Results for “performance assessment, waste management” — Page 8

DOE OSTI2020

Decommissioning of the V1 Nuclear Power Plant Jaslovske Bohunice - 20270

The paper focuses on introducing the approach and method applied for decommissioning of the V1 nuclear power plant (further the 'V1 NPP') located in Jaslovske Bohunice in the Slovak Republic, to the conference participants. The Paper outlines activities and steps necessary to comply with the requirements contained in the decision of the Slovak government from 1999 regarding the early shutdown of the V1 NPP. The company responsible for the V1 NPP decommissioning is Jadrova a vyradovacia spolocnost, a.s., (further JAVYS) with the State as a sole shareholder. On the basis of the V1 NPP Decommissioning Conceptual Plan, out of four assessed options, JAVYS selected the immediate decommissioning option (the 'IDO') for the V1 NPP. On the basis of multi-criteria analysis, the IDO specified the approach of immediate and continuous dismantling of equipment followed by demolition of buildings and preparation of the site for its further potential use. The IDO also included the summary of technical, environmental, legislative information as well as the determination of assumed costs for decommissioning of the V1 NPP. Prior to commencement of the V1 NPP decommissioning, within the process of termination of operation, activities connected with de-fuelling, monitoring, processing of historical waste and, not to forget, the process of obtaining the license for the V1 NPP decommissioning were executed. JAVYS decided to divide the decommissioning process into two stages. In 2011, JAVYS obtained a license for the first stage of the V1 NPP decommissioning. Within this stage, dismantling of inactive equipment, demolitions of inactive buildings, monitoring of systems and preparatory works for the upcoming stage of decommissioning were implemented. In 2015, in line with the license for the 2. stage of the V1 NPP decommissioning, the activities of decontamination and dismantling of contaminated and active equipment as well as demolitions of remaining buildings began. In this stage radioactive waste (RAW) produced during the decommissioning is to be processed. After decontamination, the material fulfilling the free release criteria is to be released into the environment, the site is to be cleared from the scope of the Atomic Act and released from the surveillance of the national regulators. Future application of certain methods and techniques for decontamination and dismantling in similar environments might bring an added value to the operators. Paper includes a description of best practices for Nuclear Power Plant VVER type reactors decommissioning. Schedule comparison is given to show how the critical path of certain projects is being managed. Application of the International Standard for Decommissioning Costing (ISDC) methodology provides a uniform method which enables comparison of cost estimates to other nuclear facilities under decommissioning. The cost estimate for the V1 NPP decommissioning has been continuously updated based on more advanced and detailed information on the decommissioning activities and projects. Monitoring of progress of the V1 NPP decommissioning is performed via four key-performance indicators. The Earned Value Management (EVM) methodology is used for evaluating time and cost aspect of decommissioning activities while waste conditioning index is calculated by comparing the actually produced waste to planned values of waste for a respective monitored period. Radiological safety index is assessed by comparison of the personnel records on the individual yearly doses received by each respective employee to the boundary value. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2023

E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility Inadvertent Human Intruder Limits and Doses in Support of the PA2022

This report documents the inadvertent human intruder (IHI) analysis for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS), near Aiken, South Carolina. This analysis supports the 2022 Performance Assessment for ELLWF, complying with the Department of Energy standard for operation of low-level waste disposal facilities (USDOE, 2017). The ELLWF is an operating waste disposal facility and is scheduled to continue accepting waste to 2065. One task of the 2022 Performance Assessment (PA) is to establish waste inventory limits for the various disposal units at ELLWF. This is done by modeling future contaminant release and transport through applicable pathways to human receptors, comparing predicted doses per disposed curie with applicable performance measures, to obtain inventory limits which will assure that doses to receptors do not exceed performance measures.

