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131 records · Page 8

Laser Brazing of High Temperature Braze Alloy

The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) consists of 1080 conical tubes, which are furnace brazed themselves, manifolds, and surrounding structural jacket making almost four miles of braze joints. Subsequent furnace braze cycles are performed due to localized braze voids between the coolant tubes. SSME nozzle experiences extremely high heat flux (180 mW/sq m) during hot fire. Braze voids between coolant tubes may result in hot combustion gas escape causing jacket bulges. The nozzle can be disqualified for flight or result in mission failure if the braze voids exceed the limits. Localized braze processes were considered to eliminate braze voids, however, damage to the parent materials often prohibited use of such process. Being the only manned flight reusable rocket engine, it has stringent requirement on the braze process. Poor braze quality or damage to the parent materials limits the nozzle service life. The objective of this study was to develop a laser brazing process to provide quality, localized braze joints without adverse affect on the parent materials. Gold (Au-Cu-Ni-Pd-Mn) based high temperature braze alloys were used in both powder and wire form. Thin section iron base superalloy A286 tube was used as substrate materials. Different Laser Systems including CO2 (10.6 micrometers, 1kW), ND:YAG (1.06 micrometers, 4kW). and direct diode laser (808nm. 150W) were investigated for brazing process. The laser process variables including wavelength. laser power, travel speed and angle of inclination were optimized according to bead geometry and braze alloy wetting at minimum heat input level, The properties of laser brazing were compared to that of furnace brazing. Microhardness profiles were used for braze joint property comparison between laser and furnace brazing. The cooling rate of laser brazing was compared to furnace brazing based on secondary dendritic arm spacing, Both optical and Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) were used to evaluate the microstructures of the braze materials and tube substrate. Metallography of the laser braze joint was compared to the furnace braze. SEM Energy Disperse X-Ray Spectra (EDX) and back scattered imaging were used to analyze braze alloy segregation. Although all of the laser systems, CO2, ND:YAG, and direct diode laser produced good braze joint, the direct diode laser was selected for its system simplicity, compactness and portability. Excellent laser and braze alloy coupling is observed with powder alloy compared to braze alloy wire. Good wetting is found with different gold based braze alloys. The laser brazing process can be optimized so that the adverse affect on the parent materials can be eliminated. Metallography of the laser braze joint has shown that quality braze joint was produced with laser brazing process. Penetration of the laser braze to the substrate is at neglectable level. Zero penetration is observed. Microstructure examinations shown that no observable changes of the microstructure (grain structure and precipitation) in the HAZ area between laser braze and furnace braze. Wide gaps can be laser brazed with single pass for up to 0.024 inches. Finer dendritic structure is observed in laser brazing compared with equiaxial and coarser grain of the furnace brazing microstructure. Greater segregation is also found in the furnace braze. Higher hardness of the laser braze joint comparing to furnace braze is observed due to the fast cooling rate and Finer microstructure in the laser brazing. Laser braze joint properties meet or exceed the furnace joint properties. Direct diode laser for thin section tube brazing with high temperature braze alloys have been successfully demonstrated. The laser's high energy density and precise control has shown significant advantages in reducing process heat input to the substrates and provide high quality braze joints comparing to other localized braze process such as torch, TIG, and MPTA processes. Significant cost savings can be realized particularly with localized braze comparing to a full furnace braze cycle.

Gao, Y. P.↗

EVA Swab Kit: Tools and Techniques for Collecting Aseptic Samples from Crewed Space Missions

