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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 145 records · Page 8
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1996

Decision Making In A High-Tech World: Automation Bias and Countermeasures

Automated decision aids and decision support systems have become essential tools in many high-tech environments. In aviation, for example, flight management systems computers not only fly the aircraft, but also calculate fuel efficient paths, detect and diagnose system malfunctions and abnormalities, and recommend or carry out decisions. Air Traffic Controllers will soon be utilizing decision support tools to help them predict and detect potential conflicts and to generate clearances. Other fields as disparate as nuclear power plants and medical diagnostics are similarly becoming more and more automated. Ideally, the combination of human decision maker and automated decision aid should result in a high-performing team, maximizing the advantages of additional cognitive and observational power in the decision-making process. In reality, however, the presence of these aids often short-circuits the way that even very experienced decision makers have traditionally handled tasks and made decisions, and introduces opportunities for new decision heuristics and biases. Results of recent research investigating the use of automated aids have indicated the presence of automation bias, that is, errors made when decision makers rely on automated cues as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing. Automation commission errors, i.e., errors made when decision makers inappropriately follow an automated directive, or automation omission errors, i.e., errors made when humans fail to take action or notice a problem because an automated aid fails to inform them, can result from this tendency. Evidence of the tendency to make automation-related omission and commission errors has been found in pilot self reports, in studies using pilots in flight simulations, and in non-flight decision making contexts with student samples. Considerable research has found that increasing social accountability can successfully ameliorate a broad array of cognitive biases and resultant errors. To what extent these effects generalize to performance situations is not yet empirically established. The two studies to be presented represent concurrent efforts, with student and professional pilot samples, to determine the effects of accountability pressures on automation bias and on the verification of the accurate functioning of automated aids. Students (Experiment 1) and commercial pilots (Experiment 2) performed simulated flight tasks using automated aids. In both studies, participants who perceived themselves as accountable for their strategies of interaction with the automation were significantly more likely to verify its correctness, and committed significantly fewer automation-related errors than those who did not report this perception.

Mosier, Kathleen L.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Determining Aircraft Moments of Inertia from Flight Test Data

Flight test maneuver design and dynamic modeling techniques were developed for determining aircraft moments of inertia from flight test data. Full nonlinear rigid-body rotational equations of motion were used in the analysis, with aerodynamic moment dependencies modeled by linear expansions in the aircraft states and controls. Aerodynamic parameters were estimated simultaneously with inertia parameters using equation-error modeling applied to flight test data from maneuvers designed specifically for this problem. The approach was demonstrated using a nonlinear F 16 simulation, then applied to a remotely piloted subscale aircraft flight test. Errors in the aircraft moment of inertia parameters determined from simulated F-16 flight test maneuver data were less than 6 percent compared to the true values in the simulation. Flight test results for the subscale aircraft were within 6 percent of ground-test values obtained using the same aircraft.

Aircraft Moments of Inertia↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Determining Aircraft Moments of Inertia from Flight Test Data

Flight test maneuver design and dynamic modeling techniques were developed for determining aircraft moments of inertia from flight test data. Full nonlinear rigid-body rotational equations of motion were used in the analysis, with aerodynamic moment dependencies modeled by linear expansions in the aircraft states and controls. Aerodynamic parameters were estimated simultaneously with inertia parameters using equation-error modeling applied to flight test data from maneuvers designed specifically for this problem. The approach was demonstrated using a nonlinear F-16 simulation, then applied to a remotely-piloted subscale aircraft flight test. Errors in the aircraft moment of inertia parameters determined from simulated F-16 flight test maneuver data were less than 6 percent compared to the true values in the simulation. Flight test results for the subscale aircraft were within 6 percent of ground-test values obtained using the same aircraft.

moments of inertia↗
NASA NTRS2021

Determining Aircraft Moments of Inertia from Flight Test Data

Flight test maneuvers and dynamic modeling techniques were developed for determining aircraft moments of inertia from flight test data. Full nonlinear rigid-body rotational equations of motion were used in the analysis, with aerodynamic moment dependencies modeled by linear expansions in the aircraft states and controls. Aerodynamic parameters were estimated simultaneously with inertia parameters using equation-error modeling applied to flight test data from maneuvers designed specifically for this problem. The approach was demonstrated using a nonlinear F 16 simulation, then applied to a remotely-piloted subscale aircraft flight test. Errors in the aircraft moment of inertia parameters determined from simulated F-16 flight test data were less than 6 percent compared to the true values in the simulation. Flight test results for the subscale aircraft were within 6 percent of ground-test values obtained using the same aircraft.

