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This document is a collection of writings concerning the application of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to the International Space Station (ISS), Space Shuttle, and X-38 vehicles. An overview of how GPS technology was applied is given for each vehicle, including rationale behind the integration architecture, and rationale governing the use (or non-use) of GPS data during flight.
Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training for aviation mechanics has become mandatory in many industrialized countries since 1998. Yet, to date, MRM training remains optional in the U.S. Interestingly, a similar safety discipline, namely Crew/Cockpit Resource Management (CRM), is mandatory for pilots, flight engineers, flight attendants, and dispatchers and is regulated in the Federal Aviation Administration s (FAA) Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). If MRM training is important to enhance aviation technicians working behavior, the rationale to not regulate it opens a window for study. This research aims to inductively investigate the FAA s regulatory rationale concerning MRM training based on direct inputs from the FAA s Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) members. Delphi methodology associated with purposive sampling technique was adopted. The result revealed that the FAA cannot regulate MRM because the aviation industry is strongly opposed to it due to the lack of training budgets, the need of a quantifiable cost-effect analysis, concern over the FAA s inspection workforce, an ongoing voluntary alternative called the Air Transportation Surveillance System (ATOS), the government s lower priority on maintenance after 9/11, and the airlines tight embracement of operational flexibility without regulation.
The Cassini mission to Saturn is complex with 12 science teams conducting distributed operations across the United States and Europe. Each Team includes scientists from around the world who actively participate in operations, including observation design, instrument commanding, downlink processing, and archiving. This represents a change in how JPL complex deep-space missions have been operated. Since Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI), the Cassini Project has spent 17 months conducting science operations and has gained real-world experience that has tested the assumptions and rationale for this approach. We have learned that many of the expected benefits have been realized, but there were numerous unexpected challenges as well. This paper will discuss the lessons learned from the Cassini Tour experience to date. It will revisit the assumptions and rationale behind the distributed instrument operations design and will describe the results, good and bad, of implementing this method of operations. We will describe how Instrument Teams are structured, their roles and responsibilities, what challenges they faced going into orbital operations (the 'tour') and what creative solutions were proposed when funding limitations and schedule milestones prevented optimum solutions. We will also discuss the problems that have been encountered both on the ground and with the instruments, how these problems and anomalies were overcome, and what was learned along the way about the characteristics of distributed instrument operations.
White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) was requested to perform ambient temperature hydrostatic pressurization testing of a Space Transportation System (STS) 40-in. Kevlar Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel (COPV). The 40-in. vessel was of the same design and approximate age as the STS Main Propulsion System (MPS) and Orbiter Maneuvering System (OMS) vessels. The NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) assembled a team of experts and conducted an assessment that involved a review of national Kevlar COPY data. During the review, the STS COPVs were found to be beyond their original certification of ten years. The team observed that the likelihood of STS COPV Stress rupture, a catastrophic burst before leak failure mode, was greater than previously believed. Consequently, a detailed assessment of remaining stress rupture life became necessary. Prior to STS-114, a certification deviation was written for two flights of OV-103 (Discovery) and OV-104 (Atlantis) per rationale that was based on an extensive review of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, COPV data, and revisions to the STS COPV stress levels. In order to obtain flight rationale to extend the certification deviation through the end of the Program, the Orbiter Project Office has directed an interagency COPV team to conduct further testing and analysis to investigate conservatism in the stress rupture model and evaluate material age degradation. Additional analysis of stress rupture life requires understanding the fiber stresses including stress that occurs due to thru-wall composite compression in COPV components. Data must be obtained at both zero gauge pressure (pre-stress) and at the component operating pressure so that this phenomenon can be properly evaluated. The zero gauge pressure stresses are predominantly a result of the autofrettage process used during vessel manufacture. Determining these pre-stresses and the constitutive behavior of the overwrap at pressure will provide necessary information to better predict the remaining life of the STS COPVs. The primary test objective is obtaining data to verify the hypothesis of a radially oriented thru-thickness stress-riser in the COPV composite whose magnitude is a function of the applied pressure and the load history. The anticipated load dependent response follows from the constitutive behavior of the composite overwrap so data to quantify its nonlinear and time dependent response will be sought. The objective of the Fiber Braggs Gratings (FBGs) were to advance the state-of-the-art by developing techniques using FBG sensors that are capable of assessing stress-rupture degradation in Kevlar COPVs in a health monitoring mode (1). Moreover, they sought to answer questions of how embedded sensors affect overall integrity of the structure. And lastly, they sought to provide an important link in the overall stress rupture study that will help close the loop on the COPV fabrication process. NDE inspection methods will be used from start to finish and FBG will be an integral link within the overall chain.
