Characterizing Nuclear Material Out of Regulatory Control: Testing Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Nuclear Forensics Capabilities
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Erythritol tetranitrate (ETN) is a homemade explosive with high explosive performance which can easily be synthesized using widely available chemical precursors. Ascertaining the manner in which ETN is synthesized and being able to trace the ETN back to its precursor materials may aid in the forensic identification. As a proof of concept, seven different types of ETN were synthesized with laboratory grade materials as well as commercially available chemicals from the hardware store and grocery store. The seven different types of solid ETN and the reaction quenches were analyzed using high performance liquid chromatography (HPLC). Partial least squares discriminant analysis (PLS-DA) was used to probe the different classes of ETN and reaction quenches. Several PLS-DA models were produced with the seven different types of ETN and quenches having their own classification, ETN and quenches based on their acid source, and ETN and the quenches based on their nitrate source. Regardless of which classification manner was used, there were no differences found between the different types of ETN or their reaction quenches. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that there is inherent variability in the synthesis of ETN making HPLC an unreliable method to determine the source of the synthesis materials. Elemental impurities were measured in seven solid ETN samples and their reaction quenches by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS). No differences were discovered between the solid ETN samples, but there were trace metals found in the reaction quenches which were found to be identifiers of the source material.
ABSTRACT The mission of radiological dispersal device (RDD) nuclear forensics is to identify the provenance of nuclear and radiological materials used in RDDs and to aid law enforcement in tracking nuclear materials and routes. The application of databases to radiological forensics is to match RDD source material to a source model in the database, provide guidance regarding a possible second device, and aid the FBI by providing a short list of manufacturers and distributors, and ultimately to the last legal owner of the source. The Argonne/Idaho National Laboratory RDD attribution database is a powerful technical tool in radiological forensics. The database (1267 unique vendors) includes all sealed sources and a device registered in the U.S., is complemented by data from the IAEA Catalogue, and is supported by rigorous in-lab characterization of selected sealed sources regarding physical form, radiochemical composition, and age-dating profiles. Close working relationships with global partners in the commercial sealed sources industry provide invaluable technical information and expertise in the development of signature profiles. These profiles are critical to the down-selection of potential candidates in either pre- or post- event RDD attribution. The down-selection process includes a match between an interdicted (or detonated) source and a model in the database linked to one or more manufacturers and distributors.
Correct prediction of the fission products inventory in irradiated nuclear fuels is essential for accurate estimation of fuel burnup, establishing proper requirements for spent fuel transportation and storage, materials accountability and nuclear forensics. Such prediction is impossible without accurate knowledge of neutron induced fission yields. Unfortunately, the accuracy of the fission yields reported in the ENDF/B-VII.0 library is not uniform across all of the data and much of the improvement is desired for certain isotopes and fission products. We discuss our measurements of cumulative fission yields in nuclear fuels irradiated in thermal and fast reactor spectra using Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry.
The development of radioactive sample surrogates for training and exercises Source term information is required for to reconstruct a device used in a dispersed radiological dispersal device. Simulating a radioactive environment to train and exercise sampling and sample characterization methods with suitable sample materials is a continued challenge. The Idaho National Laboratory has developed and permitted a Radioactive Response Training Range (RRTR), an 800 acre test range that is approved for open air dispersal of activated KBr, for training first responders in the entry and exit from radioactively contaminated areas, and testing protocols for environmental sampling and field characterization. Members from the Department of Defense, Law Enforcement, and the Department of Energy participated in the first contamination exercise that was conducted at the RRTR in the July 2011. The range was contaminated using a short lived radioactive Br-82 isotope (activated KBr). Soil samples contaminated with KBr (dispersed as a solution) and glass particles containing activated potassium bromide that emulated dispersed radioactive materials (such as ceramic-based sealed source materials) were collected to assess environmental sampling and characterization techniques. This presentation summarizes the performance of a radioactive materials surrogate for use as a training aide for nuclear forensics.
Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear or other radioactive material, or of evidence contaminated with radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings under international or national law related to nuclear security. The goal of forensic science is to discover linkages among people, places, materials, and events. Nuclear forensics is an essential component of national response plans to events involving nuclear or other radioactive materials out of regulatory control and informs prevention, detection, and response.
Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear or other radioactive material, or of evidence contaminated with radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings under international or national law related to nuclear security. The goal of forensic science is to discover linkages among people, places, materials and events. Nuclear forensics is an essential component of national response plans to events involving nuclear or other radioactive materials out of regulatory control and informs prevention, detection and response.
Thorough physical and chemical characterization of plutonium–beryllium (PuBe) neutron sources is an important capability with applications ranging from material accountancy to nuclear forensics. Furthermore, characterization of PuBe sources is not trivial owing to range of existing source designs and the need for adequate infrastructure to deal with radiation and protect the analyst. Our study demonstrates a method for characterization of three PuBe sources that includes physical inspection and imaging followed by controlled disassembly and destructive analysis.
Sol–gel vitrification can be used to rapidly produce solid, vitreous materials to support nuclear forensics research. Here, this work investigates three sol–gel synthetic approaches’ ability to retain fission products within the glass as a function of drying temperature. Eight of the ten fission products studied were quantitatively retained (less than 5% losses) at temperatures up to 600 °C for glasses prepared using an acidic catalyst and at temperatures up to 300 °C for glasses prepared using a basic catalyst. Both systems show partial loss of ruthenium and complete loss of iodine at temperatures above 300 and 100 °C, respectively.
