ADDITIONAL BALLISTIC TESTING OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHIPPING PACKAGES
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Abstract not provided.
Abstract not provided.
Data obtained from testing shipping package materials have been leveraged to support extending the service life of select shipping packages while in nuclear materials transportation. Increasingly, nuclear material inventories are being transferred to an interim storage location where they will reside for extended periods of time. Use of a shipping package to store nuclear materials in an interim storage location has become more attractive for a variety of reasons. Shipping packages are robust and have a qualified pedigree for their performance in normal operation and accident conditions within the approved shipment period and storing nuclear material within a shipping package results in reduced operations for the storage facility. However, the shipping package materials of construction must maintain a level of integrity as specified by the safety basis of the storage facility through the duration of the storage period, which is typically well beyond the one year transportation window. Test programs have been established to obtain aging data on materials of construction that are the most sensitive/susceptible to aging in certain shipping package designs. The collective data are being used to support extending the service life of shipping packages in both transportation and storage.
Non-sustainable packaging materials (polymers) are a large portion of the increasing amount of plastic waste that become environmental pollutants. While many biodegradable or compostable polymers have been developed in recent years, most fail to compete with the non-sustainable polymers dominating the market, due to lack of certain desired properties, such as thermal (high melt temperature) and mechanical (high ductility) performance. For example, the popular compostable polymer polylactic acid (PLLA) has a high melt temperature but is very brittle. Another polymer, poly(d-valerolactone) (PVL) demonstrates great ductility but has a very low melt temperature. By blending PLLA and PVL, there is an opportunity to create a new biodegradable material with synergistic desired properties for packaging applications. In this study, we produce several (9) physical blends of PVL and PLLA with varying compositions of the two polymers while applying three different materials to make them more compatible (compatibilizers). We test the success of compatibilization by scanning electron microscopy (SEM), mechanic testing (strain at break) and differential scanning calorimetry (melting temperature). Overall, we highlight several promising materials with high compatibility and desired thermomechanical properties for sustainable packaging. Ideally, these materials could help mitigate future plastic pollution in Colorado and beyond.
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the DOE M441.1-1 /sup>1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE, 2008) requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” In order to ensure continuing safe storage of nuclear material and the maximization of risk reduction, TA-55 has established a Surveillance Program to ensure storage container integrity for operations within its specified design life. The LANL SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan 2 defines the near-term field surveillance plan for SAVY-4000 containers as required by the Manual. A long-term surveillance plan will be established based on the results of the first several years of surveillance and the results of the lifetime extension studies as defined in the Accelerated Aging Plan 3 . This report details progress in positioning the Surveillance Program for successful implementation in FY14 and status of the Design Life Extension Program in terms of its implementation and data collection for FY13.
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE, 2008) requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” This report defines the near-term field surveillance plan for SAVY-4000 containers as required by the Manual. The long-term surveillance plan will be based on the results of the first several years of surveillance and the results of the lifetime extension studies.
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in FY 2013 (Kelly et al. 2013). The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance and other surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies (Blair et al. 2012, Weis et al. 2015a). The LANL SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan Update was issued in 2014 (Kelly et al. 2014). This 2016 update reflects changes to the surveillance plan resulting from restrictions on handling residue materials greater than 500 g, the addition of specific engineering judgment containers, and 2015 surveillance findings. The SAVY-4000 container has a design life of five years, which was chosen as a conservative estimate of the functional properties of the materials used in the construction of the SAVY 4000 when exposed to the potential insults including temperature, corrosive materials and gases, and radiation. The SAVY-4000 container design basis is described in a safety analysis report (Anderson et al. 2013). In the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA’s) approval of the safety analysis report, it was recommended that the design life clock begin on March 2014 (Nez et al. 2014). However, it is expected that a technical basis can be developed to extend the design life of the SAVY-4000 containers to approximately 40 years (Blair et al. 2012, Weis et al. 2015a). This surveillance plan update covers five years (2015–2019) and is developed to ensure SAVY-4000 containers meet their design criteria over the current five-year design life and to gather data that can be used in developing the technical basis for a 40-year design life. The technical basis for the longer design life will be developed based on the results of this surveillance plan and the concurrent lifetime extension studies (Blair et al. 2012, Weis et al. 2015a). A long-term surveillance plan will be developed by the completion of this plan and will be based on the results of the first several years of this five-year surveillance plan and the lifetime extension studies. In addition, the current Hagan container population is so large (approximately 3,500 LANL-wide, approximately 3,000 in PF-4) that it is anticipated Hagan containers will be in use for many years to come. Therefore, this plan includes surveillance activities for the Hagan container system during the time it takes to replace the Hagan containers with manually-compliant containers such as the SAVY 4000. These Hagan examinations not only provide information to determine if additional Hagan surveillance is needed, but also support SAVY lifetime-extension studies because some of the container components are made from similar material (e.g., stainless steel and Viton).