This document presents rationale for the frequency band selection, technical and operational characteristics of active spaceborne sensors in the Earth Exploration-Satellite Service (active), and interference assessment for a 1 MHz bandwidth sensor in the 100-150 MHz frequency range. The active spaceborne sensors expected to be operating in the frequency range of 100-150 MHz is the synthetic aperture radar (SAR) such as the MOSS. The technical characteristics, mission objectives, orbital parameters, design parameters, antenna characteristics, and preliminary interference assessment are given for MOSS. The purpose of the document is to provide rationale for the frequency band selection, technical characteristics of the active spaceborne sensor Microwave Observatory of Subsurface and Subcanopy (MOSS) that can be used to analyze the compatibility of active spaceborne sensors and other systems of 1 MHz bandwidth in the 100-150 MHz frequency band.
EUMETSAT launched the meteorological satellite MetOp-A in October 2006; it is the first of the three satellites that constitute the EUMETSAT Polar System (EPS) space segment. This satellite carries a challenging and innovative instrument, the GNSS Receiver for Atmospheric Sounding (GRAS). The goal of the GRAS instrument is to support the production of atmospheric profiles of temperature and humidity with high accuracy, in an operational context, based on the bending of the GPS signals traversing the atmosphere during the so-called occultation periods. One of the key aspects associated to the data processing of the GRAS instrument is the necessity to describe the satellite motion and GPS receiver clock behaviour with high accuracy and within very strict timeliness limitations. In addition to these severe requirements, the GRAS Product Processing Facility (PPF) must be integrated in the EPS core ground segment, which introduces additional complexity from the data integration and operational procedure points of view. This paper sets out the rationale for algorithm selection and the conclusions from operational experience. It describes in detail the rationale and conclusions derived from the selection and implementation of the algorithms leading to the final orbit determination requirements (0.1 mm/s in velocity and 1 ns in receiver clock error at 1 Hz). Then it describes the operational approach and extracts the ideas and conclusions derived from the operational experience.
Health effects of brief and prolonged exposure to carbon dioxide continue to be a concern for those of us who manage this pollutant in closed volumes, such as in spacecraft and submarines. In both examples, considerable resources are required to scrub the atmosphere to levels that are considered totally safe for maintenance of crew health and performance. Defining safe levels is not a simple task because of many confounding factors, including: lack of a robust database on human exposures, suspected significant variations in individual susceptibility, variations in the endpoints used to assess potentially adverse effects, the added effects of stress, and the fluid shifts associated with micro-gravity (astronauts only). In 2007 the National Research Council proposed revised Continuous Exposure Guidelines (CEGLs) and Emergency Exposure Guidelines (EEGLs) to the U.S. Navy. Similarly, in 2008 the NASA Toxicology Group, in cooperation with another subcommittee of the National Research Council, revised Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations (SMACs). In addition, a 1000-day exposure limit was set for long-duration spaceflights to celestial bodies. Herein we examine the rationale for the levels proposed to the U.S. Navy and compare this rationale with the one used by NASA to set its limits. We include a critical review of previous studies on the effects of exposure to carbon dioxide and attempt to dissect out the challenges associated with setting fully-defensible limits. We also describe recent experiences with management of carbon dioxide aboard the International Space Station with 13 persons aboard. This includes the tandem operations of the Russian Vozduk and the U.S. Carbon Dioxide Removal System. A third removal system is present while the station is docked to the Shuttle spacecraft, so our experience includes the lithium hydroxide system aboard Shuttle for the removal of carbon dioxide. We discuss strategies for highly-efficient, regenerable removal of carbon dioxide that could meet the 1000-day SMAC of 0.5%, which would apply to long-duration voyages to Mars.
