mai Lee↗
NASA NTRS2025

Private Astronaut Post-Mission Debrief Interviews Study

BACKGROUND The commercialization of space will increasingly include individuals that are not rigorously-selected, highly-trained professional astronauts. Private astronaut missions (PAMs), such as Axiom-1 in 2022, will continue to travel to the International Space Station in the coming years, but the risk of integrating private astronauts with NASA astronauts has not been clearly quantified nor mitigated. An earlier internal NASA operations assessment, which consisted of a comprehensive literature review and interviews of current NASA experts, found that PAMs are likely to increase the risk to NASA astronauts during integrated missions (Landon, Whiting, Russell, Schorn, Passmore, & Roma, 2022). There are ongoing efforts at NASA to mitigate concerns from a medical, psychological, and technical perspective. NASA experts are working closely with PAM providers to offer recommendations and best practices beyond the limits of requirements to ensure crew health and safety. However, efforts are siloed between groups to some extent, and with the rate of PAMs likely to increase, a more comprehensive and integrated process is needed to reduce the burden on NASA resources. AIMS The purpose of this project is to understand private astronauts’ motivations for journeying to space, their pre-mission preparation period, and their experiences in space. Data will be collected via private astronaut post-mission debrief interviews. This data will inform training needs and in-mission support needed for missions that include private astronauts; the preparation NASA astronauts and mission support personnel will need to work with these integrated crews; and gaps in knowledge to guide research and countermeasure development. Our study aims to (1) Characterize risks posed by commercialization and private astronaut crew integration in spaceflight operations, as it relates to Team, Human Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), and Behavioral Medicine (BMed) Risks, (2) Recommend potential countermeasures and identify gaps in current research. Countermeasures may be related to crew selection and composition, training, crew support systems (e.g., medical/psychological support, support from Mission Control, on-board resources), and habitability and human factors design. METHOD The BHP Lab will conduct 30-minute interviews with up to eight (8) private astronaut mission (PAM) astronauts (e.g., Axiom) and spaceflight participants (e.g., SFPs or “free flyers” on Polaris Dawn) per year from 2024-2030 to discuss knowledge gaps and needs related to selection and assessment, crew composition, training, crew support systems (e.g., medical/psychological support, support from Mission Control, onboard resources), and habitability and human factors design, which may influence the risk to NASA astronauts. Interviews will then be coded using thematic analysis and interpreted with the assistance of lexical analysis software (e.g., LIWC). As of the end of 2024, we have collected data from one PAM crew. At the conclusion of data collection in 2030, a final report will be prepared integrating all data collected by 2031. SUMMARY Post-return interviews of private astronauts are being conducted to understand their experiences and inform training and countermeasures to ensure the safety of all who journey to the ISS.

Private Astronaut Missions↗
NASA NTRS2016

[MaRS Project]

The Space Exploration Division of the Safety and Mission Assurances Directorate is responsible for reducing the risk to Human Space Flight Programs by providing system safety, reliability, and risk analysis. The Risk & Reliability Analysis branch plays a part in this by utilizing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) tools to identify possible types of failure and effective solutions. A continuous effort of this branch is MaRS, or Mass and Reliability System, a tool that was the focus of this internship. Future long duration space missions will have to find a balance between the mass and reliability of their spare parts. They will be unable take spares of everything and will have to determine what is most likely to require maintenance and spares. Currently there is no database that combines mass and reliability data of low level space-grade components. MaRS aims to be the first database to do this. The data in MaRS will be based on the hardware flown on the International Space Stations (ISS). The components on the ISS have a long history and are well documented, making them the perfect source. Currently, MaRS is a functioning excel workbook database; the backend is complete and only requires optimization. MaRS has been populated with all the assemblies and their components that are used on the ISS; the failures of these components are updated regularly. This project was a continuation on the efforts of previous intern groups. Once complete, R&M engineers working on future space flight missions will be able to quickly access failure and mass data on assemblies and components, allowing them to make important decisions and tradeoffs.

