Recommendations for Design-Stage Safety and Security Probabilistic Risk Assessment Co-Development
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Poster for ECRA poster session.
During future lunar missions, exposure to solar particle events (SPEs) is a major safety concern for crew members during extra-vehicular activities (EVAs) on the lunar surface or Earth-to-moon transit. NASA s new lunar program anticipates that up to 15% of crew time may be on EVA, with minimal radiation shielding. For the operational challenge to respond to events of unknown size and duration, a probabilistic risk assessment approach is essential for mission planning and design. Using the historical database of proton measurements during the past 5 solar cycles, a typical hazard function for SPE occurrence was defined using a non-homogeneous Poisson model as a function of time within a non-specific future solar cycle of 4000 days duration. Distributions ranging from the 5th to 95th percentile of particle fluences for a specified mission period were simulated. Organ doses corresponding to particle fluences at the median and at the 95th percentile for a specified mission period were assessed using NASA s baryon transport model, BRYNTRN. The cancer fatality risk for astronauts as functions of age, gender, and solar cycle activity were then analyzed. The probability of exceeding the NASA 30- day limit of blood forming organ (BFO) dose inside a typical spacecraft was calculated. Future work will involve using this probabilistic risk assessment approach to SPE forecasting, combined with a probabilistic approach to the radiobiological factors that contribute to the uncertainties in projecting cancer risks.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) has tasked PNNL to address the regulatory challenges associated with confirming the safe transport of Transportable Nuclear Power Plants (TNPPs) containing irradiated nuclear fuel. A previous report—Proposed Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework for Approval of Microreactor Transportation Packages (PNNL-31867)—determined that the expected radioactive inventory in the irradiated fuel of a TNPP would likely require shipment in an NRC-approved Type B package (or spent nuclear fuel cask) but that a TNPP “package” is unlikely to meet the entire suite of NRC requirements set forth in Part 71 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for a Type B package. It was therefore concluded that shipment of this initial TNPP transportation package, as well as possibly others, under existing regulations would likely require NRC approval using the 10 CFR 71.12 (“Specific exemptions”) process that relies on risk-informed decision making supported by quantitative risk assessment (i.e., Probabilistic Risk Assessment).
Historically, identifying resources to include in a medical system has been based on heuristically guided clinical subject matter expert assessment. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and tradespace analysis have the power to simplify and increase the fidelity of this traditional approach by providing initial risk estimates and system design solutions that fit within the specified constraints. This will be especially important as the increased mission complexity, distance from Earth, and duration of LDEMs is likely to drive an increase in mission medical risk. NASA’s Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces tool (IMPACT) is designed to do just that. IMPACT uses an evidence based medical database of conditions likely to affect LDEM outcomes and a PRA computational engine to estimate how medical conditions and included medical capabilities affect mission outcomes. We identified the 10 medical conditions with the largest effect on medical risks and determined what medical system capabilities affected risk reduction the greatest.