Objective 1: Provide regulators with a methodology for development of airworthiness requirements for certification of UAS. a) Rationale: a comprehensive methodology does not currently exist to support development of regulation for certification of UAS. Regulation is essential to enable routine access to the NAS. b) Approach: 1) assess existing approaches and classification schemes for deriving acceptable means of compliance to airworthiness requirements. 2) investigate a service-based approach to classification of UAS. 3) conduct comparative analysis of different methodologies. 4) work with FAA to determine best approach and conduct case study. 5) participate in regulatory/standards organizations developing safety and performance requirements for UAS. Objective 2: Provide regulators and industry with hazard and risk-related data to support criteria for UAS type design. a) Rationale: There is presently little UAS specific data (incident, accident, and reliability), especially in a civil context, to support risk assessment and development of standards and regulation. b) Approach: Identify gaps in existing data, provide measured data as needed, and formulate recommendations by: 1) evaluating UAS incident/accident data collection efforts and determining additional support necessary for regulation. 2) assessing UAS-specific hazards and risks. 3) evaluating need for reliability data for UAS-unique systems, components and subsystem, and determining additional measurement requirements. 4) developing guidance and best practices for UAS type design.
This paper offers conceptual strategy and rationale for returning astronauts to the moon. NASA's historic Apollo program enabled humans to make the first expeditionary voyages to the moon and to gather and return samples back to the earth for further study. To continue exploration of the moon within the next ten to fifteen years, one possible mission concept for returning astronauts using existing launch vehicle infrastructure is presented. During these early lunar missions, expeditionary trips are made to geographical destinations and permanent outposts are established at the lunar south pole. As these missions continue, mining operations begin in an effort to learn how to live off the land. Over time, a burgeoning economy based on mining and scientific activity emerges with the formation of more accommodating settlements and surface infrastructure assets. As lunar activity advances, surface infrastructure assets grow and become more complex, lunar settlements and outposts are established across the globe, travel to and from the moon becomes common place, and commerce between earth and the moon develops and flourishes. Colonization and development of the moon is completed with the construction of underground cities and the establishment of a full range of political, religious, educational, and recreational institutions with a diverse population from all nations of the world. Finally, rationale for diversifying concentrations of humanity throughout earth's neighborhood and the greater solar system is presented.
Purpose: The Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element is one of six elements within NASA s Human Research Program (HRP) and is responsible for addressing the risk of "the inability to adequately recognize or treat an ill or injured crewmember" for exploration-class missions. The Near Earth Asteroid (NEA) Medical Conditions List, constructed by ExMC, is the first step in addressing the above-mentioned risk for the 13-month long NEA mission. The NEA mission is being designed by NASA's Human Space Flight Architecture Team (HAT). The purpose of the conditions list is to serve as an evidence-based foundation for determining which medical conditions could affect a crewmember during the NEA mission, which of those conditions would be of concern and require treatment, and for which conditions a gap in knowledge or technology development exists. This information is used to focus research efforts and technology development to ensure that the appropriate medical capabilities are available for exploration-class missions. Scope and Approach: The NEA Medical Conditions List is part of a broader Space Medicine Exploration Medical Conditions List (SMEMCL), which incorporates various exploration-class design reference missions (DRMs). The conditions list contains 85 medical conditions which could occur during space flight and which are derived from several sources: Long-Term Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH) in-flight occurrence data, The Space Shuttle (STS) Medical Checklist, The International Space Station (ISS) Medical Checklist, and subject matter expert opinion. Each medical condition listed has been assigned a clinical priority and a clinical priority rationale based on incidence, consequence, and mitigation capability. Implementation: The conditions list is a "living document" and as such, new conditions can be added to the list, and the priority of conditions on the list can be adjusted as the DRM changes, and as screening, diagnosis, or treatment capabilities change. The NEA medical conditions list was used recently as the basis for identifying gaps in in-flight medical evaluation (screening) capabilities. Learning Objectives: The audience will become familiar with the approach taken by NASA's Exploration Medical Capability element in addressing the risk of inability to recognize and treat medical conditions in the setting of a Near Earth Asteroid mission. Which one of the following statements is incorrect? a) The Near Earth Asteroid (NEA) medical conditions list includes 85 medical conditions which could occur during space flight. b) Each condition on the NEA medical conditions list has been assigned a clinical priority and a clinical priority rationale. c) The NEA medical conditions list targets a mission to Mars. d) The NEA medical conditions list should be viewed as a "living document" where new conditions can be added and clinical priorities adjusted to address changes in the design reference mission or medical capabilities. The incorrect answer is c). The NEA medical conditions list targets a mission to a Near Earth Asteroid.