Aruljothi, Arunvenkatesh↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Lessons learned from past failures of launch vehicle developments and operations were used to create a new method to predict the probability of failure of conceptual systems. Existing methods such as Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Human Risk Assessments were considered but found to be too cumbersome for this type of system-wide application for yet-to-be-flown vehicles. The basis for this methodology were historic databases of past failures, where it was determined that various faulty human-interactions were the predominant root causes of failure rather than deficient component reliabilities evaluated through statistical analysis. This methodology contains an expert scoring part which can be used in either a qualitative or a quantitative mode. The method produces two products: a numerical score of the probability of failure and guidance to program management on critical areas in need of increased focus to improve the probability of success. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this new method, data from a concluded vehicle program (USAF's Titan IV with the Centaur G-Prime upper stage) was used as a test case. The theoretical vs. actual probability of failure was found to be 4.46% vs. 6.67% respectively. Recommendations are made for future applications of this method to ongoing launch vehicle development programs.

Launch Vehicle↗
NASA NTRS2019

Prognostic Launch Vehicle Probability of Failure Assessment Methodology for Conceptual Systems Predicated on Human Causal Factors

Lessons learned from past failures of launch vehicle developments and operations were used to create a new method to predict the probability of failure of conceptual systems. Existing methods such as Probabilistic Risk Assessments and Human Risk Assessments were considered but found to be too cumbersome for this type of system-wide application for yet-to-be-flown vehicles. The basis for this methodology were historic databases of past failures, where it was determined that various faulty human-interactions were the predominant root causes of failure rather than deficient component reliabilities evaluated through statistical analysis. This methodology contains an expert scoring part which can be used in either a qualitative or a quantitative mode. The method produces two products: a numerical score of the probability of failure or guidance to program management on critical areas in need of increased focus to improve the probability of success. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this new method, data from a concluded vehicle program (USAF's Titan IV with the Centaur G-Prime upper stage) was used as a test case. Although the theoretical vs. actual probability of failure was found to be in reasonable agreement (4.46% vs. 6.67% respectively) the underlying sub-root cause scoring had significant disparities attributable to significant organizational changes and acquisitions. Recommendations are made for future applications of this method to ongoing launch vehicle development programs.

Craig H Williams↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Elevated CO2 Could Undermine an Exploration Crew's Ability to Independently Respond to Unanticipated, Time- and Safety-Critical Anomalies

Safety and mission critical anomalies are inevitable on NASA exploration missions. Delays and interruptions in communication with Earth-experts drives the requirement that crew resolve some time- and safety-critical anomalies on their own. The HRP, HFBP, Human-System Integration Architecture (HSIA) risk refers to the possibility that, during communication blackouts and thus the absence of vast ground expertise, a small crew may not be able to independently respond to unanticipated, time-critical malfunctions or to detect safety critical procedure errors.

carbon dioxide↗
NASA NTRS2012

Development of Human System Integration at NASA

Human Systems Integration seeks to design systems around the capabilities and limitations of the humans which use and interact with the system, ensuring greater efficiency of use, reduced error rates, and less rework in the design, manufacturing and operational deployment of hardware and software. One of the primary goals of HSI is to get the human factors practitioner involved early in the design process. In doing so, the aim is to reduce future budget costs and resources in redesign and training. By the preliminary design phase of a project nearly 80% of the total cost of the project is locked in. Potential design changes recommended by evaluations past this point will have little effect due to lack of funding or a huge cost in terms of resources to make changes. Three key concepts define an effective HSI program. First, systems are comprised of hardware, software, and the human, all of which operate within an environment. Too often, engineers and developers fail to consider the human capacity or requirements as part of the system. This leads to poor task allocation within the system. To promote ideal task allocation, it is critical that the human element be considered early in system development. Poor design, or designs that do not adequately consider the human component, could negatively affect physical or mental performance, as well as, social behavior. Second, successful HSI depends upon integration and collaboration of all the domains that represent acquisition efforts. Too often, these domains exist as independent disciplines due to the location of expertise within the service structure. Proper implementation of HSI through participation would help to integrate these domains and disciplines to leverage and apply their interdependencies to attain an optimal design. Via this process domain interests can be integrated to perform effective HSI through trade-offs and collaboration. This provides a common basis upon which to make knowledgeable decisions. Finally, HSI must be considered early in the requirements development phase of system design and acquisition. This will provide the best opportunity to maximize return on investment (ROI) and system performance. HSI requirements must be developed in conjunction with capability ]based requirements generation through functional. HSI requirements will drive HSI metrics and embed HSI issues within the system design. After a system is designed, implementation of HSI oversights can be very expensive. An HSI program should be included as an integral part of a total system approach to vehicle and habitat development. This would include, but not limited to, workstation design, D&C development, volumetric analysis, training, operations, and human -robotic interaction. HSI is a necessary process for Human Space Flight programs to meet the Agency Human ]System standards and thus mitigate human risks to acceptable levels. NASA has been involved in HSI planning, procedures development, process, and implementation for many years, and has been building several internal and publicly accessible products to facilitate HSI fs inclusion in the NASA Systems Engineering Lifecycle. Some of these products include: NASA STD 3001 Volumes 1 and 2, Human Integration Design Handbook, NASA HSI Implementation Plan, NASA HSI Implementation Plan Templates, NASA HSI Implementation Handbook, and a 2 ]hour short course on HSI delivered as part of the NASA Space and Life Sciences Directorate Academy. These products have been created leveraging industry best practices and lessons learned from other Federal Government agencies.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗
NASA NTRS2009

