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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Performance Evaluation of Intelligent Solar Control Software Through Hardware-in-the-Loop (CRADA Final Report)

Recent research has highlighted the potential for solar to act as a zero-marginal-cost and zero-emission flexibility resource on the bulk power system when operated with advanced control systems. To increase the performance of these systems, leading technologies, including machine learning (ML) and hierarchical inverter set point allocation, have been developed by Latimer Controls, Inc. to estimate the headroom of large PV plants for grid operation and control; however, these technologies lack comprehensive validation under real-world application scenarios. Latimer Controls, Inc. received two voucher awards for research at a national laboratory from the Department of Energy American Made Solar Prize Round 6. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) was selected to collaborate with Latimer staff to conduct a performance evaluation of Latimer PV control software. The NREL team will develop a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed to perform testing and validation of the Latimer PV control technology in a de-risked yet realistic testbed environment. Latimer and NREL worked together to analyze the test data, draw conclusions from the results, and disseminate the resulting scientific findings. In this CRADA work, we propose to test and validate the real-world application of the Latimer Control solution in an HIL environment. We evaluate the performance of different flexible solar technologies in responding to automatic generation control signals in a closed-loop fashion. In particular, a data-driven potential high limit (PHL) estimation is developed for large solar plants to accurately estimate their headroom so that they have fast and short-time regulation and control capability to participate in grid services and respond to grid signals in real time (e.g., AGC). This PHL estimation algorithm is embedded in a hardware power plant controller (PPC) and tested with an IEEE-39 bus system model developed in RTDS. To account for the varying cloud conditions and diverse inverter dispatches, we developed a 135-MW PV plant with detailed modeling of 27 individual PV modules and inverters using RTDS. The real-world communications used in such big plants, such as ModBus TCP/IP for inverter level and DNP3 for plant level, were developed to emulate the real-world applications in big PV plants. The ML-based PHL estimation method is tested under nine separate weather scenarios against the ‘reference-control’ solution, hereafter referred to as the baseline solution. The baseline method reserves a subset of inverters (reference group) to operate at their PHL at all times and dispatches only the remaining inverters (control group) at curtailed levels to fulfill the flexibility need. Despite being successfully piloted by NREL in California in 2017 and Chile in 2020, there exist two gaps in the state of the art to fully unlock the flexibility of PV plants: a. There is a trade-off between the PHL estimation accuracy and the flexibility range. b. There lacks granularity in the PHL estimation to capture the variation across inverters. The Latimer solution seeks to address these gaps by applying machine learning methods to improve PHL estimation accuracy while accounting for variability at every inverter. Performance metrics were taken from the 2023 Georgia Power CARES utility-scale RFP. The results demonstrate that the ML-based approach outperforms the traditional baseline method in PHL estimation accuracy for 7 of 9 scenarios. The average PHL error across the nine scenarios was 7.40% for the ML-based method, 2.06% less than the 9.46% PHL error average across scenarios that was exhibited by the baseline method. Additionally, the PHL error was below 5% for at least 95% of the testing interval for 3 of 9 tested intervals with the ML approach, whereas it did not achieve this metric for any of the baseline tests. Overall, simulation results indicate the superior performance of an ML-based approach compared to the conventional baseline reference-control approach, showcasing its potential to support grid stability and operational efficiency. This laboratory HIL testing using real PPC, representative power system simulation models in real-time with detailed PV plant and inverter models, and real-world communication protocols gives us confidence that this machine learning based PHL estimation algorithm works well in the hardware PPC and therefore de-risks future field commissioning. The end goal of this project is to advance grid technology to address the grid operation challenges brought by solar plant’s variability and uncertainties in power generation.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Advancing How We Learn from Biodesign to Mitigate Risks with Next-Generation Genome Engineering

In the last decade, the unprecedented simplicity and flexibility of the CRISPR-Cas system has made it the dominant transformative tool in gene and genome editing. However, this democratized technology is both a boon and a bane, for which we have yet to understand the full potential to investigate and rewrite genomes (also named “genome biodesign”). Rapid CRISPR advances in a range of applications in basic research, agriculture, and clinical applications pose new risks and raise several biosecurity concerns. In such a fast-moving field of research, we emphasize the importance of properly communicating the quality and accuracy of results and recommend new reporting requirements for results derived from next-generation genome engineering.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Large Load Integration - Task List and Overview