Accurate predictions of the health risks to astronauts from space radiation exposure are necessary for enabling future lunar and Mars missions. Space radiation consists of solar particle events (SPEs), comprised largely of medium energy protons, (less than 100 MeV); and galactic cosmic rays (GCR), which include protons and heavy ions of higher energies. While the expected frequency of SPEs is strongly influenced by the solar activity cycle, SPE occurrences themselves are random in nature. A solar modulation model has been developed for the temporal characterization of the GCR environment, which is represented by the deceleration potential, phi. The risk of radiation exposure from SPEs during extra-vehicular activities (EVAs) or in lightly shielded vehicles is a major concern for radiation protection, including determining the shielding and operational requirements for astronauts and hardware. To support the probabilistic risk assessment for EVAs, which would be up to 15% of crew time on lunar missions, we estimated the probability of SPE occurrence as a function of time within a solar cycle using a nonhomogeneous Poisson model to fit the historical database of measurements of protons with energy > 30 MeV, (phi)30. The resultant organ doses and dose equivalents, as well as effective whole body doses for acute and cancer risk estimations are analyzed for a conceptual habitat module and a lunar rover during defined space mission periods. This probabilistic approach to radiation risk assessment from SPE and GCR is in support of mission design and operational planning to manage radiation risks for space exploration.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is addressing the challenges associated with safe transport of microreactors including the development and evaluation of regulatory options. PNNL developed a risk-informed regulatory framework for the licensing of the transportation of microreactors in which irradiated nuclear fuel is part microreactor transportation package. The framework lays out a viable regulatory pathway, including decision points for regulatory options and the supporting technical evaluations for those options in phases from near to long term. A microreactor and its contents will likely not be able to meet all the federal regulatory requirements as a Type B or fissile material transportation package under 10 CFR Part 71 (“Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material”). However, the regulatory framework developed by PNNL lays out a viable risk-informed licensing options that are safe and feasible. Risk assessment such as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) can be used to show comparable safety to that provided by a Type B or fissile material package for surface transport. The framework includes guidance on applicable regulations and discusses historical precedence in using risk information for transportation licensing. The framework includes guidance for performing a microreactor transportation PRA, use and development of risk evaluation criteria, and factors such of defense-in-depth and safety margin concepts. Key advantages of using the approach are (1) increasing the likelihood of successfully obtaining regulatory transportation package approval, (2) informing the design on the relative risk significance of microreactor containment and shielding, and (3) informing the need for transportation compensatory measures. This paper focuses on two primary elements of the framework which are development of a transportation PRA for microreactor packages and development of the risk acceptance guidelines to assess the results of the PRA for regulatory decision-making.
A probabilistic methodology for evaluating failure risk, assessing service life, and establishing design parameters for structures subject to fatigue failure has been developed.
Advanced nuclear reactors are a promising option for aiding the world in achieving its net-zero carbon emission goals, however, there are significant challenges to attaining and maintaining economic competitiveness with other sources of electricity. To improve the economic competitiveness of advanced reactor designs, a project was initiated to explore the use of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) to guide asset-management decision-making during advanced reactor operation. MDPs are a powerful tool for optimizing decision-making in complex environments and their application to advanced reactors can aid in planning maintenance and repair activities to minimize downtime and maximize generation. The described approach expands on previous work regarding the use of MDPs for operational decision-making through the direct incorporation of real-time plant information. The integral MDP analysis includes information from online component diagnostic tools and the plant’s real-time generation risk assessment (GRA) and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which evaluate plant risk from both an economic and safety perspective. The result is an asset-management optimization framework that is based on real-time data regarding plant component status and the current best-estimate of plant risk. The paper presents an overview of the theoretical framework to incorporate the different information pathways into an integral MDP analysis, along with example analyses.
INTRODUCTION: Previous spaceflight experience and results from probabilistic risk assessment of spaceflight medical risk have highlighted the need for vital sign measurements, medical scopes, and clinical imaging tools for managing medical conditions during spaceflight. The Human Research Program’s Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element and the Mars Campaign Office’s Exploration Medical Integrated Product Team (XMIPT) have performed ground-based evaluations of two Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) Multi-functional Integrated Medical (MIM) devices, which integrate various medical capabilities together in one device. The key findings from these evaluations are presented in a complementary presentation, leaving this presentation to focus on forward recommendations for customized integration of multiple medical functionalities. KEY COMPONENTS: The key features of a custom integration of multiple medical functionalities includes devices and capabilities that optimally reduce medical risk. The COTS MIM devices incorporated functionality for best supporting Earth-based, emergency, pre-hospital care. Our custom integration will use probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as the Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT), to determine the optimal functionality to include based on medical risk minimization. An additional feature of custom integration includes the ability to adapt to different requirements within different vehicles and/or missions. The COTS MIM devices store data in patient specific records, however, the format of the records is not modifiable, and data are not easily transferred from the MIM device to a central data architecture outside of the manufacturer’s established system. Our concept for custom integration will use devices that have an open application programming interface, which can easily connect to independent data architectures and third-party visualization software. The ultrasound capabilities included within the COTS MIM devices did not satisfy many of the Artemis Research and Operations Working Group’s ultrasound functional needs, and therefore, incorporation of higher quality ultrasound capabilities within a customized integration will be beneficial. The COTS MIM devices included minimal procedural guidance and clinical decision support tools. Supplemental tools of this type would need to be supplied along with the COTS MIM devices if they were to be used operationally, so another advantage of customization is the ability to integrate these support tools along with the medical functionality, for a more streamlined user experience. CONCLUSION: Investigation of a customized integration of medical functionality provides a method for further understanding the needs of a long-term exploration spaceflight medical system. The crew members of these exploration missions will need to operate more and more independently from Earth-based ground support. Therefore, having an optimized, streamlined medical system, which contains the functionality and supporting information needed, while remaining within mission and vehicle constraints, will help to maintain crew health and performance, which is necessary for achieving high levels of mission success.