Valuable insights into the history and evolution of a geologic deposit can be found by investigating neutron capture reactions. Thermal neutron capture reactions occur within both the samarium (Sm) and the uranium (U) systems, where 149 Sm and 235 U can capture neutrons to become 150 Sm and 236 U, respectively. Although largely unexplored, paired measurements of 150 Sm and 236 U could be important for understanding neutron capture effects within uranium ore bodies, and such measurements are potentially useful in nuclear forensics for assessing a material's provenance or mineral exploration. In this work, we refined measurement procedures of Sm isotope compositions utilizing MC-ICPMS. While geologic reference materials were found to have indistinguishable Sm isotope compositions, we found significant isotope variations consistent with nuclear field shift among synthetic Sm standards. Here, this observation highlights that future high-precision Sm isotope investigations need to carefully evaluate synthetic standard(s) against geologic reference materials until an unfractionated and agreed-upon standard is identified. Here, we applied this method to a set of nine uranium ores from the South Australian Beverley North uranium deposits. Although 236 U excesses had been previously reported for these U ores, we found no measurable isotopic shifts in 149 Sm- 150 Sm at the current level of precision (±5 parts per million). One possible explanation for this disparity in the observed neutron capture signatures between U and Sm is that the source(s) of the U and Sm in these ores may be decoupled. This is consistent with the finding that these ores have variable 143 Nd/ 144 Nd, thus demonstrating that diverse sources were involved in the formation of the Beverley North deposits. Alternatively, this deposit may be too young (<50Ma) to have accumulated measurable neutron capture effects in Sm to be detected with the methods employed here.
Uranium ore concentrates are materials found early within the nuclear fuel cycle and contain high concentrations of uranium in an easily transported form, making the concentrates a likely target for illegal diversion. These concentrates are typically converted to U 3 O 8 for further processing and, therefore, may lose specific physicochemical characteristics in determining the materials’ source and processing history. In this work, we explore the Raman spectra of eight oxide samples produced from various uranium ore concentrates and processing pathways to examine the presence of spectroscopic signatures relating to each sample's process history. Samples produced from amine extraction and dialkylphosphoric acid extraction processes show unique characteristics due to high concentrations of α-UO 3 , whereas samples calcinated from metallic diuranates do not form pure α-U 3 O 8 because of metallic ion inclusions. Pure α-U 3 O 8 oxide samples are obtained through calcination of ammonium diuranate, ammonium uranyl carbonate, and metastudtite intermediates. The Raman spectra of these oxide samples show close agreement with pristine α-U 3 O 8 spectra. However, deviations from the pristine spectra are observed in the 300–460 cm -1 spectral range. In conclusion, these deviations are unique identifying signatures that were likely created by lasting effects from the process history. Spectral center of mass calculations indicate grouping of samples based on processing history.
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The analysis of particulates from environmental sampling is routinely performed for nuclear forensics applications. In order to increase the tools available for nuclear forensics applications, capability development materials (CDMs), or reference particulates, are necessary for developing and benchmarking new analytical methods. Historically, these CDM particulates have been produced with highly controlled and characterized isotopic and size parameters for applications in developing and benchmarking particle sizers and mass spectrometry analytical methods [1- 4]. However, the development of CDMs with highly characterized particle morphology and phase of the particles is vital for aiding in the development and benchmarking of particle analytical methods for those parameters. In many cases, key properties such as crystallographic phase, morphology, and microstructure, may be correlated to processing history of environmental sampling particulates [5]. To that end, this work investigates determining the structural fingerprint of produced Pu-doped uranium oxide CDMs using transmission electron microscopy (TEM). The particulates, one of which shown in Figure 1, were synthesized to Fig. 1. Single particulate of uranium oxide fabricated using the THESEUS technique. develop capabilities for environmental sampling investigations. These particles are monodisperse at diameter of 1 μm and a range of plutonium concentrations from 0- 1,000 ppm. Given their small diameter, TEM analysis was ideal for studying the particulate structural fingerprint in detail. Previous investigations confirmed the external homogeneity of the particulates at different plutonium concentrations, however this analysis focuses on determining the grain structure, phase distribution, and porosity of the particulates.
Since beginning at Los Alamos National Laboratory in February of 2012, I have been working as a DHS./DNDO Postdoctoral Research Associate under the mentorship of Lav Tandon and Khalil Spencer (NA-22 and mass spectrometry). The focus of my efforts, in addition to pursuing needed training and qualifications, has been the application of various instrumental approaches (e.g. Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry; TIMS) to a range of systems of interest in materials characterization and nuclear forensics. Research to be pursued in the coming months shall include the continued use of such approaches to advance current methods for: modified total evaporation, monitoring critical minor isotope systems, and chronometry. Each of the above points will be discussed.
This report summarizes the analytical techniques that can be used in forensic investigations of different materials produced across the nuclear fuel cycle in order to distinguish their origin and history. The measurable attributes of nuclear fuel cycle materials are known as signatures. Because signatures are created, modified and destroyed as material moves through the fuel cycle, it is important to consider the relevant analytical techniques in the context of where material is produced in the fuel cycle. To this end, we use the 10 steps in the fuel cycle identified by the IAEA as the basis for the following discussion. Each step in the fuel cycle creates and/or modifies signatures. Table 1 summarizes the process, the material, the relevant signatures, and the analytical techniques commonly used to characterize the signatures for each fuel cycle step. From Table 1 it is apparent that most analytical techniques are relevant to evaluating signatures for a variety of materials along the fuel cycle. For example, isotopic compositions are important signatures for materials produced in every step in the fuel cycle. It is also clear from Table 1 that individual signatures can be evaluated using a variety of techniques. Uranium isotopes for example, can be determined using gamma-spectroscopy, quadrupole and multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry, thermal ionization mass spectrometry and UF6 gas source mass spectrometry. Each technique has its particular strengths and weaknesses. The appendix of this document provides a more detailed description of individual techniques that can successfully be applied to signature characterization for the range of fuel cycle materials.
No abstract provided.