Large Load Integration Tasks: Task 1 – Workshops Support stakeholder engagement across industry to promote collaboration and identify solutions to challenges that will guide other work Task 2 – Ancillary Services Characterize different types of large loads to assess under what conditions they may be utilized to provide grid stability services Task 3 – Communications Explore the cybersecurity and communications infrastructure required to enable large loads to interface with grid operations to provide ancillary services Task 4 – Nuclear Integration Explore risks and methods for supporting large load energy needs with SMRs and incorporating them into the wider power system Task 5 – Decision Support and TA Provide support to stakeholders through the creation of planning tools and direct technical assistance.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems may become more widely deployed throughout the country, and so it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity of the facility, and the company that owns the facility. The two main ways bad actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when companies conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks associated with a generic hydrogen storage system by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2023

Analyzing Insider Risk Threat to the Internet of Things (IoT)

Recent technological advancement has created a growing convergence of innovation. From machine learning to ubiquitous computing to wireless networks and automation, the world is seeing new technology increasingly capable of connecting with each other. Devices and systems use open communications networks to interact, process information, and react. This is called the Internet of Things (IoT) and is comprised of physical devices that exchange data over networks, creating revolutionary possibilities. The most common way most people interact with an IoT is through ‘smart home’ products like Amazon’s Alexa, which use microphones, speakers, and phones to control a variety of devices, from lights and thermostats, to cameras, to appliances and vacuum cleaners. But the open nature of IoT networks—necessary for their ability to communicate and operate—also introduces privacy and security concerns. At a personal level, this might mean a hack into a home to steal private information, but when applied in broader industries like healthcare, transportation, manufacturing, or the military, this vulnerability can have serious consequences. As IoT usage and interconnectivity increases, so too does the susceptibility to malicious actors. And the entire system is only as secure as its least secure member. This creates particular risk and vulnerability to radiological material industries, as a competent insider adversary could utilize the IoT to potentially steal or access classified or sensitive information about employees, sites, or systems; or simply sabotage security or maintenance from a more remote—and less secure—device. The IoT relies on a secure network across the entire system, especially in transport which may lack the security of more permanent locations; if one device fails, it can create a ripple effect and an insider threat may seek to exploit that connectivity. While IoT benefits drive increased innovation and usage, there are also vulnerabilities an insider threat could exploit; this risk of an IoT to radiological material must be addressed in any mitigation effort.

Kinney, Justin↗
DOE OSTI2023

Influence of the irradiated pulmonary microenvironment on macrophage and T cell dynamics

The lung is sensitive to radiation, which increases the risk of normal tissue toxicity following radiation therapy. Adverse outcomes include pneumonitis and pulmonary fibrosis, which are thought to result from dysregulated intercellular communication within the pulmonary microenvironment. Macrophage accumulation in the lung following radiation exposure is implicated in these pathogenic outcomes. Here we investigate the role of the microenvironment in macrophage and T cell dynamics. Materials and methods C57Bl/6 mice received 6Gyx5 x-ray irradiation to the right lung. Macrophage and T cell dynamics were investigated in ipsilateral right lungs, contralateral left lungs and compared to those from non-irradiated control subjects at 4-26wk post exposure. Lungs were evaluated by flow cytometry, histology and proteomics. Results In uni-lung irradiated subjects, focal regions of macrophage accumulation were noted in both lungs by 8wk, however fibrotic lesions were observed only in ipsilateral lungs by 26wk. Both infiltrating and alveolar macrophages populations transiently expanded in both lungs, however a transitional CD11b+ alveolar macrophage population persisted only in ipsilateral lungs and expressed lower CD206. Concurrently, arginase-1+ macrophages were noted within areas of macrophage accumulation in ipsilateral but not contralateral lungs at 8 and 26wk post exposure, while CD206+ macrophages were absent from these accumulations. While CD8+ T cells were present in both lungs of irradiated subjects, T regulatory cells were only increased in ipsilateral lungs. Unbiased proteomics analysis of immune cells revealed a substantial number of differentially expressed proteins in ipsilateral lungs when compared to either contralateral or non-irradiated lungs, as well as between contralateral lungs from irradiated subjects and non-irradiated controls. Conclusions Pulmonary macrophage and T cell dynamics are impacted by the microenvironmental conditions that develop in the lung following radiation exposure, both locally and systemically. Our findings demonstrate that while macrophages and T cells infiltrate and expand in both lungs, they diverge phenotypically depending on their environment.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids: A Semi-Supervised Deep Learning Approach