When Failure Means Success: Accepting Risk in Aerospace Development

Over the last three decades, NASA has been diligent in qualifying systems for human space flight. As the Agency transitions from operating the Space Shuttle, its employees must learn to accept higher risk levels to generate the data needed to certify its next human space flight system. The Marshall Center s Engineering workforce is developing the Ares I crew launch vehicle and designing the Ares V cargo launch vehicle for safety, reliability, and cost-effective operations. This presentation will provide a risk retrospective, using first-hand examples from the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced (DC-XA) and the X-33 single-stage-to-orbit flight demonstrators, while looking ahead to the upcoming Ares I-X uncrewed test flight. The DC-XA was successfully flown twice in 26 hours, setting a new turnaround-time record. Later, one of its 3 landing gears did not deploy, it tipped over, and was destroyed. During structural testing, the X-33 s advanced composite tanks were unable to withstand the forces to which it was subjected and the project was later cancelled. These are examples of successful failures, as the data generated are captured in databases used by vehicle designers today. More recently, the Ares I-X flight readiness review process was streamlined in keeping with the mission's objectives, since human lives are not at stake, which reflects the beginning of a cultural change. Failures are acceptable during testing, as they provide the lessons that actually lead to mission success. These and other examples will stimulate the discussion of when to accept risk in aerospace projects.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗
NASA NTRS2023

Risk Trade-Space Analysis for Safe Human Expeditions to Mars

We assessed the integrated safety, health, and performance risk to crews on long-duration missions, specifically to Mars. Using a systems approach rather than one focused on individual countermeasures, we examined the trade space around several such risks to identify high-potential risk mitigation strategies and characterize aspects of Mars mission architectures that could lower aggregated risk. Current Mars Design Reference missions would require durations well over two years and would increase crew exposure to radiation and microgravity well beyond ISS levels, likely resulting in significantly reduced performance beyond our current capability to mitigate that could jeopardize mission success. A “fast Mars transit” round-trip mission concept was studied using an innovative flight dynamics approach to quantify the minimum total mission energy required for a Mars transit with total mission duration less than 400 days. This approach holds promise for sending humans to Mars and returning them safely with acceptable, potentially mitigatable, exposure to microgravity and radiation using current or near-term technologies. The fast transit concept would also result in fewer time-driven vehicle failures and enable sustainable deployment of humans and infrastructure to Mars on a regular cadence, allowing steady exploration and colonization of Mars. Finally, we conclude that reliance on the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) mission operations paradigm – i.e., one of near-complete real-time dependence on experts at Mission Control to manage the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew – is high risk given the communication delays and limited resupply of any Mars mission, and this risk is not eliminated by the shorter missions durations of fast transit scenarios. Based on historical trends, it is highly likely that the crew will face a high-consequence problem of uncertain origin during Mars transit when ground support will be greatly reduced. While it may be possible to reduce anomaly rates through improved reliability analysis and testing, and to reduce anomaly impacts through added robustness, such mitigations address only known failure modes and known uncertainties. Therefore, a radical shift in the Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) that defines the operational paradigm, systems design, and human-systems interactions is required to improve the risk posture to an acceptable level regardless of mission duration.