This report validates and documents the detailed features and practical application of the framework for software intensive digital systems risk assessment and risk-informed safety assurance presented in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and Practitioner. This framework, called herein the "Context-based Software Risk Model" (CSRM), enables the assessment of the contribution of software and software-intensive digital systems to overall system risk, in a manner which is entirely compatible and integrated with the format of a "standard" Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as currently documented and applied for NASA missions and applications. The CSRM also provides a risk-informed path and criteria for conducting organized and systematic digital system and software testing so that, within this risk-informed paradigm, the achievement of a quantitatively defined level of safety and mission success assurance may be targeted and demonstrated. The framework is based on the concept of context-dependent software risk scenarios and on the modeling of such scenarios via the use of traditional PRA techniques - i.e., event trees and fault trees - in combination with more advanced modeling devices such as the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) or other dynamic logic-modeling representations. The scenarios can be synthesized and quantified in a conditional logic and probabilistic formulation. The application of the CSRM method documented in this report refers to the MiniAERCam system designed and developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center.
A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach has been developed and applied to the risk analysis of capsule abort during ascent. The PRA is used to assist in the identification of modeling and simulation applications that can significantly impact the understanding of crew risk during this potentially dangerous maneuver. The PRA approach is also being used to identify the appropriate level of fidelity for the modeling of those critical failure modes. The Apollo launch escape system (LES) was chosen as a test problem for application of this approach. Failure modes that have been modeled and/or simulated to date include explosive overpressure-based failure, explosive fragment-based failure, land landing failures (range limits exceeded either near launch or Mode III trajectories ending on the African continent), capsule-booster re-contact during separation, and failure due to plume-induced instability. These failure modes have been investigated using analysis tools in a variety of technical disciplines at various levels of fidelity. The current paper focuses on the development and application of a blast overpressure model for the prediction of structural failure due to overpressure, including the application of high-fidelity analysis to predict near-field and headwinds effects.
How do you understand the data and assumptions in your probabilistic analysis? The PRA analyst needs to understand the data and input assumptions to effectively communicate the system/mission's risks. The decision maker also needs to understand conservatisms and how to interpret uncertainty in the PRA results. Properties such as assumptions on the distributions, uncertainty, use of test data, and common cause modeling can be the subject of much discussion, but often are the leading drivers of a risk profile.
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a method for assessing and integrating the risk of failure in a multivariate system. While it is often applied by engineers designing complex machines, it could also be applied to humans to assess the probability of a health “failure” treating diseases as the multiple “variables” and the human as the “complex machine.” The Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) was developed to apply PRA to assess medical risk for exploration spaceflight and inform the design of medical systems for space flight. The NASA engineering community utilizes event-driven and fault tree probabilistic techniques to classify risk in the space flight environment by leveraging the inherent knowledge of complex space flight system design and testing to quantify risk. However, in harmonizing the risk of human space flight, answering the question of “How do we balance astronaut health, performance and resource risks with other engineering risks on exploration space missions?” remains a profoundly challenging and largely qualitative practice. The Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) is one aspect of the Human Research Program’s efforts to represent space fight human health and performance risks quantitatively.