The dependence on advanced information and communication technology increases the vulnerability in smart grids under cyber-attacks. Recent research on unobservable false data injection attacks (FDIAs) reveals the high risk of secure system operation, since these attacks can bypass current bad data detection mechanisms. To mitigate this risk, this paper proposes a data-driven learning-based algorithm for detecting unobservable FDIAs in distribution systems. We use autoencoders for efficient dimension reduction and feature extraction of measurement datasets. Further, we integrate the autoencoders into an advanced generative adversarial network (GAN) framework, which successfully detects anomalies under FDIAs by capturing the unconformity between abnormal and secure measurements. Also, considering that the datasets collected from practical power systems are partially labeled due to expensive labeling costs and missing labels, the proposed method only requires a few labeled measurement data in addition to unlabeled data for training. Numerical simulations in three-phase unbalanced IEEE 13-bus and 123-bus distribution systems validate the detection accuracy and efficiency of this method.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing Grid Communications Infrastructure: Addressing Gaps Beyond NERC CIP Facility Perimeters

The North American electric grid relies on a complex communications infrastructure that extends beyond facility perimeters traditionally covered by NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards. While CIP requirements have significantly strengthened cybersecurity within Electronic Security Perimeters, many operational communications—such as those between control centers, substations, and third-party networks—fall outside current regulatory scope. As grid modernization introduces new technologies and connectivity models, these external pathways present evolving security challenges. This brief explores the nature of these challenges, including emerging attack vectors and supply chain considerations, and highlights how ongoing grid transformation increases exposure to sophisticated threats. It outlines practical strategies and policy options to complement existing standards, such as expanding secure communications practices, enhancing supply chain transparency, and fostering collaboration among federal, state, and industry stakeholders. Near-term actions like encryption, authentication, and contractual safeguards can help reduce risk while longer-term frameworks are developed to ensure resilient and secure grid operations.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Hardware design and testing of the generic rear transition module for the global trigger subsystem of ATLAS Phase-II Upgrade

Abstract In the framework of the ATLAS experiment’s Phase-II Upgrade at the High-Luminosity Large Hadron Collider (HL-LHC), new and improved trigger hardware and algorithms will be implemented onto a single-level, 10 μs-latency architecture. The Global Trigger is a new subsystem which will bring event-filter capabilities by performing offline-like algorithms on full-granularity calorimeter data. The implementation of the functionality is firmware-focused and composed of several processing nodes, which are hosted on identical hardware, made up of an Advanced Telecommunications Computing Architecture (ATCA) front board, called Global Common Module (GCM), and a rear transition module (RTM), called Generic RTM (GRM). The GRM, which was developed to mitigate the risks deriving from the complex design and power management of the GCM, features an advanced Xilinx Versal Prime system-on-chip and can handle communication with the GCM and Front-End Link eXchange (FELIX) subsystem and trigger processors through 124 25.8 Gb/s transceiver links, for readout and control. Additionally, the GRM mounts a Low-Power GigaBit Transceiver (lpGBT) chip which enables emulation of the detector front-ends for integration tests. This paper presents the GRM hardware design and its testing.