Mars↗
NASA NTRS2003

Reducing the Risk of Human Space Missions with INTEGRITY

The INTEGRITY Program will design and operate a test bed facility to help prepare for future beyond-LEO missions. The purpose of INTEGRITY is to enable future missions by developing, testing, and demonstrating advanced human space systems. INTEGRITY will also implement and validate advanced management techniques including risk analysis and mitigation. One important way INTEGRITY will help enable future missions is by reducing their risk. A risk analysis of human space missions is important in defining the steps that INTEGRITY should take to mitigate risk. This paper describes how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of human space missions will help support the planning and development of INTEGRITY to maximize its benefits to future missions. PRA is a systematic methodology to decompose the system into subsystems and components, to quantify the failure risk as a function of the design elements and their corresponding probability of failure. PRA provides a quantitative estimate of the probability of failure of the system, including an assessment and display of the degree of uncertainty surrounding the probability. PRA provides a basis for understanding the impacts of decisions that affect safety, reliability, performance, and cost. Risks with both high probability and high impact are identified as top priority. The PRA of human missions beyond Earth orbit will help indicate how the risk of future human space missions can be reduced by integrating and testing systems in INTEGRITY.

Jones, Harry W.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Lunar Lettuce Production During Artemis III Mission to the Moon's South Pole

The Artemis Science Plan identified that the infrastructure and resources associated during a human/robotic exploration mission can be used to conduct fundamental lunar science needed to mitigate the risks of human exploration of surface systems (i.e. Mars and the Moon). In particular, studying the response of life to the combination of fractional gravity and deep space radiation of the Moon is needed to mitigate the HEOMD risks to the crew that result from inadequate diets. Essential nutrients and vitamins available to astronauts have been shown to degrade within the stored food system during long duration missions. Other risks to exploration missions were isolation and confinement, distance from the Earth, radiation and partial gravity.

O. Monje↗
NASA NTRS2014

Some Challenges in the Design of Human-Automation Interaction for Safety-Critical Systems

Increasing amounts of automation are being introduced to safety-critical domains. While the introduction of automation has led to an overall increase in reliability and improved safety, it has also introduced a class of failure modes, and new challenges in risk assessment for the new systems, particularly in the assessment of rare events resulting from complex inter-related factors. Designing successful human-automation systems is challenging, and the challenges go beyond good interface development (e.g., Roth, Malin, & Schreckenghost 1997; Christoffersen & Woods, 2002). Human-automation design is particularly challenging when the underlying automation technology generates behavior that is difficult for the user to anticipate or understand. These challenges have been recognized in several safety-critical domains, and have resulted in increased efforts to develop training, procedures, regulations and guidance material (CAST, 2008, IAEA, 2001, FAA, 2013, ICAO, 2012). This paper points to the continuing need for new methods to describe and characterize the operational environment within which new automation concepts are being presented. We will describe challenges to the successful development and evaluation of human-automation systems in safety-critical domains, and describe some approaches that could be used to address these challenges. We will draw from experience with the aviation, spaceflight and nuclear power domains.

systems engineering↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Proof-of-Concept for a Long-Term Health Metric to Quantify End of Mission Health Status in Astronauts

NASA has long used Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) when high-stakes decisions need to be made about complex systems. For spaceflight medical risk, the Human Research Program’s Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) is a significant step towards robustly quantifying the risk to crew health during exploration missions. However, there remains a significant gap in the ability to comprehensively characterize and assess risk across the disparate functionalities and capabilities which comprise the entire Crew Health and Performance (CHP) system. To fill this gap, the Crew Health and Performance – Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) project aims to perform risk characterization for the CHP system by assessing performance risk in addition to medical risk. This effort also includes quantifying Long-Term Health (LTH) risk in addition to in-mission risk outcomes within the CHP-PRA results. LTH risk encompasses the timeframe from immediately post-flight, through the rest of an astronaut’s career, through retirement, and until death. A proof-of-concept LTH risk metric is based on medical condition end-state, as defined by the Evidence Library, capturing the spaceflight specific medical impacts persisting into post-flight[1]. Condition outcomes in the Evidence Library progress through three Clinical Phases (CP): the diagnostic phase (CP1), the treatment/convalescent phase (CP2), and the end-state phase (CP3) which represents the detrimental effects of the condition after the crew member has recovered to the maximal extent. Each CP has an associated Task Impairment (TI), defined as the degree of crew incapacity due to experiencing the condition, and is quantified with a 0-1 range. Conditions with an associated CP3 (e.g. Sepsis, Traumatic Hypovolemic Shock, Sudden Cardiac Arrest, etc.) typically have serious consequences that can cause an astronaut to be fully or partially debilitated throughout the remainder of the mission. Consequently, the Cumulative CP3 TI End-of-Mission Health Status Metric is developed by CHP-PRA to quantify the cumulative effects of all conditions which progressed to the CP3 state throughout the entirety of the mission. Hence, this End-of-Mission Health Status Metric attempts to serve as an indicator of an astronaut’s health state at the time of landing. The severity of the lingering effects of in-mission medical events are dependent on mission activities and the level of available in-mission medical care. This allows the associated cumulative TI metric to be used in comparison with the crew’s end of mission health status for different levels of in-mission resources. This presentation provides the strategy for using CP3 as an LTH metric component, as well as a proof-of-concept demonstration of LTH risk characterization using this component.

