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DOE OSTI2020

Fabrication Lessons Learned of Transportation Packaging from the Perspective of a Design Authority - 20322

This paper presents lessons learned regarding fabricating packaging systems from the perspective of a design authority (DA). Capturing and implementing lessons learned is critical for an organization to reduce systematic project risk and thereby promote the likelihood of project success. This paper defines the design authority as the organization responsible for technical design, resolving technical design issues, quality assurance program, and maintenance of the packaging system license. A package system is defined as the packaging, its contents, and auxiliary equipment. Packages are certified by the NRC under 10 CFR 71[1] for transportation by ground. The following lessons learned subjects are presented in the paper: quality assurance, interpretation of drawing dimensional requirements, execution of manufacturing processes, hardware dimensional inspection, and leakage rate testing. All discrepancies presented in this paper have been resolved as described in the appropriate final data package. All described package systems are in compliance with their Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and certificate of conformance requirements. The intent of this paper is to identify opportunities for improving the outcome of future projects and to mitigate fabrication challenges proactively. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Lessons Learned—Fluoride Exposure and Response

Laboratory research can expose workers to a wide variety of chemical hazards. Researchers must not only take personal responsibility for their safety but also inevitably rely on coworkers to also work safely. The foundations for protocols, requirements, and behaviors come from our history and lessons learned from others. For that reason, here, a recent incident is examined in which a researcher suffered hydrofluoric acid (HF) burns while working with an inorganic digestion mixture of aqueous HF (8%) and nitric acid (HNO 3 , 58%). HF education is critical for workers because delays in treatment, improper treatment, and delay of symptoms are all factors in unfavorable outcomes in case reports. Furthermore, while the potential severity of the incident was elevated due to bypassed engineered controls and lack of proper personal protective equipment, only minor injuries were sustained. We discuss the results of a causal analysis of the incident that revealed areas of improvement in protocols, personal protective equipment, and emergency response that could help prevent similar accidents from occurring. We also present simple improvements that anyone can implement to reduce the potential consequences of an accident, based upon our lessons learned.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2013

Solid-State Lighting: Early Lessons Learned on the Way to Market

Analysis of issues and lessons learned during the early stages of solid-state lighting market introduction in the U.S., which also summarizes early actions taken to avoid potential problems anticipated based on lessons learned from the market introduction of compact fluorescent lamps.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2025

Lessons Learned from MARVEL Initial Fabrication and Testing

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) project is intended to be amongst the first U.S. advanced reactor demonstrations in four decades. By virtue of being sponsored directly by the U.S. Department of Energy, the reactor is intended to benefit the broader nuclear community by exercising design processes, safety reviews, and supply chains. This project is intent on publicly documenting key lessons learned along the way toward demonstration. Building on a 2024 report that focused on lessons learned from the design and project management phase, this 2025 edition focuses on findings from the MARVEL guard vessel fabrication and primary coolant apparatus test (PCAT) testing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2026

MARVEL Lessons Learned – 2026 Edition Fabrication, Fuel Procurement, Quality Assurance, and Safety Basis

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) project is intended to be among the first U.S. advanced reactor demonstrations in four decades. By virtue of being sponsored directly by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the reactor is expected to benefit the broader nuclear community by exercising design processes, safety reviews, and supply chains. This project is committed to publicly documenting key lessons learned along the way toward demonstration. Building on a 2025 report that focused on lessons learned from guard vessel fabrication and Primary Coolant Apparatus Test (PCAT) testing (Abou-Jaoude et al. 2025), this 2026 edition captures findings spanning structural fabrication, quality assurance (QA), reactivity control system (RCS) assembly, fuel fabrication and shipment, safety basis development, balance-of-plant design, and overall reactor design.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

NASA NTRS2006

Heritage Adoption Lessons Learned, Active Mirror Telescope Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism

The Active Mirror Telescope (AMT) task adopted the Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism (CDLM) design as used on the Galaxy Evolution Explorer (GALEX) project. The three separate mechanisms that comprise the CDLM will be discussed in this paper in addition to a focus on heritage adoption lessons learned and specific examples. These lessons learned will be valuable to any project considering the use of heritage designs.