Instruments & Instrumentation↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Design and Evaluation of Zero Trust Architecture for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: EVs @ Scale Series on EV Charging Station Cybersecurity

Implementing a zero trust architecture can significantly bolster the security of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. EV charging infrastructure includes numerous networked interfaces, each of which can present potential vulnerabilities. When these vulnerabilities are exploited, they can compromise the entire system, leading to severe operational and security risks. Zero trust is a security model that operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify," which helps manage the attack surface and limit the scope of any potential compromises. Fundamentally, this model ensures that no entity, whether inside or outside the network, is trusted by default. The design principles of zero trust include continuous verification, strict deny-by-default access controls, and micro-segmentation. Continuous verification ensures that every request is thoroughly checked, regardless of its origin. Strict access controls enforce the principle of least privilege, allowing users and devices only the minimum necessary access to perform their functions. Micro-segmentation involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments to prevent lateral movement in case of a breach. In the context of EV charging infrastructure, zero trust can be implemented through various strategies. For example, multi-factor authentication (MFA) can be required for engineers to access the management interfaces and control systems of charging stations. Real-time monitoring and analysis of network traffic can help detect and respond to anomalies. Systems that do not need to communicate with each other can be micro-segmented to enhance security. All communications should adhere to predefined policies to be permitted. Additionally, encrypting communications can protect sensitive information exchanged between chargers and management systems. This paper presents a zero trust architecture specifically designed for EV charging infrastructure. Implementing zero trust not only mitigates risks but also builds a resilient infrastructure capable of withstanding and quickly recovering from cyber threats. The architecture addresses six defined security objectives. A comprehensive test plan is developed to assess the architecture against these objectives, and the results of the evaluation are reported. This approach is essential for maintaining the reliability and integrity of EV charging services in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable digital landscape. This is the first in a planned series of papers exploring the implementation of zero trust in EV charging infrastructure. Each paper will delve into different aspects and applications of zero trust, highlighting how various work processes and requirements can lead to distinct architectural designs. These architectures will be tailored to address specific security challenges and operational needs within the EV charging ecosystem, ensuring a robust and adaptable security framework.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Case study of UAS ignition of prescribed fire in a mixedwood on the William B. Bankhead National Forest, Alabama

Abstract Background For at least four decades, practitioners have recognized advantages of aerial versus ground ignition for maximizing the effectiveness of prescribed fires. For example, larger areas can be ignited in less time, or ignition energy may be variously targeted over an area in accordance with the uneven distribution of fuels. The maturation of wireless communication, geopositioning systems, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has enhanced those advantages, and UAS approaches also provide further advantages relative to helicopter ignitions, such as reduced risk to human safety, lower operating costs, and higher operational flexibility. In a long running study at the Bankhead National Forest in northcentral Alabama, prescribed fire has been used for nearly 20 years. Most of the burns have been hand-ignited via drip torches, while some have been aerially ignited via helicopter. In March 2022, for the first time, a UAS was used to ignite prescribed fires across a landscape that included a long-term research stand. This field note relates comparisons of both fire behavior and fuel consumption metrics for the UAS-ignited burn versus previous burns on the same stand, and versus burns of other research stands in the same year. Results The UAS-ignited prescribed fire experienced burn effects similar to those from ground-ignited prescribed fires on the same stand in previous years, as well as those from ground-ignited prescribed fires on other stands in the same year. Conclusion This post hoc analysis suggests that UAS ignition approaches may be sufficient for achieving prescribed burn goals, thereby enabling practitioners to realize the advantages offered by that ignition mode.

Environmental Sciences & Ecology↗
DOE OSTI2026

Digital-Threat Bias and Psychological Distance: Barriers to Foundational Digital-Security Improvement

Modern life is held together by a web of digital dependencies that enable and provide delivery of critical services and functions—think the provision of utilities such as electricity and water, as well as our dependency on digital services for social and economic services (internet, communication, etc.). As this dependency grows, the complexity related to the delivery of these critical services increases as well. As complexity increases, the understanding of the risk and impact associated with potential disruption, degradation, or destruction—due to either malicious or non-malicious events of those digitally enabled functions—decreases. One potential explanation for the difficulty to 1) understand the risks faced and 2) address them appropriately and effectively is the abstractness and psychological distance assigned to “digital threat.” The complexity of these digitally enabled services creates a perceived complicatedness; as a result, digital threats are treated differently than similarly devasting (but more easily understood) kinetic or physical threats. How we categorize these threats also matters. Acts of cyber-enabled sabotage to critical infrastructure need to be defined as irregular warfare. By inadequately defining the threat, we compound the problem. Acknowledging this digital-threat bias is foundational to improving the ability to protect critical infrastructure. Using construal-level theory and psychological-distance concepts provides an intriguing starting point to address these issues, to reframe the challenges faced, and pursue more effective critical infrastructure security and defense policy.