An analysis was performed to identify the engineering rationale for the existing particulate limits in MSFC-SPEC-164, Cleanliness of Components for Use in Oxygen, Fuel, and Pneumatic Systems, determine the applicability of this rationale to fibers, identify potential risks that may result from fiber contamination in liquid oxygen/fuel bipropellant systems, and bound each of these risks. The objective of this analysis was to determine whether fiber contamination exceeding the established quantitative limits for particulate can be tolerated in these systems and, if so, to derive and recommend quantitative allocations for fibers beyond the limits established for other particulate. Knowledge gaps were identified that limit a complete understanding of the risk of promoted ignition from an accumulation of fibers in a gaseous oxygen system.
UltraSail is a next-generation, highrisk, high-payoff sail system for the launch, deployment, stabilization, and control of very large (km2 class) solar sails enabling high payload mass fractions for interplanetary and deep space spacecraft. UltraSail is a non-traditional approach to propulsion technology achieved by combining propulsion and control systems developed for formation- flying microsatellites with an innovative solar sail architecture to achieve controllable sail areas approaching 1 km2, sail subsystem area densities approaching 1 g/m2, and thrust levels many times those of ion thrusters used for comparable deep space missions. UltraSail can achieve outer planetary rendezvous, a deep-space capability now reserved for high-mass nuclear and chemical systems. There is a twofold rationale behind the UltraSail concept for advanced solar sail systems. The first is that sail-andboom systems are inherently size-limited. The boom mass must be kept small, and column buckling limits the boom length to a few hundred meters. By eliminating the boom, UltraSail not only offers larger sail area, but also lower areal density, allowing larger payloads and shorter mission transit times. The second rationale for UltraSail is that sail films present deployment handling difficulties as the film thickness approaches one micrometer. The square sail requires that the film be folded in two directions for launch, and similarly unfolded for deployment. The film is stressed at the intersection of two folds, and this stress varies inversely with the film thickness. This stress can cause the film to yield, forming a permanent crease, or worse, to perforate. By rolling the film as UltraSail does, creases are prevented. Because the film is so thin, the roll thickness is small. Dynamic structural analysis of UltraSail coupled with dynamic control analysis shows that the system can be designed to eliminate longitudinal torsional waves created while controlling the pitch of the blades, while using solar photon pressure to slew the spin axis. Vacuum tests have also verified that electrostatic and molecular adhesion forces can substantially be eliminated by making the film electrically conductive, reducing the peel force of the film off the storage roll to levels of 100s of micro-N. The innovation demonstrated the capability of deploying a six-micron aluminum- coated film from a reel through a slit in vacuum. The innovation also demonstrated a spin-stabilized method for deploying a long reel of solar sail film using solar pressure to spin-up and orbit raise the satellite, and also a gravity gradient method for deploying a long reel of solar sail film using solar pressure to orbit raise the satellite. The solar sail mass fraction of 25% is consistent with high specific impulse ion systems, but without the added weight and cost of a power source and processing unit. The large sail area, coupled with low film density, is giving UltraSail a high payload fraction. The UltraSail deployment scheme unrolls a micrometerscale reflection-coated polyimide film from a storage mandrel to a maximum length of several kilometers with the aid of a blade tip satellite.
This handbook is a companion to NPR 7120.5E, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements and supports the implementation of the requirements by which NASA formulates and implements space flight programs and projects. Its focus is on what the program or project manager needs to know to accomplish the mission, but it also contains guidance that enhances the understanding of the high-level procedural requirements. (See Appendix C for NPR 7120.5E requirements with rationale.) As such, it starts with the same basic concepts but provides context, rationale, guidance, and a greater depth of detail for the fundamental principles of program and project management. This handbook also explores some of the nuances and implications of applying the procedural requirements, for example, how the Agency Baseline Commitment agreement evolves over time as a program or project moves through its life cycle.
The 2015 Advanced Environmental Health/Advanced Food Technology (AEH/AFT) Standing Review Panel (from here on referred to as the SRP) met for a site visit in Houston, TX on December 14 - 15, 2015. The SRP met with representatives from the Space Human Factors and Habitability (SHFH) Element and members of the Human Research Program (HRP) to review the updated research plans for the Risk of Adverse Health Effects Due to Host-Microorganism Interactions (MicroHost Risk) and the Risk of Performance Decrement and Crew Illness due to an Inadequate Food System (Food Risk). During the meeting, the SRP also met with the vehicle engineers to discuss possible food storage options. The SRP would like to commend Dr. Oubre and Dr. Douglas for their detailed presentations, as well the frank, refreshing, and comprehensive engineering presentation. This gave much needed perspective to the food storage issues and reassured the committee about NASA's approach to the problem. In terms of critiques, the SRP remains unconvinced about the rationale for probiotic use other than for specific applications supported by the literature. It is not clear what gap or problem is being addressed by the use of probiotics, and the rationale for their use needs to be clearly rooted in the available literature. The SRP thinks that if low-Earth orbit is associated with immune system impairment, then there may additional risks linked with the use of probiotics. It is not clear to the SRP how NASA will determine if probiotics are having their intended beneficial effect. A similar concern is raised as to what gaps or problems are being addressed by "functional foods". Mixed infections, rather than single species infections, which can augment severity of disease, also represent a significant concern. Overall, the SRP considers this to be a strong program that is well-organized, well-coordinated and generates valuable data.