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DOE OSTI2022

A Review of the Literature on the Radiolytic Stability of the Next-Generation Solvent

The Original Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) solvent (based on the BOBCalixC6 extractant) currently in use at the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) is set to be replaced by the Next-Generation Solvent (NGS, based on the MaxCalix extractant). Current SWPF flammability safety controls use G-values for volatile gases obtained from radiolysis studies with the Original CSSX solvent. A review of past irradiation tests of both solvent systems was performed to assess the radiolytic stability of NGS with respect to flammable gas generation from radiolysis.

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DOE OSTI2022

Colloid-Facilitated Actinide Transport in a Cementitious-Impacted SRS Groundwater

The objective of this report is to provide a literature review relevant to the question of whether colloid facilitated transport of plutonium is enhanced in a cementitious groundwater system on the Savannah River Site (SRS). Contaminant transport is commonly described as taking place in a system with a mobile aqueous phase and an immobile solid phase. There has been an increasing awareness of a third phase, a mobile solid phase, also referred to as a mobile colloidal phase. Mobile colloids consist of organic and/or inorganic submicron-particles that move with groundwater flow. When radionuclides are associated with the mobile colloids, the net effect is that radionuclides can move faster through the subsurface system than would be predicted by transport models that do not include mobile colloids. It is important to distinguish between subsurface colloids and subsurface mobile colloids. The subsurface environment includes an enormous reservoir of colloids, but only a tiny fraction, if any, are mobile. Mobile colloid formation is commonly described as involving a three-step process: genesis, stabilization, and transport. It was concluded that there is a strong likelihood that submicron colloids of plutonium exist near the source term, (i.e., the genesis step is likely completed). While such particles have not been directly detected, it is highly likely that plutonium could either attach to submicron particles in the sediment or that submicron plutonium fragments exist at the source. However, the tendency for these plutonium colloids to move in the SRS subsurface is extremely low, especially in engineered cementitious environments where the ionic strength of the solution and the elevated concentrations of divalent cations greatly curtails colloid suspension stability (i.e., the stabilization step is likely not completed). Together these data strongly indicate that plutonium-bearing colloids would likely exist in the near field of a tank closure facility, but the colloids would be unlikely to be mobile, thereby providing a vector for enhanced transport. Under cementitious leachate impacted groundwater conditions, it is reasonable to assume plutonium transport occurs primarily as a two-phase system, a mobile aqueous phase and an immobile solid phase.

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DOE OSTI2025

Reassessment of Dose Contributions from the M-Area Glass Special Waste Form Buried in the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

During a recent revision to the groundwater (GW) and inadvertent human intruder (IHI) screening analysis report (Aleman and Hamm, 2023), weaknesses within the screening logic were observed resulting in U-235 being brought back into the list of radionuclides requiring inventory limits within the M-Area Glass SWF. In addition, while reviewing the earlier vadose zone (VZ) transport analysis efforts, an input deck error was observed in the U-234G VZ transport simulation.

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DOE OSTI2025

Standard Analysis Report INV-SAR-81, Revision 0 Chemical and Cement Components 2023 Inventory Estimates for the Interim State Performance Assessment of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

This standard analysis report provides the estimates for the chemical (oxyanions and complexing agents) and cement components with a data collection cut-off date of December 31, 2023. These estimates will be included in a Performance Assessment Inventory Report developed for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) interim state repository configuration performance assessment (PA) for the 2026 Compliance Recertification Application (CRA).

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DOE OSTI2020

Assessment of Methane Generation from the Thermolysis of Organics in Caustic Waste