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Systems and methods for detecting and mitigating cyber attacks on power systems comprising distributed energy resources

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cybersecurity attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and the generation-load balance. Investigations of the impact to the power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary show that each grid-support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The invention provides methods for minimizing the risks to distribution and transmission systems using an engineered control system which detects and mitigates unsafe control commands.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Systems and methods for detecting and mitigating cyber attacks on power systems comprising distributed energy resources

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) on power systems is increasing the power system cybersecurity attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid-support functions which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and the generation-load balance. Investigations of the impact to the power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary show that each grid-support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The invention provides methods for minimizing the risks to distribution and transmission systems using an engineered control system which detects and mitigates unsafe control commands.

Johnson, Jay Tillay↗
DOE OSTI2020

Lessons Learned from Demolition of Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 20507

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC), a Jacobs owned company, is making significant progress demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), which has long been known as one of the most hazardous buildings in the DOE Environmental Management Complex (DOE Complex). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut down in 1996, and material processing was completed in 2004. After approximately 25 years of demolition preparations, open-air demolition of the main portions of the Hazard Category II nuclear facility began in November 2016. To prepare the PFP for demolition, CHPRC employees performed some of the most hazardous work across the DOE Complex. In addition to extensive demolition preparations, including a wide-reaching communication strategy across the Hanford Site, CHPRC implemented robust controls and monitoring during demolition, and when necessary, adjusted demolition practices and sequence to maintain employee safety and project efficiency. Demolition of the main PFP building began in November 2016. The technical complexity, high hazards and radiological concerns have all led to a difficult demolition environment. Following a spread of contamination at the project site beyond the radiological boundaries in December 2017, work was halted and a recovery plan was generated to allow the demolition work to continue. After the implementation of additional controls and concurrence from regulatory agencies and DOE, the demolition was ready to resume work and reinitiated in August 2018. There are a number of lessons learned from the demolition activities and recovery plan process. This paper allows CHPRC and DoE's Richland Operations Office (RL) to share lessons learned and progress to date with other challenging and hazardous projects across the DOE Complex. Understanding the risk acceptance level is critical to execution of any open-air demolition project and is unique to each facility. Four key lessons learned from this project include: 1) plan execution issues, 2) stakeholder communication issues, 3) watching for summit fever and 4) minimizing exposed contaminated surfaces during demolition. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems are becoming more widely deployed throughout the country, and as their presence continues to grow, it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity, and to the company that owns the facility. The two main mechanisms malicious actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when facility managers conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks applicable to a wide variety of hydrogen storage systems by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2020

After the hurricane: Validating a resilience assessment methodology

With increasing utility grid outages in the United States, there is growing interest in assessing risk and developing mitigation strategies to reduce the impact of grid outages. Working with the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) developed a replicable energy resilience assessment methodology and investment decision tool to: (1) identify and score hazards and vulnerabilities at the site level; (2) analyze risks to energy infrastructure; and (3) identify and prioritize energy resilience investments. This work improves on existing resilience assessment methodologies and tools by combining a bottom-up, all-hazards assessment methodology with top-down geographic information system mapping capabilities to provide an innovative, dynamic tool for identifying and prioritizing actionable solutions. This process combines probabilistic forecasting with an iterative approach for continuously updating and reassessing risks to address temporal dynamism. Relationships among systems are modeled and visualized to estimate the effectiveness of resilience actions across multiple interdependent systems and inform financial priorities through cost-difficulty-impact trade-offs. The approach is validated in a case study at Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB) in Florida, which experienced a Category 5 hurricane in 2018. The risks and mitigation strategies identified pre-hurricane are compared with post-hurricane, realized impacts. The assessment effectively identifies risks and actions to increase site energy resilience, but the methodology can be enhanced though greater consideration of the interdependencies between the energy system and related systems like transportation, communication, and food/water systems, which impact the recovery of the energy system and the base.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