Introduction: When we send humans to search for life on other planets, we'll need to know what we brought with us versus what may already be there. To ensure our crewed spacecraft meet planetary protection requirements—and to protect our science from human contamination—we'll need to assess and verify whether micro-organisms may be leaking/venting from our spacesuits. This requires collecting samples under Extravehicular Activity (EVA) conditions. Detailed, systematic research on forward contamination from robotic spacecraft has been steadily progressing since the Viking missions, but systematic studies of contamination from space suits has not been conducted in many years. The modern EMU (Extravehicular Mobility Unit) suit used by NASA is designed to leak at rates as high as 100 cc/min. Before humans land on Mars there is a critical need to understand the types and quantities of microbes that could be introduced via space suits. The Human Forward Contamination Assessment team at NASA’s Johnson Space Center (JSC) has developed a prototype EVA swab tool [1,2,3,4] designed for use in space to sample cleaned and uncleaned space suits to determine the present day microbial load and eventually the rate of leakage. The ability to assess microbial leakage early in advanced space suit and life support system design cycles will help avoid costly hardware redesign later. Test Objectives: The primary objective of EMU testing was to characterize the type of micro-organisms typically found on or near selected suit pressure joints under suit differential pressure conditions. Most human-borne microbes can fit through a 0.5 to 1.0 µm gap. Knowing which joints are more likely to leak will inform hardware design decisions. Knowing which types of micro-organisms may leak from EVA suits provides a basis for subsequent studies to characterize the viability of those organisms under destination conditions, as well as how far they might spread through natural or human-influenced processes. That data, in turn, will inform exploration mission operations and hardware design. The secondary objective of testing was to evaluate the interface between a fully suited test subject and the EVA swab tool at vacuum. Bulky EVA suits can restrict movement and limit visibility through the helmet visor. Fully suited testing is important for identifying tool design issues prior to flight. At exploration destinations, such as Mars, suited crew may be required to periodically sample their suits as part of an environmental monitoring protocol. Suit Microbial Sampling Results: This report details results of microbial swabs collected from current flight suit configurations worn by crew members assigned to upcoming ISS expedition missions as well as swabs collected from prototype suits intended for use on the Orion spacecraft. These tests were intended to characterize the types of contaminants found on flight suits under current, typical handling conditions. No attempt was made to change suit handling procedures, provide additional sterilization, or to limit typical potential contaminant sources. Using culture based techniques, we cultivated 235 CFU (colony forming units) comprised of 26 bacterial species and one fungal species on the outside of the suits. The fungal species and 14 of the bacterial species were unique to the suit surfaces and were not detected in any of the background samples collected within the chambers. We sequenced 755,434 ribosomal fragments on all of the suit surfaces from swab samples. 557,016 of these sequences represent DNA that survived at least 4 hours at vacuum. These sequences formed 2,464 OTU's (Operational Taxonomic Units, 97% similarity) showing low diversity in the samples. The most abundant sequences that survived vacuum belong to the genera Staphyloccocus, Ralstona, Bacillus and Rhodobacter all of which are common to the human microbiome. [5] See Danko et al., (2021) for more complete details of these first analyses. Further analysis of EVA suit materials with respect to the efficacy of various cleaning protocols and engineered containment solutions is planned to inform suit design for NASA’s Artemis Moon to Mars program crew testing. Swab Tool Function Results: The kit was demonstrated for fit and function in suited subject vacuum tests to determine how well the tool worked as an aseptic microbial sampling device as well as to identify any design elements that could be upgraded for EVA task specific improvement. It was found that sample acquisition efficacy could be enhanced by redesign of the sample canister to end-effector interface. Several modifications of the sample caddy assemblies to optimize EVA safety and functionality were also identified. Consequently, fabrication of the redesigned sample canister to end-effector assembly interfaces and and the sample caddy assemblies are required. Fabrication of sixteen flight sample canister assemblies (8 per each of two EVA Swab Kits) and two sample caddy assemblies are in process to be followed by hardware testing and certification to produce two flight-certified EVA Swab Kits for transport to ISS no earlier than summer of 2022. Sampling Strategy: The International Space Station is an ideal testbed for systematic studies of contamination from crewed vehicles since it has been continuously occupied for 20 years and exposed to non-terrestrial conditions. We will sample the exterior of the ISS during EVA using a purpose-built swab tool capable of maintaining sterility while undergoing temperature changes from -151 to +121°C under hard vacuum. Prior to each EVA, the project team will work with ISS mission managers to identify precise sampling locations, which will vary by EVA based on the translation paths and worksites scheduled for that particular EVA. Ideally, translation path handrails and areas near ECLSS (Environmental Control and Life Support System) external vent openings on a spacecraft would be assessed. There are currently more than a dozen ECLSS external vents on the ISS. Some are connected to systems that vent waste products, while others are intended to equalize cabin pressure. As EVA opportunity allows, microbial samples from any of these external vents would provide a valuable data point, though some will be more useful than others. Four criteria have been identified to help prioritize sampling sites near vents: • EVA Accessibility: To minimize cost, it is desired to piggy-back onto a planned EVA. Therefore, the sampling location must be readily accessible by an EVA crew • Type of Vented Products: Vent products that have been in direct contact with crew, such as cabin air, are more likely to contain microorganisms than vent products associated with isolated systems, such as experiment module combustion products. • Mass of Vented Products: Higher-flow vents are more likely to contain detectible levels of microbial contaminants than lower-flow vents. • Local Environment: Sample locations with relatively benign local conditions, such as warm surfaces shielded from direct ultraviolet (UV) radiation exposure, may be more likely to support microbial growth than locations with harsher local environmental conditions. Because EVA accessibility is the most important criteria, the proposal team worked with an astronaut and flight controllers using the Dynamic Onboard Ubiquitous Graphics (DOUG) tool. The DOUG virtual environment allows an operator to “fly” around the current ISS vehicle configuration to assess EVA translation paths, attach points, and keep-out zones. While analysis on station or rapid return to Earth would be preferable, samples collected from the exterior of the ISS have already been exposed to temperature variations between -157 and +121 °C as well as hard vacuum. Therefore, they should be fairly stable and robust. We hypothesize that samples collected from the ISS exterior could be stored for up to 6 months at -80°C without degradation. Sample canisters will be returned to Earth while frozen at -80°C for analysis, and sterilized canisters can be re-flown back to ISS to support additional sampling opportunities Relevance to NASA Exploration Objectives: These data will allow us to identify new or improved methods, technologies, and procedures for spacecraft sterilization and leakage mitigation to minimize the amount of contamination introduced to the environment by human explorers. This work is funded by NASA research grant: NNH18ZDA001N-PPR References: [1] Bell, M.S. et al. (2015) LPS XLVI, Abst. #1832 [2] Rucker et al. (2018) 42nd COSPAR (PPP.3) [3] Bell, M.S. et al. (2019) Mars Extant Life Conference, Abst. #5096.[4] Bell, M.S. et al., (2020) 43rd COSPAR (BO.2).[5] Danko D, et.al.,(2021)Front.Microbiol.12:608478.