Methane generation has been detected during thermolytic Hydrogen Generation Rate (HGR) testing of SRS tank waste and in simulant samples. Simulant testing has shown methane generation in the presence of trimethylsilanol (TMS) and radioactive sample testing has shown methane generation in presence of methylmercury, both of which are found within SRS waste tanks. The 2019 report Evaluation of the Current State of Knowledge for Thermolysis of Organics within SRS Waste Forming Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) reviewed historical data and assessed literature pertaining to thermolytic methane generation. That review recommended undertaking thermolysis studies on simulated waste to detect and quantify VOCs. The purpose of this assessment is to review chemistry and current knowledge of organics in SRS waste to recommend which organics in SRS waste tanks, if any, should be tested for thermolytic methane generation. An evaluation of observed methane generation rates has been performed to assess the implication for current CSTF controls. Based on the inputs used in this report, it was concluded that no methane generation data observed to date has challenged the existing 5% organic contribution to the Composite Lower Flammability Limit (CLFL) assumption in the CSTF tank farm at temperatures below 100 °C. Evidence shows that thermolytic pathways to methane generation become significant at temperatures >100 °C in caustic waste. Currently, the influences of thermolytic methane production on the flammability of vessels at >100 °C (e.g., evaporators) is unclear. It is recommended that testing should be undertaken using the HGR experimental approach for methane generation. The initial simulant testing should obtain quantitative methane generation rates at elevated temperatures for methylated siloxanes/silanes and methylmercury with the goal of determining the current mechanism for thermolytic methane generation seen in SRS tank waste. The results of this testing should then be compiled and analyzed to ascertain the risk of challenging the current projected organic contribution of 5% to the CLFL at elevated temperatures. Following this testing, an evaluation of possible flammable gas generation in the 2H and 3H Evaporators should be performed to assess the risk of methane generation at the high temperatures employed by the evaporators.

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DOE OSTI2020

FY2019 Performance Assessment Annual Review for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

The Savannah River Site (SRS) E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) consists of six types of disposal units described in the Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008): Low Activity Waste Vault (LAWV), Intermediate Level Vault (ILV), Trenches [Slit Trenches (STs), Engineered Trenches (ETs), and Component-in-Grout (CIG) Trenches], and Naval Reactor Component Disposal Areas (NRCDAs). The ELLWF is a part of the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF). SWMF is managed and operated by the SRS Management and Operations prime contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Within SRNS, the Solid Waste Management (SWM) organization is responsible for operating the SWMF, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the technical agency responsible for preparing and maintaining the PA. SWMF operations have been performed at SRS since 1952. The mission of the SWMF is to provide storage, processing, disposal, and shipment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste. The SWMF is committed to treat, store, and dispose of these waste products in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of the facility worker, the co-located worker, and the offsite general public. Wastes handled in the SWMF include low level waste, transuranic waste, hazardous waste, Toxic Substances Control Act waste, and mixed waste (containing both hazardous and radioactive constituents).

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DOE OSTI2020

FY2019 Performance Assessment Annual Review for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility

The Savannah River Site (SRS) E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) consists of six types of disposal units described in the Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008): Low Activity Waste Vault (LAWV), Intermediate Level Vault (ILV), Trenches [Slit Trenches (STs), Engineered Trenches (ETs), and Component-in-Grout (CIG) Trenches], and Naval Reactor Component Disposal Areas (NRCDAs). The ELLWF is a part of the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF). SWMF is managed and operated by the SRS Management and Operations prime contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Within SRNS, the Solid Waste Management (SWM) organization is responsible for operating the SWMF, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the technical agency responsible for preparing and maintaining the PA. SWMF operations have been performed at SRS since 1952. The mission of the SWMF is to provide storage, processing, disposal, and shipment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste. The SWMF is committed to treat, store, and dispose of these waste products in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of the facility worker, the co-located worker, and the offsite general public. Wastes handled in the SWMF include low level waste, transuranic waste, hazardous waste, Toxic Substances Control Act waste, and mixed waste (containing both hazardous and radioactive constituents).

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DOE OSTI2021

FY2020 performance assessment annual review for the E-area low-level waste facility