Parameter estimation↗
NASA NTRS1981

A general aviation simulator evaluation of a rate-enhanced instrument landing system display

A piloted-simulation study was conducted to evaluate the effect on instrument landing system tracking performance of integrating localizer-error rate with raw localizer and glide-slope error. The display was named the pseudocommand tracking indicator (PCTI) because it provides an indication of the change of heading required to track the localizer center line. Eight instrument-rated pilots each flew five instrument approaches with the PCTI and five instrument approaches with a conventional course deviation indicator. The results show good overall pilot acceptance of the display, a significant improvement in localizer tracking error, and no significant changes in glide-slope tracking error or pilot workload.

Hinton, D. A.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Takeoff Performance Monitoring System display options

The development of displays for the Takeoff Performance Monitoring System (TPMS) is described with attention given to the three concepts prepared for commercial applications. The TPMS algorithm is described and related to the display requirements for pilots of two-engine airplanes. Head-up and -down displays are considered for displaying the simple advisory data which indicate whether the takeoff is a 'Go' or 'No-go' based on engine failure, acceleration error, and runway length. Six pilots are shown the three display options which include: (1) basic information; (2) basic data with 'Go/No-go' advisory flags; and (3) basic data, advisory flags, and an abort-warning symbol. The pilots tended to select the option with the most advisory data available, but the inconclusive preference study led to the concept of presenting all three configurations as possible display options for the TPMS.

Middleton, David B.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Using Computational Cognitive Modeling to Diagnose Possible Sources of Aviation Error

We present a computational model of a closed-loop, pilot-aircraft-visual scene-taxiway system created to shed light on possible sources of taxi error. Creating the cognitive aspects of the model using ACT-R required us to conduct studies with subject matter experts to identify experiential adaptations pilots bring to taxiing. Five decision strategies were found, ranging from cognitively-intensive but precise, to fast, frugal but robust. We provide evidence for the model by comparing its behavior to a NASA Ames Research Center simulation of Chicago O'Hare surface operations. Decision horizons were highly variable; the model selected the most accurate strategy given time available. We found a signature in the simulation data of the use of globally robust heuristics to cope with short decision horizons as revealed by errors occurring most frequently at atypical taxiway geometries or clearance routes. These data provided empirical support for the model.

Pilots↗
NASA NTRS1990

Procedural error monitoring and smart checklists

Human beings make and usually detect errors routinely. The same mental processes that allow humans to cope with novel problems can also lead to error. Bill Rouse has argued that errors are not inherently bad but their consequences may be. He proposes the development of error-tolerant systems that detect errors and take steps to prevent the consequences of the error from occurring. Research should be done on self and automatic detection of random and unanticipated errors. For self detection, displays should be developed that make the consequences of errors immediately apparent. For example, electronic map displays graphically show the consequences of horizontal flight plan entry errors. Vertical profile displays should be developed to make apparent vertical flight planning errors. Other concepts such as energy circles could also help the crew detect gross flight planning errors. For automatic detection, systems should be developed that can track pilot activity, infer pilot intent and inform the crew of potential errors before their consequences are realized. Systems that perform a reasonableness check on flight plan modifications by checking route length and magnitude of course changes are simple examples. Another example would be a system that checked the aircraft's planned altitude against a data base of world terrain elevations. Information is given in viewgraph form.

Palmer, Everett↗
NASA NTRS1998

Cockpit Interruptions and Distractions: Effective Management Requires a Careful Balancing Act

Managing several tasks concurrently is an everyday part of cockpit operations. For the most part, crews handle concurrent task demands efficiently, yet crew preoccupation with one task to the detriment of performing other tasks is one of the more common forms of error in the cockpit. Most pilots are familiar with the December 1972 L1011 crash that occurred when the crew became preoccupied with a landing gear light malfunction and failed to notice that someone had inadvertently bumped off the autopilot. More recently a DC-9 landed gear-up in Houston when the crew, preoccupied with an stabilized approach, failed to recognize that the gear was not down because they had not switched the hydraulic pumps to high. We have recently started a research project to study why crews are vulnerable to these sorts of errors. As part of that project we reviewed NTSB reports of accidents attributed to crew error; we concluded that nearly half of these accidents involved lapses of attention associated with interruptions, distractions, or preoccupation with one task to the exclusion of another task. We have also analyzed 107 ASRS reports involving competing tasks; we present here some of our conclusions from those ASRS reports. These 107 reports involved 21 different types of routine tasks crews neglected at a critical moment while attending to another task. Sixty-nine percent of the neglected tasks involved either failure to monitor the current status or position of the aircraft or failure to monitor the actions of the pilot flying or taxiing. Thirty-four different types of competing activities distracted or preoccupied the pilots. Ninety percent of these competing activities fell into one of four broad categories: communication (e.g., discussion among crew or radio communication), heads-down work (e.g., programming the FMS or reviewing approach plates), responding to abnormals, or searching for VMC traffic. We will discuss examples of each of these four categories and suggest things crews can do to reduce their vulnerability to these and similar situations.