Mary Suzanne Bell↗

Unique Tuft Test Facility Dramatically Reduces Brush Seal Development Costs

Brush seals have been incorporated in the latest turbine engines to reduce leakage and improve efficiency. However, the life of these seals is limited by wear. Studies have shown that optimal sealing characteristics for a brush seal occur before the interference fit between the brush and shaft is excessively worn. Research to develop improved tribopairs (brush and coating) with reduced wear and lower friction has been hindered by the lack of an accurate, low-cost, efficient test methodology. Estimated costs for evaluating a new material combination in an engine company seal test program are on the order of $100,000. To address this need, the NASA Lewis Research Center designed, built, and validated a unique, innovative brush seal tuft tester that slides a single tuft of brush seal wire against a rotating shaft under controlled loads, speeds, and temperatures comparable to those in turbine engines. As an initial screening tool, the brush seal tuft tester can tribologicaly evaluate candidate seal materials for 1/10th the cost of full-scale seal tests. Previous to the development of the brush seal tuft tester facility, most relevant tribological data had been obtained from full-scale seal tests conducted primarily to determine seal leakage characteristics. However, from a tribological point of view, these tests included the confounding effects of varying contact pressures, bristle flaring, high-temperature oxidation, and varying bristle contact angles. These confounding effects are overcome in tuft testing. The interface contact pressures can be either constant or varying depending on the tuft mounting device, and bristle wear can be measured optically with inscribed witness marks. In a recent cooperative program with a U.S. turbine engine manufacturer, five metallic wire candidates were tested against a plasma-sprayed Nichrome-bonded chrome carbide. The wire materials used during this collaboration were either nickel-chrome- or cobaltchrome-based superalloys. These tests corroborated full-scale seal test results and provided insight into previously untested combinations. As the cycle temperature for improved efficiency turbine engines increases, new brush seal materials combinations must be considered. Future brush seal tuft testing will include both metallic and ceramic bristles versus commercial and NASA-developed shaft coatings. The ultimate goal of this work is to expand the current data base so that seal designers can tailor brush seal materials to specific applications.

Fellenstein, James A.↗

Joint Test Plan for Gas Dynamic Spray Technology Demonstration

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and NASA have similar missions, facilities, and structures located in similar harsh environments. Both are responsible for a number of facilities/structures with metallic structural and non-structural components in highly and moderately corrosive environments. Regardless of the corrosivity of the environment, all metals require periodic maintenance activity to guard against the insidious effects of corrosion and thus ensure that structures meet or exceed design or performance life. The standard practice for protecting metallic substrates in atmospheric environments is the use of an applied coating system. Current coating systems used across AFSPC and NASA contain volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). These coatings are subject to environmental regulations at the Federal and State levels that limit their usage. In addition, these coatings often cannot withstand the high temperatures and exhaust that may be experienced by AFSPC and NASA structures. In response to these concerns, AFSPC and NASA have approved the use of thermal spray coatings (TSCs). Thermal spray coatings are extremely durable and environmentally friendly coating alternatives, but utilize large cumbersome equipment for application that make the coatings difficult and time consuming to repair. Other concerns include difficulties coating complex geometries and the cost of equipment, training, and materials. Gas Dynamic Spray (GDS) technology (also known as Cold Spray) will be evaluated as a smaller, more maneuverable repair method as well as for areas where thermal spray techniques are not as effective. The technology can result in reduced maintenance and thus reduced hazardous materials/wastes associated with current processes. Thermal spray and GDS coatings also have no VOCs and are environmentally preferable coatings. To achieve a condition suitable for the application of a coating system, including GDS coatings, the substrate must undergo some type of surface preparation and/or depainting operation to ensure adhesion of the new coating system. The GDS unit selected for demonstration has a powder feeding system that can be used for surface preparation or coating application. The surface preparation feature will also be examined. The primary objective of this effort is to demonstrate GDS technology as a repair method for TSCs. The project will also determine the optimal GDS coating thickness for acceptable performance. Successful completion of this project will result in approval of GDS technology as a repair method for TSCs at AFSPC and NASA installations and will improve corrosion protection at critical systems, facilitate easier maintenance activity, extend maintenance cycles, eliminate flight hardware contamination, and reduce the amount of hazardous waste generated.

Lewis, Pattie↗

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