The Savannah River Site (SRS) E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) consists of six types of disposal units described in the Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008): Low Activity Waste Vault (LAWV), Intermediate Level Vault (ILV), Trenches [Slit Trenches (STs), Engineered Trenches (ETs), and Component-in-Grout (CIG) Trenches], and Naval Reactor Component Disposal Areas (NRCDAs). The ELLWF is a part of the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF). SWMF is managed and operated by the SRS Management and Operations prime contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Within SRNS, the Solid Waste Management (SWM) organization is responsible for operating the SWMF, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the technical agency responsible for preparing and maintaining the PA. SWMF operations have been performed at SRS since 1952. The mission of the SWMF is to provide storage, processing, disposal, and shipment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste. The SWMF is committed to treat, store, and dispose of these waste products in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of the facility worker, the co-located worker, and the offsite general public. Wastes handled in the SWMF include low level waste, transuranic waste, hazardous waste, Toxic Substances Control Act waste, and mixed waste (containing both hazardous and radioactive constituents). The FY2020 PA Annual Review for the ELLWF affirms that the disposal facility continued to operate within the bounds of the current PA and Composite Analysis (CA) baseline and the subsequent SA’s and satisfied all the requirements, conditions, and limitations identified in the 2008 DAS (DOE 2008a), RWMB SRNL_STI-2020-00588 Revision 0 vi (McGill, 2020), and ELLWF Low-Level Waste Acceptance Criteria (SRS-1S, 2014). This annual review affirms that the supporting studies performed in FY2020 do not alter the conclusions of the ELLWF PA (WSRC, 2008) and that there is a reasonable expectation that the ELLWF will meet the performance objectives delineated in DOE Manual 435.1-1 (DOE 2011)

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DOE OSTI2025

E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility Inadvertent Human Intruder Limits and Doses in Support of the PA2022

This report documents the inadvertent human intruder (IHI) analysis for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS), near Aiken, South Carolina. This analysis supports the revised ELLWF Performance Assessment (PA), complying with the Department of Energy standard for operation of low-level waste disposal facilities (USDOE, 2017). The ELLWF is an operating waste disposal facility and is scheduled to continue accepting waste to 2065. One task of the revised PA is to establish waste inventory limits for the various disposal units at ELLWF. This is done by modeling future contaminant release and transport through applicable pathways to human receptors, comparing predicted doses per disposed curie with applicable performance measures, to obtain inventory limits which will assure that doses to receptors do not exceed performance measures. This report documents results of modeling future doses to one class of receptor, the inadvertent human intruder. It is assumed that after site closure, public knowledge of the site is lost, and IHIs will engage in activities on the ELLWF that will disrupt the closure cap, causing dose to the IHI. Following USDOE (2017), six different stylized exposure scenarios are considered, simulating activities by an IHI which could result in a radiological dose. The six scenarios are: • Acute – Basement Construction: IHI constructs a basement and encounters waste during excavation which is inadvertently mixed with clean soil and diluted. • Acute – Well Drilling: IHI drills a water well through waste and is exposed to drill cuttings mixed with clean soil that are brought to the surface. • Acute – Discovery: IHI begins constructing a basement but stops when encountering the riprap in the final closure cap and is exposed to photon radiation from unexcavated material residing in the undisturbed waste zone. • Chronic – Agriculture: Resident IHI is exposed to waste that was excavated for basement construction and mixed with native soil in the intruder’s vegetable garden. • Chronic – Post-Drilling: Resident IHI is exposed to waste from drill cuttings mixed with native soil and scattered in the garden area. • Chronic – Residential: Resident IHI is exposed to external radiation while in home located above waste with shielding provided by the concrete basement floor and any soil or engineered material remaining between the basement and waste. Dose calculations are performed using the SRNL Dose Toolkit (Aleman, 2023), following the approach of Smith et al (2019). Calculations are performed separately for 27 of the 33 disposal units (DUs) at ELLWF and are radionuclide specific. The results of the IHI analysis include: • Dose Factors: mrem per disposed curie (acute) and mrem/yr per disposed curie (chronic) for each parent radionuclide, for each DU. • Inventory Limits: in curies, for each parent radionuclide, for each DU. • Estimated Dose to IHI: mrem (acute) and mrem/yr (chronic), for each DU, given its projected closure inventory without inventory biases applied. Most DU-specific IHI inventory limits are in the range of 10 3 to 10 7 curies per nuclide. The lowest inventory limits are associated with gamma-emitters such as Sn-126, Ra-226, Th-232, and Cm-248. Radionuclides with short half-lives such as Pu-241, and nuclides which are pure beta emitters or which decay by electron capture, such as Ni-59 and Ni-63, have the highest limits. For the 27 evaluated DUs, predicted IHI doses are shown in Table ES-1. The maximum acute dose is 1.18 mrem, at ST23, much less than the DOE performance measure of 500 mrem (USDOE, 2017). The highest chronic dose is 37.2 mrem/yr at ST02, below the DOE performance measure of 100 mrem/yr. Also shown are estimated inventory sums of fractions (SOFs) at closure in 2065, for groundwater (GW) and IHI pathways. For each DU, the inventory is constrained by the GW pathway. For most DUs, the IHI SOFs are approximately 1000 times lower than the GW SOF values, and the IHI pathway does not drive risk for any disposal unit.