Today’s lighting technology is steadily becoming more energy efficient and less toxic to the environment since the passing of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) [1]. EISA has mandated a higher energy efficiency standard for lighting products and the phase out of the common incandescent lamp. This has led lighting manufacturers to pursue solid-state lighting (SSL) technologies for consumer lighting applications. However, two major roadblocks are hindering the transition process to SSL lamps: cost and quality. In order to cut cost, manufactures are moving towards cheaper packaging materials and a variety of package architecture construction techniques which may potentially erode the quality of the lamp and reduce its survivability in everyday applications. Typically, SSL lamps are given product lifetimes of over twenty years based off of the IES TM-21-11 lighting standard which does not include moisture effects or large operational temperatures [2]. A group of recently released off-the-shelf lamps have undergone a steady-state temperature humidity bias life test of 85°C/85%RH (85/85) to investigate the reliability in harsh environment applications. The lack of accelerated test methods for lamps to assess reliability prior to introduction into the marketplace does not exist in literature. There is a need for SSL physics based models for the assessment and prediction of a lamp’s lifetime which is being spearheaded by the DOE [3]. In order to be fully accepted in the marketplace, SSL lamps must be able to perform similarly to incandescent lamps in these environments, as well as live up to the lifetime claims of manufacturers. A lamp’s package architecture must be designed with performance factors in mind, as well as address some of the known and published package related failure mechanisms, such as carbonization of the encapsulant material, delamination, encapsulant yellowing, lens cracking, and phosphor thermal quenching [4]. Each failure mechanism produces the similar failure mode of lumen degradation predominately due to two contributing factors: high junction temperature and moisture ingress. The current state-of-the-art has focused on individual areas of the lamp, such as the LED chip, substrate material, electrical driver design and thermal management techniques. [5] – [16] Looking at the lamp as a whole is a novel approach and has not been seen before in literature. This work followed the JEDEC standard JESD22-A101C of 85/85 with a one hour interval of applied voltage followed by a one hour interval of no applied voltage [17]. This test was performed continuously for each SSL lamp until it became nonoperational, i.e. did not turn on. Periodically, photometric measurements were taken following the IES LM-79-08 standard at room temperature using an integrating sphere, a spectrometer, and lighting software. The overall health of the SSL lamps was assed using the relative luminous flux (RLF), correlated color temperature (CCT) and the color difference (Δu'v') using the Euclidean distance of the CIE 1976 color space coordinates. Finally, a Weibull analysis was completed to compare the characteristic lifetime of the SSL lamp to the actual rated lifetime. An important result from this work shows that the rated lifetime does not come close to the actual lifetime when the SSL lamps are used in a harsh humid environment which is fairly common in outdoor applications across the U.S. Also, the photometric results are presented for the entire lifetime of each SSL lamp under test.
Since the late 1990’s, the Hagan container was used as the primary container for packaging of plutonium-bearing materials. The Hagan design consisted of a threaded closure, a Viton® ORing, a carbon-carbon filter, and a 304L stainless steel (SS) body. Over the years, Hagans have shown vulnerability in their design [1]. In 2008, The Department of Energy (DOE) issued DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual, which detailed an approach to obtain highconfidence in containers by including specific design requirements, material contents and an approach to determine life span from said contents, and surveillance techniques [2]. In response to both the vulnerability issues with the Hagan and DOE M 441.1-1, the SAVY 4000 container with its twist style closure, Viton® O-Ring, Fiberfrax-Gortex filter, and annealed 316L SS body, was designed as the replacement for Hagan containers, but only for a short term lifespan of 5 years [1]. However, both the Hagan and SAVY 4000 are being pushed to maintain a lifespan of 40 years. Therefore, proper confidence must be placed on each component of each container to last a minimum of 40 years. So far, the biggest concern found during surveillance of these containers is corrosion and the potential for failure by corrosion. One concern is that the containers fail due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC), especially around the weld between the collar and the body as welds leave residual stresses. One advantage the SAVY 4000 has is that the body is annealed, but its weld is still susceptible as it was welded after annealing [3, 4]. Moreover, 316L SS is known to have a higher pitting resistance (pits are a precursor to SCC and can also lead to extensive failure of the material), than 304L SS [4]. During recent surveillance activities, two SAVY 4000’s containing Solution Assay Instrument (SAI) solutions were opened. The SAI SAVY 4000’s contained plutonium (Pu) in 3M HCl solution in plastic volumetric flasks placed inside of polyethylene bags. Historically, a SAVY 4000 containing an SAI solution is packaged for 3 weeks, however, these particular containers were not reopened until 14 months later. When opened, brown-red corrosion product was found all over the inside of the container as shown in Figure 1.
This package of materials guides commercial building owners and operators through the specification, procurement, and selection of an Energy Information System (EIS) or related building energy performance monitoring and diagnostic technology.
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.”This 2017 update reflects changes to the surveillance plan resulting from surveillance findings as documented in Reeves et al. 2016. These findings include observations of corrosion in SAVY and Hagan containers and the indication (in one SAVY container) of possible filter membrane thermal degradation. This surveillance plan update documents the rationale for selecting surveillance containers, specifies the containers for 2017 surveillance, and identifies a minimum set of containers for 2018 surveillance. This update contains important changes to the previous surveillance plans.
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy (DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013 (Kelly et al. 2013). The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Four surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014 (Kelly et al. 2014), one in 2016 (Kelly et al. 2016), one in 2017 (Kelly et al. 2017) and one in 2018 (Kelly et al. 2018). This 2019 update documents what was actually done in 2018 and what is planned for 2019. Deviations from the 2018 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination.
The Packaging Surveillance Program section of the Department of Energy ( DOE) Manual 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual (DOE 2008), requires DOE contractors to “ensure that a surveillance program is established and implemented to ensure the nuclear material storage package continues to meet its design criteria.” The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SAVY-4000 Field Surveillance Plan was first issued in fiscal year (FY) 2013 (Kelly et al. 2013). The surveillance plan is reviewed annually and updated as necessary based on SAVY-4000 surveillance findings, as well as results of the lifetime extension studies. Three surveillance plan updates have been issued, one in 2014 (Kelly et al. 2014), one in 2016 (Kelly et al. 2016) and one in 2017 ( Kelly et al. 2017). This 2018 update documents what was actually done in 2017 and what is planned for 2018. Deviations from the 2017 surveillance plan were necessary because some of the planned surveillance containers were not available for examination.