heritage adoption↗

NASA NTRS2005

Lessons Learned Implementing Multi-Mission Sequencing Software

This paper will describe the software and its uses to provide context for its criticality. The different approaches that have been taken to implement the software in a multi-mission format will be outlined. The advantages and disadvantages as well as the lessons learned during development and maintenance of these different architectures will be discussed, Finally. the use of multi-mission software in operations and the lessons learned from using it will be discussed.This paper will provide valuable information to organizations exploring the use of multi-mission software. regardless of whether the change is to minimize spacecraft ground software development time or cost reduction. Similarly. the paper will provide insight into some of the steps that can be taken during software development and operational use that will minimize difficulty later.

software↗

NASA NTRS2014

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗

NASA NTRS2011

Human Factors Throughout the Life Cycle: Lessons Learned from the Shuttle Program

With the ending of the Space Shuttle Program, it is critical that we not forget the Human Factors lessons we have learned over the years. At every phase of the life cycle, from manufacturing, processing and integrating vehicle and payload, to launch, flight operations, mission control and landing, hundreds of teams have worked together to achieve mission success in one of the most complex, high-risk socio-technical enterprises ever designed. Just as there was great diversity in the types of operations performed at every stage, there was a myriad of human factors that could further complicate these human systems. A single mishap or close call could point to issues at the individual level (perceptual or workload limitations, training, fatigue, human error susceptibilities), the task level (design of tools, procedures and aspects of the workplace), as well as the organizational level (appropriate resources, safety policies, information access and communication channels). While we have often had to learn through human mistakes and technological failures, we have also begun to understand how to design human systems in which individuals can excel, where tasks and procedures are not only safe but efficient, and how organizations can foster a proactive approach to managing risk and supporting human enterprises. Panelists will talk about their experiences as they relate human factors to a particular phase of the shuttle life cycle. They will conclude with a framework for tying together human factors lessons-learned into system-level risk management strategies.

human factors↗

NASA NTRS2018

Flight Systems Integration & Test: Lessons Learned for Future Success

This paper offers a comprehensive view of flight system integration and test (I&T) lessons learned related to mishaps and close calls, focusing on what can be done to improve the I&T process to avoid recurrence. Specific areas within the realm of I&T that are covered in this paper include: I&T team communication and training; design of flight and ground systems for I&T; planning and scheduling; configuration management and process documentation; ground support equipment and tools; cleanrooms and contamination; mechanical integration, handling, and deployments; electrical integration and electrostatic discharge; functional testing and troubleshooting; environmental testing and facilities; and launch site operations. To illustrate "real-world" lessons learned for I&T, examples from throughout the history of the U.S. space program are presented. Also presented are some best practices for I&T that can help mitigate mishaps and close calls on the ground or during flight.

Integration & Test↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned from Large-Scale Aerospace Structural Testing

Large-scale testing of aerospace structures is frequently the final step in a development project to validate the structural performance, and that typically involves a large cost and time investment. In order to ensure that the testing provides the required data, avoiding errors that can result in an unsuccessful test and failure to meet objectives is critical. Presented herein are five lessons learned to provide insight to those conducting tests in order to help them avoid known pitfalls that may result in an unsuccessful test. Five subject large-scale tests are described, and include two composite wing tests, a composite hybrid-wing body center section test, a full-scale 27.5-ft diameter metallic barrel test, and an 8-ft diameter metallic barrel test. Problems identified during the testing and mitigation approaches to solve the problems are presented, then the lessons learned are summarized.

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned from Large-Scale Aerospace Structural Testing

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spacecraft Line-Of-Sight Jitter Mitigation and Management Lessons Learned and Engineering Best Practices

Predicting, managing, controlling, and testing spacecraft line-of-sight (LoS) jitter caused by micro-vibrations due to onboard internal disturbance sources is a formidable multidisciplinary engineering task. It is especially challenging for those missions hosting high-performance, vibration-sensitive optical sensor payloads with stringent pointing stability requirements. Both NASA and ESA are planning technically aggressive spaceflight missions that include ultra-high-performance optical payloads with delicate, highly vibration-sensitive scientific and observational instruments. The GN&C community of practice will need to leverage and build upon their collective experiences and lessons learned to better address future micro-vibration challenges. To identify lessons learned and best engineering practices the NASA Engineering & Safety Center (NESC) sponsored a two-day Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop in late 2019. The workshop’s goal was to provide a multidisciplinary forum to elicit deeper understanding of the issues related to solving the spacecraft LoS jitter/micro-vibration problem. A primary objective was to identify and share best practices, rules of thumb, and options for jitter-related activities. Representatives from NASA, JPL, ESA, along with NASA’s industrial partners, independent consultant subject matter experts, and members of academia participated in the workshop. This paper will describe the motivation for the NASA Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop and summarize the identified findings, observations, and recommendations.