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DOE OSTI2020

Long-Term PCT of ILAW Glasses (Final Report FY2020)

About 50 million gallons of high-level mixed waste is currently stored in underground tanks at The United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford site in the State of Washington. The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will provide DOE’s Office of River Protection (ORP) with a means of treating this waste by vitrification for subsequent disposal. The tank waste will be separated into low- and high-activity waste fractions, which will then be vitrified respectively into Immobilized Low Activity Waste (ILAW) and Immobilized High Level Waste (IHLW) products. The ILAW product will be disposed in a near-surface engineered facility – the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) – on the Hanford site, while the IHLW product is designed for deep geological disposal in a national facility for high-level nuclear waste. The ILAW and IHLW products must meet a variety of requirements with respect to protection of the environment before they can be accepted for disposal. The objective of the work described in this report is to perform testing, data collection, and analyses for the ILAW glass product for subsequent use in the performance assessment (PA) of the IDF to assess potential environmental risks associated with long-term storage.

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DOE OSTI2020

Measurement Acceptance Region (MAR) Assessment Results Based on the October 2019 Sludge Batch 10 Projections

Recent analysis of a Tank 26 sample indicated a higher than anticipated sulfur concentration in the supernatant and a significant amount of insoluble sulfur. The final concentration in the glass product would be well above the sulfate limits of 0.6-0.65 weight percent (wt.%) determined for previous sludge batches. In preparation for Sludge Batch 10 (SB10) processing, washing of Tank 51 will be performed to reduce the sulfate concentration in the glass product to less than 0.65 wt.% at waste loadings (WLs) of interest. To evaluate the feasibility of two Tank 51 Na wash endpoints (0.8 and 1.2M), Savannah River Remediation requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory perform assessments using the Defense Waste Processing Facility Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models and their associated Measurement Acceptance Region (MAR) constraints.

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DOE OSTI2026

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

As part of its periodic re-certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities, the United States Environmental Protection Agency expects a re-evaluation of features, events, and processes, such as post-closure nuclear criticality. Although salt creep beneficially encapsulates the TRU waste in the closed WIPP repository, the spacing between an array of waste packages is disrupted as the salt creep closes disposal rooms and containers lose structural integrity. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality evaluation was updated, however, because of the introduction of criticality control overpack (CCO) containers, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCO containers during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual disposal room closure from salt creep. Geomechanical models of roof fall demonstrate three tiers of CCO containers are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure) were used to predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Models of spheres or cylinders with 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular compacted spacing demonstrate that an array of CCO containers is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the mass of hydrogenous material shipped in CCO containers (usually plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

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DOE OSTI2026

Performance Assessment of the Inactive Trenches in the 200 West Low-Level Burial Grounds at the Hanford Site

The purpose of this document is to provide a performance assessment (PA) of the 200 West Area Low‑Level Burial Grounds (LLBGs), under the requirements of DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management1. The objective is to ensure that the radioactive waste is managed in a manner that is protective of human health and the environment. Figure ES-1 shows the location of the LLBGs in the 200 West and 200 East Areas of the Hanford Site.