It has been well documented in the literature that contamination within oxygen systems can create significant fire hazards. Cleanliness limits for nonvolatile residues, ranging from 10 to 500 mg/sq m, have been established for various industries and types of oxygen systems to reduce the risk of ignition of flammable organic films. Particulate cleanliness limits used for oxygen systems vary considerably. Maximum allowed particle size, quantity limits, and allocations for fibers or metallic particles are all variables seen in aerospace cleanliness limits. Particles are known to have the potential to ignite within oxygen systems and must be limited to prevent fires. Particulate contamination may also pose risks to the performance of oxygen systems that are unrelated to ignition hazards. An extensive literature search was performed to better understand the relative importance of particle ignition mechanisms versus other deleterious effects of particles on oxygen systems and to identify rationale for derivation of particulate cleanliness limits for specific systems. The identified risks of different types and sizes of particles and fibers were analyzed. This paper summarizes the risks identified and rationale that may be used to derive particulate cleanliness limits for specific oxygen systems.
It has been well documented in the literature that contamination within oxygen systems can create significant fire hazards. Cleanliness limits for nonvolatile residues, ranging from 10 to 500 milligrams per square meter, have been established for various industries and types of oxygen systems to reduce the risk of ignition of flammable organic films. Particulate cleanliness limits used for oxygen systems, however, vary considerably, notably within the aerospace industry. Maximum allowed particle size, quantity limits, and allocations for fibers or metallic particles are all variables seen in aerospace cleanliness limits. Particles are known to have the potential to ignite within oxygen systems and must be limited to prevent fires. Particulate contamination may also pose risks to the performance of oxygen systems that are unrelated to ignition hazards. An extensive literature search was performed to better understand the relative importance of particle ignition mechanisms versus other deleterious effects of particles on oxygen systems and to identify rationale for derivation of particulate cleanliness limits for specific systems. The identified risks of different types and sizes of particles and fibers were analyzed. This paper summarizes the risks identified and rationale that may be used to derive particulate cleanliness limits for specific oxygen systems.
It is possible to use a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) to transport data and/or commanding from one end-point to another end-point where DTN is not used. This implies that at least one or the other end-point is sending and receiving as a non-DTN node. It also implies that at least one intermediate node prior to the non-DTN node has a Convergence Layer Adapter (CLA) or application which supports appropriate protocols. This is the basic concept of Rationale, Scenarios, and Requirements for DTN in Space, section 4.2.2.6.3: An application on the last hop relay node may extract TeleCommands(TCs) from an immediate or delayed TC file and radiate them as TCs to their destination (typically orbiter to lander); Rationale: Such an application could be used to support low-level commanding in case the destination spacecraft’s network layer is not functioning properly.
The Cassini mission to Saturn is complex with 12 science teams conducting distributed operations across the United States and Europe. Each Team includes scientists from around the world who actively participate in operations, including observation design, instrument commanding, downlink processing, and archiving. This represents a change in how JPL complex deep-space missions have been operated. Since Saturn Orbit Insertion (SOI), the Cassini Project has spent 17 months conducting science operations and has gained realworld experience that has tested the assumptions and rationale for this approach. We have learned that many of the expected benefits have been realized, but there were numerous unexpected challenges as well. This paper will discuss the lessons learned from the Cassini Tour experience to date. It will revisit the assumptions and rationale behind the distributed instrument operations design and will describe the results, good and bad, of implementing this method of operations. We will describe how Instrument Teams are structured, their roles and responsibilities, what challenges they faced going into orbital operations (the “tour”) and what creative solutions were proposed when funding limitations and schedule milestones prevented optimum solutions. We will also discuss the problems that have been encountered both on the ground and with the instruments, how these problems and anomalies were overcome, and what was learned along the way about the characteristics of distributed instrument operations.