long term health↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Supervisory Control with Dual Tasking in Post G-Transition Vehicle Landings

BACKGROUND Landing during exploration spaceflight may consist of both planned automated supervisory control and unplanned crew override. Supervisory control, particularly when performed under cognitive load with additional monitoring tasks, is essential for ensuring overall mission success during landing contingencies. Evaluating performance in a relevant Human Landing System (HLS) supervisory landing task after long-duration microgravity exposure can help identify potential risks from human error and sensorimotor alterations. Adaptive changes in the sensorimotor system can manifest during g-transitions as spatial disorientation. Although training and landing aids facilitate successful landings despite disorientation, these adaptive changes may heighten cognitive demand, which must be considered in the landing strategy. It is important to characterize these effects as soon as possible following the G-transition while the sensorimotor system remains in a state of adaptive flux to inform appropriate countermeasures. METHODS A Multi-attribute Lunar Table Battery (MALTB) task was developed for an iOS tablet device to provide flexible crew testing and training capabilities in-flight and on the ground. Elements of the tablet task were derived from the Multi-Attribute Task Battery (MATB, Cegarra et al. 2020). The task requires crew members to study a map of a planned landing site and memorizing the terrain and surface landmarks to inform potential divert maneuvers during landing. The user will oversee a series of approaches through touchdown simulations on the tablet with an external camera view of the Lunar surface. The primary responsibility of the crew member will be to execute a divert if the guidance recommended site is erroneous (e.g., the guidance projected landing target is not within 10m of the planned landing site center), or the projected landing site is no longer suitable due to surface obstacles. Considering vehicle maneuverability and fuel reserves, the divert capabilities will diminish as the task progresses. In cases where a divert is initiated, a new landing target will need to be designated by the user and will be evaluated for the proximity to the original pre-planned site. A secondary operational monitoring task will challenge the user's cognitive reserve by requiring the user to maintain several gauges within acceptable limits and respond to a visual indicator while completing the landing approach. Outcome measures include distance from the planned landing site to the user-initiate divert landing location, ground slope at the new landing site, time to divert, the ability to accomplish the secondary monitoring tasks, and perceived workload. The tablet task is being evaluated in a ground-based study to determine the learning effect of first-time users. The tablet task will be utilized in a flight study to test performance multiple times postflight. Future potential testing in-flight have been identified for capsules with iOS tablet devices. Multi-attribute Lunar Table Battery Task MALTB comprises video footage of thirty distinct landing conditions. The landing scenarios feature various landing sites (n = 3), hazardous object sizes (n = 6), sun azimuth degrees (n = 4), camera modes (i.e., fixed or gimbaled), and navigation bias (i.e., true or false). Each seventy second trial uses a sixty-degree constant glideslope trajectory. The application architecture and layout include user identification setup and data storing, a guided walkthrough of the task and interface components, practice mode for task familiarization, and a modified Bedford workload scale administered following task completion. The time-based dependent measures are saved locally to the iOS Files application and post-processing scripts have been developed to evaluate the remaining measures of performance. RELEVANCE This project will deliver an operational demonstration of crew monitoring capability following spaceflight and identify potential deficits that may require remediation. Comparison of individual vestibular and cognitive changes with crew performance will help better characterize the landing risks associated with sensorimotor alterations. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: This project is funded by NASA’s Human Research Program Human Health Countermeasures Element. REFERENCES Cegarra J, Valery B, Avril E, Calmettes C, Navarro J (2020) OpenMATB: A Multi-Attribute Task Battery promoting task customization, software extensibility and experiment replicability. Behav Res Methods 52:1980-1990 doi: 10.3758/s13428-020-01364-w

Matthew McDonnell↗