Lessons Learned;↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Composite Overwrap Lessons Learned on 40k Thrust Chamber Assemblies

Filament wound carbon fiber/polymer composite overwraps combined with additively manufactured (AM) copper alloy combustion chambers are a critical part of NASA’s Rapid Analysis and Manufacturing Propulsion Technology (RAMPT) project. The composite overwrap is a high strength-to-weight material and allows for significant weight reduction of the high-pressure thrust chamber assembly, reduction of overall cost, and reduced fabrication time while offering structural robustness. Integrated AM/composite overwrap chamber assemblies using 2,000 lbf (2k) and 7,000 lbf (7k) thrust were successfully hot fire tested at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). These assemblies allowed the team to learn lessons related to the design, analysis, and manufacturing of these integrated assemblies. A final goal of the RAMPT project is to design and test a 40,000 lbf (40k) thrust chamber assembly. The40k chamber presented the team several new challenges including an integral inlet port in the main body of the composite overwrap. Through multiple iterations of manufacturing techniques, varied materials, and Non-Destructive Evaluations (NDE), many lessons were learned to obtain a final design solution that would not only allow for the interrupted port inlet but also allow for sufficient material margins for the most critically stressed part of the chamber. This paper will cover the manufacturing techniques exploring fabric designs to help subsidize the coverage in the areas left bare by the inlet port during the filament winding process and custom tooling needed for the final full chamber processing. The original material choice of bismaleimide (BMI) 5250-4 from the 7k chamber performed well for the extreme environment of hot fire testing but proved to be difficult with the increased scale and interrupted port design of the 40kchamber. Discussion in this paper will cover these changes, including evaluation of the design, comparison to the prior 2k and 7k designs, and show the final hardware that will be tested. One primary goal of this work and RAMPT project is to provide this development process and data to industry for infusion into future engine designs.

Filament Wound↗

NASA NTRS2023

Lessons Learned from Large-Scale Aerospace Structural Testing

Large-scale testing of aerospace structures is frequently the final step in a development project to validate the structural performance, and that step typically involves a large cost and time investment. To ensure that the testing provides the required data, avoiding errors that can result in an unsuccessful test and failure to meet objectives is critical. Five lessons learned are presented herein to provide insight to those conducting tests in order to help them avoid known pitfalls that may result in an unsuccessful test. Five large-scale tests are described, and include two composite wing tests, a composite hybrid-wing body center section test, a full-scale 27.5-ft diameter metallic barrel test, and an 8-ft diameter metallic barrel test. Problems identified during the testing and mitigation approaches to solve the problems are presented, then the lessons learned are identified and discussed.

Lessons Learned↗

DOE OSTI2015

Marine Hydrokinetic Energy Regulators Workshop: Lessons from Wind

Ian Baring-Gould presented these lessons learned from wind energy to an audience of marine hydrokinetic regulators. Lessons learned spanned the areas of technology advances, using collaborative approaches to involve key stakeholders; using baseline studies to measure and prioritize wildlife impacts, and look at avoidance and mitigation options early in the process.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2015

Aspirations and common tensions: larger lessons from the third US national climate assessment

The Third US National Climate Assessment (NCA3) was produced by experts in response to the US Global Change Research Act of 1990. Based on lessons learned from previous domestic and international assessments, the NCA3 was designed to speak to a broad public and inform the concerns of policy- and decision-makers at different scales. The NCA3 was also intended to be the first step in an ongoing assessment process that would build the nation’s capacity to respond to climate change. This concluding paper draws larger lessons from the insights gained throughout the assessment process that are of significance to future US and international assessment designers. We bring attention to process and products delivered, communication and engagement efforts, and how they contributed to the sustained assessment. Based on areas where expectations were exceeded or not fully met, we address four common tensions that all assessment designers must confront and manage: between (1) core assessment ingredients (knowledge base, institutional set-up, principled process, and the people involved), (2) national scope and subnational adaptive management information needs, (3) scope, complexity, and manageability, and (4) deliberate evaluation and ongoing learning approaches. Managing these tensions, amidst the social and political contexts in which assessments are conducted, is critical to ensure that assessments are feasible and productive, while its outcomes are perceived as credible, salient, and legitimate.

Moser, Susanne C.↗