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DOE OSTI2025

Employing MACS/ViBRANT as a Surrogate MARVEL Reactor for Startup Reactivity Tuning and Supervisory Control Processes

Advanced nuclear reactors are a key part of the future of nuclear energy both in the United States and globally. They offer unique benefits for various energy-demanding applications, including use in remote locations, compact size, modular manufacturing, remote monitoring, low and/or variable power rating operation, and reliance on novel technologies to enhance operational safety. To achieve economic feasibility, advanced reactors must significantly reduce their workforces in comparison with the current fleet. Achieving this reduction will occur through reducing staff workloads using technology to achieve autonomous or semi-autonomous operations, demonstrated by comprehensive testing and validation activities. These operations will require both software and hardware platforms during the design and testing phases. While simulations are useful during the design phase, their performance can significantly deviate during actual deployment on hardware. This report presents the outcomes of a collaborative technical initiative between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Microreactor Program (MRP) and Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (ASI) Program. The collaboration utilized the Microreactor Automated Control System (MACS) hardware platform to bridge the gap between theoretical reactor design and actual startup and control operations. Two key use cases were investigated: facilitating the startup testing period and demonstrating supervisory control. The first use case details the key Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) reactor startup physics testing activities conducted using the MACS platform. These activities included drum worth measurements, shutdown margin assessment, temperature feedback analysis, and scram time evaluation, as well as unique testing that would apply to the MARVEL reactor to demonstrate the testing methodologies in a low-risk environment. The MACS platform, serving as a surrogate representation of the MARVEL reactor, proved instrumental in performing these tests. The exercise revealed aspects that led to optimized processes, refined hardware design, and enhanced base software capabilities. By maturing methods and technologies in this manner, the initiative promises to reduce wasted time in the actual on-site reactor deployment effort, thereby saving significant time and resources. The second use case focuses on the development and implementation of supervisory control methods aimed at managing core tilt, which can result from asymmetrical operations or manufacturing imperfections in fuel rods or reactivity control devices. A key objective was to assess and compare the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for supervisory control. The effort aimed to define the role of supervisory control to enhance performance without risking control instability. This effort explored three distinct approaches: rules-based (RB) methods, optimization techniques, and reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms. Each approach was evaluated for its ease of implementation, its usability, and its effectiveness in responding to asymmetries in neutron flux. Comparative analysis of these approaches provided valuable insights into their applicability and effectiveness, offering a robust framework for advanced reactor operations. Together, these two use cases highlight the potential of hardware test beds to help streamline the design, operation, and control of advanced nuclear reactors. This collaborative effort underscores the importance of continued innovation and experimentation in achieving the next generation of safe, reliable, and economically viable nuclear energy solutions.

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DOE OSTI2024

FY24 Advancements in PFLOTRAN Development for GDSA Framework

The Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the Office of Spent Fuel & Waste Disposition of U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is conducting research and development on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). This report describes fiscal year 2024 accomplishments in the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) PFLOTRAN Development work package, which is charged with developing subsurface simulation software for postclosure performance assessment of deep geologic disposal of SNF and HLW.

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DOE OSTI2021

FY2021 Long-Term PCT of ILAW Glasses

Approximately 54 to 56 million gallons of radioactive waste is currently stored in underground tanks at The United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford site in the State of Washington. The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) will provide DOE’s Office of River Protection (ORP) with a means of treating this waste by vitrification for subsequent disposal. The tank waste will be separated into low- and high-activity waste fractions, which will then be vitrified respectively into Immobilized Low Activity Waste (ILAW) and Immobilized High Level Waste (IHLW) products. The ILAW product will be disposed in a near-surface engineered facility – the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) – on the Hanford site, while the IHLW product is designed for deep geological disposal in a national facility for high-level nuclear waste. The ILAW and IHLW products must meet a variety of requirements with respect to protection of the environment before they can be accepted for disposal. The objective of the work described in this report is to perform testing, data collection, and analyses for the ILAW glass product for subsequent use in the performance assessment (PA) of the IDF to assess potential environmental risks associated with long-term storage.

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