The emergence of model-based engineering, with Model- Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) leading the way, is transforming design and analysis methodologies. The recognized benefits to systems development include moving from document-centric information systems and document-centric project communication to a model-centric environment in which control of design changes in the life cycles is facilitated. In addition, a “single source of truth” about the system, that is up-to-date in all respects of the design, becomes the authoritative source of data and information about the system. This promotes consistency and efficiency in regard to integration of the system elements as the design emerges and thereby may further optimize the design. Therefore Reliability Engineers (REs) supporting NASA missions must be integrated into model-based engineering to ensure the outputs of their analyses are relevant and value-needed to the design, development, and operational processes for failure risks assessment and communication.
Human systems PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment: a) Provides quantitative measures of probability, consequence, and uncertainty; and b) Communicates risk and informs decision-making. Human health risks rated highest in ISS PRA are based on 1997 assessment of clinical events in analog operational settings. Much work remains to analyze remaining human health risks identified in Bioastronautics Roadmap.
NASA has a world-class capability for quantitatively assessing the risk of highly-complex, isolated engineering structures operated in extremely hostile environments. In particular, the International Space Station (ISS) represents a reasonable risk analog for High Pressure, High Temperature drilling and production operations on deepwater rigs. Through a long-term U.S. Government Interagency Agreement, BSEE has partnered with NASA to modify NASA's Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) capabilities for application to deepwater drilling and production operations. The immediate focus of the activity will be to modify NASA PRA Procedure Guides and Methodology Documents to make them applicable to the Oil &Gas Industry. The next step will be for NASA to produce a PRA for a critical drilling system component, such as a Blowout Preventer (BOP). Subsequent activities will be for NASA and industry partners to jointly develop increasingly complex PRA's that analyze other critical drilling and production system components, including both hardware and human reliability. In the presentation, NASA will provide the objectives, schedule, and current status of its PRA activities for BSEE. Additionally, NASA has a Space Act Agreement with Anadarko Petroleum Corporation to develop a PRA for a generic 20K BOP. NASA will summarize some of the preliminary insights gained to date from that 20K BOP PRA as an example of the distinction between quantitative versus qualitative risk assessment.
NASA has long used Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) when high-stakes decisions need to be made about complex systems. For spaceflight medical risk, the Human Research Program’s Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) is a significant step towards robustly quantifying the risk to crew health during exploration missions. However, there remains a significant gap in the ability to comprehensively characterize and assess risk across the disparate functionalities and capabilities which comprise the entire Crew Health and Performance (CHP) system. To fill this gap, the Crew Health and Performance – Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) project aims to perform risk characterization for the CHP system by assessing performance risk in addition to medical risk. This effort also includes quantifying Long-Term Health (LTH) risk in addition to in-mission risk outcomes within the CHP-PRA results. LTH risk encompasses the timeframe from immediately post-flight, through the rest of an astronaut’s career, through retirement, and until death. A proof-of-concept LTH risk metric is based on medical condition end-state, as defined by the Evidence Library, capturing the spaceflight specific medical impacts persisting into post-flight[1]. Condition outcomes in the Evidence Library progress through three Clinical Phases (CP): the diagnostic phase (CP1), the treatment/convalescent phase (CP2), and the end-state phase (CP3) which represents the detrimental effects of the condition after the crew member has recovered to the maximal extent. Each CP has an associated Task Impairment (TI), defined as the degree of crew incapacity due to experiencing the condition, and is quantified with a 0-1 range. Conditions with an associated CP3 (e.g. Sepsis, Traumatic Hypovolemic Shock, Sudden Cardiac Arrest, etc.) typically have serious consequences that can cause an astronaut to be fully or partially debilitated throughout the remainder of the mission. Consequently, the Cumulative CP3 TI End-of-Mission Health Status Metric is developed by CHP-PRA to quantify the cumulative effects of all conditions which progressed to the CP3 state throughout the entirety of the mission. Hence, this End-of-Mission Health Status Metric attempts to serve as an indicator of an astronaut’s health state at the time of landing. The severity of the lingering effects of in-mission medical events are dependent on mission activities and the level of available in-mission medical care. This allows the associated cumulative TI metric to be used in comparison with the crew’s end of mission health status for different levels of in-mission resources. This presentation provides the strategy for using CP3 as an LTH metric component, as well as a proof-of-concept demonstration of LTH risk characterization using this component.