Dismukes, R. K.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Error, stress, and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross sectional surveys

OBJECTIVES: To survey operating theatre and intensive care unit staff about attitudes concerning error, stress, and teamwork and to compare these attitudes with those of airline cockpit crew. DESIGN:: Cross sectional surveys. SETTING:: Urban teaching and non-teaching hospitals in the United States, Israel, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. Major airlines around the world. PARTICIPANTS:: 1033 doctors, nurses, fellows, and residents working in operating theatres and intensive care units and over 30 000 cockpit crew members (captains, first officers, and second officers). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES:: Perceptions of error, stress, and teamwork. RESULTS:: Pilots were least likely to deny the effects of fatigue on performance (26% v 70% of consultant surgeons and 47% of consultant anaesthetists). Most pilots (97%) and intensive care staff (94%) rejected steep hierarchies (in which senior team members are not open to input from junior members), but only 55% of consultant surgeons rejected such hierarchies. High levels of teamwork with consultant surgeons were reported by 73% of surgical residents, 64% of consultant surgeons, 39% of anaesthesia consultants, 28% of surgical nurses, 25% of anaesthetic nurses, and 10% of anaesthetic residents. Only a third of staff reported that errors are handled appropriately at their hospital. A third of intensive care staff did not acknowledge that they make errors. Over half of intensive care staff reported that they find it difficult to discuss mistakes. CONCLUSIONS: Medical staff reported that error is important but difficult to discuss and not handled well in their hospital. Barriers to discussing error are more important since medical staff seem to deny the effect of stress and fatigue on performance. Further problems include differing perceptions of teamwork among team members and reluctance of senior theatre staff to accept input from junior members.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS2018

San Francisco Bar Pilot Fatigue Study

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the extent of fatigue among San Francisco Bar Pilots (Maritime Pilots) and its potential impact on safety, and to make recommendations concerning how the risk of fatigue could be managed. Information was gathered via a literature review, observations of Bar Pilots at work, surveys, a task analysis, and an analysis of dispatch records.The work of San Francisco Bar Pilots involves an unusual mix of activities and job demands. Their work calls for situational awareness, reasoning, communication, and perceptual abilities comparable to those required by airline pilots and air traffic controllers. Errors can have severe consequences for public safety and the environment, as well as significant financial costs. Fatigue is increasingly recognized as a hazard that must be managed by the transportation industry. The reduced sleep quality and quantity experienced by personnel who work at night, in conjunction with human circadian rhythms can lead to an operationally significant level of cognitive impairment. The cognitive impact of fatigue includes functions that are critical to safe maritime piloting, such as vigilance, judgment, reaction time and communication. The surveys distributed to Bar Pilots did not uncover evidence of widespread fatigue. The survey results also suggested that fatigue was not a major concern of Bar Pilots. Bar Pilots had overall low scores on the subjective fatigue measures used in the survey, and generally assessed the safety risk due to fatigue as low. Compared to air traffic controllers, Bar Pilots gave significantly lower ratings on questions concerning the prevalence and impact of fatigue. The application of fatigue modeling software to Bar Pilot dispatch records identified that in most cases, pilot's cognitive effectiveness was predicted to be acceptable during their duty periods. However, these results could not be verified with objective data.The study identified a number of fatigue issues that deserve attention. These include Bar Pilot work periods that frequently infringe on the circadian low, consecutive work periods without a significant break, consecutive periods of night work, unpredictable work schedules, start time variability, the potential for sleep inertia, and the number of pilots on the board at any given time.

fatigue↗
NASA NTRS2007

Safety Performance of Airborne Separation: Preliminary Baseline Testing

The Safety Performance of Airborne Separation (SPAS) study is a suite of Monte Carlo simulation experiments designed to analyze and quantify safety behavior of airborne separation. This paper presents results of preliminary baseline testing. The preliminary baseline scenario is designed to be very challenging, consisting of randomized routes in generic high-density airspace in which all aircraft are constrained to the same flight level. Sustained traffic density is varied from approximately 3 to 15 aircraft per 10,000 square miles, approximating up to about 5 times today s traffic density in a typical sector. Research at high traffic densities and at multiple flight levels are planned within the next two years. Basic safety metrics for aircraft separation are collected and analyzed. During the progression of experiments, various errors, uncertainties, delays, and other variables potentially impacting system safety will be incrementally introduced to analyze the effect on safety of the individual factors as well as their interaction and collective effect. In this paper we report the results of the first experiment that addresses the preliminary baseline condition tested over a range of traffic densities. Early results at five times the typical traffic density in today s NAS indicate that, under the assumptions of this study, airborne separation can be safely performed. In addition, we report on initial observations from an exploration of four additional factors tested at a single traffic density: broadcast surveillance signal interference, extent of intent sharing, pilot delay, and wind prediction error.

Consiglio, Maria C.↗
NASA NTRS1972

Congruent and spurious motion in the learning and performance of a compensatory tracking task.

Examination of the importance of congruent and spurious yaw motion in compensatory tracking by eight airline pilots. The pilots, seated erect in the Ames man-carrying rotation device(MCRD), tracked with k/s+1 and k/s(s+1) vehicle dynamics in fixed- and moving-base simulation. Following the learning phase of the experiment, five levels of spurious angular acceleration were superimposed on the motion of the MCRD. Learning of the tracking task was found to be a function of both vehicle dynamics and mode of simulation. The presence of congruent motion information reduced learningtime in k/s(s+1) vehicle dynamics and resulted in lower tracking error in both vehicle dynamics. The spurious angular accelerations resulted in an increase in pilot tracking error; however, the relationship between the magnitude of the acceleration and its effect was highly complex. The data suggest that the minimal disturbance level for spurious angular accelerations during tracking is below 0.4 degec.

Guercio, J. G.↗
NASA NTRS2015

How To Make the Most of Your Human: Design Considerations for Single Pilot Operations

Reconsidering the function allocation between automation and the pilot in the flight deck is the next step in improving aviation safety. The current allocation, based on who does what best, makes poor use of the pilot's resources and abilities. In some cases it may actually handicap pilots from performing their role. Improving pilot performance first lies in defining the role of the pilot - why a human is needed in the first place. The next step is allocating functions based on the needs of that role (rather than fitness), then using automation to target specific human weaknesses in performing that role. Examples are provided (some of which could be implemented in conventional cockpits now). Along the way, the definition of human error and the idea that eliminating/automating the pilot will reduce instances of human error will be challenged.

Schutte, Paul C.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Effects of higher order control systems on aircraft approach and landing longitudinal handling qualities

An investigation of approach and landing longitudinal flying qualities, based on data generated using a variable stability NT-33 aircraft combined with significant control system dynamics is described. An optimum pilot lead time for pitch tracking, flight path angle tracking, and combined pitch and flight path angle tracking tasks is determined from a closed loop simulation using integral squared error (ISE) as a performance measure. Pilot gain and lead time were varied in the closed loop simulation of the pilot and aircraft to obtain the best performance for different control system configurations. The results lead to the selection of an optimum lead time using ISE as a performance criterion. Using this value of optimum lead time, a correlation is then found between pilot rating and performance with changes in the control system and in the aircraft dynamics. It is also shown that pilot rating is closely related to pilot workload which, in turn, is related to the amount of lead which the pilot must generate to obtain satisfactory response. The results also indicate that the pilot may use pitch angle tracking for the approach task and then add flight path angle tracking for the flare and touchdown.

Pasha, M. A.↗
NASA NTRS1976

Evaluating a CRT map predictor for airborne use

Six airline pilots participated in a fixed-base simulator experiment designed to study the advantages and disadvantages of incorporating a simple horizontal flight-path predictor on both fixed and rotating electronic CRT map displays. The pilots were asked to fly a modified 'figure eight' ground track while attempting to maintain constant altitude. All flight information was displayed on one 17-in. (43-cm) CRT monitor. The controlled variables were the map orientation, pilots, presence or absence of crosswinds, presence or absence of wind gusts, and presence or absence of predictor. Error scores were recorded as deviations from the commanded ground track and altitude. It was found that the predictor reduced deviations from the commanded ground track, narrowed performance differences among pilots, narrowed the error differences found with and without crosswinds, and decreased pilot work load.

Baty, D. L.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Physics-based Simulation of Human Posture Using 3D Whole Body Scanning Technology for Astronaut Space Suit Evaluation

Over the past few years high precision three-dimensional (3D) full body laser scanners have been developed to be used as a powerful anthropometry tool for quantification of the morphology of the human body. The full body scanner can quickly extract body characteristics in non-contact fashion. It is required for the Anthropometry and Biomechanics Facility (ABF) to have capabilities for kinematics simulation of a digital human at various postures whereas the laser scanner only allows capturing a single static posture at each time. During this summer fellowship period a theoretical study has been conducted to estimate an arbitrary posture with a series of example postures through finite element (FE) approximation and found that four-point isoparametric FE approximation would result in reasonable maximum position errors less than 5%. Subsequent pilot scan experiments demonstrated that a bead marker with a nominal size of 6 mm could be used as a marker for digitizing 3-D coordinates of anatomical landmarks for further kinematic analysis. Two sessions of human subject testing were conducted for reconstruction of an arbitrary postures from a set of example postures for each joint motion for the forearm/hand complex and the whole upper extremity.

Kim, Kyu-Jung↗